Intraday Public Information: the French Evidence by Vukic, Alen et al.
  
 
Intraday Public Information: 
The French Evidence 
 
 
 
 
 
Thesis presented to the Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences 
at the University of Fribourg (Switzerland) to obtain the doctoral degree 
in Economics and Social Sciences 
 
 
 
 
by 
 
Alen Vukic 
from Balerna (TI) 
 
 
 
Accepted by the Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences 
on 13th January 2004 on the recommendation of 
 
Prof. Dr. Jacques Pasquier-Dorthe (First Advisor) 
and 
Prof. Dr. Martin Wallmeier (Second Advisor) 
 
 
 
 
Fribourg (Switzerland) 
2004 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
«The Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences at the University of Fribourg neither approves 
nor disapproves the opinions expressed in a doctoral dissertation. They are to be considered 
those of the author (decision of the Faculty Council of 23 January 1990).» 
  
 
“Those who don’t do anything never make a mistake” 
Théodore de Banville 
 
 
 
“The important thing is never to stop asking questions” 
Albert Einstein 
 
 
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
This thesis was started in 1999, when I was assistant to Prof. Jacques Pasquier-Dorthe, head 
of the Seminaire d‘Economie d‘Entreprise et de Gestion Financière (SEEGF) at the University of 
Fribourg, Switzerland. Prof. Pasquier-Dorthe is the first person to whom I would like to express 
my gratitude for having accepted to become my supervisor. His knowledge has been a constant 
fountain of inspiration and, what is equally important, he attaches great importance to the human 
relations within the SEEGF. His patience, his understanding, and his ability to grasp other 
people’s problems are some of his merits which I shall never forget. 
My thanks also go to Prof. M. Wallmeier for his willingness to act as second supervisory 
professor. He gave me useful advice and friendly encouragement. So did the other members of 
the Seminar, Sophie Gay Anger PhD, CFA, Michel Ruffa, Amos Poncini, Levon Babalyan and 
Florent Ledentu, all of whom I would like to thank for their support; in particular, Sophie Gay 
Anger, PhD, CFA made many helpful suggestions and provided constant encouragement. Of 
great assistance were my colleagues at the University and Dr. Curzio de Gottardi, who lent me 
moral and technical support, and who made it possible for me to work in a most pleasant 
environment. Dr Angelo Ranaldo, a former member of the SEEGF, merits particular 
acknowledgement. I can never thank him enough for the innumerable enlightening 
considerations, ideas, critical remarks, and for the time he spent on reading my thesis, always 
giving an objective judgment which allowed me to advance in my work, especially in view of his 
experience in the microstructure field. 
In 2000, I had the chance to participate in a course on microeconomics, during which I 
became acquainted with Prof. B. Schmidt, Prof. J.J. Laffont, Prof. J.C. Rochet and Prof. M. 
Dewatripont who gave me a solid background in microeconomics. Another important source of 
information were the lectures given by Prof. Deschamps, who holds the Chair of Econometrics.  
I am also extremely grateful to the Société de Bourse Française, in particular to Mr. B. Perrot, 
for giving me access to a great amount of useful data on the French Stock Exchange. 
In this type of research work, the moral support plays an essential role, and this was perfectly 
assumed by my companion Cristiana. She gave me the strength and confidence to continue even 
at times when the difficulties seemed overwhelming. Likewise I shall never forget the many hours 
passed in discussing my thesis with my faithful friends Massimo, Dario and Gabriele, with my 
sister Claudia and her friend Federico, and with Graziano and Aurelia, the parents of my 
companion. Graziano in particular encouraged my efforts by pointing out the importance of 
empirical research. Today I feel that he pushed me into the right direction. 
My very special thanks go to my father and mother who made it possible for me to continue 
the studies, and who lent me their continuing moral support. If I reach my goal, it is mainly due 
to that, and for this reason I would like to dedicate this doctoral thesis to them. 
 
 
 CONTENTS 
 
 
Acknowledgements V 
 
Contents VII 
 
List of abbreviations XI 
 
List of figures XV 
List of tables XVII 
 
INTRODUCTION 1 
 
0.1. The concept of microstructure 3 
 
0.2. Market structures 5 
 
0.3. The French Stock Exchange 6 
 
0.4. Intraday public information pattern 7 
 
0.5. The impact of public information on the Paris Bourse 8 
 
 
CHAPTER 1 MARKET STRUCTURES 9 
 
1.1. Abstract 11 
 
1.2. Introduction 13 
 
1.3. Historical background of stock exchanges 14 
 
1.4. Organization of financial markets 17 
 
1.4.1. The moment of the exchange 17 
 
1.4.1.1. The fixing market 17 
 
1.4.1.2. The continuous market 19 
 
1.4.2. The counterparts of the exchange 19 
 
1.4.2.1. Price-driven marke 19 
 
1.4.2.2. Order-driven market 21 
 
1.4.3. The location of the exchange 22 
 
1.4.3.1. Centralized market 22 
1.4.3.2. Fragmented market  23 
 
1.4.4. Other methods  24 
 
1.4.5. Concluding remarks  27 
Intraday Public Information: The French Evidence 
  
 
VIII 
1.5. Microstructure of financial markets 29 
 
1.5.1. Determinants of the spread 32 
 
1.5.1.1. Order processing costs 33 
 
1.5.1.2. Inventory holding costs 34 
 
1.5.1.3. Adverse information costs 36 
 
1.5.2. Empirical studies on the three components  
  of transaction costs 42 
 
1.6. Tick-by-tick data 44 
 
1.7. Conclusions 46 
 
 
CHAPTER 2 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FRENCH STOCK  
EXCHANGE TRADING STRUCTURE   47 
 
2.1 Abstract  49 
 
2.2. Introduction and literature review  51 
 
2.3. The structure of the Paris Bourse  56 
 
2.4. Dataset and methodology  61 
 
2.5. Empirical results  67 
 
2.6. Determinants of intraday market liquidity  75 
 
2.7. The relation between spread and volume imbalance  81 
 
2.8. Conclusions  84 
 
2.9. Figures  87 
 
2.10. Tables  107 
 
2.11. Appendix  137 
 
2.11.1. Analysis of a time series  139 
 
2.11.2. Intraday market liquidity indicators  143 
 
2.11.3. Intraday market variables  146 
 
 
CHAPTER 3 INTRADAY PUBLIC INFORMATION PATTERNS  149 
 
3.1. Abstract  151 
 
3.2. Introduction and literature review  153 
 
3.3. Data and methodology 157 
Intraday Public Information: The French Evidence 
  
 
 IX 
3.4. Empirical results  160 
 
3.5. Conclusions  163 
 
3.6. Figures  165 
 
3.7. Tables  187 
 
 
CHAPTER 4  PUBLIC INFORMATION IMPACT ON THE  
 PARIS BOURSE  231 
 
4.1. Abstract  233 
 
4.2. Introduction and literature review  235 
 
4.3. Data and methodology  241 
 
4.3.1. Transactions and order data  241 
4.3.2. Public information releases  241 
4.3.3. Methodology   242 
 
4.4. Empirical results  245 
 
4.5. Conclusions  251 
 
4.6. Figures  253 
 
4.7. Tables  263 
 
 
CHAPTER 5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS  287 
 
5.1. Market structures  289 
 
5.2. Empirical analysis of the French Stock Exchange  
 trading structure  291 
 
5.3. Intraday public information patterns  295 
 
5.4. Public information impact on the Paris Bourse  297 
 
5.5. Research agenda  299 
 
 
 
REFERENCES  301 
  
 
 
 
 
 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
AA: All Alerts news 
AA-FR: All Alerts news France 
ABSRET: Return in absolute terms 
ADR: American Depositary Receipts 
AIC: Akaike Information Criterion 
AIM: Amsterdam Interprofessional Market 
AMEX: American Stock Exchange 
ARCH: Auto Regressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity 
ARMA: Auto Regressive Moving Average 
BAS: Bid-Ask spread 
BBO: Best bid and offer 
BDM: Base de Données de Marché 
BNP: Banque Nationale de Paris 
BVLP: Bolsa de Valores de Lisboa e Porto 
CAC: Cotation Assistée en continu 
CATS: Computer Aiding Trading System 
CBOE: Chicago Board of Exchange 
CET: Central European Time 
CORES: Computer-assisted Order Routing and Execution System 
CORP: Corporate news 
CORP_FR: Corporate news France 
CPI: Consumer Price Index 
DF test: Dickey and Fueller Test 
DSPR: Difference spread 
DSPR_WAS: Difference spread from the weighted average spread file 
ECN: Electronic Communication Network 
ECO: Economic news 
ECO_FR: Economic news France 
EHS: Effective half spread 
EMM: Euronext market model 
EST: U.S. / Canadian Eastern Standard Time 
Intraday Public Information: The French Evidence 
  
 
 
XII 
EU: European Union 
EUR: Euro 
FR: Flow ratio 
FX: Forex 
GARCH: Generalized ARCH 
IBIS: Integrated Stock Exchange Trading and Information System 
INDU: Industrial news 
INDU_FR: Industrial news France 
IPO: Initial Public Offering 
ITS: Intermarket Trading System 
LIFFE: London International Financial Futures and Option Exchange 
LOB: Limit Order Book 
LR: Liquidity Ratio 
LSB: Lin, Sanger and Booth (1995) 
LSE: London Stock Exchange 
MABSVIMB: Average traded volume imbalance in absolute terms 
MARKET: Market news 
MARKET_FR: Market news France 
MEDVOL: Average traded volume 
MID: Midquote 
MRR: Madhavan, Richardson and Roomans (1997) 
NASDAQ: National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations 
NBTR: Number of trades 
NSC: Nouveau Système de Cotation 
NYSE: New York Stock Exchange 
OAT: Obligations Assimilables du Trésor 
OTC: Over the counter 
PAC: Partial Auto Correlation 
PER: Price / earnings ratio 
POSIT: Portfolio System for Institutional Trading 
PP test: Phillips-Perron test 
Prob(F-s): Probability related to the F-Statistic 
Intraday Public Information: The French Evidence 
  
 
 
 XIII 
PSE: Paris Stock Exchange 
QHS: Quoted half spread 
QHS_WAS: Quoted half spread from the weighted average spread file 
RAA: ratio of AA 
RAA_FR: ratio of AA_FR 
RBB: Reuters Business Briefing 
RCORP: Ratio of Corporate news 
RCORP_FR: Ratio of Corporate news France 
RDSPR: Ratio of DSPR 
RECO: Ratio of Economic news 
RECO_FR: Ratio of Economic news France 
RET: Average return 
RINDU: Ratio of Industrial news 
RINDU_FR: Ratio of Industrial news 
RMABSVIMB: Ratio of MABSVIMB 
RMARKET: Ratio of Market news 
RMARKET_FR: Ratio of Market news France 
RNEWS: ratio of number of news announcements 
RQHS_WAS: Ratio of QHS_WAS 
RRET: Ratio of RET 
RSUMVOL: Ratio of SUMVOL 
RVARRET: Ratio of VARRET 
RVOLA: ratio of VOLA 
RWT: Ratio of WT 
SABSVIMB: Cumulated traded volume imbalance in absolute terms 
SBF: Société de Bourse Française 
SEAQ – I: SEAQ International 
SEAQ: Stock Exchange Automated Quotation System 
SEATS: Stock Exchange Automated Trading System 
SUMVOL: Cumulated traded volume 
SWX: Swiss Stock Exchange 
TARCH: Threshold ARCH 
Intraday Public Information: The French Evidence 
  
 
 
XIV 
VAR: Value at-risk 
VARRET: Volatility of returns 
VIMB: Volume imbalance 
VOLA: Volatility measured as log range 
WAS: Weighted average spread 
WT: Waiting Time between subsequent trades 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
 
CHAPTER 2 - EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FRENCH STOCK EXCHANGE 
TRADING STRUCTURE 
 
FIG. 2.9.1.A: Intraday patterns of the effective half spread from December 1, 1999 to March 31, 2000 89 
FIG. 2.9.1.B: Intraday patterns of the effective half spread from April 1, 2000 to November 30, 2000 90 
FIG. 2.9.2: Intraday patterns of the quoted half spread from December 1, 1999 to March 31, 2000 91 
FIG. 2.9.3: Intraday patterns of the difference spread from December 1, 1999 to March 31, 2000 92 
FIG. 2.9.4: Intraday patterns of the midquote from December 1, 1999 to March 31, 2000 93 
FIG. 2.9.5: Intraday patterns of the QHS_WAS from December 1, 1999 to March 31, 2000 94 
FIG. 2.9.6: Intraday patterns of the cumulated traded volume from December 1, 1999 to March 31, 2000 95 
FIG. 2.9.7: Intraday patterns of the number of trades from December 1, 1999 to March 31, 2000 96 
FIG. 2.9.8: Intraday patterns of the cumulated volume imbalance from December 1, 1999 to March 31, 2000 97 
FIG. 2.9.9: Intraday patterns of the SABSVIMB from December 1, 1999 to March 31, 2000 98 
FIG. 2.9.10: Intraday patterns of the average return from December 1, 1999 to March 31, 2000 99 
FIG. 2.9.11: Intraday patterns of the return in absolute terms from December 1, 1999 to March 31, 2000 100 
FIG. 2.9.12: Intraday patterns of the volatility of returns from December 1, 1999 to March 31, 2000 101 
FIG. 2.9.13: Intraday patterns of the volatility as log range from December 1, 1999 to March 31, 2000 102 
FIG. 2.9.14: Intraday patterns of the waiting time from December 1, 1999 to March 31, 2000 103 
FIG. 2.9.15: Intraday patterns of the liquidity ratio from December 1, 1999 to March 31, 2000 104 
FIG. 2.9.16: Intraday patterns of the flow ratio from December 1, 1999 to March 31, 2000 105 
 
CHAPTER 3 - INTRADAY PUBLIC INFORMATION PATTERNS 
 
FIG. 3.6.1: Average number of All Alerts news observations by time of the day 167 
FIG. 3.6.2: Average number of Political news observations by time of the day 168 
FIG. 3.6.3: Average number of Market news observations by time of the day 169 
FIG. 3.6.4: Average number of Industrial news observations by time of the day 170 
FIG. 3.6.5: Average number of General news observations by time of the day 171 
FIG. 3.6.6: Average number of Economic news observations by time of the day 172 
FIG. 3.6.7: Average number of Corporate news observations by time of the day 173 
FIG. 3.6.8: Average number of Alcatel news observations by time of the day 174 
FIG. 3.6.9: Average number of France Telecom news observations by time of the day 175 
FIG. 3.6.10: Average number of Vivendi news observations by time of the day 176 
FIG. 3.6.11: Average number of Total news observations by time of the day 177 
FIG. 3.6.12: Average number of All Alerts news France observations by time of the day 178 
FIG. 3.6.13: Average number of Political news France observations by time of the day 179 
FIG. 3.6.14: Average number of Market news France observations by time of the day 180 
 
Intraday Public Information: The French Evidence 
  
 
 
XVI 
FIG. 3.6.15: Average number of Industrial news France observations by time of the day 181 
FIG. 3.6.16: Average number of General news France observations by time of the day 182 
FIG. 3.6.17: Average number of Economic news France observations by time of the day 183 
FIG. 3.6.18: Average number of Corporate news France observations by time of the day 184 
FIG. 3.6.19: Average number of All alerts news observations by day of the week 185 
FIG. 3.6.20: Average number of All alerts news observations by month of the year 186 
 
CHAPTER 4 – PUBLIC INFORMATION IMPACT ON THE PARIS BOURSE 
 
FIG. 4.6.1.A: Daily evolution of the CAC 40 index (December 1, 1999 – March 31, 2000) 255 
FIG. 4.6.1.B: Historical volatility of the CAC 40 index (December 1, 1999 – March 31, 2000) 255 
FIG. 4.6.1.C: Historical volatility of the CAC 40 index between 1998 and 2000 256 
FIG. 4.6.2: Price impact measure for Air Liquide 257 
FIG. 4.6.3: Price impact measure for Axa 258 
FIG. 4.6.4: Price impact measure for Total Fina 259 
FIG. 4.6.5: Price impact measure for France Telecom 260 
FIG. 4.6.6: Price impact measure for Vivendi 261 
FIG. 4.6.7: Price impact measure for France Telecom (one minute) 262 
 
 
 
 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
TABLE 1.4.1: Variation in Real-World Trading Systems 26 
 
CHAPTER 2 - EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FRENCH STOCK EXCHANGE 
TRADING STRUCTURE 
 
TABLE 2.3.1: Trading cycles at the Paris Bourse 58 
TABLE 2.10.1.A: Descriptive statistics 109 
TABLE 2.10.1.B: Descriptive statistics of the sixteen liquidity indicators during the first period 110 
TABLE 2.10.1.C: Descriptive statistics of the sixteen liquidity indicators during the second period 111 
TABLE 2.10.2.A: T-statistic for the effective half spread 112 
TABLE 2.10.2.B: T-statistic for the quoted half spread 113 
TABLE 2.10.2.C: T-statistic for the difference spread 114 
TABLE 2.10.2.D: T-statistic for the midquote 115 
TABLE 2.10.3: T-statistic for the QHS_WAS 116 
TABLE 2.10.4.A: T-statistic for the cumulated traded volume 117 
TABLE 2.10.4.B: T-statistic for the number of trades 118 
TABLE 2.10.4.C: T-statistic for the cumulated volume imbalance 119 
TABLE 2.10.4.D: T-statistic for the cumulated volume imbalance in absolute terms 120 
TABLE 2.10.5.A: T-statistic for the average return 121 
TABLE 2.10.5.B: T-statistic for the return in absolute terms 122 
TABLE 2.10.5.C: T-statistic for the volatility of returns 123 
TABLE 2.10.5.D: T-statistic for the volatility as log range 124 
TABLE 2.10.6: T-statistic for the waiting time 125 
TABLE 2.10.7.A: T-statistic for the liquidity ratio 126 
TABLE 2.10.7.B: T-statistic for the flow ratio 127 
TABLE 2.10.8.A: The Pearsons correlation between 14 liquidity proxies during the first period 128 
TABLE 2.10.8.B: The Pearsons correlation between 14 liquidity proxies during the second period 128 
TABLE 2.10.9.A: Stocks ranked by different liquidity proxies during the first period 129 
TABLE 2.10.9.B: Stocks ranked by different liquidity proxies during the second period 130 
TABLE 2.10.10: Intraday market depth in terms of trading volume 131 
TABLE 2.10.11: Intraday market depth in terms of order volume imbalance 132 
TABLE 2.10.12: Time dimension of intraday market liquidity 133 
TABLE 2.10.13: Tightness of intraday market liquidity 134 
TABLE 2.10.14: Intraday volatility of return 135 
TABLE 2.10.15: Intraday relation between quoted half spread from the WAS file and volume imbalance 136 
 
Intraday Public Information: The French Evidence 
  
 
 
XVIII 
 
CHAPTER 3 – INTRADAY PUBLIC INFORMATION PATTERNS 
 
TABLE 3.7.1: Global information flow by month of the year 189 
TABLE 3.7.2: Global information flow by day of the week 190 
TABLE 3.7.3: Firm-specific news 191 
TABLE 3.7.4: Rank of Firm-specific news 192 
TABLE 3.7.5: Rank of Firm-specific news by month of the year 193 
TABLE 3.7.6: Rank of Firm-specific news by month of the year and by market capitalization 195 
TABLE 3.7.7.: News category 196 
TABLE 3.7.8: Samples of Reuters news 198 
TABLE 3.7.9.A: T-statistic for All Alerts News 202 
TABLE 3.7.9.B: T-statistic for Political News 203 
TABLE 3.7.9.C: T-statistic for Market News 204 
TABLE 3.7.9.D: T-statistic for Industrial News 205 
TABLE 3.7.9.E: T-statistic for General News 206 
TABLE 3.7.9.F: T-statistic for Economic New 207 
TABLE 3.7.9.G: T-statistic for Corporate News 208 
TABLE 3.7.10.A: Mean equality test among months of the year and days of the week for All Alerts News 209 
TABLE 3.7.10.B: Median equality tests among months of the year and days of the week for All Alerts News 210 
TABLE 3.7.10.C: Variance equality tests among months of the year and days of the week for All Alerts news 211 
TABLE 3.7.11.A: Mean equality test among months of the year and days of the week for Political news 212 
TABLE 3.7.11.B: Median equality tests among months of the year and days of the week for Political news 213 
TABLE 3.7.11.C: Variance equality tests among months of the year and days of the week for Political news 214 
TABLE 3.7.12.A: Mean equality test among months of the year and days of the week for Market news 215 
TABLE 3.7.12.B: Median equality tests among months of the year and days of the week for Market news 216 
TABLE 3.7.12.C: Variance equality tests among months of the year and by days of the week for Market news 217 
TABLE 3.7.13.A: Mean equality test among months of the year and days of the week for Industrial news 218 
TABLE 3.7.13.B: Median equality tests among months of the year and days of the week for Industrial news 219 
TABLE 3.7.13.C: Variance equality tests among months of the year and days of the week for Industrial news 220 
TABLE 3.7.14.A: Mean equality test among months of the year and days of the week for General news 221 
TABLE 3.7.14.B: Median equality tests among months of the year and days of the week for General news 222 
TABLE 3.7.14.C: Variance equality tests among months of the year and days of the week for General news 223 
TABLE 3.7.15.A: Mean equality test among months of the year and days of the week for Economic news 224 
TABLE 3.7.15.B: Median equality tests among months of the year and days of the week for Economic news 225 
TABLE 3.7.15.C: Variance equality tests among months of the year and days of the week for Economic news 226 
TABLE 3.7.16.A: Mean equality test among months of the year and days of the week for Corporate news 227 
TABLE 3.7.16.B: Median equality tests among months of the year and days of the week for Corporate news 228 
TABLE 3.7.16.C: Variance equality tests among months of the year and days of the week for Corporate news 229 
TABLE 3.7.17: The Pearsons correlation between 15 news categories during a one year period 230 
Intraday Public Information: The French Evidence 
  
 
 
 XIX 
 
CHAPTER 4 – PUBLIC INFORMATION IMPACT ON THE PARIS BOURSE 
 
TABLE 4.7.1: T-test for the Air Liquide stock 265 
TABLE 4.7.2: T-test for the Axa stock 266 
TABLE 4.7.3: T-test for the Total Fina stock 267 
TABLE 4.7.4: T-test for the France Telecom stock 268 
TABLE 4.7.5: T-test for the Vivendi stock 269 
TABLE 4.7.6: Intraday relationship between quoted half spread and Market news 270 
TABLE 4.7.7: Intraday relationship between QHS_WAS and Industrial New 271 
TABLE 4.7.8: Intraday relationship between market cumulated trading volume and All Alerts News 272 
TABLE 4.7.9: Intraday relationship between return and Economic news 273 
TABLE 4.7.10: Intraday relationship between volatility and All Alerts News 274 
TABLE 4.7.11: Intraday relationship between Air Liquide price impact and public information 275 
TABLE 4.7.12: Intraday relationship between Axa price impact and public information 276 
TABLE 4.7.13: Intraday relationship between France Telecom price impact and public information 277 
TABLE 4.7.14: Intraday relationship between Total Fina price impact and public information 278 
TABLE 4.7.15: Intraday relationship between Vivendi price impact and public information 279 
TABLE 4.7.16: Intraday relationship between intraday market liquidity proxy and All Alerts news 280 
TABLE 4.7.17: Intraday relationship between five intraday market liquidity proxy and public information arrival 281 
TABLE 4.7.18.A: Granger causality test results for the quoted half spread 282 
TABLE 4.7.18.B: Granger causality test results for the quoted half spread from the WAS file 283 
TABLE 4.7.18.C: Granger causality test results for SUMVOL 284 
TABLE 4.7.18.D: Granger causality test results for ABSRET 285 
TABLE 4.7.18.E: Granger causality test results for the VOLA 286 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 

 
 
 
 
 
0.1. The concept of microstructure 
 
The process and outcome of exchanging assets under explicit trading rules is known as market 
microstructure (Garman 1976, O'Hara 1995, Easley and O'Hara 1995, Biais, Glosten and Spatt 
2002). How a specific trading process affects trades, quotes and price formation, how actual 
markets and market intermediaries behave, and the consequences of market organization for 
price discovery and welfare are some of the most interesting topics in the field of the micro-
finance. The mechanisms of trading involve specific intermediaries (specialists, Saitori, market 
makers, dealers); a specific location (centralized or fragmented markets) and a specific moment 
when the exchange takes place (fixing or continuous markets). Whatever the mechanism, buyers 
and sellers trade at a price. How this price is formed, and how price-setting rules evolve in 
markets, is fundamental in order to understand how services and goods are allocated in the 
economy. One has to investigate how different trading protocols affect trades, quotes and prices, 
and why prices exhibit particular time series properties. The goal is to understand the 
microstructure of financial markets and the process by which they become efficient. 
One can say that, in a state of equilibrium, the price is determined by the intersection of 
supply and demand for a particular goods item. In the literature, we find two approaches: 
according to the first (O'Hara 1995), the equilibrium price is determined by simply looking for a 
market clearing price, but how exactly this market clearing price is achieved, is of no interest. The 
second, known as the Walrasian approach, is often used in economics. There, auctioneers, 
through a series of preliminary auctions, aggregate demand and supply in order to find a market-
clearing price (quantity supplied equals quantity demanded). In this case, prices evolve naturally, 
the auctioneers remain passive, and there are no other factors influencing price behaviour. These 
two approaches can be related to the first Welfare theorem of the Arrow-Debreu model, namely 
that all economic agents have the same information or, at least, that all agents are equally 
uncertain. 
In all these approaches, the trading mechanism practically plays no role for the resulting 
equilibrium. But, as Radner (1979) notes, "a more detailed specification of the trading mechanism 
is required than in the analysis of the general equilibrium, because, in the markets, traders have 
different information”. Thus, the analysis differs if I consider agents who are asymmetrically 
informed (the behaviour of agents may reveal information), or if, like in many markets where 
trading is not only matching supplies and demands in equilibrium, the behaviour of participants is 
not passive, so that the trading mechanism may have an importance of its own. 
In this context, the study by Demsetz (1968) should be mentioned. He was one of the first to 
look into the determination of prices in security markets and the behaviour of traders. In his 
opinion trade may involve some implicit costs, because, unlike in the Walrasian auction, trading 
has a time dimension. Thus, at a particular moment, the number of traders wishing to sell 
without delay may not equal the number of those who want to buy immediately. This imbalance 
makes it impossible to find a market clearing price at a given time. However, it is possible, paying 
a price for immediacy, to overcome this lack of equilibrium. For example, there are two traders 
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on the demand side (one who wants to transact immediately and one not) and two on the supply 
side (analogously). If a trader wants to buy (sell) now, he has to wait for a seller (buyer), or else 
offer a higher (lower) price to induce those waiting sellers (buyers) to transact now. Thus, in the 
equilibrium, there are two prices and not only one. The price depends on whether someone 
wants to buy or sell at a given moment. 
The implication that a specific structure and organization of the market could affect the 
trading price is of equal importance. Other important aspects which can affect the trading price 
are the interaction between the market mechanism and trader behaviour. If the trading 
mechanism matters in setting prices, then it will also matter in affecting traders' order decisions. 
In order to be able to study the microstructure of a particular market, one needs a broad 
understanding of the overall structure of the security market. This will be the topic of the first 
chapter. 
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0.2. Market structures 
 
The most striking development in asset markets over the past two decades is the proliferation 
of new markets and the changes in the old one, due, above all, to the technological improvements 
and the European integration. Starting from the London Stock Exchange, a series of structural 
changes have affected financial markets in Europe, in North America and in the rest of the 
world. Furthermore, some electronic markets have evolved, such as Reuters' Instinet, Investment 
Technology Group's Posit, Globex and the Arizona Stock Exchange (O'Hara 1995). 
In view of the higher competition, however, not all of these markets will survive. The question 
of which market design will, or even should prevail is rarely asked, let alone resolved. 
The goals of a market depend, of course, on whose perspective is considered. For an exchange 
or automated clearing system, the underlying goal may be as straightforward as the maximization 
of trading commissions. From a trader’s perspective, the ideal market may be one in which orders 
are accommodated with the least effect on price, or one that has the lowest overall trading cost. 
For a regulator, the best market may be the one with the greatest stability. For a society as a 
whole, however, it is clear that while each of these goals may be important, none captures all the 
ways in which markets affect welfare in the economy (O’Hara 1995). 
The process of exchange occurs between buyers and sellers who can, for example, contact 
each other directly or communicate through a computer screen, or a single intermediary can 
arrange every trade, or there may be numerous individuals who meet to set prices. Whatever the 
setting, the organization of financial markets defines the rules of the game played by investors 
and liquidity suppliers. These rules affect the way in which prices are formed and trades 
determined. Many authors identify three dimensions in this trading game. First the time of 
playing, i.e. the moment when the exchange takes place. There exists two possibilities: at a 
specific moment, or continuously during a trading day. Second, who plays. The players may 
involve a wide range of market participants, although not all types of players are found in every 
mechanism. These players are: the customer (who submits buy and sell orders), the broker (who 
submits orders for the customer), the dealer (who trades for his own account) and the specialist 
or the market maker (who quotes prices for buying or selling assets). This list is not exhaustive. 
Finally, where one can play the game, i.e. the location of the exchange, which can be centralized 
(order flows transmitted to the same location) or fragmented (order flows can be routed through 
different channels). 
The various microstructure models analyse different trading mechanisms and their impact on 
the price formation process and on the agents’ behaviour. Starting with Demsetz (1968) to Roll 
(1984), Madhavan, Richardson and Roomans (1997) and Huang and Stoll (1997), the evolution of 
models is impressive. The majority of these studies are based on a price-driven market in the US. 
My study, instead, concentrates on an order-driven market. Furthermore, the low cost of tick-by-
tick data collection has increased the capacity of models to better describe the process and 
outcome of assets exchange. More detailed description of these topics will be given in the first 
chapter. 
Introduction 
  
 
 
6 
0.3. The French Stock Exchange 
 
While the models and applications may differ, each specific microstructure analysis 
classification requires some clarification of the underlying trading mechanism. Thus, the market 
design is an important feature in studying the price formation process and time series properties 
when an event occurs during the trading day. In contrast to the Walrasian auctioneer, the 
structure of the market does have an influence on the traders’ decisions and on his behaviour. 
The Paris Bourse nowadays is one of the most closely studied markets, because of its 
structure, transparency and low cost of data collection. Its structural changes occurred at three 
distinctive moments: First, the daily call auction before 1986. Second, the introduction of a 
computerized limit order market, in which trading occurs continuously, between 1986-2000. 
Finally, after September 22, 2000, when the stock exchanges of Amsterdam, Brussels and Paris 
merged under the holding company Euronext NV to form the first pan-European stock 
exchange. The Euronext trading system has the same characteristics as the Paris Bourse. It is an 
order-driven market (with a central order book), based on price / time priority. 
One of the fundamental qualities the investor is looking for is the liquidity of a financial 
market, but the liquidity is also influenced by the mechanism of trading. Although the liquidity 
concept is ambiguous, I try to assess intraday market liquidity through commonly used measures 
and some new proxies, and I will check whether these available measures of liquidity provide the 
same degree of estimation of market liquidity. This is the objective of chapter 2. 
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0.4. Intraday public information pattern 
 
The link between information and changes in asset prices is central to financial economics. As 
Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) argue, private information plays a dominant role in explaining the 
time patterns of trading volume and return volatility in security markets. Public information is 
relegated to a lesser role, that of an unspecified, exogenous factor. In spite of this hypothesis, I 
use a distinctive proxy of public information flow. This proxy, measured as the number of news 
released by the Reuters 2000 alert system terminal, can be considered as a good approximation of 
the information available to the market participants. I use the public information flow to 
document the patterns of information arrival, with an emphasis on the intraday flows. 
Information is central in market efficiency. Investors react to new information as it arrives, 
depending on its characteristics, revising their beliefs, depending on their expectations of risk and 
return. News patterns are a first step in order to achieve my goal of getting to know the impact of 
news on asset prices. My assessment of public information is not restricted to one category only 
(firm-specific or macroeconomic event), but is divided into different types, relevant and non-
relevant for the French market, each one having a characteristic pattern and probably a different 
impact. The objective of the third chapter is to study these intraday news patterns. 
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0.5. The impact of public information on the Paris Bourse 
 
Whether the amount of information that is publicly available to market participants affects the 
trading activity, has always been a field of great interest in financial economics. In general, 
whether current prices “fully reflect” all publicly available information, is known as “semi-strong 
form test” of efficient market models (Fama 1970). Information is considered the major source 
of heterogeneity in investor expectations, which, in turn, generate trading activity. News arrival 
on the market induces a revision in expectations and, depending on the level of consensus 
between investors, a rise in trading activity. Much of disagreement regarding the news market is 
due to the differing emphasis made in the various studies. The impact of public news arrival on 
prices has been studied extensively, both from the theoretical and empirical points of view. In 
particular, key macroeconomic news and their unexpected components have been examined. 
Also the overall flow of information, rather than specific news, has been explored. My objective 
is to develop a more general concept of information, which is not only limited to specific shock 
related announcement such as consumer price index or money supply. In fact, I will consider 
eight major categories of news that may have an impact on stocks that constitute the CAC40 
index during the period studied (December 1999 – November 2000). 
The analysis also concerns the public / private information controversy. Some investigations 
on microstructure deal with the effect of private information available to market participants on 
their strategic behaviour (Kyle 1985, Admati and Pfleiderer 1988), whereas others deal with this 
strategic behaviour of uninformed participants. I shall try to examine these aspects in more detail 
in chapter 4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 1 
 
MARKET STRUCTURES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
1.1. Abstract 
 
First I review the development of financial markets in last 
two decades, pointing out the main changes and taking into 
consideration the different types of stock markets. Each has 
its own “market architecture”, i.e. a set of rules governing 
the trading process. These rules are based on choices 
concerning a variety of attributes, such as: (1) the degree of 
continuity (periodic vs. continuous systems), (2) dealer 
presence (auction or order-driven vs. dealer or quote driven), 
(3) location (centralized or fragmented), (4) price discovery 
(independent price discovery vs. prices determined in 
another market), (5) automation (floor trading vs. screen 
based electronic systems), (6) order forms (market, limit, 
stop, hidden, etc.), (7) protocols (program trading, minimum 
tick, circuit breaker, etc.), (8) pre- and post-trade 
transparency (quantity and quality of information provided 
to market participant), (9) information dissemination (extent 
and speed of information dissemination), (10) anonymity 
(hidden order, trader identity) and (11) off-market trading 
(off-exchange, after hours). The moment, the counterpart 
and the location are, however, the main characteristics of 
stock exchanges. Second, the most important microstructure 
models are presented, in which the bid-ask spread becomes 
the central axis of the microstructure theory (among others 
Kyle 1985, George, Kaul and Nimalendran 1993, Madhavan, 
Richardson and Roomans 1997, Huang and Stoll 1997). 
Finally, the importance and the meaning of tick-by-tick data 
as a source for developing new models are discussed. 
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1.2. Introduction 
 
Nowadays, financial markets are similar in many operational aspects, even if there exist some 
microstructure differences. An exhaustive definition of market microstructure is given by Easley 
and O'Hara (1995): "market microstructure is the study of the process and outcome of 
exchanging assets under explicit trading rules". As stated in this definition, market microstructure 
pays attention to the interaction between a particular mechanism of trading and its outcome. 
Many authors who concentrate their research on microstructures offer important insights into 
the operation and behaviour of security markets. Although this is a vast research area, I shall 
focus my interest on the market behaviour in relation to different information environments. 
This chapter is organized as follows. First, I shall review the development of financial markets in 
the last twenty years. This will allow us to understand the actual market architecture, which is the 
basis of my analysis. I then describe and summarize the most important microstructure models in 
Section 4. Finally, the advantages of using tick-by-tick data in the empirical analysis will be 
evaluated. 
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1.3. Historical background of stock exchanges 
 
Interest in market microstructure is driven by the rapid structural, technological and regulatory 
changes affecting the security industry worldwide. The causes of these transformations are 
complex. Here, I provide only a partial and not exhaustive review of them. 
In the mid-1980s, the microstructure of the European equity market changed dramatically. 
The increasing competition among European stock markets, globalisation, pressure on trading 
costs and the development of alternative trading mechanism forced such changes (Pagano 1997). 
Until 1985, each financial market in Europe operated without close contacts with other 
international stock exchanges. There were many barriers such as closed membership 
organization, high obstacles to potential entrants, national regulations, difficult capital mobility 
and high communication costs. The bourses had take measures in order to avoid this isolation. 
Thanks to the European integration, the situation has gradually improved since 1985. This 
progress combined with the technology evolution, led to increased capital mobility and a decrease 
in communication costs. Deregulation also allows a stronger influence to institutional investor. 
The benefits derived from the international diversification contribute to more intense trading 
across national borders. 
The first European stock exchange which started modifying its rules was the London Stock 
Exchange (hereafter LSE). In the rest of the world, some revisions began at the end of 1970s. 
The Toronto Stock Exchange altered its trading organization in 1977, introducing a 
computerized execution system, whereas Tokyo, began its restructuring process in 1982. In 1986, 
the LSE decided to reform its equity market. It gave up old method based on trading through 
"jobbers" (dealers) 1, opening the dealership to banks and others financial institution. Similar to 
the U.S. NASDAQ system, it introduced a screen-based technique, called SEAQ. The latter 
concerned only British equities, whereas for international securities SEAQ-I was introduced. For 
each foreign stock, certain market makers provide bid and ask quotes. In order to increase the 
competitiveness of the LSE, stamp duty was abolished for foreign stocks, and halved for British 
equities. These reforms changed also the attitude of foreign investor who trade in the SEAQ-I, 
because now they can find more immediacy in trading through market makers, facility to trade 
very large blocks of stocks and absence of taxes. These are some of the reasons that have led U.S. 
institutional investors, above all, to diversify into European stock markets. 
The other stock exchanges acted in response to this deregulation process. The Paris Bourse 
was the first one to react to the reforms implemented by the LSE. The danger of losing business 
to the SEAQ-I pushed the French Stock Exchange to introduce some innovations in its trading 
system. As Pagano (1997) points out, four major innovations were implemented one after the 
other: (a) introduction of screen-based trading, (b) replacement of publicly appointed brokers by 
                                                 
1 Jobbers receive customer orders via single-capacity brokers (who act on account of the clientele or on their own 
account), and commissions are fixed by the members of the stock exchange. 
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corporate dual capacity brokers2, (c) liberalization of commissions and (d) modification of the 
principle that trade should be concentrated in one market. 
The Paris Stock Exchange was closely followed in its reforms by two other European markets: 
Madrid and Milan. Then, in the early 1990s, the German, Dutch, Israeli and, in the mid-1990s, 
Swiss markets reorganized their structure. 
Madrid, in 1989, adopted an automated trading system, where "Sociedades de bolsa" replaced 
"agentes de cambio". The former can trade on their own account and can be held by domestic or 
foreign banks, insurance companies and securities firms. 
This wave of reforms influenced other important trading places, such as Belgium, which 
adopted the French structure. In 1991, the Italian stock exchange moved from the open outcry 
call auction to an automated continuous auction managed by "Società di Intermediazione 
Mobiliare". 
Germany’s system of call auction is different from other European places. SEAQ-I pressure, 
first, and reforms in other European countries, forced Germany to modify its organization. 
Germany’s response to SEAQ-I competition was the introduction of the IBIS, a screen-based 
trading system, run by the Frankfurt Stock Exchange. Other stock markets underwent minor 
transformations. Regional exchanges were maintained, but the IBIS system now runs the majority 
of trading transaction with Frankfurt. This gradual change will lead to the disappearance of 
regional exchanges and of "Kursmakler" 3. During the same period, the German Stock Exchange 
was transformed into a joint-stock corporation, called Deutsche Börse AG 4. 
Amsterdam is particularly influenced by the competition from SEAQ-I. It introduced some 
innovations in two steps. In the first, in 1987, the trading system run by "hoekmannen"(single 
capacity dealers) was joined to the AIM 5. This new arrangement was programmed in such a way 
that it facilitates block-trading and meets the requirement of institutional investors and banks. In 
a second step, a continuous auction system was introduced. 
According to the SWX (1996a and b), the Swiss Exchange began its changes in the nineties. In 
1990, there were still seven stock exchanges, plus the option market SOFFEX (now called 
EUREX6). After the initial project, in 1992, the launch of the new electronic trading system 
started on August 2, 1996. Its structure is the first in the world that fully integrates the stock 
market trading system, covering the entire spectrum from trade order through to settlement 
(SWX 1996a and b). 
Where stand the markets today ? What Pagano (1997) says in his paper about the possibility of 
increasing competition between trading systems, is even more true today. Some factors stimulate 
such competition. First, the EU Investment Services Directives facilitate cross-border access for 
                                                 
2 Act as agents (on account of the clientele) and as principals (on their own account). 
3 Officially appointed auctioneers who can take positions on their own account to avoid extreme price fluctuations. 
4 The main shareholders are: Deutsche Börse Beteiligungsgesellschaft (7.20%), Allianz (5.91%) and Bayerische 
Hypovereinsbank (4.69%). 
5 Amsterdam Interprofessional Market. 
6 Option Exchange born after the merger between the German Option Exchange and the Swiss Option Exchange 
(SOFFEX). 
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investment firms and cross-border branching by using the electronic networks of the European 
exchanges. French and German Bourses establish direct links to investors in London and in 
other major financial centers. 
Pressure on trading costs, above all from institutional investors, is the second factor playing an 
important role in increasing competition among financial markets. 
The recent introduction of the Euro, which eliminates the exchange rate risks within the 
European monetary union, allows increased cross-border trade volume. It will be important for 
some Bourses to be able to attract the majority of foreign investors, competing, in fact, with 
alternative trading systems for the same equity. Moreover, some trading networks are being set 
up by brokers in competition with official exchanges, which increases the competition also within 
the national boundaries, not only outside. These trading systems do not contribute to price 
discovery, but simply facilitate cross orders at a reference price drawn from an official exchange. 
The Arizona Stock Exchange is an example. It matches orders at NYSE closing prices. 
ISTINET, set up by Reuters, is another example, where the system allows traders to post 
anonymous bids and offers, and to negotiate electronically. As Madhavan (2000) points out, in 
the U.S., the structural shift affecting the security industry includes also competition between 
exchanges and ECNs7, changes in the regulatory environment, and an increase in trading volume, 
new technological innovations, the growth of the Internet and the proliferation of new financial 
instruments. 
Concentration and mergers between European stock markets are another factor which 
explains the increasing competitiveness amongst stock exchanges. Let’s take Euronext as an 
example, which is the result of a merger between the Paris Bourse, and the Brussels and 
Amsterdam Stock Exchanges. Its objective is to become the first integrated European bourse. 
What the traders hope for is the reduction of transaction costs and an increase in liquidity needs. 
Transparency and efficiency of price discovery mechanism will be one of the attributes of the 
new Bourse. 
Virt-x, on the other hand, is an innovative platform in London, where more than 600 
European blue chips are traded 8. Virt-x presents the lowest costs of production. Since its start 
this concentration on only one platform has been a guarantee for great liquidity. 
As we have seen, the stock exchanges have made impressive progress during the last two 
decades, thanks to new technologies and competition. Technology will still progress in the 
coming years. At the same time competition and further economic integration in Europe will lead 
to the demise of some national stock exchanges. They will be replaced, maybe, by a single market 
for the European time zone. 
Financial markets progress continuously. Nevertheless, we can make use of certain factors 
which allow us to look at the organization in a more differentiated manner. This is the objective 
of the next chapter. 
                                                 
7 Electronic communications network. 
8 All the Swiss blue chips are traded on this platform since 25th June 2001. 
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1.4. Organization of financial markets 
 
In view of the remarkable diversity in trading mechanisms around the world and across assets, 
it is useful to begin with a taxonomy of market structures. As Madhavan (2000) and 
Venkataraman (2000) say, market architecture refers to the distinctive set of rules governing the 
trading process. These rules dictate when and how orders can be submitted, who can see or 
handle the orders, how orders are processed and how prices are set (O'Hara 1995). The rules of 
trading influence the profits derived from various trading strategies (Harris 1997), hence they 
affect trader behaviour, price formation and trading costs. The properties of asset prices depend, 
in some aspects, on the structure of the market on which they are quoted, and the markets differ 
in price evaluation, transmission, execution of orders and the role assumed by the intermediaries. 
Thus, all these variables are closely intertwined. Biais, Foucault and Hillion (1997) and Fleuriet 
and Simon (2000) define three criteria for distinguishing financial markets. The first one is the 
moment of the exchange, or, as Madhavan (2000) says, the degree of continuity. A distinction is 
made between fixing markets (which allow trading only at a specific point in time) and 
continuous markets (which allow trading at any point in time while the market is open). The 
second criterion refers to the exchange counterparts, or, as Madhavan (2000) calls it, the reliance 
on market makers. I shall distinguish between agency markets and dealer markets. Similarly, when 
describing the market typology through the price formation process, I shall distinguish price-
driven markets (market makers take both sides in every transaction) and order-driven markets 
(without intervention by market makers). The third criterion is the location of the exchange, 
where we can in turn distinguish between centralized markets and fragmented markets. 
 
1.4.1. The moment of the exchange 
 
1.4.1.1. The fixing market 
 
In the fixing market, orders are batched together for simultaneous execution in a single 
multilateral trade, once or twice during a working day and at a pre-specified time. All transactions 
get to the market at a single price, via a centralized mechanism, which best balances aggregated 
sales and aggregated purchase orders (Pagano and Röell 1992, Madhavan 1992, Madhavan 2000). 
The exchange volume is maximized. Purchases at this price and higher, and sales at this price and 
lower, generally are executed. 
Biais, Foucault and Hillion (1997), and Economides and Schwartz (1995) distinguish four 
types of fixing markets: 
 
1. The first type is called “price scan auction” by Economides and Schwartz (1995). All 
market participants are physically present in the same place. The auctioneer opens the 
market by calling the stock name and its starting price, and the participants respond with 
their wishes for purchases or sales. The auctioneer manages the call trading session, 
adjusting the price continuously until the value that best balances the buy and sell orders 
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is found: he raises the price if there is excess demand, and lowers the price if there is 
excess supply. This process continues until the discovery of the equilibrium price. If, 
because of discontinuities, there is no exact match between aggregated purchases and 
sales at a certain price, buy orders placed at the clearing price are not executed in full (if 
buys exceed sells), or sells are not executed in full (if sells exceed buys). Time priority 
(the orders placed first are executed first), or pro rata execution (an equal percentage of 
each order is executed) is commonly used to determine which orders to execute among 
those which had been placed at the lowest executable bid (if buys exceed sells) or at the 
highest executable ask (if sells exceed buys). Examples of this type of call auction 
include art auctions, tulip bulb auctions, the old call market system of the Paris Bourse 
(à la criée), the old trading system of the Milan Stock Exchange, the open outcry market, 
and the system currently used to open trading on the NYSE (Amihud, Mendelson and 
Murgia (1990), Madhavan (2000)). 
 
2. An alternative to the first fixing type is the sealed bid / ask auction used by the U.S. 
Treasury Bonds. This method allows market participants to submit their bids, but these 
offers are not disclosed to the other participants until the fixing moment. This is a 
limitation. In fact, it hides orders that some participants might wish to expose and the 
others would like to see. When the auctioneer calls the fixing, orders are arrayed by price 
and cumulated from the highest bid to the lowest bid for buy orders and from the 
lowest ask to the highest ask for sell orders. The cumulated orders are matched against 
each other. After this, a clearing price is determined. 
 
3. A crossing network method also batches orders (Economides and Schwartz (1995)), but 
instead of determining the price within the batching process, it uses a price that has 
been set elsewhere. For example, POSIT, Instinet, and the two NYSE crossing 
networks, all cross orders at prices that have been established in the primary market 
center. Instinet and the NYSE's after hours systems use closing prices, while POSIT 
uses current intraday prices. 
 
4. The fourth approach is the open order book auction. It is the opening procedure used 
in most electronic continuous markets, such as Toronto's CATS, Tokyo's CORES, 
Paris' CAC and Australia's SEATS. Also the Arizona Stock Exchanges is an electronic 
call market. Aggregated quantities at each bid and ask prices are disclosed to market 
participants, as soon as the market receives them. All participants can watch the market 
as it is forming. Furthermore, the equilibrium price is continuously updated and 
displayed after each new order has been submitted. 
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1.4.1.2. The continuous market 
 
In contrast to the fixing market, in a continuous market the trader can submit his orders at any 
time. Quotations and transactions are continuously updated, and orders are executed each time 
an opposite order with identical or better price is transmitted to the market. Moreover, a new 
price can be established after every transaction, instead of the fixing market where there is a 
single price for all transactions. Continuous trading increases the frequency of trading, thereby 
enabling immediate execution during the entire business day. 
Brennan and Cao (1996) show that a move from periodic call auctions to continuous trading 
increases investors' welfare and asset values. Their model assumes an initial supply / demand 
shock, which is followed by information-motivated trading volume. Such an environment, 
allowing for more trading rounds, facilitates a better reaction to new information and improves 
risk sharing. The model predicts that a higher frequency of trading will result in a larger trading 
volume. Furthermore, the increase in volume should have a positive stock price response. 
However, continuous trading does not necessarily improve the investor welfare. If the supply and 
demand shocks are dispersed over the entire trading period, continuous trading may result in 
higher execution costs for liquidity traders. For example, in Kyle's (1985) model, allowing for 
more rounds of trade will increase the expected profits of the informed, thereby hurting the 
liquidity traders. As a result, continuous trading can lead to a reduction in trading volume, and, in 
the extreme, to a market breakdown (Madhavan (1992)). In such an environment, allowing for 
more rounds of the continuous trade can result in welfare reduction (Garbade and Silber (1979)). 
 
1.4.2. The counterparts of the exchange 
 
1.4.2.1. Price driven-market 
 
Another way to distinguish a financial market consists in describing it by the price formation 
process. In a price-driven or quote-driven system, designated market makers supply liquidity to 
the market by quoting a purchase price (investor's ask price or market maker's bid price), an offer 
price (investor's bid price or market maker's ask price) and the number of shares at which they 
are willing to trade. The difference between the bid and the ask price is the market maker’s 
spread. Demsetz (1968) argues that the market maker's spread, which is a measure of the value of 
the liquidity service provided by the dealer, is the appropriate return, under competition, in an 
organized exchange market. The priorities of the market maker is to provide liquidity to the 
market, to discover the price, to stabilize the price and to permit continuous trading by 
overcoming the asynchronous timing of investor orders. He adjusts the spread by buying and 
selling stocks in response to fluctuation in his own inventory in order to avoid imbalances 
between the offer and the supply sides. According to Smidt (1971), this is an active role assumed 
by the market maker, instead of the passive role Demsetz (1968) assigns to him. Demsetz (1968) 
argues that the market maker only regulates the bid-ask spread (hereafter BAS) in response to 
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changing conditions. In reality, as Smidt (1971) suggests, the market maker actively adjusts the 
spread in response to fluctuations in his inventory levels. Although the primary function of the 
market maker remains that of a supplier of immediacy (Demsetz 1968), he also plays an active 
role in price setting, primarily with the objective of achieving a rapid turnover and not 
accumulating significant positions on one side of the market (Brockman and Chung 1999). This 
is a risky activity for the market maker, because he can expose himself to a considerable variation 
of prices. In fact, when he buys a stock for himself, it is not certain that he has the possibility to 
sell it immediately; thus, for example, if he is long, he will rarely purchase another security, but 
instead will quote a competitive ask price to lower his inventory levels (Madhavan 2000). A 
market maker offers the possibility to traders with privileged information to use their information 
to his detriment. Therefore he tries to protect himself from this possible loss, giving an ask price 
which is lower than a bid price (Ho and Stoll 1983). The market maker may be the monopolist 
for some assets and in some markets. In the NYSE, such a market maker monopolist, is called a 
"specialist". In many other cases market makers compete with one another. There exists, by now, 
a considerable literature on specialist behaviour. The rules of the NYSE require the specialist to 
maintain meaningful spreads at all times, keep price continuity, and trade in a stabilizing manner. 
Previous studies (Hasbrouck and Sofianos (1993), Madhavan and Sofianos (1998), and Kavacejz 
(1999)) show that the specialist's quotes anticipate future order imbalances and help to reduce 
transitory volatility. Madhavan and Panchapagesan (2000) maintain that the specialist's opening 
price is more efficient than the price which would prevail in an automated auction market using 
public orders only. These results suggest that the NYSE specialist can play a beneficial role in 
price formation. However, for heavily traded stocks, the role of a specialist is less clear due to his 
low participation rates. 
According to Stoll (1985) and Madhavan (2000), market makers typically face competition 
from floor traders, competing dealers, limit orders and other exchanges. Models of competition 
among market makers were developed, for example, by Ho and Stoll (1983). Although the early 
literature argues that competition among market makers in the NASDAQ system would result in 
lower spreads than in a specialist system, the opposite seems to be the case, even after checking 
factors such as firm age, firm size, risk and price level (Madhavan 2000). Christie and Schultz 
(1994) and Christie, Harris and Schultz (1994), suggest that dealers on NASDAQ might have 
implicitly colluded to set spreads wider than those justified by competition. Theoretical studies by 
Kandel and Marx (1997) and Dutta and Madhavan (1997) provide some justifications for this 
opinion, always with reference to the NASDAQ. 
The higher cost structure of a dealership market is reflected in the spread which dealers charge 
investors (Varnholt 1996). The transaction costs reduce the trading volume. Therefore, due to the 
relatively high transaction costs, dealership markets are primarily used for blue chip stocks or for 
government bonds. From an investor's point of view, dealership markets offer the advantage of 
immediacy in executing a trade. 
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1.4.2.2. Order-driven market 
 
In a pure order-driven market, there is no designated market maker (Handa and Schwartz 
1996). Thus, one defines an order-driven market as a trading system where incoming buy and sell 
orders are automatically and instantly matched with orders currently outstanding on the limit 
order book (hereafter LOB). Public limit orders spontaneously provide liquidity to the market 
and establish the bid-ask spread and the depth. There is only one intermediate: the broker, who 
submits the orders for his customers. Orders are accumulated in a limit order book (LOB). A 
limit order is registered in the LOB and executed each time an opposite order with identical or 
better price is transmitted to the market. The difference between the prices at the lowest sell limit 
order and the highest buy limit order defines the effective bid-ask spread (Brockman and Chung 
1999). BAS is the investor's compensation for keeping an inventory, considering adverse 
selection risks, brokerage commissions, communication costs and clearing (Ranaldo 2001). 
Order-driven depth, on the other hand, is a function of the number of shares available at the 
highest bid and lowest ask, and is determined by the willingness of investors to provide 
immediacy through submission of limit orders (Brockman and Chung 1999). 
In a pure order-driven market, buyers and sellers must decide between two types of orders, 
namely limit orders and market orders. A limit order specifies a particular price, and is a promise 
to trade at that price, but bears the risk of adverse selection and non-execution. Unexecuted limit 
orders enter the LOB, where they are stored until executed or cancelled. A market order is 
executed with certainty at the most attractive price posted by previous limit orders, but pays an 
implicit price for immediacy. The choice between limit orders and market orders depends on the 
market conditions and on the propensity of the investor to trade (his relative patience). Al-
Suhaibani and Kryzanowski (2001) give a good survey of research works on the choice between 
limit orders and market orders. In particular, their paper focuses on the choice between limit 
order and market order by a trader, and the resultant profitability of such a choice. 
Still concerning market orders, in the NYSE, in the Paris Bourse and in the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange, market orders can be stopped rather than immediately executed, either automatically 
like in Paris, or depending on the judgement of the Saitori in Tokyo or the specialist in New 
York. In the Paris Bourse, market orders which are stopped at the quotes, often attract liquidity 
from the other side of the market. For the NYSE, Harris and Hasbrouck (1996) find that market 
orders are often blocked by the specialist and executed within the quotes. Similarly for the Tokyo 
Stock Exchange, Hamao and Hasbrouck (1995) show that orders are often stopped by the 
Saitori. 
These results suggest the existence of a potential liquidity supply, which is not available within 
the LOB. The following interpretation can be offered. For example, some agents who are willing 
to buy or sell do not place their orders in the book immediately, perhaps because they are afraid 
of adverse execution, or are reluctant to show their willingness to trade. Instead, they monitor the 
market, waiting for favourable opportunities to hit the quotes or place orders. Such opportunities 
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arise when the spread is large or when market orders have been stopped (Biais, Hillion and Spatt 
1995). 
Studies by Rock (1988), Angel (1991), Kavacejz (1999), Harris and Hasbrouck (1996), Seppi 
(1997), Bias Hillion and Spatt (1995) and Foucault (1999), among others, help in advancing the 
knowledge of liquidity provision by studying the LOB. 
Many of the world's major stock exchanges, such as the NYSE and Tokyo, rely at least 
partially on limit orders for the provision of liquidity. I found a variety of evidence showing how 
liquidity is supplied and consumed in the marketplace, and on the interaction of liquidity and 
priority considerations. The probability that investors place limit orders (rather than hitting the 
quotes) is greater when the BAS is larger, or when the order book is thin. On the contrary, 
investors tend to hit the quote when the spread is tight. Thus, the investors provide liquidity 
when it is valuable to the marketplace, and consume liquidity when it is plentiful. In order to 
obtain time priority under these circumstances, investors place limit orders relatively quickly 
when the liquidity has diminished. 
Since the order book itself never assumes any positions, it needs no expensive risk 
management tools, similar to a market maker (Varnholt 1996). The use of electronic LOB, 
combined with an order-driven market making has been rapidly increasing in recent years, due to 
improvements in information technology and financial market deregulation. The practical 
importance of such a market structure is growing, as financial markets have adopted a 
computerized LOB, while others are evaluating the merits of introducing LOB into the market 
architecture. Recently the NYSE has debated the benefits of adopting elements of a consolidated 
LOB into its design (Hollifield, Miller and Sandås 2001). 
Other important analyses of limit order markets were carried out by Rock (1990), Glosten 
(1994) and Bernhardt and Hughson (1993). 
 
1.4.3. The location of the exchange 
 
1.4.3.1 Centralized market 
 
The third criterion that allows to distinguish financial markets is based on the trading space, 
which can be centralized or fragmented. A market is said to be centralized when the stock order 
flow is transmitted to the same location (same floor or same system), so that the market 
participants can observe all the quotes and trades and take them into account in their strategies. 
There is only one transaction price. 
In centralized markets, trades are the outcome of multilateral negotiations, i.e. all the agents 
present in the market can participate in all trades. For example, in a floor or a pit, as soon as an 
agent quotes a price, other market participants can observe it and offer a better price. They can 
take this information into account in their own strategies. Examples of centralized markets are 
the stock and future exchanges (Biais 1993). In such open outcry markets, Ho and Stoll (1983) 
assumption that dealers can monitor their competitors’ trades and quotes and interfere with their 
inventories, is realistic. This transparency also prevails in electronic agency markets. 
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1.4.3.2. Fragmented market 
 
By contrast, in a fragmented market, the stock order flow can be routed through different 
markets. It is possible to have multiple prices for the same asset. Dealer markets, such as 
NASDAQ, SEAQ, the foreign exchange market and the Treasury bonds market, are fragmented. 
Deals are often the outcome of bilateral transactions negotiated on the phone, which the other 
market participants cannot observe. Fragmented markets are much less transparent. Trades and 
quotes are often displayed on screens, but this display is generally not instantaneous, nor is it 
sufficient. The extent to which screen quotes can be improved (in terms of price and quantity) is 
usually uncertain. They do not show the intensity with which agents want to sell or buy. In many 
over the counter (hereafter OTC) markets (interbank market, infrequently traded bonds or 
equities), company quotes can only be obtained by phone. Even if screen quotes are fixed (which 
is the case in the NASDAQ, in the French government bonds OAT market, or in SEAQ for 
alpha stocks), they can be irrelevant. Therefore, in fragmented markets, the agents can only assess 
quotes and positions of their competitors. In this respect, the agents who provide liquidity to the 
market are at a disadvantage, compared to the general public. Market order traders can ask 
market makers for quotes, in search of the best quotes. This is not possible for market makers. A 
given market maker would not show his best quotes, and hence his inventory position, to a 
competitor who asks him for a price on the telephone. Biais, Foucault and Hillion (1997) give 
three possible explanations for such fragmentation:  
 
1. A security can be listed on more than one exchange (multiple quotations). For example, 
in the U.S. market it is possible that the NYSE stocks are also listed in regional stock 
exchanges (Boston, Chicago, Cincinnati, Pacific and Philadelphia) or in some private 
trading networks (Instinet). 
2. Off-exchange transactions (outside the principal market). Some orders are handled 
differently from others. For instance, small orders are routed to immediate execution, 
whereas, large block trades are negotiated off-board in an upstairs market. These 
transactions are difficult to handle, because block trades provoke unfavourable price 
variations for two reasons: first, if the market is not liquid, and secondly, if transactions 
are perceived as a signal of the stock value. 
In many equity markets, including USA, there are two distinct trading mechanisms for 
large block transactions. Madhavan (2000) gives a good explanation of block trade 
mechanisms. First, a block can be sent directly to the downstairs or principal markets, 
such as the NYSE or NASDAQ. Second, a block trade can be directed to the upstairs 
market where a block broker facilitates the trading process by locating counterparties to 
the trade and then formally crossing the trade in accordance with the regulations of the 
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principal market9. One argument cited for the growth of upstairs markets in the U.S. is 
that the downstairs markets, in particular the NYSE, offer too much information about a 
trader's identity and motivations for trade. Madhavan (1995) and Seppi (1990) argue that 
big traders are afraid of having their strategies leaked, and prefer to use upstairs markets 
to accomplish large-block trades in one single step. 
3. OTC markets. Intermediaries are not gathered into the same place where orders arrive. 
The market maker gives price quotations by telephone or by electronic terminals. Some 
price-driven markets are fragmented by nature, for example the NASDAQ, the SEAQ, 
and the interbank markets (Biais 1993). 
 
Fragmentation causes some problems with respect to transparency. They concern information 
release about exchange conditions, and the possibility that the same security has two different 
prices in two different locations. Biais, Foucault and Hillion (1997) give two possible solutions to 
avoid such problems: 
1. Even if transactions are decentralized, exchange conditions must be centralized. Block 
trades can be negotiated in the upstairs market, but must be recorded in the order book. 
2. Try to connect different markets where the same stock is negotiated, so the broker is 
informed about different prices and can choose the best one. This system is used in the 
U.S. market for stocks that are handled on the NYSE and on the regional stock 
exchanges (for example the ITS trading system). 
 
1.4.4. Other methods 
 
There are other factors that allow to distinguish markets (Madhavan 2000, Biais, Foucault and 
Hillion 1997): 
1. One important difference between trading systems is the quantity and the quality of the 
information available to the market participants at the time the price is formed. Pagano 
and Röell (1996), Madhavan (2002) and O’Hara (1995) define transparency as the extent 
to which market makers can observe the size and direction of the current order flow. 
Their notion is closer to that of Bias (1993), who defines transparency as the visibility of 
the limit orders or market maker quotes. 
Non transparent markets provide little in the way of indicated prices or quotes, while 
highly transparent markets often provide a great deal of relevant information before 
(quotes, depths, etc.) and after (actual prices, volumes, etc.) trade occurs. A useful way 
to think about transparency, which has many aspects, is to divide it into pre-trade and 
                                                 
9 Reputation plays a critical role in upstairs markets, where it allows traders who are known not to trade on private 
information to obtain better prices than in an anonymous market. Liquidity providers, especially institutional traders, 
are reluctant to submit large limit orders, and thus offer free options to traders using market orders. This problem is 
especially significant in systems with open LOB and minimum price increments. Upstairs markets allow those traders 
to participate selectively, screened by block brokers, who avoid trades which may originate from traders with private 
information. 
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post-trade dimensions. Most continuous auction markets provide great pre-trade 
transparency, i.e. great visibility of the best price at which any incoming order can be 
executed. All deals are immediately publicized on-line. In electronic auction markets, 
brokers can scan the LOB and see exactly at what price an order would execute (except for 
hidden orders). In contrast, dealer markets, such as foreign exchange and corporate junk 
bond markets, NASDAQ and LSE, display only very limited information, namely quotes at 
which market maker must deal until they reach the posted size. Post-trade transparency, i.e., 
the public visibility of recent trading history, also tends to be lower in dealer markets 
(Madhavan 2002). This reflects both inherent technical factors and deliberate choices by 
exchange authorities. Technically, after a deal is negotiated over the telephone, it takes at 
least a few minutes to report it to the exchange and to publish it on the screen. 
On the NYSE, until recently only the specialist could see the orders in the order book at 
every moment10. Only the bid-ask quotation is electronically disseminated to traders 
who are not specialists. In the Tokyo Stock Exchange, the Saitori can give some 
information about the order book, but only to the agents on the floor. In Tokyo, only 
the lead offices of the member can observe the orders, and they are required not to 
disseminate this information. The Toronto Stock Exchange and the Paris Bourse use an 
automated LOB system, which offers continuous trading with a high degree of transparency 
(i.e. public display of current and away limit orders) without relying on dealers. The Paris 
CAC and the SuperMontage11 NASDAQ systems display for everybody five best bid 
and offer prices and the number of share offered at each of the five bid and ask quotes. 
Only the Société de Bourse France knows the totality of the order book. 
Pagano and Röell (1996) investigated whether greater transparency enhances liquidity by 
reducing the opportunities for taking advantage of less informed or non-professional 
participants. They found that greater transparency generates lower trading costs for 
uninformed traders, although not necessarily for every size of trade. 
 
2. It is possible to stabilize the stock prices if they exceed a maximal limit. This measure is 
adopted in order to avoid great variations. When the trading system stops the 
mechanism, the orders are accumulated. After the trading halt, a price that best balances 
the aggregate quantities is fixed. In a dealer market, this task is given to the market 
maker. The most organized markets also have formal procedures to halt trading in the 
event of large price movements (Circuit breaker). 
                                                 
10 Now all traders can observe the book. 
11 SuperMontage, is a system that aggregates and displays the five best bids and offers for each stock in Nasdaq 
trades. Island Chief Technology Officer William Sterling says that SuperMontage will not allow its participants to 
maintain their anonymity throughout the lifecycle of a trade. If market makers enter a bid on SuperMontage as non-
attributable, and if someone comes in and takes this bid, they will find out who it was as soon as the bid is executed. 
Thus SuperMontage offers pre-trade anonymity, but not post-trade anonymity. 
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3. The degree of exchange automation: floor versus screen-based electronic systems. 
Nowadays many markets are automated. Many aspects of the exchange process can be 
automated, for example orders, information release and order execution. Such 
automated mechanisms reduce the costs of transactions. 
 
4. Decimalization and minimum tick. Decimalization refers to the quoting of stock prices 
in decimals rather than fractions, such as eighths or sixteenths12. The minimum tick is a 
separate issue, although in the literature it is often associated with decimalization, and 
concerns the smallest increment in which stock prices can be quoted. For example, a 
system may have decimal pricing but a minimum tick of 5 cents or 2 cents. From an 
economic perspective, what is relevant is the minimum tick, not the unit of 
measurement of stock prices (Madhavan 2002). 
 
5. Price discovery: the extent to which the market provides independent price discovery, or 
uses prices determined in another market as the basis for transactions. 
 
6. The allowed order form, i.e., market, limit, stop, hidden, upstairs crosses, baskets. 
 
 
The following table gives a survey of the main characteristics of some of the world stock 
exchanges. 
 
Table 1.4.1 Variation in Real-World Trading Systems 
Architecture Typical NYSE NYSE Paris POSIT Chicago Foreign 
Elements ECN Open Intraday Bourse  Board of Exchange 
  Market Trading   Trade Market 
Continuous trading X  X X  X X 
Dealer presence  X X   X  
Price discovery X X X X  X X 
Automation X   X X   
Anonymity X X  X X   
Pretrade quotes X  X X  X  
Posttrade quotes X X X X X X  
 
Source: Madhavan (2002) 
                                                                                                                                                        
SuperMontage integrates the functionality of Nasdaq's two incumbent systems: SuperSoes, the market's sole 
execution pipeline for all market-maker-addressed orders, and SelectNet, an order-routing vehicle, which Nasdaq 
participants use mainly to send orders to ECNs. 
12 Proponents of decimalization in the US markets noted that it would allow investors to compare prices more 
quickly than could be done when fractions were used, thereby facilitating competition. They often mistakenly 
estimated important cost savings for investors because quoted spreads were thought to fall dramatically. 
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1.4.5. Concluding remarks 
 
At present, many different market structures are available, and there is an open discussion 
regarding which is the best one. 
The current trend towards automation of auction trading mechanisms raises one important 
question: would a fully automated auction market provide better execution than a floor-based 
market structure ? Theoretical models on the competition between an automated and a hybrid 
LOB (with specialists) (e.g. Glosten (1994) and Seppi (1997)) suggest that neither structure is 
clearly superior. Domowitz and Steil (1999) discuss the benefits of an automated trading 
structure. They also survey the empirical literature on the issue and conclude that electronic 
trading generally yields considerable cost savings over traditional floor-based trading. In contrast, 
Benveniste, Marcus and Wilhelm (1992) argue that the professional relationship which evolves on 
the floor of an exchange, due to repeated trading between the specialists and floor brokers, 
results in information sharing on forthcoming order flows and the intrinsic value of the stock. 
This helps to reduce the information asymmetry and to increase the effective liquidity of a 
traditional floor-based system. 
Theory suggests that a multilateral trading system (such as single-price call auctions) is an 
efficient mechanism for aggregating diverse information. Consequently, there is great interest in 
the way call auctions operate, and whether such a system can be used more widely for trading 
securities. Analyses of single price markets were made by Mendelson (1982) and Ho, Schwartz 
and Withcomb (1985). The information aggregation argument suggests that call auctions are 
valuable when there is wide spread uncertainty over fundamentals and market failure is possible. 
Empirical studies seem to support this aspect of the argument. Indeed, many continuous markets 
use single price auction mechanisms when there is much uncertainty, for examples at the time of 
opening, closing, or reopening after a trading halt. 
Smidt (1979) discusses how differences between periodic and continuous systems might affect 
returns. Amihud and Mendelson (1987) compare and contrast return variances from open-to-
open and close-to-close for NYSE stocks. Any differences are likely to result from diversities in 
the trading system. Their evidence seems to support the view that distinctions between 
continuous and batch systems can be observed in variables such as price and return volatility. 
Similarly, Amihud and Mendelson (1991), Stoll and Whaley (1990), and Forster and George 
(1996) also conclude that differences in market structures affect returns. Amihud, Mendelson and 
Lauterbach (1997) document large increases in asset values for stocks which moved to 
continuous trading on the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange. 
Madhavan (1992) shows that a quote-driven system provides greater price efficiency than a 
continuous auction system. Both mechanisms reach the equilibrium when free entry into market 
making is possible.  
Madahavan, Porter and Weaver (2002) found a decrease in liquidity associated with the display 
of the LOB on the Toronto Stock Exchange after checking for volume, volatility and price. 
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Biais (1993) compared centralized and fragmented markets, showing that although expected 
spreads are equal in both markets, centralized markets exhibit more volatile spreads than 
fragmented markets. 
In theoretical studies, various conclusions were reached about the effects of transparency. 
According to some models (O’Hara 1995), transparency can reduce problems of adverse 
selection, and thus of spreads, by allowing dealers to screen out traders likely to have private 
information. Other models, such as Madhavan (1996), however, indicate that transparency can 
exacerbate price volatility. Intuitively disclosing information would allow investors to better 
estimate the extent of noise trading, thus increasing vulnerability of the market to asymmetric 
information effects. Contrary to popular belief, Madhavan (1996) showed that potentially adverse 
effects of transparency are likely to be greatest in thin markets. 
Transparency is a complicated subject, but recent research provides revealing insights:  
(1) Pre- and post-trade transparency can affect liquidity and price efficiency (O’Hara 1995, 
Madhavan 1996) 
(2) Greater transparency is associated with more informative prices (O’Hara 1995, 
Bloomfield and O’Hara 2000) 
(3) Complete transparency is not always beneficial. Much pre-trade transparency reduces 
liquidity, because traders are unwilling to reveal their intentions to trade (Madhavan, 
Porter and Weaver 2002). Too much post-trade transparency can induce fragmentation, 
as traders seek off-market venues for their trades. 
(4) Changes in transparency are likely to benefit one group of traders at the expense of others 
(Madhavan 2002). 
Consequently, no particular market structure will be equally preferred by all traders and 
dealers. 
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1.5. Microstructure models 
 
Theoretically, every investor wants to maximize his utility, by buying a stock at the lowest 
price and selling it at the highest price within a certain investment horizon. In every market 
structure, the ask price, the price at which an investor can buy, is different from the bid price, the 
price at which it is possible to sell. Therefore, the realization of the investor’s objective requires a 
full understanding of the price formation process. The aim of this chapter is to summarize 
theoretical and empirical works on some of the most important microstructure models in this 
field. Any survey must be selective, especially for the microstructure literature, which comprises 
literally thousands of research articles spanning over decades. The microstructure literature 
considers costs of transactions, fiscality and other frictions in the analysis of the price formation 
process of financial assets. Cohen, Hawawini, Maier, Schwartz and Whitcomb (1980), Biais 
(1989) and Peiers (1997) have analysed how some mechanisms of market exchange can influence 
price formation in the presence of such frictions. In particular Cohen, Hawawini, Maier, Schwartz 
and Whitcomb (1980) say in their paper that the literature on security market microstructure 
discusses the interplay between market participants, trading mechanisms and the dynamic 
behaviour of security prices in a regime where frictions impede the trading process. These 
frictions lead to a bid-ask spread and to a price settlement that is different from one stock to 
another. Many old models claim that the price formation is independent of transaction costs, 
behaviour of traders, organization of financial markets and revelation of information. However, 
these elements are important variables, which can influence the price formation process. 
Theoreticians have constructed many models in order to explain how the equilibrium price must 
consider investors' behaviour and security market structure. Recent studies on the microstructure 
of security markets draw attention to the role of the market organization in the determination of 
security prices. It is now increasingly recognized that institutional factors, such as the broker’s 
handling of investor orders, the management of the limit order book or the existence of 
designated specialists with a firm obligation to maintain price continuity, affect the speed of price 
adjustment to changing conditions (Beja and Goldman 1980). The determinant of prices in a 
security market and its adjustment to new conditions is of great interest in the financial literature. 
Among the first investigations into the behaviour of stock prices were Bachelier (1900) and 
Kendall (1953). Kendall (1953), thanks to Bachelier's doctoral thesis, suggested the random walk 
hypothesis and developed the idea of market efficiency. After Kendall (1953), other authors such 
as Fama (1965) and Samuelson (1965), defined the concept of market efficiency, with three 
degrees of efficiency suggested later by Fama (1970). This theory is based on the random walk of 
price variation and considers the following hypothesis: 
 
1. Homogeneity of investor expectations 
2. Cost-free availability of information 
 
Financial studies have considered other anomalies affecting stock prices (PER, week-end 
effect, January effect, etc), but all these hypotheses concerning efficiency theory were unable to 
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explain the reality of the price formation process. Hypotheses such as homogeneity and cost-free 
availability of information, are unreal. Investor expectations are heterogeneous, because they 
differ with respect to richness level, beliefs, risk aversion and quality of information possessed. 
Heterogeneity in the price formation process is the basis for developing rational expectation 
models. These models consider that investors have much more information available, namely 
their own information and the information derived from prices which reveal totally or partially 
the private information of other market participants. Admati (1985) says that, if, in a speculative 
market, agents have diverse and asymmetric information, the equilibrium price will usually 
contain information beyond that held originally by each agent. This observation, together with 
the assumption that agents make statistically correct inferences based on all the information they 
possess, including current prices, leads to the notion of a rational expectation equilibrium, where 
equilibrium prices affect the behaviour of the agents (both by entering their budget constraints 
and by influencing their beliefs and predictions). Admati (1985) and Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) 
consider the heterogeneity expectations in their model of price formation. 
Grossman (1976) shows that the price can resolve the asymmetric information problem which 
exists between informed13 and uninformed agents. He shows that is possible to obtain a complete 
revealing equilibrium, where prices fully reflect the information (public and private). 
Problems can occur when the information obtained by the informed has to be paid for. In 
fact, if equilibrium prices reveal all the available information, the informed traders couldn't obtain 
more profit than the uninformed one. Under these conditions, nobody has an interest to pay in 
order to be informed, and therefore equilibrium prices can not reveal any private information. 
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) come to the conclusion that the price cannot be fully revealing. In 
order to solve this problem, the authors show the possibility of introducing a noise. This leads to 
the noisy rational expectation models (Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), Hellwig (1980), Admati 
(1985), Battacharya and Spiegel (1991)). The noise denotes investors with other objectives beside 
informational ones: liquidity traders. 
Liquidity traders' reasons to exchange are liquidity needs, fiscal advantages or information they 
erroneously consider superior, for reasons that are not related directly to the future payoffs of 
financial assets14. A reasonable approach is to differentiate between discretionary liquidity traders 
and nondiscretionary liquidity traders (Admati and Pfleiderer 1988). Discretionary liquidity 
traders can be strategic and must operate over a given day, choosing when to trade during the 
day, subject to the constraint of trading only once during the time period, so as to minimize the 
(expected) cost of their transaction, i.e. they deal in the periods of lowest costs. Nondiscretionary 
liquidity traders must trade a particular number of shares at a particular time, regardless of costs. 
 
                                                 
13 Informed traders trade in order to benefit from private information about the firm's value; they maximize their 
expected trading profit. 
14 Included in this category are large traders, such as some financial institutions, whose trades reflect the liquidity 
needs of their clients or who trade for portfolio balancing reasons. Most models that involve liquidity (noise) trading 
assume that liquidity traders are executed by large institutional traders. 
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Noisy rational expectation models are not always sufficient to explain the price formation 
process, because these models use the hypothesis that investors have a negative utility function. 
Therefore, the richness level is not considered in the determination of the equilibrium price. 
Noisy rational expectation models assume that agents know the models of the economists 
which they use for the description and the definition of prices. The behaviour of economic 
agents does not always follow economists' models (Shiller (1990)). The noise trading theory has a 
positive impact on the study of market microstructure because, it helps to develop models which 
consider the interaction among informed traders, liquidity traders and market makers for a better 
description of the bid-ask price formation. This theory is criticizable because of the difficulty to 
identify the noise trader. As a number of studies have documented (Kendall 1953, Fama 1965, 1970, 
Solnik 1973, Solnik and Bousquet 1990, Jain and Joh 1988, McInish and Wood 1990), the 
microstructure theory has a positive impact on studies regarding price formation of financial assets. 
In the microstructure models, the existence of transaction costs involves some frictions in the 
price formation process. There exist two types of costs: 
 
1. Direct costs: information costs, costs of market access 
2 Implicit costs: the bid-ask spread, the difference between the lowest available quote to 
sell the security under consideration, and the highest available quote to buy the same 
security (Choi, Salandro and Shastri 1988). The BAS represents one component of the 
transaction costs faced by a trader who desires immediacy and actively seeks to 
establish position in a security (Demsetz 1968). 
 
In particular, the BAS theory has continuously progressed since the seminal work of Demsetz 
(1968) and the first spread measurement model provided by Roll (1984). The bid-ask spread becomes 
the central axis of the microstructure theory15. The bid-ask spread is recognized and widely studied 
for the Anglo-Saxon markets, where price-driven markets are the dominant organization. In an order-
driven market, the spread is also a reality. The different theories of financial markets define two 
typologies of bid-ask spread (Bessembinder and Kaufman (1997) and Stoll (1989)):  
 
1. Quoted spread: it is the difference between the ask and the bid price quoted by the 
market maker. In an order-driven market, it is the difference between the two best 
limits of the limit order book on each side. It is directly observable and is related to 
characteristics such as the volume of trading stock price, the number of market makers, 
the risk of security and other factors (Stoll 1989). 
2. Effective spread: it reflects the reduction in trading costs attributable to trades executed 
within the quotes (estimate of the percentage execution cost actually paid by a trader 
                                                 
15 The pioneering analyses of BAS are: Stigler (1964), Demsetz (1968), West and Tinic (1971), Tinic (1972), Tinic and 
West (1972, 1974), Garman (1976), Beja and Hakansson (1977), Cohen, Maier, Schwartz and Withcomb (1978), 
Benston and Hagerman (1974), Hamilton (1976, 1978), Branch and Freed (1977), Stoll (1978), Ho and Stoll (1979, 
1980), Newton and Quandt (1979), Schleef and Mildenstein (1979), Smidt (1979), Amihud and Mendelson (1980). 
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and of gross revenue to the supplier of immediacy). There are two components: price 
impact and realized half spread (Bessembinder and Kaufmann 1997). Price impact 
measures the average information content of the trade, which comprises market making 
costs in the form of losses to better informed trades. Realized half spread (price reversal 
after a trade) measures the effective gain (net of losses to better informed traders, but 
gross of inventory and order processing costs), of the service given by the market 
maker. The latter is the only one that has an economic meaning for the market maker. 
It is equal to the expected gain of the dealer through a round trip exchange. Realized 
half spread ought to be estimated. However, its estimation is difficult because of 
intermediation costs, defined as the difference between transaction price and 
equilibrium price. The equilibrium price is not observable. It is less than the spread 
quoted by a dealer (Stoll 1989). 
 
Quoted and effective spreads are equal only under two conditions: 
 
1. Absence of transaction costs 
2. The execution of each order at the best bid and ask price. 
 
Lee (1993) compares average quoted and effective BAS for trades executed off the NYSE to 
that executed on the NYSE within 10 minutes. Huang and Stoll (1994) estimate quoted and 
effective (realized) spreads by exchange, for a sample of large capitalization NYSE issues. 
Bessembinder and Kaufmann (1997) extend the analysis to include small and medium 
capitalization as well. They find that the effective BAS is only modestly larger for trades executed 
off the NYSE. However, the trades transacted off the NYSE contain less information, as 
measured by their impact on subsequent market prices, than trades executed on the NYSE. As a 
consequence, the realized BAS is lower by a factor of two to three for trades executed on the 
NYSE. 
The observation that realized BAS is substantially greater for trades executed off the NYSE 
implies higher market making costs for the non-informed. 
 
1.5.1. Determinants of the spread 
 
Schwartz (1988) identifies four classes of variables as determinants of BAS: activity, risk, 
information and competition. Greater trading activity can lead to lower spreads, due to 
economies of scale in trading costs. Using trading cost arguments, previous researchers show that 
a number of activity variables are significant determinants of BAS, including: 
 
1. The average number of shares traded (Tinic 1972) 
2. The volume (Tinic and West 1972, Branch and Freed (1977), Stoll (1978)) 
3. The number of transactions (Benston and Hagerman (1974). 
Copeland and Galai (1983) model the BAS as an option provided by the market maker, and 
show that the BAS is inversely related to the frequency of trading. They note that since less 
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frequent trading usually means lower trading volume, the BAS is likely to be inversely related to 
measures of market activity. Inventory control models (Garman (1976) and Ho and Stoll (1980, 
1981) show that uncertainty in the arrival of buy and sell orders forces dealers away from their 
optimal inventory position. Consequently, as in Amihud and Mendelson (1980), increasing order 
arrival variability would increase the BAS. Tinic (1972) and Hamilton (1978) hypothesize instead 
a direct relationship between the BAS and the intrinsic risk of holding a security. Several more 
recent studies relate information asymmetries between informed and liquidity traders to trading 
cost in security markets. Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and Hasbrouck (1988) think that as dealers’ 
perceived exposure to private information rises, the BAS widens. Only few researchers 
(Hamilton, 1978), have focused on the intensity of competition among traders as a source of 
downward pressure on the spread. 
In the literature, many researchers who studied the bid-ask spread components in order to 
explain transactions costs, have documented that the quoted spread must cover three types of 
costs incurred by providers of immediacy: 
 
1. Order processing costs (Roll 1984). 
2. Inventory holding costs (Stoll 1978, Ho and Stoll 1979, 1980, Amihud and Mendelson 
1980). Under the inventory cost model, realized spread is less than quoted spread, 
because dealers lower both bid and ask prices after a dealer purchase and raise both 
after a sale, in order to induce transactions which will equilibrate the inventory. 
3. Adverse information costs (Grossman and Stiglitz 1980, Copeland and Galai 1983, 
Glosten and Milgrom 1985, Kyle 1985 and Easley and O’Hara 1987). Under the 
adverse information cost model, bid and ask spread prices are changed in a similar way 
to reflect the information conveyed by transactions. 
 
I shall try to analyse these three components in more detail. 
 
1.5.1.1. Order processing costs 
 
The order processing cost can be viewed as the compensation to the market maker for 
providing liquidity service. Copeland and Stoll (1990) argue that order costs represent clerical 
costs of carrying out a transaction, the cost of the dealer's time, and the cost of the physical 
communication and office equipment necessary to carry out the transaction. To a considerable 
degree, order costs are fixed with respect to any particular transaction. Because of these fixed 
costs, the average order processing cost per share should decrease as trade size increases. 
Under the assumption that the market maker faces only order processing costs, Roll (1984), 
Glosten (1987), Niederhoffer and Osborne (1966) derive a simple measure of the spread based 
on the negative autocovariance of security returns. 
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1.5.1.2. Inventory holding costs 
 
A. Theoretical approach 
 
In the inventory models, the risk faced by a dealer during a transaction is an inventory risk: at 
the ask price proposed by a dealer for an asset, some traders may buy a certain amount of that 
asset, but there may be a much smaller (or much greater) amount of the asset offered at the bid 
price for the same time. During these periods, the dealer position is not hedged (Kast and 
Lapierd (1997)). Both authors say that the obligation of the market maker to be a counterpart can 
lead him to hold portfolios whose risk and diversification characteristics are not optimal. This is a 
cost for the market maker, which hit the customer in the form of a wide spread. The spread 
compensates market makers for bearing the risk of holding unwanted inventories.  
Inventory models were developed by Stoll (1978), Amihud and Mendelson (1980), Ho and 
Stoll (1980, 1981), Biais (1993) and Kast and Lapierd (1997). They suggest models that explain 
the behaviour of a risk averse market maker (monopolist) who has to take a risky position in 
order to satisfy the liquidity needs of investors. Stoll's (1978) study shows that inventory holding 
costs are a function of: 
 
1. Characteristics of the market maker: his risk aversion and his inventory position 
2. The absolute value of the transaction 
3. Characteristics of the title: return volatility and time holding period. Holding 
period depends on the transaction volume. 
 
He finds that the stock spread is thin when the dealer has a more important position. 
Ho and Stoll (1980, 1981) also show that uncertainty in the arrival of buy and sell orders 
forces dealers away from their optimal inventory position. 
The main implications of such inventory models are: 
1. If a dealer is long, he may be reluctant to take an additional inventory without 
dramatic temporary price reductions. Price effects become larger following a 
sequence of trades on one side of the market (institutions break up their block 
trades). 
2. Transitory inventory effects affect market impact costs, which will be greater 
toward the end of the day, because market makers must be compensated for 
bearing overnight risks (Cushing and Madhavan 2001). 
3.  The degree to which dealers are capital constrained (larger inventory effects might 
be observed for dealers with less capital) 
4.  Market makers can be viewed as an institution to bring buyers and sellers together 
in time through the use of inventory. A buyer doesn’t need to wait for a seller to 
arrive, but may simply buy from a dealer who depletes his or her inventory. 
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B. Empirical studies 
 
Kast and Lapierd (1997) model the dealers’ behaviour when the bid and ask prices are fixed. 
These prices reflect the risk aversion of the market makers. Benston and Hagerman (1974) 
suggest the width of the spread is an increasing function of the market maker risk aversion, and 
decreases with the number of market makers. If the market makers are risk averse, then inventory 
holding costs per unity increase with the risk of holding non optimal portfolios. Besides, the 
thinness of the spread can be associated with the existence of a large number of market makers, 
because the presence of other dealers on the market allows the other dealers to compensate the 
temporary imbalance of their inventory by doing inter-dealer exchanges. 
Biais (1993) confirms Benston and Hagerman's (1974) results and suggests that the positive 
relation between inventory and spread is much more pronounced when the variance of the asset 
is important. 
Mannaï (1995) tries to decompose the spread in the option market, where inventory holding 
costs are an increasing function of volatility. 
Ho and Stoll (1983) develop a theoretical model in a multi-period context. This model 
considers market equilibrium, the behaviour of two market makers and the determinants of the 
bid-ask spread. Hansch, Naik and Viswanathan (1998) confirm, through an empirical study in the 
London market, the theoretical results of Ho and Stoll (1983): 
 
1. The composition of the market spread depends on the position of the market maker. If 
he holds important risky assets, the dealer wouldn't buy other stocks in order to avoid 
increasing his positions on one side of the market. He would announce a favourable bid 
price. On the contrary, if his position is near zero or negative, the market maker would 
quote an interesting ask price. 
2. The market spread is a function of expectation of the market makers on the positions of 
their competitors. 
 
Cohen, Maier, Schwartz and Whitcomb (1981) and Hamon, Handa, Jacquillat and Schwartz 
(1994) study the inventory holding cost in a market structure without market makers, and where 
the spread is determined by the limit orders. There are two implications: first, the inventory effect 
causes quotations to change systematically as a function of order flow. After a buy (sell), the 
dealer stocks increase (decrease), and as a consequence his quotations decrease (increase). 
Secondly, these spread movements render much more likely the arrival of a sell order as a 
consequence of a buy order, and vice-versa. This means a negative order autocorrelation. 
Choi, Salandro and Shastri’s (1988) approach treats the BAS as a holding cost for the dealer. 
In this framework, BAS is directly related to the dealer's inventory costs which he incurs because 
the dealer cannot diversify his portfolio risk (Demsetz 1968, Ho and Stoll 1981). This approach 
has been criticized mainly because, in practice, dealers diversify operations across many securities, 
and practice risk sharing through partnership and pooling arrangements. 
Bessembinder (1992) finds that spreads widen with proxies for inventory carrying costs. These 
proxies are: forecast of price risk, interest rate based measures of liquidity costs, and a non 
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trading indicator. These findings can be contrasted with those of other studies conducted in 
equity markets (Hasbrouck (1991), George, Kaul and Nimalendran (1993) and Madhavan and 
Smidt (1991)) where inventory costs appear to have little effect if any on market maker quotes. 
In the model of Amihud and Mendelson (1980), as the market maker approaches the desired 
inventory position, the BAS is reduced. Hence, if greater volumes of trading or larger trade sizes 
move a dealer away from the desired inventory position, spreads will increase. Ho and Macris 
(1984) show that the market maker adjusts his quotation in relation to his inventory position. He 
increases his quotations when his inventory level is below his optimal objective. Madhavan and 
Sofianos (1998) invalidate this result. They show that market makers check their inventories, 
participating actively in the market instead of only adjusting their quotations. Specialists can 
manage their positions by selectively trading rather than changing their bid and ask quotes. If 
specialists selectively time the magnitude and direction of their trades to control their inventory, 
they will participate more actively on the sell (buy) side when they are long (short). 
Lee, Mucklow and Ready (1993), Hasbrouck and Sofianos (1993) and Madhavan and Smidt 
(1993) also find some evidence on the relation of BAS to dealer inventory control costs. They 
find that for a sample of NYSE stocks, BAS becomes wider in response to higher trading 
volume. Consequently, at the opening and closing of the market when volume tends to be higher, 
there would be greater order imbalance and, therefore, the BAS would be wider than during the 
rest of the day. Thus, for a specialist structure such as the NYSE, this type of model would 
predict a U-shaped BAS pattern, as a single market maker may be forced to accumulate unwanted 
inventories during peak trading volume, while in a system using competing market makers, such 
as the CBOE, he will be less likely to accumulate such positions. 
Furthermore Chan, Chung and Johnson (1995) suggest that specialists and competing market 
makers may differ in their ability to manage imbalances by using their bid and ask quotes. In 
maintaining a fair and orderly market, specialists cannot execute orders only on one side of the 
spread, unlike competing market makers, who can set bid and ask quotes to attract trades on one 
side of the spread only. 
Analysis of inventory based models suggests that specialists will widen spreads during periods 
of high volume, i.e., at the open, and the close. This theory does not explain the occurrence of 
high volume at these times; for this I shall turn to information models. 
 
1.5.1.3. Adverse information cost (asymmetric information models) 
 
A. Theoretical approach 
 
The presence of investors with private information modifies the behaviour of the market 
makers and affect the bid-ask spread (Bagehot 1971). In the asymmetric information models 
(Copeland and Galai (1983), Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and Easley and O'Hara (1987)), the 
spread is considered as an indemnity of potential losses which the market maker incurs in the 
presence of better informed investors (adverse selection component). 
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Informed investors are defined as investors having superior information with respect to the 
market maker. If the dealer isn't able to identify these investors, he has to increase his spread in 
order to compensate his possible losses to informed investors. 
Bagehot (1971), Copeland and Galai (1983) and Glosten and Milgrom (1985) assume the 
existence, in a continuous market, of informed and non-informed investors and risk neutral 
market makers. Giving this situation, the dealer includes in his prices a cost that compensates him 
for the expected losses to informed investors when activity is disguised through noise traders. 
Kyle (1985) underlines this disguise behaviour and gives the following interpretation: in the 
equilibrium, informed investors, in order not to reveal themselves, have to exchange the same 
quantity as the non-informed ones. In this way, the informed ones, who imitate the behaviour of 
the liquidity traders, reduce the capacity of the dealers to distinguish between their orders and the 
ones executed by the non-informed. Since they cannot distinguish the trading of the insider from 
the trading of noise traders, the noise traders in effect provide camouflage, which enables the 
insiders to make profits at the expense of market makers. 
In fact, if the insider exchanges a different quantity with respect to non-informed agents, he is 
immediately revealed to the market. Thus, there is a gradual incorporation of information into 
prices. Easley and O'Hara (1995) consider the case where the non-informed can exchange small 
and big quantities. They show that, in this case, there exists equilibrium where the informed 
agents exchange only big quantities. This leads to a different spread for big and small orders. 
They also suggest that, when the number of transactions is thin until a certain moment, it is less 
probable that there is an informed agent in the market. This means that the spread decreases 
during the time when the frequency of transaction is thin and the exchange volume is low. 
 
B. General empirical evidence 
 
Copeland and Galai (1983) pay attention to the effect of information in the spread. In the 
presence of informed and non-informed investors, the market maker is likely to offer an option 
out of the money for a certain number of stocks at a certain moment. The exercise price of this 
option determines the spread. Copeland and Galai (1983) show that the ask and bid prices are the 
result of an arbitrage between eventual losses and expected gains from liquidity providers. 
Nevertheless, according to Glosten and Milgrom (1985), the mean value of the spread depends 
on the distribution manner of the arrival of the informed and non-informed investors, the 
elasticity of supply and demand of the non-informed, and the information quality of the 
informed during the period of transaction. Concerning the impact of the number of investors on 
the spread, Glosten and Milgrom (1985) confirm the result of Copeland and Galai (1983). 
According to them, the increasing number of informed leads to a wider spread. In the Glosten 
and Milgrom (1985) model, the adverse selection spread component is equal to the revision of 
the expectation of the market makers after the submission of an order. When someone submits 
an order to buy (sell) stocks, the uninformed market maker, knowing that the order might be 
information motivated, revises his expectations of the future stock value upward (downward). 
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Since the revision in expectations, conditional on the type of order received, can be anticipated, 
the rational market maker incorporates it into his bid and asks prices. 
For Hasbrouck (1991), trades are a signal of private information. In his article, he proposes 
two new measures of trade informativeness. Many other microstructure models decompose 
prices into efficient ones and a disturbance term that comprises various microstructure 
imperfections. The variance of efficient price changes can be decomposed into trade-correlated 
and uncorrelated components. The trade correlated component has a natural interpretation as an 
absolute measure of trade informativeness (efficient price variance attributable to trade). The 
ratio of this component to the total variance is a relative measure (i.e. a proportion normalized 
with respect to the total public information). For a sample of NYSE listed companies, trades are 
found to be more informative for lower capitalization in both absolute and relative terms. From 
an analysis of intraday patterns, it appears that trades at the beginning of trading are more 
informative in absolute terms, but slightly less informative in relative terms (Hasbrouck 1991). 
Trading on private information creates inefficiencies, because there is a less than optimal risk 
sharing (Glosten 1989). This occurs because the response of market makers to the existence of 
traders with private information is likely to reduce market liquidity. In fact, if the adverse 
selection is too extreme, each market maker will expect to lose money on trade. The consequence 
is that the market shuts down until enough public information arrives to relieve the adverse 
selection problem. The institution of a monopolist specialist may ease this inefficiency. A 
monopolist specialist may even close the market in such a situation, but he doesn’t have to. The 
specialist may get some information from the informed by keeping the market open, thus 
reducing the adverse selection problem and making subsequent trades more profitable. The result 
is that both the liquidity traders and the informed traders will be better off than in a competing 
market maker system. While competing market makers are forced to set price schedules that lead 
to a conditional expected profit of zero (conditioned by the quantity traded), the monopolist 
specialist maximizes expected profits whatever the quantities (Glosten and Milgrom 1985, 
Glosten 1989). Neuberger and Hansch (1996) address the question whether dealers on the LSE 
act strategically, while a large part of the microstructure literature assumes that dealers are forced 
to make zero expected profits on each trade (Glosten and Milgrom 1985). They argue that, if 
dealers can get valuable information from order flows, one might expect them to act strategically 
in order to make money on their own account and avoid revealing their knowledge through price 
setting. They deliberately accept losses on some trades in order to make superior profits on 
others. Dealers normally do have information, which is not publicly available. In many dealership 
markets (most OTC), trade publication is neither on time nor comprehensive. Dealers tend to 
have better information than the other market participants about trades and prices. Even when 
trade prices and quantities are published promptly, there is much information available to the 
dealer, which is not made public. Thus, if dealers know more than other investors, how do they 
make use of that information ? They may not always be able to use the information to make 
money, but in many markets it is possible for a dealer to trade on his information. If he can trade 
on his information, he is also able to act strategically. This is what the authors also find. 
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Easley and O'Hara (1987), Kyle (1985) and Glosten (1987) have developed theoretical models 
suggesting that asymmetric information components should increase with the quantity traded. 
Lin, Sanger and Booth (1995), Huang and Stoll (1994), Lin (1992), Stoll (1989) Koshi and Michaely 
(2000)16 have found empirically that this assumption is correct. Jones, Kaul and Lipson (1994) 
suggest to make a distinction between competitive and strategic models. In competitive models with 
asymmetric information, the size of trades is positively related to the quality (or precision) of the 
information possessed by informed traders. Therefore, trade size introduces an adverse selection 
problem into security trading, because informed traders prefer to trade large amounts at any given 
price (Pfleiderer (1984), Easley and O’Hara (1987), Grundy and McNichols (1989), Holthausen and 
Verrecchia (1990), Kim and Verrecchia (1991)). Consequently, as Pfleiderer (1984) and Kim and 
Verrecchia (1991) explicitly show, there is a positive relation between absolute price changes and 
volume, where volume is measured as the aggregate demand of all investors. 
In strategic models, asymmetric information also leads to trading, but an informed monopolist 
trader may camouflage his trading activity by making several small size trades rather than one 
large trade (Kyle (1985), Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) and Foster and Viswanathan (1990)). Such 
strategic behaviour may attenuate the positive relation between the size of transactions and the 
informed (monopolist) trader's information. Therefore, in both competitive and strategic models, 
the size of trades or volume of the informed agents is positively related to the quality of their 
information, thus resulting in a positive relation between volume and absolute price changes. 
Why does the effective spread increase with trade size ? The conjecture that the increase is due 
to adverse information is based primarily on Easley and O'Hara (1987). The results of Lin, Sanger 
and Booth (1995) are also consistent with the model of Easley and O'Hara (1987) and supportive 
of their conjecture. 
Lin, Sanger and Booth’s (1995) measured the adverse information as a permanent component of the 
spread, but this might be biased for several reasons, especially in large trades: continuity requirements 
and the presence of limit orders may prevent the specialist from immediately adjusting quotes to a new 
equilibrium level. Another potential problem with their estimate of the adverse information component 
of the spread is that it does not use information contained in previous trades or quotes. 
Chung, McInish, Wood and Whyhowski (1995) suggest that market makers deduce the extent 
of the adverse selection problem associated with a stock, and set up the BAS accordingly, by 
observing how many financial analysts are following the stock. Market makers do this based on 
the belief that more financial analysts would follow a stock with a greater extent of information. 
Similarly, financial analysts deduce the profit potential of a stock from the size of the spread set 
up by the market makers (based on the expectation that market makers would set up a greater 
spread for a stock with a greater information asymmetry). 
                                                 
16 Koshi and Michaely (2000) investigated the effect of asymmetric information on prices and liquidity by analyzing 
trades, quotes, spreads and depths. Their finding are consistent with the hypothesis that large trades contain more 
information. Results are stronger for purchases than sales. Quoted prices are better measures of information effects 
than transaction prices, because they check for bid-ask bounces. 
CHAPTER 1 – Market structures 
  
 
40 
Benston and Hagerman (1974) use the unsystematic risk of a security as an empirical proxy for 
the degree of the market makers' exposure to informed traders. They hypothesize that the more 
frequent occurrence of firm-specific events leads to a greater unsystematic risk and, consequently, 
a greater opportunity for informed traders to trade against market makers. They predict a positive 
correlation between spreads and unsystematic risks. Stoll (1978) suggests that market makers' 
losses to informed traders will be greater for stocks with a greater trading volume. Chiang and 
Venkatesh (1988) use insider ownership and institutional holdings as proxies for the degree of 
information asymmetry faced by market makers. 
Noronha, Sarin and Saudagaran (1996) estimate the changes in the degree of asymmetric 
information after international listings. They use three different tests, developed by Hasbrouck 
(1991), Madhavan and Smidt (1991) and George et al. (1991), and arrive at the same conclusions 
as Freedman (1992) namely that dual listing attracts informed traders, because it increases their 
opportunity to trade on their inside information. Similar results are obtained for the Toronto 
Stock Exchange on the basis of the Hasbrouck (1991) VAR approach. 
Foster and Viswanathan (1996) analyze a multi-period model of trading with differently 
informed traders, liquidity traders and market makers. Generalizing Kyle’s (1985) informed 
monopolist trader model, Foster and Viswanathan (1996) assume that informed traders have 
disparate (heterogeneous) information and estimate the value of an asset not only from their own 
private information, but also using any information revealed by other traders during trading. Kyle 
(1985), Michener and Tighe (1991), Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) and Foster and 
Viswanathan (1993) show that with identical information, informed traders compete very 
aggressively, and most of the information is impounded in prices within a few trading periods (rat 
race). 
On the other hand, with heterogeneous information, each trader has some degree of 
monopoly power, because part of his information is known only to him. This reduces the degree 
of competition between traders, which provides an incentive to trade less aggressively. In 
addition, the correlation between the signals of the informed traders falls considerably as more 
trading occurs. 
 
C. Empirical evidence of the impact of public information on the asymmetric components 
 
Kim and Verrecchia (1991) model the effects of information asymmetry prior to the release of 
public information. One implication of their research is that if market makers anticipate an 
increased probability of facing an informed trader before public information is released, the 
adverse selection component of the BAS will increase. Lee, Mucklow and Ready (1993) and 
Krinsky and Lee (1996) found empirical evidence that information asymmetry affects the BAS 
around the time of publication of earnings, and Koshi and Michaely (2000) found evidence of 
increased trade around the time of dividend announcements. 
Information asymmetry might increase following the release of public information, if market 
participants differ in their ability to interpret the information. Kim and Verrecchia (1994) model 
an environment with superior information processors, who trade profitably after public 
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information events. Peiers (1997) and Ito, Lyons and Melvin (1998) found empirical evidence 
that domestic currency dealers hold an informational advantage over foreign dealers with regard 
to economic conditions within their country. Although it is unlikely that Treasury market 
participants are aware of economic news before it is released, it is still possible that certain traders 
are better to estimate the impact of economic news on bond prices, so that their trades may 
reveal information to other market participants after a certain announcement. 
Research on currency markets also highlights other types of information asymmetry that may 
be influenced by the release of public information. Lyons (1995) and Cao and Lyons (1999) 
model the foreign exchange market and suggest that the access of FX dealers to the customer 
order flow provides them with useful private information about short-term price movements. 
Evans and Lyons (2001) found empirically that a high portion of daily exchange rate movements 
can be explained by the order flow. Fleming (2001) found that order flow explains price changes 
in the US Treasury market as well, which suggests that Treasury dealers with sizeable customer 
order flows may possess an informational advantage in inter-dealer trading. 
Koshi and Michaely (2000) analyze the price and liquidity impact of trades of different sizes in 
three distinct periods: when dividends are announced, during regular periods and after the 
dividends are paid. It is likely that a trade during an announcement period will contain more 
information than a similar size trade on a regular day. A trade around the ex dividend day is least 
likely to contain information, since much of the ex-day trading is tax- rather than information 
motivated. They also examine a fourth extreme case in which market participants know a priori 
that trades have no information content. Theory predicts that such trades have no information-
based impact on either prices or liquidity. 
Regarding liquidity, average spreads are higher, and depth is lower, during announcement 
periods than during regular or ex dividend periods. Thus, the impact of an individual trade on 
spreads is most pronounced during periods when the amount of information asymmetry is 
highest. 
How can one isolate the asymmetric information component of the spread ? The simplest 
solution suggests that every variation of the quoted spread is caused by asymmetric information. 
Morse and Ushman (1983) were interested in the evolution of the asymmetric component during 
the period when the earnings of 25 stocks quoted on the Paris Bourse were announced. They 
applied the event study to the spread on the basis of daily incoming data. However, they found 
no spread modification during the quarterly earnings announcements. 
Based on Beaver’s (1968) approach, Gajewski (1996) conducted a similar study, but with 
intraday data. He showed that the spread widens significantly after earnings announcements. The 
revisions of the spread around earnings announcements reflect the mean change in the 
expectations of the agents. On the other hand, the volume conveys the heterogeneity of 
expectation revisions by the agents. Chiang and Venkatesh (1986) suggest that in order to isolate 
the asymmetric information component, one can limit the study to periods where the presence of 
informed investors is much more evident (during earnings announcements, stocks buy back 
programmes, IPO). They perform a regression of the quoted spread, with variables similar as in 
Stoll's (1978) study. For 75 stocks quoted on the NYSE, they observe a spread increase in cases 
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where earnings and dividend announcements are dissociated. A similar method is used by Franz 
Rao and Tripothy (1995) with different variables (transaction volume, volatility, PER). A 
decreasing spread following earnings announcements confirms the hypothesis of a reduction of 
asymmetric information. 
Chiang and Venkatesh (1988) use the percentage of ownership by corporate insiders as a 
proxy for the degree of information asymmetry faced by the dealer. A positive correlation 
between spreads (net of holding costs and firm size effects) and insider holdings would imply 
that dealers perceive a positive relationship between holdings and information asymmetry. The 
authors use Stoll’s (1978) theory and the empirical work as a starting point. 
They also advance the hypothesis that information asymmetry is likely to be higher before 
earnings and dividend announcements, and use time series data on spreads to ascertain whether 
spreads have increased during those pre-announcement periods. 
 
1.5.2. Empirical studies on the three components of transaction costs 
 
Ranaldo (2001) analyses the BAS components in an electronic limit order market. He uses 
three models: the Lin, Sanger and Booth (1995) (hereafter LSB) model, the Madhavan, 
Richardson and Roomans (1997) (hereafter MRR) model, and the AR(1) model, which is an 
extension of the MRR and considers also the price discreteness and the protracted effects of 
price and order dynamics, like Hasbrouck (1991). The three models are based on different 
assumptions, and their comparative analysis provides insights into the fundamental role of 
structural models. The spread components are examined also in relation to market liquidity, trade 
size and the entire trading day. Ranaldo (2001) finds that adverse selection and order persistence 
components increase with stock liquidity, and they characterize the afternoon trading. The 
adverse selection component (order processing being the main transaction component) increases 
(decreases) with trade size. 
His conclusions are: first, in all three models, the order processing cost appears to be the 
widest component. Second, the LSB model seems to overestimate (underestimate) the adverse 
selection costs (order processing), and the MRR (1997) show somewhat inconsistent results 
especially in terms of adverse selection estimates. Third, in the LSB (1995) model, greater severe 
asymmetric information costs are associated with more liquid stock, whereas in the MRR (1997) 
and in the AR(1) model, the less liquid a stock is, the more severe is the adverse selection. 
Fourth, large volume sizes convey a higher degree of private information, while order processing 
costs decrease with order size. The three models provide yet more discordant results. Finally, the 
intraday patterns of spread components show that the asymmetric information affects the 
afternoon trading, in contrast to the US markets. Order processing is much more evident in the 
earlier part of the Swiss Stock Exchange trading. 
The models of Madhavan, Richardson and Roomans (1997) and Huang and Stoll (1997) are 
closely related. The latter decompose the non-information part of the spread into inventory and 
order processing components. By contrast, the MRR (1997) model gives a better explanation on 
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the effect of information flows on stock prices over the day, and comes to interesting 
conclusions: 
 
1. Both information flows and trading frictions are important factors in explaining intraday 
price volatility in individual stocks. 
2. Information asymmetry decreases steadily throughout the day, which is consistent with 
theoretical models (Handa and Schwartz 1991 and Madhavan 1992), where market 
makers learn from the order flow, as well as with evidence from experimental markets 
(Bloomfield 1996, Bloomfield and O'Hara 1996). However, dealer costs increase over the 
day (possibly reflecting the costs of carrying inventory overnight), so that the BAS 
exhibits the U-shaped pattern already noted in previous research work. 
3. Execution costs can be estimated by taking into account the possibility that orders may be 
executed within the BAS, as well as information and inventory effects. The transaction 
costs are significantly lower than the BAS, once the probability of executing within the 
quotes is considered. In contrast to the BAS, the execution costs increase over the day. 
This result correlates with concentrated trading at the opening by discretionary liquidity 
traders who can selectively time their trades. 
 
Since my work concerns the microstructure of an order-driven market with a limit order book, 
my most important reference will be the model developed by Glosten (1994). 
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1.6. Tick-by-tick data 
 
The development of high frequency data bases, which provide the spreads (bid and ask), 
prices, trade volumes and time of each entry, allows for empirical investigations on a wide range 
of issues in the financial market. Goodhart and O’Hara (1997) offer a good summary, setting out 
some of the many important issues concerning the use, analysis and application of high frequency 
data sets and shedding new light on estimation models and on econometric methods of market 
microstructure. 
Nowadays, many stock markets operate during opening hours, on a continuous, high 
frequency basis. Market microstructure studies depend on access to this data. Second-by-second 
data allows the virtually continuous observation of prices, volumes, trade size and depths. The 
ability to access and analyse high frequency data bases provides an enormous potential for a 
better understanding of financial markets. 
One reason why data sets traditionally were low frequency and discrete, was the cost of 
collection and analysis. The advent of electronic technology has brought a dramatic fall in the 
cost of gathering data, and has decreased the cost of simultaneous transmission of “news” to 
physically dispersed viewers. These structural changes in trading have important implications for 
both the availability and interpretation of high frequency data. While each market differs, there 
are features in common. All centralized exchange data providing bids and asks, price and volume 
of any trade is usually available with a great degree of accuracy. In decentralized markets, there is 
no such quasi-automatic mechanism for providing information on quotes or trades at all. 
Most automated exchanges collect data on price, quantity, time, trader identity, order type and 
depths. However, dissemination of this information to traders and outside observers, such as 
researchers, can be problematic in some markets, for example where the LOB is not displayed 
even to market participants. In recent years, much progress has been made with respect to the 
information available to market participants. Nowadays they can observe the five best orders, on 
each side of the book, in many important stock exchanges (for example in France, Switzerland 
and in the NASDAQ SuperMontage system). 
The different process of price formation in an automated market, as compared to other 
systems, has been a subject of many studies. Glosten (1994) highlights the advantages of an 
electronic exchange, in particular compared to a market maker system but provides a useful 
overview of alternative systems. Domowitz and Wang (1994) analyse two computerized market 
designs with respect to pricing and their relative efficiency properties. Bollersev and Domowitz 
(1992) consider the effect of alternative trade algorithms in electronic clearing systems on 
volatility. Biais et al. (1995) analyse the behaviour of the Paris limit order bourse. In their view 
high frequency is fundamental for understanding the market behaviour. However, the availability 
of continuous time data sets presents the problem of dealing with a process which is itself time 
varying. 
Traditional studies had relied on price observations drawn at fixed time intervals, considering 
that prices probably don’t vary significantly over short time intervals. With the rise of 
microstructure research, the complexity of the process by which prices evolve through time has 
CHAPTER 1 – Market structures 
  
 
 45 
become more evident. A fundamental property of high frequency data is that observations can 
occur at varying time intervals, and trades are not equally spaced throughout the day. The 
sporadic nature of trading makes measurements, for example of returns and volatility, 
problematic. Researchers have dealt with these problems in a number of ways. Goodhart and 
O’Hara (1997) provide a useful review, and I shall survey the main publications in which high 
frequency data were used. 
First, in studies on the statistical characteristics of continuous financial market processes, 
which examine for example time-varying volatility. The best known fact about intraday statistical 
characteristics is that many indicators broadly follow a U-shaped, or a reverse J-shaped pattern, 
namely: the volume of trades (Admati and Pfleiderer 1988, Foster and Viswanathan 1996, Jain 
and Joh 1988 Brock and Kleidon 1992); the volatility (Kim and Verrecchia 1991, Alizadeh, 
Brandt, Diebold, 200217); the GARCH model (Bollersev et al. 1992, Engle 1992); the model 
variance as unobserved stochastic process (Jacquier 1994, Harvey and Shepard 1993, Harvey et al. 
1994); the implicit forecast of volatility derived from option markets to forecast subsequent 
volatility in the spot market (Harvey and Whaley 1992, Canina and Figlewski 1993, Jorion 1994); 
the equity prices and the spread between the bid and ask quotes. Other interesting ways of study 
are, for example, the commonality in liquidity, the relation between volume imbalance and 
spread. The intriguing feature of such temporal intraday pattern is that it is not easy to explain it 
theoretically. My work tries to provide a new and significant contribution in this field of research. 
Second, in the analysis of equity markets run by specialists. Here, much of the literature 
focuses on how market makers learn from trades, and how this in turn affects prices and quotes. 
The theoretical literature focuses on analysing the factors influencing a single market maker in his 
determination of the spread. Three main factors are identified: first, inventory carrying costs 
(Amihud and Mendelson 1980, Zabel 1981, Ho and Stoll 1983 and O’Hara and Oldfield 1986). 
Second, the existence of traders with private information (Kyle 1985, Glosten and Milgrom 1985, 
Easley and O’Hara 1987, 1992, Glosten 1989, Admati and Pfleiderer 1988, 1989) and finally, the 
other costs and the competitive conditions which help to determine the mark-up that the single 
market maker can charge. These conditions are frequently taken as being constant over the day, 
but in some models (Brock and Kleidon, 1992), they can be time varying. 
Another issue of importance is whether high frequency data bases will reveal limitations to the 
efficiency of markets, thereby providing a way of making an excess return from trading. 
Inter-market relationships form another main block of empirical research within the micro-
market studies (Stephan and Wahley 1990, De Jong Nijman and Röell 1996, Ranaldo and Vukic 
1999). The ability to access and analyse high frequency data bases provides enormous potential 
for advancing the understanding of financial markets. 
 
 
 
                                                 
17 They explain the log range as a superior volatility proxy. 
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1.7. Conclusions 
 
The positive changes in financial markets and the access to high frequency data permit 
researchers to deepen their understanding of the price formation process, where the bid-ask 
spread has always played an important role. It is widely recognized that there are three 
components constituting the bid-ask spread. 
Apart from order processing costs, the market microstructure literature has focused on two 
additional costs of market making which are also reflected in the spread: the inventory and the 
adverse selection costs of trading. Demsetz (1968), Stoll (1978), Amihud and Mendelson (1980) 
and Ho and Stoll (1981, 1983) emphasize the inventory holding costs of market makers, whereas 
Copeland and Galai (1983), Kyle (1985), Glosten and Milgrom (1985), Easley and O'Hara (1987) 
concentrate on the adverse selection costs faced by liquidity suppliers when only some traders are 
informed. The detection and measurement of the components constituting the BAS has 
progressed since the seminal work of Demsetz (1968). Subsequent models have become more 
complete and complex. Several statistical models empirically measure the components of the 
BAS. In one class of models pioneered by Roll (1984), inferences about the BAS are made from 
the serial covariance properties of observed transaction prices. Following Roll (1984), other 
covariance spread models include Choi, Salandro and Shastri (1988), George, Kaul and 
Nimalendran (1991), who solve Roll’s problem of time varying expectations of price return, and 
Stoll (1989) (order persistence). In another category of models, inferences about the spread are 
made on the basis of a trade indicator regression model. The latter is based solely on the direction 
of trade, whether incoming orders are purchases or sales. Also covariance models depend on the 
probabilities of changes in trade direction. Huang and Stoll (1997), who developed a general 
model for understanding all the relevant spread components, show that the existing trade 
indicator and covariance models fail to decompose the spread fully into all its components. Order 
processing and inventory costs are considered together even if these components are different. 
Glosten and Harris (1988) were the first to suggest such a decomposition model, but they did not 
have the quote data in order to assess the model directly. Lin, Sanger and Booth (1995) estimated 
the effect of trade size on the adverse information component of the spread, and Hasbrouck 
(1988, 1991) models the time series of quotes and trades for the NYSE in a vector autoregressive 
framework in order to make inferences about the sources of the spread. He concludes that there 
is evidence for inventory and information effects. Statistical models of spread components have 
been applied in a number of ways: for comparing dealer and auction markets (Affleck, Hedge and 
Miller 1994, Lin, Sanger and Booth 1995a, Porter and Weaver 1995), for analysing the source of 
short run return reversal (Jegadeesh and Titman 1995), for determining the sources of spread 
variation during the day (MRR 1997), for testing the importance of adverse selection of spreads 
of closed end funds (Neal and Wheatley 1998) and for assessing the effect of takeover 
announcements on the spread components (Jennings 1994). 
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2.1. Abstract 
 
This chapter describes and analyses the trading structure 
at the Paris Bourse, before and after the merger with the 
Amsterdam and Brussels Stock Exchanges. In the empirical 
part, the stocks of the CAC 40 index over a one-year period 
are analysed. First, stylised facts based on intraday 
transactions and order book data are reported, focusing on 
the intraday behaviour of returns, volatility, trading activity 
and bid-ask spread. Second, the behaviour of the 
determinants of intraday market liquidity during the trading 
session is checked, and finally the relation between volume 
imbalance and spread is investigated. 
My main empirical conclusions about intraday patterns 
are that:  
(1) Volumes follow an J-shaped pattern, confirming in part 
the empirical regularities previously found on the US markets 
and in some European markets. (2) Volatility is highest at the 
beginning of the day, diminishes throughout the trading day, 
and rises again and at the end of the trading session. (3) 
Volume imbalance is strong during the first hours of trading. 
(4) This is true also for the different measures of the BAS, 
which follows a reverse J-shaped pattern. 
The determinants of intraday market liquidity show that 
market depth, in terms of trading volume, follows a TARCH 
model, whereas market depth, estimated by order volume 
imbalance, and the tightness of intraday market liquidity 
follow a GARCH model. The time dimension and the 
intraday return volatility are also analysed, and both follow a 
GARCH model. 
I also found a strong relationship between volume 
imbalance and spread, mainly during the period from 
December 1, 1999, to March, 31, 2000. 
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2.2. Introduction and literature review 
 
Two aims for trades are widely recognized as important: liquidity and information (Admati 
and Pfleiderer 1988). In this chapter, my analysis focuses on the first objective. A fundamental 
quality sought by every investor is the liquidity of the financial market, which applies also to his 
choice and management of a portfolio. In the microstructure literature, many researchers (among 
others Kyle (1985), Admati and Pfleiderer (1988), Grossman and Miller (1988), Handa and 
Schwartz (1996) and Harris (1995)) show that the way the market is organized and works, the 
behaviour of market participants and the economic, technological and institutional environment 
can have an influence on market liquidity. 
The purpose of this paper is fourfold. In order to assess more accurately the importance of 
different features of market design, I first describe and analyse the trading structure of the Paris 
Stock Exchange and of the Euronext. Second, I present some stylised facts, which allow us to 
check whether certain anomalies found in previous studies are also characteristic for the Paris 
Bourse. In this respect, I differentiate the intraday patterns of the stock market through the 
commonly used measures of stock liquidity: volume, return, volatility, waiting time between 
subsequent trades, liquidity ratio, flow ratio and bid-ask spread. For each liquidity proxy, I check 
if it provides the same degree of estimation of market liquidity and discuss also its patterns. 
Third, I investigate the determinants of intraday market liquidity and, finally, I deepen the analysis 
on the relationship between volume imbalance and spread. 
In the literature, the liquidity is traditionally associated with the activity of market makers that 
provide the liquidity. The spread represents a measure of the value of the liquidity service 
provided by the dealer (Demsetz 1968). But the liquidity is a property that belongs to every 
market, even if no market makers are present. In fact, in an order-driven market, the liquidity is 
provided by the limit orders given by the agents. The latter, considered as liquidity demanders, 
bear the costs of the spread, i.e. the cost of immediacy18. 
As Handa and Schwartz (1996) put it, “investors want three things from markets: liquidity, 
liquidity and liquidity”. But the liquidity concept of financial markets is ambiguous, and is used 
without a clear definition (Kyle 1985). 
Some authors have tried to give a definition of market liquidity. Keynes (1930) says that “if an 
asset is more liquid than another, it is more certainly realizable at short notice without loss”. This 
definition suggests that the degree of liquidity of an asset can be measured along two dimensions: 
the risk of its final value (“more certainly realizable”) and the availability of a market which can 
readily absorb the sale without adverse price change (“realizable at short notice without loss”). 
The definition given by Biais, Focault, Hillion’s (1997) includes also an adverse price variation 
argument. In addition, they suggest a rapidity concept, namely for an agent to find a counterpart.  
                                                 
18 Hasbrouck and Schwartz (1988) assess liquidity provision in three market centers: the NYSE, the American Stock 
Exchange (agency/auction market) and the NASDAQ (dealer market). 
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Black (1971) gives another definition and says that four conditions must be fulfilled: 
 
1. Spread (represents the implicit cost per unity of liquidity); 
2. Depth (the market can absorb, immediately or over a long period of time, 
important volumes without weighting on actual prices); 
3. Resiliency (the rapidity of the prices to return, after an increase or decrease, to the 
previous levels); 
4. Immediacy (investors can buy or sell at every moment and immediately). 
 
In other words, a liquid market is a continuous and efficient market, where any amount of 
stock (small or large) can be bought or sold immediately, or over a larger period, near the current 
market price (Black 1971). 
Considering the definitions given above, liquidity seems to be determined by the behaviour of 
at least four market features: spread, volume, price movements and waiting time. The intraday 
and daily evolution of these liquidity proxies has been the subject of a number of studies19, with 
controversial conclusions about causes and effects of these empirical regular patterns. 
The measure of liquidity is an object of theoretical controversies, as the conditions that must 
be fulfilled are difficult to measure. The common denominators are the rapidity (Gouriéroux, 
Jasiak, Le Fol 1997) and the capacity of the market to absorb important transaction volumes 
(Poincelot, 1996). 
Bernstein (1987) discusses the different measures of liquidity and presents a survey of the 
relevant literature. Many researchers (Harris (1995), Grossman and Miller (1988), Kyle (1985), 
Admati and Pfleiderer (1988)) show also that the market microstructure has an influence on its 
liquidity. In fact, the liquidity degree of a stock can be analysed as a result of the coexistence of 
agents with different motivations. The impatient investor who demands liquidity and places a 
market order, is a non-informed investor who wants to realize a transaction before a given 
deadline (Harris (1995)). On the other hand, if the deadline is sufficiently far and the spread large, 
the patient investor (informed investor, liquidity provider) will put a limit order (Handa and 
Schwartz 1996). 
Theoretical models have been developed to explain these empirical regularities as the response 
of market participants to the nature of information flow, the trading hours of an exchange, and 
other properties of the trading environment. Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) and Foster and 
                                                 
19 The market microstructure literature has demonstrated that there are intraday patterns in returns (Wood, McInish 
and Ord (1985)), in the variability of returns (Wood, McInish and Ord (1985), McInish and Wood (1990a)), in the 
volume of trading (Jain and Joh (1988), McInish and Wood (1990b)), in the number of trades and in the number of 
shares per trade (McInish and Wood (1991b)), and in the daily index autocorrelations (McInish and Wood 1991a). 
The volume of deals, the volatility of equity prices and the spread all broadly follow a U-shaped pattern in the NYSE 
(Foster and Viswanathan 1989, Lockwood and Linn, 1990, McInish and Wood 1990a, 1991, 1992, Stoll and Whaley 
1990, Lee et al. 1993, Sheikh and Ronn 1994, Easley et al. 1993). Explications of these patterns can be found in Kyle 
(1985), Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and Admati and Pfleiderer (1988, 1989). 
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Viswanathan (1989, 1990) developed models in which the interaction between various traders 
(strategic behaviour of liquidity traders and informed traders) leads to certain patterns in trading 
volume, BAS, variability and returns. Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) show that the interaction 
between potentially informed investors (whose private information is short-lived), discretionary 
liquidity traders and market makers leads to specific patterns in price changes. These patterns 
occur due to the fact that buying and selling volume are greater in distinct periods. Osborne 
(1962) also provides a pattern of the activities of market participants. He noted that since 
individual investors have more time to devote to financial decisions during the weekend, they are 
relatively more active in the market on Monday, which tends to be a day of strategic planning. 
Higher volumes may also occur during the first hour, because investors transact on 
information gathered during the night and in the morning before the market opens. And volume 
increases before the end of the day may reflect investors who close or hedge open positions 
which they cannot monitor or change overnight. 
Brock and Kleidon (1992) focus on modelling a larger BAS and greater price variability during 
the first and last hours of trading, when the volume is heaviest. Gerety and Mulherin (1992) 
extended the work of Brock and Kleidon (1992) and found that trading volume at the end of one 
day and the opening of the following day is related to expected overnight return volatility. They 
also found that the volume at the opening is related to the unexpected return volatility from the 
previous night. 
Atkins and Basu (1995) attribute, instead, the U-shaped pattern of volume to public 
announcements for two reasons. First, the large traded volume at the beginning of the day could 
be the result of the aggregate amount of new information that becomes known between the end 
of one day and the opening of the following day. Second, the traded volume at the end of the day 
is much more difficult to explain. The authors suppose that if an announcement made after 
closing was known before the market closes then an increase in volume may be observed at the 
end of the day (any foreknowledge of a public announcement constitutes private information). 
Intraday patterns in BAS were examined by McInish and Wood (1992), who found over the 
all day a reverse J-shape (a large spread in the first minutes of trading, declining over about 15 
minutes to a level which lasts until the last few minutes of the day). While there are also 
differences in spreads across days of the week, these differences are much less pronounced than 
those during a single day. Furthermore, there is evidence that the pattern of differences across 
days of the week is not stable over a longer period of time. 
Niemeyer and Sandås (1995) analyse the intraday behaviour of returns, trading activity, order 
placement and BAS. Their results show that: (1) Intraday U-shape in trading activity found in 
earlier US studies can also be observed on the Stockholm Stock Exchange, (2) Limit order 
placement follows an intraday U-shape too, (3) There is no distinct pattern in returns, and (4) 
The volatility and BAS seem to be higher at the beginning of the trading day. 
Werner and Kleidon (1996) analyse intraday patterns for UK and US cross-listed stocks, in 
order to examine whether the fact that these stocks are traded in multiple markets significantly 
affects the information flow, trading pattern and dealer competition as captured by intraday 
patterns of volatility, volume and spreads respectively. British cross-listed stocks generate distinct 
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and separate intraday patterns for volatility (which increases significantly when NY starts trading 
the ADR), volume (which increases during the overlap period), and spreads for each trading 
venue. These patterns resemble the U-shaped patterns found in previous work, with the 
important exception that spreads for cross-listed stocks decline throughout the trading day in 
each market. 
Ranaldo (1999) examined the commonly used liquidity proxies (trading volume, returns, 
spreads, waiting time between subsequent trades). Some proxies had already been used previously 
as an interday liquidity measure (liquidity ratio and variance ratio), but in addition he provided 
some new indicators (order ratio and flow ratio). He applied these proxies to the 15 most liquid 
equities traded on the Swiss Stock Exchange, and found the outline of the peculiar intraday 
liquidity pattern. All his liquidity proxies indicated that the Swiss intraday liquidity patterns do not 
precisely follow a U or M-shape. 
Intraday patterns can also be explained by inventory-based models (Amihud and Mendelson 
1982). They claim that specialists widen their spreads in response to inventory imbalances. If 
imbalances accumulate during the course of trading, spreads will be larger at the close of the 
trade. On the other hand, information-based models argue that informed traders have their 
greatest advantage when the market first opens since price is an important source of information 
for uninformed liquidity traders (Foster and Viswanathan 1990, Brock and Kleidon 1992). 
Therefore, adverse selection costs should be greatest at the beginning of the day. Empirical 
evidence of these information effect is provided by Wei (1992), Hasbrouck (1991), Foster and 
Viswanathan (1993) and Lin, Sanger and Booth (1995). Furthermore, Lin et al. (1995) find that 
adverse selection costs decrease throughout the day for all trade sizes. Their research also 
suggests that the order flow is most informative in the morning, or, more generally, immediately 
after non-trading periods. 
Bessembinder (1994), Lyons (1995) and Huang and Masulis (1999), however, found an 
increasingly strong and large inventory cost component of FX spreads as the trading day is 
coming to its close. In short, the intraday patterns of order flow and transaction costs indicate 
that information is revealed through trades, resulting in progressively smaller adverse selection 
costs as the day evolves. The increase in the spread during the last half-hour most likely reflects 
an increase in the cost (risk) of holding inventory over the upcoming non-trading period. 
Based on the results of all the above mentioned studies, in my paper, I shall try to answer to 
the following questions, taking the Paris Bourse as an example: (1) does an intraday pattern of 
market concentration exist, (2) how do different liquidity proxies interact and (3) do they come to 
the same conclusion about the liquidity of a stock and, finally, (4) how does the literature explain 
the intraday seasonalities. I shall make new contributions to this subject, in particular concerning 
the volatility and the relation between volume imbalance and spread. In contrast to previous 
investigations, my paper shall consider several liquidity proxies together. 
 
In section 2.3 the trading system of the Paris Stock Exchange will be illustrated and analysed. 
Section 2.4 presents the data and the methodology used. Section 2.5 contains empirical results of 
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intraday behaviour of volume, spread, waiting time, return and volatility. Section 2.6 describes the 
dimension of intraday market liquidity and finally, section 2.7 the relationship between volume 
imbalance and spread is established. Section 2.8 gives my conclusions, while the figures, the 
tables and the Appendix are shown in Sections 2.9, 2.10 and 2.11. 
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2.3. The structure of the Paris Bourse 
 
From 1986 to 1990, the Paris Bourse gradually shifted from a daily call auction to a 
computerized limit order market, in which trading occurs continuously. The opening price is 
determined by a call auction, which is preceded by a sequence of tentative call auctions before the 
opening, in order to facilitate the price discovery process. The Paris Bourse is a centralized order-
driven market, animated by trading members who take positions for their own account or for 
their customer. The trading mechanism of the Paris Bourse is based on three computer systems: 
RONA (computerized routing of orders), CAC (Cotation Assistée en Continu, computer-assisted 
quotation system), and information release. The automation of the exchange began on June 23, 
1986, when the CATS (Computer Assisted Trading System) system of the Toronto Stock 
Exchange was installed. From June 1986 to December 1987, the most traded stocks were 
admitted to the CAC system. While at the end of 1986, only six stocks were traded on the CAC 
system, by 1991, all stocks were managed by it. The investors place their orders through brokers. 
The main characteristics of the Paris Bourse will be considered in the following section, where a 
detailed description of the Euronext (the result of the merger between Paris, Brussels and 
Amsterdam) is given. 
 
A. Euronext Paris 
 
On September 22, 2000, the Exchanges of Amsterdam, Brussels and Paris merged under the 
holding company Euronext NV to form the first pan-European exchange. 2002 saw the 
Portuguese Stock Exchange, Bolsa de Valores de Lisboa e Porto (BVLP) merging with Euronext, 
and the international derivatives exchange, LIFFE, joining the Euronext group. All Euronext 
products are now grouped under the Euronext liffe umbrella. The process of the acquisition of 
the LIFFE shares was completed on February 25, 2002. Also in February 2002, the merger of 
BVLP, the Portuguese cash and derivative market, with Euronext was completed (Euronext, 
2000a, b, d, 2002). 
This research includes both the period when the Paris Bourse was independent and the period 
when it had merged with the Amsterdam and Brussels Stock Exchanges, thus becoming the first 
integrated and transnational capital market using the Euro. In the meantime it has developed and 
became the leading market in Europe for stocks recorded on the central order book and for 
equity options. 
It was the first time in the world that three Bourses of three different countries merged in 
order to create only one single company. The board of directors of the three Stock Exchanges 
had launched the project in answer to the growing trend towards consolidation of the European 
markets and the desire of investors (market operators) to have more liquidity and lower 
transaction costs. Euronext’s objective is to offer market participants, issuers, investors and 
financial intermediaries a single trading platform for cash and derivatives, a single clearing house 
and a unified system for settlement and delivery (Euronext, 2000a, b, d). 
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For issuers, intermediaries and investors, Euronext created three points of access (via 
Amsterdam, Brussels and Paris) to its single market. By December 31, 2000, i.e. the end of the 
period under study, 1653 companies representing a market capitalization of 2.41 trillion Euro 
were listed on Euronext NV, making it the second biggest stock exchange after the London 
Stock Exchange (LSE). In terms of trading volume, however, Euronext has by far overtaken its 
European counterparts. In 2000, its central order book recorded 1.712 billion Euro for cash 
trading, compared to 969 billion Euro for the Deutsche Börse AG (DBAG), 963 billion Euro in 
Milan and 878 billion Euro for the LSE. The new pan-European exchange also outdid its main 
European competitors in equity options, with 140.4 million contracts exchanged in 2000, 
compared to 88.9 million for the DBAG, 33.7 million in Stockholm, 5.9 million in Milan and 5.5 
million on the London International Financial Future Exchange (LIFFE)20. 
At the end of the year 2001, Euronext adopted a single trading platform, linking all the 
members of the three former markets and placing them under the unified regulations of the 
Euronext market model. A single central order book for each financial instrument increases the 
transparency of the market and the liquidity of the stocks listed. 
 
B. The Euronext market model 
 
The aim of the Euronext market model (hereafter EMM) is to provide a harmonized trading 
system with a central electronic order book and a single set of trading rules. The new market 
model was introduced on April 23, 2001 in Paris, on May 21, 2001 in Brussels and on October 
29, 2001 in Amsterdam and was completed at the end of 2001. Euronext Lisbon, which joined 
the Euronext group in February 2002, will introduce the EMM and the Euronext NSC trading 
platform on its market in 2003. The trading system is order-driven, based on price / time priority. 
For companies with a good liquidity profile, trading will be continuous with an opening and 
closing auction at the start and at the end of each session. Other securities may also be traded, 
provided that there is a liquidity provider willing to fulfil certain obligations. For less liquid 
securities, trading will be non-continuous and based on intraday auctions, with or without a 
liquidity provider (Euronext, 2001b). 
                                                 
20 One year later, at the end of December 2001, Euronext had 1,539 companies listed on its regulated and 
unregulated markets, representing a market capitalization of Euro 2,070 billion. Euronext is the largest exchange in 
Europe in terms of trading volume on the central order book, and the second largest in terms of capitalization. In 
2001, Euronext's central order book recorded Euro 1.668 billion for equities compared to Euro 1.047 billion for the 
London Stock Exchange, Euro 952 billion for Deutsche Börse AG and Euro 658 billion for Milan. 
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C. Trading phases 
 
Before the opening auction, there is a pre-opening period during which orders can be entered, 
modified or deleted. A theoretical opening price is calculated and disseminated by the trading 
system in real time. At the opening, the order book is frozen momentarily, while the matching 
algorithm is running. 
Once the price determination process for each security is complete, continuous trading begins 
and orders can be entered, maintained and deleted. All unexecuted orders from the opening 
auction are forwarded to continuous trading, unless otherwise restricted by the market 
participant. Each new order triggers one or more transaction(s), if a matching order or orders 
exists on the central order book; the execution price is the price limit of the matching order on 
the book. If there is no matching order, then the incoming order is ranked on the book according 
to its own limit and time entry. The order book is open and anonymous for both pre- and post-
trading. 
The closing auction starts with an initial pre-closing phase of five minutes, only, since all 
orders entered during the trading day, orders from continuous trading and orders restricted to 
auction or closing auction only, by that time are already in the system. The processes in this 
closing auction are the same as during the opening auction. During the trading at the last price 
phase, orders can be entered and matched at the last price only. For continuously traded 
securities, this facility is extended to ten minutes (Euronext, 2000a, b, d). 
 
TABLE 2.3.1: Trading cycles at the Paris Bourse 
 
 
1. Trading phases for continuously traded securities 
 
7:00 - 9:00 pre-opening phase Order entry and calculation of theoretical opening price 
9:00 
9:00 - 17:25 
 Opening auction 
Continuous trading 
17:25 - 17:30  End of compensation trading pre-closing phase, 
indicative price, no execution 
17:30 
17:30 - 17:40 
 Closing auction 
Trading at the last price phase 
17:40  End of trading 
 
2. Trading phases for non-continuously traded securities 
 
7:00 -10:30 pre-opening phase Order entry and calculation of theoretical price 
10:30 
10:30 - 11:00 
 First auction 
Trading at auction price 
11:00 - 16:00 pre-closing phase Order entry and calculation of theoretical price 
16:00 
16:00 - 16:30 
 Second auction 
Trading at auction price 
Source: Euronext Paris (2000a, b, d) 
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On September 20,1999, the Paris Bourse SBF SA took an initial step towards a longer 
business day, moving the beginning of trading up from 10:00 a.m. to 9:00 a.m. This implemented 
the agreement reached by eight European exchanges in September to harmonize trading hours 
from 9:00 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. Since April 3, 2000 all continuously traded stocks on the Premier 
Marché, Second Marché and Nouveau Marché are traded from 9:00 a.m. to 5:30 p.m., followed 
by a closing call auction at 5.35 p.m. Times for call auctions on Le Nouveau Marché have also 
changed. The first is now held at 9:30 a.m. instead of 10:30 a.m., and the second at 5:00 p.m. 
instead of 4:30 p.m. As a result, since April 3, 2000, dissemination of closing prices for all Paris 
Bourse SBF SA indices begins at 5:35 p.m. (Euronext, 2001a). 
 
D. Trading reservations and circuit breakers 
 
The Euronext market model contains circuit breakers with a set of trading halt thresholds: the 
trading of a security is halted, if the entry of an order would produce a fluctuation of more than 
10% from the reference price. At the opening of the session, the reference price is the previous 
closing price, whilst during the session, it is the opening price. In addition to these static 
thresholds, dynamic thresholds are fixed for continuously traded securities: no price can differ by 
more than 2% from the previous one without a trading halt of five minutes: one minute freeze 
and four minutes reservation. These dynamic thresholds enable Euronext to reduce intraday 
volatility (Euronext, 2000a, b, d). 
 
E. Order types 
 
The Euronext market model recognizes the following different order types (Euronext, 2000c): 
 
1. Limit orders (pre-opening phase, continuous phase and trading at last price) are bid/ask 
orders that must be executed at their specified limit or better. 
2. Market orders (pre-opening phase and continuous phase) are unlimited bid/ask orders, to 
be executed at the next prices determined by the system. As much of the order as 
possible is executed immediately, and any remainder is ranked on the order book as a 
market order. If a market order cannot be matched, it remains in the book until executed 
or deleted, either by the market participants, or on reaching the specified expiry. 
3. Must be filled orders (pre-opening phase and continuous phase) are unlimited bid/ask 
orders, to be fully executed immediately. This type of order cannot be partially executed. 
If the order cannot be immediately executed in full, the system places a freeze on the 
instrument. If the order that caused the freeze is confirmed, Euronext market surveillance 
initiates a reservation on this instrument. 
4. Market to limit orders (auction phase and continuous phase) are orders which have to be 
executed immediately at the best price level on the opposite side of the book. The 
unexecuted amount, instead of being matched to the next price level, is automatically 
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transformed by the system into a limit order at the last executed price. In the pre-opening 
phase, a market to limit order is a market on opening order. 
5. Stop orders: These orders are designed to allow investors to protect their positions 
against trend inversion. Stop orders are available during the pre-opening and the 
continuous phase. Two stop order types can be used in order to support trading 
strategies. They are available for execution after reaching a price limit (stop limit). 
a. Stop loss order: when a stop limit is reached (exceeded or fallen below), a market 
order or a must be filled order is automatically generated and sent to the order book. 
b. Stop limit order: when the stop limit (trigger price) is reached (exceeded or fallen 
below), a limit order is automatically generated and sent to the order book. 
c. Both types of stop orders can be executed during an auction. 
 
F. Tick size 
 
One important feature of the trading structure is the minimum price difference allowed 
between limit orders, normally referred to as the tick size. Harris (1991, 1992, and 1994) finds 
that the tick used at the NYSE and the AMEX has an economically significant impact on market 
liquidity. The tick sizes expressed in Euro for the Paris Bourse, valid from January 1999, are: 0.01 
up to 50 EUR, 0.05 from 50 EUR to 100 EUR, 0.10 from 100 EUR up to 500 EUR, and 0.50 
above 500 EUR. 
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2.4. Dataset and methodology 
 
The dataset contains the tick-by-tick history of trades and orders of 43 stocks which belong, 
or have belonged, to the CAC40 index, over 256 trading days between 01.12.1999 and 
30.11.2000. The data used in this study comes from one source: the Société Bourse Française, 
which has provided the transaction and order book data. The transaction data file (named 
Bdm1d2) includes the second by second transaction prices, their applications21, as well as the 
volume data. The total number of transactions is 23’525’550. For each order, in the Bdm2d2 file, 
the dataset reports the execution time (precise to the second), the best bid and offer prices and 
the number of shares demanded and offered at each of the bid and ask quotes. In my dataset I do 
not consider order placements or cancellations outside of the best buying or selling limit orders, 
nor the hidden orders. In order to rebuild the order book, I match the transaction and order files. 
In order to determine the trade direction, I adopt the Lee and Ready (1991) procedure. The quote 
midpoint, MIDt, is calculated from the bid-ask quotes that prevail just before a transaction. The 
price transaction at time t is denoted as Pt. I also defined Dt as the buy-sell trade indicator 
variable for the transaction price, Pt. Dt equals, +1 if the transaction is buyer-initiated and occurs 
above the midpoint; it equals -1 if the transaction is seller-initiated and occurs below the 
midpoint, and 0, if the transaction occurs at the midpoint. The ability to classify accurately buyer- 
or seller-initiated trades enhances the reliability of my dataset. 
All the information in my dataset is available to market participants in real time through 
computerized information dissemination systems. All brokers are directly connected to the CAC 
system. Most banks and fund managers dealing in French stocks, in Paris as well in London or 
New York, obtain the information in real time through information vendors such as Reuters, 
Telekurs and Bloomberg, or from a subsidiary of the Bourse. My dataset does not include the 
identities of the bidding brokers. However, this type of information is available to brokers 
electronically, and the brokers can forward this information to their customers. 
Before starting my analysis, I eliminated those data which I considered as not pertinent: 
applications recorded by the electronic system, and fixing transactions. I dropped application 
trades for two reasons: first, applications do not represent any liquidity, nor any possible trade for 
the other investors, since an application is a sell/buy agreement, i.e. the investor arrives at the 
market with his/her counterpart. The second reason is the recorded time of trade, since it is not 
always the time at which the trade occurred, but rather the time at which the trade is introduced 
into electronic system. Over the considered period, 125’976 applications were dropped. As in 
other studies (Gouriéroux, Jasiak, LeFol 1997), I retained in my dataset only the trades recorded 
                                                 
21 Essentially all trades are executed at the quotes outstanding in the book. The exception are pre-matched block 
trades, which can take two forms. First, prearranged trades can be executed between or at the current best bid and 
ask price. When they are executed at the quotes, they bypass the time priority of the limit orders previously posted at 
that price. There is no size priority in the Bourse. These are called applications. Second, a block can also be traded 
outside the current spread, but then the priority of previously posted limit orders is respected. For example, if the 
block price exceeds the best ask, then the limit orders between the best ask and the block price are purchased by the 
block buyer at the block price. 
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after the opening, because the opening procedure is the result of a call auction, whereas right 
after the opening, the market switches to a continuous matching procedure. 
The analysed one-year period is divided into two distinct sub-periods, one before and one 
after the introduction of the longer time of trading. In fact, since the April 3, 2000 trading is 
possible until 17.30 CET. In order to avoid problems due to this new trading rule, my first sub-
period lasts from December 1, 1999 until March 31, 2000, and the second period from April 3, 
2000 until November 30, 2000. Intraday patterns will be documented for the trading activity at 
the CAC 40 index, which includes the most heavily traded stocks. 
Essentially, four big categories will be considered and presented: volume, spread, waiting time 
between subsequent trades and returns. I calculated every proxy continuously within each 
successive 5 minutes period22 throughout the day for each stock and then assembled the index 
containing all 43 stocks. All the mathematical expressions of each liquidity proxy are presented in 
Appendix 2.11.2. Tables 2.10.2 to 2.10.7 list also the successive t- values for each liquidity proxy, 
whereby two adjacent means are compared. 
 
A. Measures of intraday market liquidity 
 
As the liquidity is a complex and multidimensional concept, the utilization of a unique 
indicator can be misleading (Amihud and Mendelson 1986, Grossman and Miller 1988 and 
Kugler and Stephan 1997). My objective is to characterize the intraday market liquidity pattern 
through the common measures of market liquidity. The next section provides a survey of the 
indicators used in this research: spread, weighted average spread (hereafter WAS), volume, 
volume imbalance, return, volatility, waiting time between subsequent trades, liquidity ratio and 
flow ratio. For each liquidity proxy, I discuss the resulting shapes, which are plotted at the end of 
this chapter (Figures 2.9.1 to 2.9.16)23, as well as the t-values, whereby two adjacent means are 
compared (Tables 2.10.2 to 2.10.7). In each figure, the 44 graphs represent the 43 single stocks 
contained in the CAC40 index, and the standardized, equally weighted, stocks forming the index 
(named TOT_AVERAGE). There are two graphs for the quoted half spread (Figure 2.9.1.A and 
2.9.1.B), corresponding respectively to the first (December – March) and second period (April – 
November24). The figures are then reported for the first period only, as there are no major 
changes in the second period with respect to the first. 
 
B. Spread 
 
Much of the empirical work to date has focused on the spread as a proxy for market liquidity. 
Different measures of spread were used in the literature. My objective is to calculate, within an 
interval of 5 minutes, the mean of every of these liquidity proxies, and then to plot and explain 
                                                 
22 This short time interval has also been considered by Andersen and Bollersev (1996). 
23 Each liquidity proxy has been standardized following the procedure explained in Appendix 2.11.2. 
24 For the second period the t- table is not included. 
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them. These indicators, which are explained in detail in Appendix 2.11.2 are: first, the midquote 
(MID), which is the average between ask price and bid price, but cannot be considered as a real 
spread measure. The MID, however, represents the correct price considering the bid-ask bounce 
problem. It is calculated as follows: 
( )∑
=
+=
n
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t,j,it,j,ij,i 2/BidAskn
1MID  
Second, the effective half spread (labeled EHS), which represents the reduction in trading 
costs attributable to trades executed within the quotes (percentage execution cost actually paid by 
a trader and percentage of gross revenue to the supplier of immediacy). It is calculated as follows: 
( ) ( )∑
=
−=
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1EHS  
Third, the quoted half spread (QHS), i.e. the difference between the two best order limits of 
the limit order book on each side, divided by the MID, is represented by the following formula: 
( ) ( )∑
=
∗−=
n
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1QHS  
And, last the average difference spread (DSPR), within a 5 minutes interval, which is 
calculated as the difference between ask price and bid price: 
( )∑
=
−= n
1t
t,j,it,j,ij,i BidAskn
1DSPR  
 
C. Weighted average spread 
 
The Paris Bourse gives the possibility to access, in its database, the Bdfmd2 file25, containing 
the weighted average spread (hereafter WAS). The WAS represents the price for blocks 
exceeding normal market size. It is calculated for a given quantity of shares in real time by taking 
the average bid and ask prices for all orders placed on the central SUPERCAC system, weighted 
by the number of shares displayed at successive bids and asks (but, does not take into account 
hidden quantities). The price is comparable to that which would result if the block were traded on 
the central market. Following the same procedures as before, I calculated the spread measures, 
                                                 
25 The file contains one record for the WAS at the buy side (bid) and at the sell side (ask). If the SUPERCAC order 
book (either at the buy-side or at the sell-side) does not have the required minimum quantity to compute WAS, there 
will be a zero (the WAS, either at the buy side or at the sell side, will be equal to zero). 
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QHS_WAS and DSPR_WAS26, for a 5 minutes period. The MID_WAS and the EHS_WAS were 
not calculated. In particular, the EHS_WAS was not calculated, because that file is not matched 
against the transaction file, and it is therefore impossible to classify the trade direction. The 
following formula, which is explained in detail in Appendix 2.11.2, is the calculation of the 
QHS_WAS which is identical to the QHS, from the order data, but in this case the weighted 
average spread file is taken into account: 
 
( ) ( )∑
=
∗−= n
1t
t,j,it,j,it,j,ij,i MID2/BidAsk100n
1WAS_QHS  
 
D. Volume 
 
In this section, intraday patterns in trading activity at the Paris Bourse will be documented. A 
significant intraday pattern in trading activity could imply that the information content in prices 
differs in various periods of the trading day. Since information is incorporated into prices at least 
partly through trading, a period of high trading activity would produce more informative prices 
than a period of low trading activity. 
Volume has been considered as a standard measure of market liquidity, but this has been 
criticized, because it treats smalls and a big traded quantities in the same way. Within an interval 
of 5 minutes period, I look at the following several measures related to volume, that are 
presented below, such as (1) cumulated traded volume (labelled SUMVOL), (2) number of trades 
(NBTR), (3) volume imbalance (VIMB) and (4) sum of volume imbalance in absolute terms 
(SABSVIMB). For the explication of each proxy see Appendix 2.11.2. 
 
∑
=
= n
1t
t,j,i
j,i GOUTSTANDINSHARESOFNB
qSUMVOL  
∑
=
= n
1t
t,j,ij,i obsNBTR  
( )∑
=
−= n
1t
t,j,it,j,ij,i VSellVBuyVIMB  
∑
=
−= n
1t
t,j,it,j,ij,i VSellVBuySABSVIMB  
 
In order to test whether the resulting shape are significant, the observations must be 
statistically independent. For this reason, I adjusted my series in order to eliminate trends. For the 
cumulated traded volume of each stock, I took the quantity traded within a five minutes period 
on different days, divided by the number of outstanding shares. 
                                                 
26 The DSPR_WAS graph is not shown. Its and the formula is identical to the DSPR calculated from the order data, 
and for this reason it is not presented. 
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E. Return and volatility 
 
The economic significance of an intraday pattern in returns is obvious. Patterns in returns 
and/or volatilities would indicate profit opportunities, at least for traders with small transaction 
costs. Furthermore, intraday patterns in volatilities would have obvious consequences for option 
pricing, and could also affect the profitability of submitting limit orders (a short-term volatility 
could imply a certain compensation for submitting limit orders). I calculated the average 
compound rate of return (RET) within a 5 minutes period, taking into account also the return in 
absolute terms (ABSRET), as follows: 
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For the volatility, two approaches were used. First, the classical method applied in the majority 
of studies: variance of returns (VARRET). 
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Second, the log range volatility (VOLA), which was explained by Alizadeh, Brandt and 
Diebold (2002). 
 
( )j,ij,ij,i infsuplnVOLA −=  
 
The latter is superior as a volatility proxy for two reasons. First, it is more efficient, because 
the intraday sample path information contained in the range causes fewer errors in the 
measurement of variance than the daily log absolute or squared returns. Second, the log range is 
very well approximated as Gaussian. The log range is also an attractive volatility proxy for 
Gaussian quasi-maximum likelihood estimation of stochastic volatility models (Alizadeh, Brandt 
and Diebold, 2002). The liquidity proxies presented in this section are explained in detail in 
Appendix 2.11.2. 
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F. Waiting time 
 
The waiting time (WT), i.e. the definition of liquidity as the time until an asset is exchanged 
for money (Lipman and McCall 1996), is a measure for the first time theoretically explained and 
empirically used by Gouriéroux, Jasiak and LeFol (1997). The average waiting time between 
subsequent trades, explained in detail in Appendix 2.11.2, is calculated as follows within a five 
minutes period: 
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G. Liquidity ratio and flow ratio 
 
I also introduce, always on a 5 minutes basis, two other measures: liquidity ratio (LR) and flow 
ratio (FR), which are represented by the following formulas respectively: 
 
( )
100.
p
pp
pq
LR
1,j,i
1,j,in,j,i
n
1t
t,j,i.t,j,i
j,i
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −=
∑
=  
 
( )
( )∑
∑
= −
=
−
= n
1t
1t,j,it,j,i
n
1t
t,j,it,j,i
j,i
timetime
n
1
p.q
n
1
FR  
 
As noted by Cooper, Groth and Avera (1985) and Kluger and Stephan (1997), liquidity ratio is 
a measure based on the relationship between the number or value of shares traded during a 
certain time period and the absolute value of the percentage price change over the same time 
period. According to the definition of the liquidity, the market ought to be able to absorb an 
important trading volume without weight on actual prices. A high liquidity ratio represents high 
market liquidity. This measure considers the depth of the market, but not the time dimension. 
There are other problems associated with the use of this proxy, as mentioned by Ranaldo (2000). 
Concerning my database, the most important one is caused by the use of a particularly short time 
period (5 minutes), which reduces the probability of a price change. 
Flow ratio, on the other hand, is a measure representing the short-term average number of 
shares traded in Euro, i.e. value, divided by the average waiting time between subsequent trades. 
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2.5. Empirical results 
 
In this section, some general descriptive statistics from my sample will be reported, over the 
one-year period. Table 2.10.1.A provides some key features: market capitalization, number of 
trades, average number of trades, number of applications and business sector. The sample is 
extremely heterogeneous, as shown by the activity of the companies. In Table 2.10.1.A of the 
descriptive statistics, a division into two categories is made: one without major changes, and one 
with stocks that proceeded to a split or a merger. There are 30 companies in the first category 
(PANEL A) and 13 in the second (PANEL B). Table 2.10.1.B and 2.10.1.C, however, show the 
average value of each of the sixteen liquidity indicators, always during a five minutes period, for 
all the months under study. 
The figures concerning the intraday liquidity patterns are presented in Section 2.9 (Figures 
2.9.1 to 2.9.16). For every liquidity proxy, in Section 2.10, I also list the t-values, whereby two 
adjacent means are compared (Tables 2.10.2 to 2.10.7). 
 
A. Spread 
 
Three of the four spread measures show an inverse J-shaped pattern (EHS (Figure 2.9.1.A and 
2.9.1.B), QHS (Figure 2.9.2) and DSPR (Figure 2.9.3)). In particular, these patterns are 
characterized by a wide spread at the beginning of the day, which decreases constantly during the 
first hour. The afternoon shows 3 peaks (see also Tables 2.10.2.A, 2.10.2.B and 2.10.2.C): the first 
one around 14:30 (significant increase of the spread); the second one around 15:30 (a slowdown 
followed by an immediate resumption 10 minutes later even if not significant); and around the 
closing time (significant increase of the spread). The MID (Figure 2.9.4), instead, is clearly U-
shaped, showing a fall of the average spread during the lunch break27. 
My results are similar to those of Lee, Mucklow and Ready (1993) who also found a lower 
liquidity at the beginning and at the end of the trading sessions. However, they contend that it is 
impossible to make inferences about overall liquidity on the basis of quoted spreads or quoted 
depths alone. They show for a sample of NYSE firms that the combination of wider (narrower) 
spreads and lower (higher) depths is sufficient to infer a decrease (increase) in quoted liquidity. 
Using this criterion, they show that quoted liquidity decreases both after periods of high trading 
volume and immediately before the release of earnings news. In particular, Lee, Mucklow and 
Ready (1993) report a U-shaped pattern in quoted spreads and trading volume, thus confirming 
previous studies (McInish and Wood 1992), plus two new findings: effective spreads follow a 
similar J-shape pattern, and quoted depths follow a reverse U-pattern. The patterns indicate that 
market liquidity is indeed lower both at the beginning and the end of the day. Brockman and 
Chung (1999), studying the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, also found a low depth at the opening 
of trading and a fall at the closing, but they report an inverted U-shaped spread pattern. They 
give three theories to explain these intraday patterns: (1) existence of adverse selection, (2) 
                                                 
27 There is only one significant change at 12:40 p.m. as shown in Table 2.10.2.D. 
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differential liquidity demand elasticities (liquidity demand is more inelastic at the open and close 
of the market and (3) inventory management is responsible for some of the empirical regularities. 
Porter (1988) and Jaffe and Patel (undated) also found that spreads are widest in the morning, 
narrow around midday, and then rise sharply in the last few minutes before the close. 
Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) predict narrow spreads when the volume is high and prices are 
more volatile, while Foster and Viswanathan (1990) predict narrow spreads when the volume is 
high and prices are less volatile. In a model of strategic trading between two asymmetrically 
informed traders, however, Foster and Viswanathan (1993) predict a high volume, a high variance 
and wide spreads near the open. 
Chan, Chung and Johnson (1995) confirm previous findings that stocks in the NYSE have a 
U-shaped spread pattern, while options (CBOE market) display a very different intraday pattern: 
it declines sharply after the open, and then levels off. This is similar to the findings of Chan, 
Christie and Schultz (1995) for NASDAQ stocks, and of Kleidon and Werner (1993) for cross-
listed London stocks. Chan, Chung and Johnson (1995) explain the NYSE BAS pattern with the 
specialist market power model of Brock and Kleidon (1992) or the inventory model of Ho and 
Stoll (1983), and the CBOE spread with the model of Madhavan (1992), where information 
asymmetry is partially resolved as investors become informed by observing trade price, leading to 
a decline in the BAS during the day. They argue that CBOE spreads behave differently from 
NYSE spreads because of the difference in the market making structure28. They suggest that the 
degree of competition in market making and the extent of informed trading are important for 
understanding the intraday behaviour of spreads. 
Chung, Van Ness and Van Ness (1999) propose an alternative explanation for the intraday 
pattern of spread. They checked, for the NYSE market, whether a quote comes from the 
specialist, the LOB or both. Then they examined intraday variation in spreads which originates 
from specialists as well as those which originate from the LOB, and found that competition 
among limit order traders is lower during the early and late hours of trading than around midday. 
Based on these findings, the authors conclude that the U-shaped intraday pattern of NYSE 
spreads is largely determined by limit orders placed by outsiders rather than by specialists' quotes. 
Since the spreads set by specialists do not tend to increase near the close of trading, their results 
do not support the inventory-based explanations for the U-shaped pattern. However, their 
conclusions concern the spread pattern is not applicable to the French Stock Exchange, as the 
two trading structures are different and there are no specialist present on the Paris Bourse. 
Chung and Zhao (2002) show that intraday variations in spreads for NASDAQ listed stocks 
have converged to intraday variations in spreads for NYSE listed stocks after the implementation 
of the new order handling rules. They attribute this convergence to the Limit Order Display Rule, 
which requires that limit orders be displayed in the NASDAQ best bid and offer (BBO) when 
they are better than quotes posted by market makers. Their findings suggest that the different 
patterns of intraday spreads between NYSE and NASDAQ stocks reported in prior studies can 
largely be attributed to the different treatment of limit orders between the NYSE and NASDAQ 
                                                 
28 For example, NYSE opens with a call, whereas the CBOE opens with continuous trading. 
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before the market reform. Differently from my conclusion are the results found by Chan, 
Christie and Schultz (1995) about the intraday behaviour of the spread before the end of the 
trading day. According to them, the NASDAQ spread remains relatively wide after the open, 
narrows gradually during the day, and then declines sharply during the last 30 minutes of trading. 
 
B. Weighted average spread 
 
Figure 2.9.5 shows the intraday evolution of the quoted half spread obtained from the 
weighted average spread file (WAS). In particular, TOT_AVERAGE exhibits an inverse J-shaped 
pattern. Significant changes, as demonstrated in the Table 2.10.3, occur in the early morning, 
around 14:30 (when the majority of US macroeconomic news are released) and before the market 
closes (when maybe the uncertainty is higher). These results confirm previous results concerning 
specific points in time when changes occur in the European markets (Ranaldo 2000). The 
increase in the last few minutes of the trading session is not as evident as in the spread measures 
obtained from the order data. To my knowledge, this is the first time that the intraday evolution 
of the quoted spread is shown from the WAS file too. This measure seems to be a good illiquidity 
indicator, as will be demonstrated in Section 2.7. 
 
C. Volume 
 
The intraday cumulated volume (Figure 2.9.6) exhibits a somewhat J-shaped pattern instead of 
the classical U-shape pattern reported in earlier studies. Maybe this is due to the small interval 
chosen for the analysis. Jones, Kaul and Lipson (1994) emphasize, however, that the number of 
transactions, instead of the size traded, is a better proxy of market liquidity. The pattern in the 
number of transactions, NBTR (Figure 2.9.7), is clearly U-shaped. Looking at Figures 2.9.6 and 
2.9.7, we can say that the morning trade is characterized by many small quantity trades, the 
afternoon shows many high quantity trades. 
In general, the cumulated traded volume (Figure 2.9.6) follows a J-shaped pattern, with the 
biggest volume at the end of the trading session with respect to the morning29, when the volume 
is almost constant. The lunch break lasts for 2 hours and 20 minutes (12:00 p.m. – 14:20 p.m.), as 
demonstrated by the low volume registered during this period. Three peaks (see also Tables 
2.10.4.A and 2.10.4.B), in the Figure 2.9.6 (SUMVOL) and in the Figure 2.9.10 (NBTR), are 
found, which had also been considered in previous studies: the first one at the end of the lunch 
break at 14:30 (significant increase), during the release of the majority of US macroeconomic 
news and the consistent adjustment of investors’ portfolios. The second one at 15:30 (significant 
increase), the time when the US market opens. Third, a strong increase at the end of the trading 
day (significant changes are observed from 16:35), which is due to investors’ attitude. One 
explanation for the latter has been given by Brock and Kleidon (1992), namely that the investors' 
optimal overnight portfolios change simply because continuous trading is not possible, so that 
the distribution of returns during the closed period is different from the one during continuous 
                                                 
29 The number of trades is, however, at a similar level in the morning and in the late afternoon. 
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trading30. Miller (1989) claims, instead, that short sellers wish to close their positions, trying to 
achieve a net zero overnight situations in order to avoid settlement. Another reason for strong 
trading demand at certain times of the day, apart from general portfolio considerations, is that 
brokers want to execute orders at their discretion over the trading day. As close approaches, the 
need to execute any remaining orders clearly increases. 
The relatively high volume at the beginning of the day is caused by the periodic inability to 
trade, so that a trader who wishes to be at the same position at the open of trade the next day as 
he would have been if the market had been open overnight, must execute his net overnight trades 
at the first trade the next day. This provides a natural explanation for the high opening volume 
(Brock and Kleidon, 1992). Periodic closure implies that demand to trade will in general be 
stronger and relatively inelastic at open and close, because overnight price changes imply changes 
in the number of shares held in order to maintain the optimal portfolio weights. The price at the 
close will typically differ from the price at the following open, implying a change in the number 
of shares required for maintaining the optimal proportions. 
One of the most used explications for these intraday regularities is the one given by Admati 
and Pfleiderer (1988). In their paper, high volume at a specific point in time is due to the attitude 
assumed by informed traders, discretionary liquidity traders (they can time their trades 
strategically) and nondiscretionary liquidity traders (must trade a particular number of shares at a 
particular time). Their model shows, that in equilibrium, discretionary liquidity trading is typically 
concentrated, and that informed traders trade more actively in such periods when liquidity 
trading is concentrated. Their hypothesis is that the trading volume might be concentrated at the 
open and close because before and after this period it is impossible to trade. This lead to an 
increase in especially in nondiscretionary liquidity trading at the open and close. As a result, 
discretionary liquidity trading, as well as informed trading, will also be concentrated in these 
periods. The authors underline that the concentration of trading at the end of the trading day 
may also be due to settlement rules. 
Atkins and Basu (1995) consider, on the other hand, the fact that announcements of new 
information can affect the U-shaped pattern of trading volume of common stocks. They 
document that a large percentage of all announcements occur after the stock market closes, and 
suggest the U-shaped volume pattern may be the result of public announcements made when the 
market is closed. Their conclusion is in contrast to the theoretical models developed to explain 
this U-shaped pattern, which is also often attributed to the private information effect (Admati 
and Pfleiderer 1988 and Neal 1987. 
Liquidity proxies associated with volume imbalance do not follow a clear shape, but in some 
cases they seem to follow a U-shape (VIMB, Figure 2.9.8) or an inverse J-shape pattern 
(SABSVIMB, Figure 2.9.9). As demonstrated in Table 2.10.4.D, SABSVIMB shows significant 
changes around 14:30 (significant increase), 15:30 (significant increase) and last before the closing 
(significant increase). 
                                                 
30 French and Roll (1986) show that the variance rate during the night differs significantly from that during the day. 
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D. Return and volatility 
 
The average return (RET) within a 5 minutes period, as shown in Figure 2.9.10, is based on 
transaction prices. In contrast to the results of the American studies, there is no clear pattern, but 
three points must be discussed. First, there is a high average return at the beginning which then 
falls after 5 minutes (significant change). Second, two significant changes (see Table 2.10.5.A) 
happen around 14:30, namely a significant increase, and around 15:30, when a significant fall is 
observed for 10-30 minutes after the US market opens. Return in absolute terms (Figure 2.9.11), 
similar to an inverse J-shape pattern, shows a decrease for the first hour and then levels off. A 
significant increase is evident in the last five minutes (Table 2.10.5.B). 
The classical volatility measure shows that the variance of return follows a L-shape (Figure 
2.9.12). Volatility is high at the beginning of the day and then falls, remaining practically constant 
till the end. 
In contrast, volatility (Figure 2.9.13), measured by the log range methodology, clearly follows a 
U-shaped pattern with 3 peaks during the afternoon. Besides the great volatility at the beginning 
of the day, I observed, in fact, a significant increase around 14:30, a significant increase around 
15:30 as well as twenty minutes before the market closes (see Table 2.10.5.D). 
In previous price analyses it was found that transitory price volatility is greater at the open of 
trading than at the close. There are two possible explanations for the greater transitory volatility 
at the open: 1. Trading mechanisms such as the use of call auctions (Amihud and Mendelson 
1987) and the participation of specialists (Stoll and Whaley 1990) at the open are one source of 
the noisier opening price. 2. Price formation models such as Dow and Gorton (1993), Grundy 
and McNichols (1989), Leach and Madhavan (1993), Romer (1993) link the noisier opening 
prices with the fact that the overnight interruption of trading clouds the process of price 
formation provided by trading itself. 
The intraday U-shaped pattern in variance is similar to the pattern in volume found in the 
stock and option markets (Stephan and Whaley (1990), Lockwood and Linn (1990) and Foster 
and Viswanathan (1993)). The larger variances are consistent with the predictions of the models 
of Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) and Foster and Viswanathan (1990), in which discretionary 
liquidity traders pool their trades at times when trading costs are lowest. Since periods of 
concentrated trading and low trading costs are also times when informed traders choose to trade, 
prices are most informative and variable in such periods. 
Harris (1986), using transaction data, found that on Monday mornings during the first 45 
minutes after the market opens, prices drop, while on the other weekday mornings they rise. 
Otherwise, the pattern of intraday returns is similar on all weekdays (very large at the beginning 
and the end of the trading day). Systematic return patterns, especially with Monday negative 
returns, have been identified among others by Cross (1973), French (1980), Gibbons and Hess 
(1981), Lakonishok and Levi (1982), Harris (1986) and Rogalski (1984). However, all these 
studies were unable to explain their cause fully. 
Dickinson and Peterson (1989) indicate the presence of seasonality in call returns, with returns 
significantly higher in early January and significantly lower on Mondays. For the put options, 
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there are no statistically significant differences in returns31. A pattern has also been noted by 
Keim (1986) and others in the sense that the higher stock returns in January differ significantly 
from the returns earned during the other months of the year. French (1980) detects a day of the 
week effect, whereby stock returns on Mondays tend to be lower than those on other days. Other 
authors examine patterns in the derivative market. Among them are Cornell (1985) and Dyl and 
Maberly (1985, 1986) who conducted a study for the S&P 500 Stock Index Futures market. 
Cornell (1985) does not detect any difference in mean futures returns across days for a close-to-
open period, whereas Dyl and Maberly (1985, 1986) document a significant close-to-open 
weekend effect which is similar to that observed in the stock market. Smirlock and Starks (1986) 
also found intraday patterns of returns, but based on hourly returns. Monday returns in the first 
hour of trading are positive, while returns accruing later in the day are negative. This pattern is 
then reversed during his period of study (see also Harris 1984). 
Sheikh and Ronn (1994) identify daily and intraday systematic patterns in the means and 
variances of returns on options; they decompose the option returns into patterns which are 
related to the means and variances of the underlying stocks, and, by inference, those which are 
independent of patterns in the means and variances of the underlying assets. They shed light on 
the possibility that informed and liquidity traders may simultaneously trade in both markets, thus 
inducing independent yet similar patterns in option returns. However, there are patterns in 
option returns which are not replicated in the underlying stocks. These differences may be due to 
structural differences between the stock and options markets. 
Hsieh and Kleidon (1996) document that return volatility and BAS follow the usual U-shaped 
patterns (Lockwood and Linn (1990) and Andersen and Bollersev (1998)) which have been 
explained by the clustering of informed trading (Admati and Pfleiderer 1988). The U-shape do 
not reflect particularly informative trading during the opening or closing hours, but may, instead, 
constitute a rational response to the abrupt changes in dealer exposure which occurs when 
dealers periodically withdraw from the market place (Brock and Kleidon (1992), Hong and Wang 
(1995)). 
 
E. Waiting time 
 
Concerning the waiting time between subsequent trades (Figure 2.9.14), my findings show an 
inverse U-shaped pattern, with a short waiting time during the first 30 minutes and a strong 
increase during the lunch break, reaching a peak around 13:20. Then it decreases continuously 
until the end of the trading session. The main significant changes (see Table 2.10.6) occur around 
14:30 (significant decrease) and 15:30 (significant decrease), and just before the market closes 
(significant decrease). 
There are not very many studies on the waiting time between subsequent trades. Besides 
Gouriéroux, Jasiak and LeFol (1997) who examined the intraday waiting time on the Paris Bourse 
and found a M-shape pattern, Ranaldo (2000) applied the waiting time proxy, on a tick-by-tick 
                                                 
31 Lower January returns are found for in and out of the money options. 
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basis, for the Swiss market, finding a reverse U-shaped pattern. The major criticism of this type 
of measurement concerns the multidimensional concept of liquidity. It can be seen as an intensity 
proxy of market activity, but its information content changes according to the market situation. 
Furthermore, even if the immediacy of exchanges is a major determinant of market liquidity, 
the proxy of waiting time fails to recognize aspects such as breadth, depth and resiliency, because 
it informs us only on the frequency of transactions. 
 
F. Liquidity ratio and flow ratio 
 
In contrast to Ranaldo (2000), the liquidity ratio, named LR, (Figure 2.9.15) observed by me 
does not follow any clear pattern. It shows a constant increase during the whole day and only one 
decrease just toward the end of the lunch break (see also Table 2.10.7.A). This shape may indicate 
that the market is able to absorb high volumes without weighting excessively on actual prices. 
Higher value indicate higher liquidity. 
Concerning the flow ratio, named FR, (Figure 2.9.16), Ranaldo (2000) found in his study on 
the Swiss Stock Exchange a U-shaped pattern. Rather than a U-shape, I saw something like a J-
shape pattern, where 3 peaks are evident (see also Table 2.10.7.B). The first one at 14:30, the 
second at 15:30 and the last at the end of the trading session. The decrease in waiting time 
between subsequent trades leads to an increase in the flow ratio. 
 
G. Conclusive remarks 
 
In my investigation, if considers trading activity as the cumulated traded volume within 
consecutive 5 minutes periods, the intraday liquidity proxy shows, in agreement with McInish and 
Wood (1992), a negative relation between quoted spread32, from the WAS file, and cumulated 
traded volume. However, I found the relation between the cumulated traded volume and EHS, 
QHS, DSPR and MID to be slightly positive in the first period (the correlation is bigger if I take 
NBTR), which confirms the relation previously seen by Brock and Kleidon (1992). On the 
whole, if I measure the general market activity by the sum of volume, the sum of volume 
imbalance and the number of trades, I get a positive correlation of these indicators with the 
spread (see Table 2.10.8.A and 2.10.8.B). This fact is also evident from the graphs, where the 
increase in volume (Figure 2.9.6) and in volume imbalance in absolute term (Figure 2.9.9) may be 
caused by the uncertainty due to wider spread (see for example Figure 2.9.3), which in turn may 
be caused by uncertainty due to the high volume (Demos and Goodhart 1996). This result is in 
contrast with the observations made by Lee, Mucklow and Ready (1993), who claim a negative 
relation between spread and volume imbalance. In their view the average volume imbalance in 
absolute terms is negatively correlated with the spread. Wide spreads are accompanied by low 
depth and spreads widen and depths fall in response to higher volume. 
                                                 
32 Differently from McInish and Wood (1992) the relation is negative with the quoted spread calculated from the 
WAS file, and not with the quoted spread from the order data. 
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The three peaks found in most of the liquidity proxies is also characteristic for the Swiss Stock 
Exchange, as was confirmed by Ranaldo (2000), and for the German market (Röder 1996, Röder 
and Bamberg 1996, Kirchner and Schlag 1998). This behaviour has been explained by the 
adjustment of French and International traders’ positions following the release of most of the 
macroeconomic news (Becker, Finnerty and Friedman 1995). Other interpretation consider the 
end of the lunch break, the linkage between European markets and the behaviour of informed 
and liquidity traders. 
The liquidity ratio and flow ratio can also serve as a liquidity proxy, as was demonstrated by 
their high correlation with some other intraday liquidity measures (Table 2.10.8.A and Table 
2.10.8.B). 
Again consistent with Ranaldo’s (2000) findings, my research reveals that the liquidity status of 
a stock can vary according to the liquidity proxy used. Thus, even if in some cases the liquidity 
proxies are highly correlated (cf. for example Table 2.10.8.A and 2.10.8.B), the status of a single 
share may be completely different. This is the case, for example, for France Telecom when the 
volatility of return and volatility as log range are considered. In general the most appropriate 
measures of intraday market liquidity seem to be the following: EHS, QHS, DSPR, QHS_WAS, 
SUMVOL, NBTR, VARRET, VOLA, WT, LR and FR. On the other hand, it is difficult to judge 
if a stock is more liquid than another when, for example the MID measure is considered. The 
latter represent the correct price when the bid-ask bounce problem is taken into account. The 
measures of volume imbalance, i.e. VIMB and SABSVIMB, can be good liquidity indicators, if 
the imbalance is effectively transformed into trading volume. This positive relation seems to 
occur, as documented by the analysis made in Section 2.6. RET and ABSRET alone are difficult 
to interpret and it is better to associate these measures with another proxy. Liquidity ratio, for 
example, can be a solution. In fact the latter is a measure based on the relationship between the 
number or value of shares traded during a time period and the absolute value of the percentage 
price change over the same time period. In general, from Table 2.10.9.A and 2.10.9.B it is 
difficult to draw any conclusion about which is the most liquid asset, but Alcatel, France Telecom 
and Vivendi seem well positioned in all the months under study for most of the liquidity 
indicators. 
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2.6. Determinants of intraday market liquidity 
 
In view of the presence of such intraday patterns, a deeper investigation of market liquidity 
seems to be indicated. In this section, my objective is to shed new light on the determinants of 
market liquidity. In order to achieve this, it was necessary first to eliminate the seasonal 
components found in the high frequency data, which might lead to serious bias in the model 
(Andersen and Bollersev 1997). In order to adjust the data for intraday seasonality, different 
filtering procedures have been used in the literature. Bollersev and Ghysel (1996) proposed a 
method that captures the repetitive seasonal variations in volatility changes by allowing 
periodically varying coefficients in the conditional variance equation. Taylor and Xu (1995) model 
intraday seasonality by a set of multiplicative deflators. They estimate the seasonal multipliers 
after having averaged the sums of squared returns across similar time periods. A deseasonalized 
return series is then calculated by dividing each return by its seasonal multiplier. Instead, I apply a 
method similar to Ranaldo’s (2000), which consists in not using the current level market liquidity, 
but rather the logarithmic ratio between the current level and its normal value at the current 
moment. More detailed explanations and the mathematical expression of this intraday adjustment 
are provided in Appendix 2.11.2. In Appendix 2.11.3 I also show the regression procedure and 
the tests used in the regression analysis in order to validate my results. Five analyses are 
performed: depth in terms of trading volume; depth estimated by order volume imbalances; the 
time dimension of intraday market liquidity; the tightness of intraday market liquidity; and last the 
intraday return volatility. 
The majority of the models that try to explain these empirical regularities hypothesize that the 
behaviour of informed and non-informed traders play a dominant role. There are periods when 
the information asymmetry between traders is more likely: when informed traders are present, or 
when the liquidity traders are dominant. The levels of volume size and return volatility allow a 
better assessment of different intraday market situations (Glosten 1994). The results of the 
following regressions are presented in Tables 2.10.10 to 2.10.14, but only significant coefficients 
are shown. 
 
A. Depth in terms of trading volume 
 
My first analysis concerns the market depth. In this section, I use the cumulated traded 
volume as a depth proxy, and in the next section the order volume imbalance. The first 
regression analysis considers an ARMA model that may include lagged variables. The following 
general equation, labelled Equation (1), is used for both periods under study. 
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Table 2.10.10 presents the results of the regression and shows that the ratio of waiting time 
between subsequent trades and RVARRET are lagged in the second period. Clear evidence of 
this result, i.e. lagged waiting time between subsequent trades, has been reported by Dufour and 
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Engle (2000). However, I established that the value of q, r and s must not be higher than 12 (one 
hour lag) in the sensitivity analysis of the lagged dependent variables. This value has been 
considered after  studying the correlogram. After running the ARMA models, several tests are 
available in order to find the best fit. The common empirical approach implies the use of 
information criteria, such as the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), the Schwarz Information 
Criterion (SIC) and the procedure developed by Ng and Perron (1995). Finally, as recommended 
by Mills (1990), the Schwartz information criterion was used as a model selection criterion as it 
helps in the choice of the magnitudes of p and z. I found that ARMA (2,1)33 in the first period, 
and ARMA (2,3)34 in the second period have the biggest explanatory power. Nevertheless, the 
White Heteroskedasticity test still indicates the presence of heteroskedasticity and the ARCH LM 
test clearly indicates that for several variables the hypothesis stating that all coefficients of the 
lagged squared residuals are zero should not be accepted. When necessary, I tried out all plausible 
ARCH models. The likelihood ratio test was finally singled out in order to find the most adequate 
solution. Other tests and conditional variance equations are presented in detail in Appendix 
2.11.1. Depth in terms of trading volume shows a TARCH (1,2) model in the first period and a 
GARCH (1,1) model in the second period. The regression result shows that the ratio of 
cumulated trading volume is negatively related (in the first period) and positively (in the second 
period) to the ratio of waiting time between subsequent trades, and is positively related to the 
ratio of the volume imbalance, suggesting that volume imbalance tends to be transformed into 
trading volume. This confirm that both indicators, namely RSUMVOL and RSABSVIMB inform 
on market depth. The results of the regression can also be interpreted as follows: the positive 
relation to the volume imbalance may be due to a price revision following the release of public 
information or a wider diffusion of private information, as suggested by Ranaldo (2000). The 
ratio of cumulated traded volume is negatively related to the ratio of volatility of return. This 
result is different from the one found by Ranaldo (2000), Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) and Kyle 
(1985) who found that high volume is accompanied by high volatility. In contrast, my result is 
consistent with Foster and Viswanathan (1990) who predicted a negative relation between 
volume and volatility. Also the Foucault (1999) model explains that during a period of high 
uncertainty (high volatility) the trading volume may be reduced by the limit order traders’ attitude. 
The positive relation between trade frequency and market depth is similar to the results found 
previously by Ranaldo (2000)35 on the Swiss market, who hypothesized, in this case, that 
discretionary liquidity traders are more likely to be present. Madhavan and Sofianos (1998), with 
respect to specialist control, hypothesize, in cases when the volume is constituted many small 
trades rather than infrequent large sized trades that the negative relation between RWT and 
RSUMVOL is caused by divergence and asymmetry information. It can also be explained by the 
protective behaviour assumed by the discretionary liquidity traders, who reduce trade frequency. 
On the other hand the informed traders use waiting time to act strategically. Similar to Ranaldo’s 
                                                 
33 The p parameter assume value 2 and z value 1. 
34 The p parameter assume value 2 and z value 3. 
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(2000) study is the TARCH model (Zakoian (1990) and Glosten, Jaganathan, and Runkle (1993), 
in the first period, which is explained in Appendix 2.11.1, and which concerns the conditional 
variance of residuals of the cumulated trading volume. The leverage effect term is significant, and 
it appears to be an asymmetric one. The literature interprets this result by the fact that good news 
brings increased trading volumes, whereas bad news slows market activity and reduces intraday 
market depth. For this reason, the market reaction is asymmetrical, i.e. intraday market liquidity 
react differently according to good or bad news. I have used a quasi-likelihood standard error, 
since the residuals are highly leptokurtic. 
 
B. Depth estimated by order volume imbalance 
 
In this section, an analysis is made of volume imbalance, used as proxy of market depth, in 
relation to two independent variables: RQHS and RWT. The utilization of volume imbalance as a 
proxy of market liquidity has been criticized, but the results, similar to Engle and Lange (1997) 
and Lee, Mucklow and Ready (1993) are encouraging. The following general ARMA regression 
model, labelled Equation 2, was analysed:  
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The procedure used in order to find out the most powerful model is the same as the one 
explained for equation 1. In agreement with Engle and Lange (1997), Lee, Mucklow and Ready 
(1993) and Ranaldo (2000), I found a negative relation between the ratio of volume imbalance 
and the ratio of spread and the ratio of waiting time (Table 2.10.11). The most significant result is 
obtained when the lagged spread is considered as an independent variable. In this case, it seems 
that the spread has a leading explanatory power on the volume imbalances in both periods under 
study. The negative relation during, for example price revision time, may support the idea of a 
wider spread during periods of high uncertainty when demand and supply are more rigid. 
Uncertainty may induce discretionary liquidity traders to put off trades, thus reducing depth. This 
interpretation may also be related to the behaviour of limit order and market order traders, who 
observe the order book. The latter traders might be motivated by private information or liquidity 
reasons. Consistent with Lee, Mucklow and Ready (1993) and Kavajecz (1999), there may be a 
deterministic moment of adverse selection (information disclosure) where limit order traders tend 
to widen the spread reducing and thus the market depth. This idea supports my result that the 
spread tends to lead the volume imbalance. I also found that the ratio of waiting time between 
subsequent trades increases when the ratio of volume imbalance decreases. 
The conditional variance of residuals derived from the regressions represents a GARCH 
process. In this case, the autocorrelated stochastic process does not have an asymmetric 
component. 
                                                                                                                                                        
35 He uses an intraday interval of 30 minutes. My model may be more sensitive to changes of independent variables. 
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C. Time dimension of intraday market liquidity 
 
The time between subsequent trades is regressed on the ratio of volume imbalance, ratio of 
volatility and ratio of cumulated traded volume in order to establish the time dimension of 
intraday market liquidity. The general ARMA regression model, labelled Equation 3, is the 
following one: 
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The same procedure already used in previous equations, for finding the best model, also 
applies for Equation 3. The results of this regression (Table 2.10.12) do not differ substantially 
between period 1 and period 2, but in period 2 the high autocorrelation of the residuals and of 
the squared residuals does not allow to draw any significant conclusion. However, I found in 
period 1 that the ratio of waiting time is negatively related to ratio of trading volume, like in the 
Ranaldo’s (2000) paper, and positively related to ratio of volume imbalance and ratio of volatility. 
Another result is that the RWT follows an ARMA (2,1) model in the first period and an 
ARMA (3,1) in the second period. In this case the conditional variance of the residuals follows a 
GARCH (1,1) model for both periods. 
 
D. Tightness of intraday market liquidity 
 
The tightness of intraday market liquidity is also investigated in section 2.7 where, instead of 
the spread of the Bm2d2 file, I used the weighted average spread (WAS). The following ARMA 
regression, labelled Equation 4, was carried out in order to deepen the analysis of the relationship 
between spread and trading volume: 
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My empirical findings (Table 2.10.13) help to understand the behaviour of the BAS. In period 
1 there is a positive relation between the ratio of quoted spread and ratio of volume imbalance, 
i.e. a wide spread corresponds to an increase in volume imbalance. In the second period, this 
contemporaneous relation is not present and the RSABSVIMB variable is not statistically 
different from zero. A more powerful model, as shown in Table 2.10.13.B, considers a lagged 
volume imbalance variable which has a negative relation to the QHS, as reported by Ranaldo 
(2000) and Lee, Mucklow and Ready (1993). In this case, as noted by Ranaldo (2000), the trading 
activity may be dominated by the liquidity traders and also by informed traders. In fact, informed 
traders tend to trade during period when also liquidity traders are present. Lee, Mucklow and 
Ready (1993) sustain that spread widens and depth fall in response to higher trading volume. 
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McInish and Wood (1992) show that the spread is positively related to the risk level and to the 
amount of information, but negatively related to the trading activity and to the level of 
competition. In section 2.7 I give an interpretation which takes into account the behaviour of the 
more patient traders, who supply the liquidity through limit order trading, and of the eager 
traders who submit market orders motivated by private information or liquidity reasons. The 
results presented in section 2.7 are stronger in respect of equation (4). Finally, the ratio of quoted 
spread follows an ARMA (2,2)-GARCH (1,1) model. 
 
E. Intraday volatility of returns 
 
In this last regression, labelled Equation 5, I tried to analyse the volatility of return through 
the following ARMA model: 
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The results of this regression (Table 2.10.14) show a positive relation between the ratio of 
quoted spread and ratio of volatility and a negative one with ratio of volume imbalance in the 
first period. All coefficients are significantly different from zero, thus enhancing the results 
found. One explication of the positive relation between RVARRET and RQHS is the fact that 
either may increase or decrease in times when there is more asymmetric information and more 
uncertainty. The negative relation between ratio of volume imbalance and ratio of volatility may 
be interpreted as a price revision, so that the divergence between buyer and seller is higher. If I 
consider volume imbalance as a depth proxy, I ought to find, in contrast, a positive relation 
between RVARRET and RMABSVIMB (informed and liquidity traders may be active). Return 
volatility is also considered as an indicator of the intensity of the market activity. The relation 
between RAVARRET and RWT may be interpreted as follows: a decrease in waiting time may 
correspond to an increase in return volatility, so that an increase in market activity can be caused 
by the higher activity of the informed traders. But the informed traders try to hide their orders 
when the activity of the discretionary liquidity traders is more evident. If it is more likely that 
suppliers of liquidity trades are present, a rise in return volatility may correspond to a wider 
uncertainty, thus inducing a lower market activity (positive RWT). 
The literature gives another interpretation for the positive relation between volatility and 
spread. In particular, Foucault (1999) considers that if the volatility increases, the bid-ask spread 
widens. In fact, consistent with the winner’s curse problem, the risk for a limit order trader to be 
picked off is higher, and thus limit order buyers (sellers) request a higher (lower) reservation 
price, thus widening their reservation spread. Therefore, when volatility increases, limit order 
traders require a larger compensation. At the same time market order trading becomes more 
costly and, on the whole, the higher proportion of limit orders instead of market orders reduces 
the execution probability of limit order trading. 
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Furthermore, my results show that the return volatility follows an ARMA (1,2)-GARCH (1,1) 
model in the first period and an ARMA (2,2)-GARCH (1,1) model in the second one. 
Some criticism about the regression used in this study and the choice of the best model has 
been reported at the end of Chapter 4. 
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2.7. The relation between spread and volume imbalance 
 
A large body of the literature has studied the link between trading activity, usually represented 
by trading volume, and stock market returns (Benston and Hagerman 1974, Gallant, Rossi and 
Tauchen 1992, Hiemstra and Jones 1994, Lo and Wang 2000 and Karpoff 1987). Imbalance can 
provide additional power beyond volume in explaining stock returns. Intuition suggests that 
prices and liquidity should be more strongly affected by more extreme order imbalances, 
regardless of volume, for two reasons: first, order imbalances sometimes signal private 
information, which should reduce liquidity at least temporarily and could also affect the market 
price permanently, as was also suggested by Kyle’s (1985) theory of price formation. Second, 
even a random large order imbalance exacerbates the inventory problem faced by the market 
maker, who can be expected to respond by changing BAS and revising price quotations. Hence, 
order imbalances should be important influences on stock returns and liquidity (spread), and are 
conceivably more important than volume (Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam 2001). 
Most existing studies analyse order imbalance around specific events or over short periods of 
time. Sias (1997) looks at order imbalances in the context of institutional buying and selling of 
closed end funds; Lauterbach and Ben-Zion (1993) and Blume, MacKinlay and Terker (1989) 
analyze order imbalance around the October 1987 crash; and Lee et al. (1993) does the same 
around earnings announcements. Chan and Fong (2000) investigate how order imbalance 
changes the contemporaneous relation between stock volatility and volume, using data of a six 
months period. Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001) and Brown, Walsh and Yuan (1997) study order 
imbalances for thirty stocks (over one year ) and twenty stocks (over two years) respectively. 
They focus on: characterizing properties and determinants of market-wide daily order imbalance; 
studying the relation between order imbalance and aggregate measure of liquidity; and 
investigating the extent to which daily stock market returns are related to order imbalances, after 
having checked the effects of market liquidity. They saw a strong contemporaneous link between 
stock returns and order imbalance. In their view market prices tend to reverse after declines, and 
then follow previous up-moves. These results are consistent with the inventory paradigm, which 
suggests that imbalances cause price pressure. 
Hopman (2002) shows that stock returns are in large part due to supply and demand 
imbalances, rather than information. He suggests that mechanical price pressure through supply 
and demand imbalances provides a better explanation of price changes than information. 
Chordia and Subrahmanyam (2002) shed new light on the inventory effect, underlying the 
relation between order imbalance and daily returns of individual stocks. They found empirical 
evidence that market makers dynamically accommodate autocorrelated imbalances, which causes 
a positive relation between lagged imbalances and returns36. Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam 
(2001) raise the inventory problem faced by the market maker following an increase in volume 
imbalance, but what happens in an order-driven market ? I shall try to give an answer to this 
question by establishing a relation between spread and volume imbalance. 
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Four regressions are performed between spread measures (RQHS_WAS and RDSPR_WAS) 
of the WAS file and volume imbalance (MABSVIMB and SABSVIMB). Such a relation can be 
interpreted as a market tightness proxy and it is different from the one presented in section 2.6. 
In fact, the spreads are obtained by considering the ask and bid prices as prices for blocks. In the 
regression I also look at the volatility and waiting time, as suggested by Easley and O’Hara (1987) 
and Chang and Fong (2000). All the time series are seasonally adjusted.  
 
A. Quoted half spread and volume imbalance 
 
The following ARMA regression model, labelled Equation 6, was carried out and presented in 
Table 2.10.15: 
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My empirical findings, presented in Table 2.10.15.A (first period) and in Table 2.10.15.B 
(second period), help to understand the behaviour of the bid-ask spread. The final result, in Table 
2.10.15, shows that normalized RQHS_WAS follows, in the first period (December – March) an 
ARMA (2,1), while the conditional variance follows a GARCH (1,1). The results of the second 
period (April – November) seem less strong than for the first period. Furthermore for the 
conditional variance, I found an asymmetric component (TARCH (1,1)). The model indicates, in 
the second period, a negative relation between the ratio of spread (dependent variable) and the 
independent variables (waiting time, imbalance and volatility), but a positive relation between 
ratio of volatility, ratio of waiting time and spreads during the first period. Easley and O’Hara 
(1987) have already noted the dependency of the spread on the time between trades, with the 
spread decreasing when this time increases. The negative relation between imbalance and spread, 
as Ranaldo (2000) says, can be explained by thinking of volume imbalance as a market depth 
proxy. Another interpretation can be attributed to the activity of liquidity traders. High volatility 
can be associated to a period of uncertainty that induces a higher spread. Ranaldo (2000) uses 
also unexpected trading volume as a proxy of market uncertainty, finding a positive relation 
between unexpected volume and spread on the SWX. 
The result of the regression is different from Equation (4)37 where I found a positive relation 
between spread and volume imbalance (see Table 2.10.13.A), but the former result seems to be 
more logical if the results are interpreted as the ability of investors to observe the state of the 
order book. The trading strategies of sellers and buyers may be different, if the composition of 
the sell and buy side is structurally different. Volume imbalance means that one side of the book 
is thicker. For example, from a buyer’s point of view, the thicker the book is on the buy side, the 
                                                                                                                                                        
36 Relation inverse sign after checking for current imbalance. 
37 The positive relation was only found in the first period (December 1999 – March 2000). 
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greater the willingness will be to submit a market order (aggressive trader). Consistent with 
Ranaldo (2001), the use of market orders is more frequent when the volume available on the 
same side as that of the incoming trader exceeds the quoted volume on the opposite side (Ahn, 
Bae and Chan, 2000, Chung, Van Ness and Van Ness, 1999, Griffiths, Smith, Turnbull and 
White, 2000). On the other side of the book, the seller will continue to provide liquidity through 
limit orders as long as he sees, through the limit order book, that there is an imbalance on the 
buy side. The aggressive market order will match the limit order. Considering that an aggressive 
trader may want his order to be passed first, he has to trade within the spread, reducing de facto 
the spread and causing this negative relation. 
My regression analysis shows that the volatility is positively related to the spread. Also in this 
case, the behaviour of traders can be considered as the dominant factor. An increase of volatility 
can reduce aggressiveness and encourage limit order trading. This supports the model of 
Foucault (1999), in which an increase in volatility leads a larger reservation spread by limit order 
traders, a decrease of their execution probability and a decrease of the market imbalance. The 
reduced aggressiveness of traders can be explained by the information asymmetry and the higher 
profitability due to liquidity events. Traders widen the reservation spread because of the risk of 
being picked off by informed traders (Foucault, 1999). Also Lee, Mucklow and Ready (1993) had 
noted that the liquidity providers are sensitive to changes in information asymmetry, and this 
leads them to widen their spread due to higher adverse selection risk. The limit order strategy, 
when the spread is larger, is also evident in Griffiths et al. (2000) and in Biais, Hillion and Spatt 
(1995). 
Comparing the result of the regression (6) with the results obtained in Equation (4), it seems 
that the weighted average spread is a better indicator of market illiquidity than the spread 
measures derived from the order book. 
 
B. Average spread and volume imbalance 
 
Also in this section, an ARMA regression model, labelled Equation 7, is made by changing the 
measure of the spread. RDSPR_WAS is used, i.e. the difference between the two best order 
limits of the order book. 
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The results of Equation (7) does not significantly differ from Equation (6) and for this reason 
is not presented. The relation between spreads and other liquidity proxies are maintained, and so 
is the asymmetric component of the residual variance for the period April – November 2000. 
The high relation between RDSPR_WAS and volume imbalance is maintained also during the 
second period, where the decrease is lower than the decrease registered for the relation between 
RQHS_WAS and RSABSVIMB. 
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2.8. Conclusions 
 
In chapter 2 I analytically described the market trading structure of the Paris Bourse before 
and after the merger with the Amsterdam and Brussels Stock Exchanges, which has led the three 
Bourses to become the first integrated and transnational capital market using the Euro. 
In the empirical part, the intraday evolution of the commonly used liquidity proxies was 
analysed over a one year period, such as spread, return, volatility and volume of the 43 stocks 
belonging to the CAC40 index. Spread measures were divided into effective half spread (EHS), 
which represents the reduction in trading costs attributable to trades executed within the quotes; 
midquote (MID), which is the average between ask price and bid price; quoted half spread 
(QHS), that is the difference between the two best limits of the LOB on each side of the book 
divided by the midquote; and last the difference spread (DSPR), which represents the difference 
between ask and bid price. Spread had always been considered as a proxy of market liquidity. 
EHS, QHS and DSPR patterns show that the spread is wide during the first hours of trading, 
diminishes throughout the trading, and then rises again in the last hour before the market closes, 
but not to the same level as in the morning. In addition, this reverse J-shaped pattern shows two 
other peaks, which were reported also in previous studies: one around 14:30 (time when the 
majority of US macroeconomic news is released), and the second one around 15:30, even if not 
significant. The latter corresponds to the opening of the US markets when we see a decrease of 
the spread followed by resumption 10 minutes later. The midquote, instead, even if cannot be 
considered as a spread measure, clearly shows a U-shaped pattern. The same procedure has been 
used for the weighted average spread, which represents the price for a block trade. However, in 
this case, I retained only QHS and DSPR, finding a reverse J-shaped pattern too. The volume, in 
contrast to the majority of the empirical findings in the US market, follows a J-shape pattern, 
with the cumulated traded volume very light in the early morning and then constantly increasing 
after the lunch break. As suggested by Jones, Kaul and Lipson (1994), I also used also the average 
number of trades as a liquidity proxy. The resulting U-shape indicates a high number of trades, 
but no higher quantities, in the morning, whereas the afternoon characterized by high trades and 
quantities. 
The average return does not follow any clear pattern, in contrast to American studies but in 
agreement with Niemeyer and Sandås (1995). Volatility measured as variance of return and as log 
range, shows a reverse J-shaped pattern and a U-shaped pattern respectively, thus confirming 
previous studies on the subject. 
The waiting time follows an inverse U-shaped pattern. I also introduced two other liquidity 
proxies: liquidity ratio and flow ratio. The former, which was previously considered as an interday 
proxy does not correspond to the findings of Ranaldo (2000), who had used it on an intraday 
basis. I didn’t found any precise shape, but a constant increase which is logically related to the 
volume and return shapes. The flow ratio follows a reverse J-shaped pattern too. None of 
liquidity proxies allows to draw a conclusion about which stock is more liquid. 
The definition of liquidity calls for a deeper investigation of intraday market liquidity with 
respect to several dimensions: time, depth, breadth and resiliency. I analysed the intraday market 
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liquidity determinants in relation to each other. In particular, the depth dimension in terms of 
trading volume shows a negative relation between trading volume and waiting time between 
trades, and a positive relation between cumulated traded volume and volume imbalance, 
suggesting that volume imbalance tends to be transformed into trading volume. A negative 
relation is found between volume and volatility. Market depth, estimated by the cumulated traded 
volume follows an ARMA (2,1) – TARCH (1,2) in the first period and an ARMA (2,3) – 
GARCH (1,1) in the second period. The depth of the market was also measured by the volume 
imbalance indicator, and shows a negative relation with spread and waiting time. 
The time dimension of intraday market liquidity gives weak results, in particular concerning  
the behaviour of the residuals and squared residuals. It seems, however, that the waiting time is 
negatively related to the trading volume, and positively to volume imbalance and volatility. 
Furthermore, the tightness of the market was estimated through the quoted bid-ask spread. I 
found a positive relation between spread and volume imbalance only in the first period, and a 
negative one in the second period and in Equations (6) and (7). The regression analysis seems to 
support the idea of certain strategies employed by the supplier and demander of liquidity (their 
patience or their aggressiveness). The weighted average spread, calculated in relation to volume 
imbalance in Equations (6) and (7), has a bigger explanatory power and seems to be a good 
illiquidity proxy. The volatility of returns, which was also estimated, presents a positive relation to 
the spread and a negative one with the volume imbalance. 
The results of the regressions suggest, with respect to market depth, that an asymmetric effect 
exists. The TARCH models support the idea that negative and positive shocks have different 
effects on the conditional variance, inducing a different impact of bad and good news on the 
market liquidity. 
The behaviour of informed and discretionary liquidity traders has not been tested to the same 
extent as in other investigations, but my general approach seems to sustain the previously found 
hypothesis, namely that the positive relation between spread and volume may be due to the 
presence of liquidity traders, whereas the opposite occurs when informed traders are operating. 
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FIGURE 2.9.1.A: Intraday patterns of the effective half spread from December 1, 1999 to 
March 31, 2000 for the 43 stocks and the index. This figure shows the intraday evolution of 
the effective half spread (EHS) within successive intraday periods of 5 minutes for each stock 
belonging to the CAC 40 index. TOT_AVERAGE represents the average evolution for all the 43 
stocks. The liquidity indicator has been calculated following the procedure described in Appendix 
2.11.2 and it has been standardized by subtracting by its mean and then divided by its standard 
deviation. Hence the vertical axis presents the standardized extent of market liquidity. The 
horizontal axis corresponds to the time axis based on 96 periods of 5 minutes. 
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FIGURE 2.9.1.B: Intraday patterns of the effective half spread from April 1, 2000 to 
November 30, 2000 for the 43 stocks and the index. This figure shows the intraday evolution 
of the effective half spread (EHS) within successive intraday periods of 5 minutes for each stock 
belonging to the CAC 40 index. TOT_AVERAGE represents the average evolution for all the 43 
stocks. The liquidity indicator has been calculated following the procedure described in Appendix 
2.11.2 and it has been standardized by subtracting by its mean and then divided by its standard 
deviation. Hence the vertical axis presents the standardized extent of market liquidity. The 
horizontal axis corresponds to the time axis based on 102 periods of 5 minutes. 
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FIGURE 2.9.2: Intraday patterns of the quoted half spread from December 1, 1999 to 
March 31, 2000 for the 43 stocks and the index. This figure shows the intraday evolution of 
the quoted half spread (QHS) within successive intraday periods of 5 minutes for each stock 
belonging to the CAC 40 index. TOT_AVERAGE represents the average evolution for all the 43 
stocks. The liquidity indicator has been calculated following the procedure described in Appendix 
2.11.2 and it has been standardized by subtracting by its mean and then divided by its standard 
deviation. Hence the vertical axis presents the standardized extent of market liquidity. The 
horizontal axis corresponds to the time axis based on 96 periods of 5 minutes. 
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FIGURE 2.9.3: Intraday patterns of the difference spread from December 1, 1999 to 
March 31, 2000 for the 43 stocks and the index. This figure shows the intraday evolution of 
the difference spread (DSPR) within successive intraday periods of 5 minutes for each stock 
belonging to the CAC 40 index. TOT_AVERAGE represents the average evolution for all the 43 
stocks. The liquidity indicator has been calculated following the procedure described in Appendix 
2.11.2 and it has been standardized by subtracting by its mean and then divided by its standard 
deviation. Hence the vertical axis presents the standardized extent of market liquidity. The 
horizontal axis corresponds to the time axis based on 96 periods of 5 minutes. 
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FIGURE 2.9.4: Intraday patterns of the midquote from December 1, 1999 to March 31, 
2000 for the 43 stocks and the index. This figure shows the intraday evolution of the midquote 
(MID) within successive intraday periods of 5 minutes for each stock belonging to the CAC 40 
index. TOT_AVERAGE represents the average evolution for all the 43 stocks. The liquidity 
indicator has been calculated following the procedure described in Appendix 2.11.2 and it has 
been standardized by subtracting by its mean and then divided by its standard deviation. Hence 
the vertical axis presents the standardized extent of market liquidity. The horizontal axis 
corresponds to the time axis based on 96 periods of 5 minutes. 
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FIGURE 2.9.5: Intraday patterns of the QHS_WAS from December 1, 1999 to March 31, 
2000 for the 43 stocks and the index. This figure shows the intraday evolution of the quoted 
spread from the WAS file (QHS_WAS) within successive intraday periods of 5 minutes for each 
stock belonging to the CAC 40 index. TOT_AVERAGE represents the average evolution for all 
the 43 stocks. The liquidity indicator has been calculated following the procedure described in 
Appendix 2.11.2 and it has been standardized by subtracting by its mean and then divided by its 
standard deviation. Hence the vertical axis presents the standardized extent of market liquidity. 
The horizontal axis corresponds to the time axis based on 96 periods of 5 minutes. 
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FIGURE 2.9.6: Intraday patterns of the cumulated traded volume from December 1, 1999 
to March 31, 2000 for the 43 stocks and the index. This figure shows the intraday evolution of 
the cumulated traded volume (SUMVOL) within successive intraday periods of 5 minutes for 
each stock belonging to the CAC 40 index. TOT_AVERAGE represents the average evolution 
for all the 43 stocks. The liquidity indicator has been calculated following the procedure 
described in Appendix 2.11.2 and it has been standardized by subtracting by its mean and then 
divided by its standard deviation. Hence the vertical axis presents the standardized extent of 
market liquidity. The horizontal axis corresponds to the time axis based on 96 periods of 5 
minutes. 
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FIGURE 2.9.7: Intraday patterns of the number of trades from December 1, 1999 to 
March 31, 2000 for the 43 stocks and the index. This figure shows the intraday evolution of 
the number of trades (NBTR) within successive intraday periods of 5 minutes for each stock 
belonging to the CAC 40 index. TOT_AVERAGE represents the average evolution for all the 43 
stocks. The liquidity indicator has been calculated following the procedure described in Appendix 
2.11.2 and it has been standardized by subtracting by its mean and then divided by its standard 
deviation. Hence the vertical axis presents the standardized extent of market liquidity. The 
horizontal axis corresponds to the time axis based on 96 periods of 5 minutes. 
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FIGURE 2.9.8: Intraday patterns of the cumulated volume imbalance from December 1, 
1999 to March 31, 2000 for the 43 stocks and the index. This figure shows the intraday 
evolution of the cumulated volume imbalance (VIMB) within successive intraday periods of 5 
minutes for each stock belonging to the CAC 40 index. TOT_AVERAGE represents the average 
evolution for all the 43 stocks. The liquidity indicator has been calculated following the procedure 
described in Appendix 2.11.2 and it has been standardized by subtracting by its mean and then 
divided by its standard deviation. Hence the vertical axis presents the standardized extent of 
market liquidity. The horizontal axis corresponds to the time axis based on 96 periods of 5 
minutes. 
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FIGURE 2.9.9: Intraday patterns of the SABSVIMB from December 1, 1999 to March 31, 
2000 for the 43 stocks and the index. This figure shows the intraday evolution of the 
cumulated volume imbalance in absolute terms (SABSVIMB) within successive intraday periods 
of 5 minutes for each stock belonging to the CAC 40 index. TOT_AVERAGE represents the 
average evolution for all the 43 stocks. The liquidity indicator has been calculated following the 
procedure described in Appendix 2.11.2 and it has been standardized by subtracting by its mean 
and then divided by its standard deviation. Hence the vertical axis presents the standardized 
extent of market liquidity. The horizontal axis corresponds to the time axis based on 96 periods 
of 5 minutes. 
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FIGURE 2.9.10: Intraday patterns of the average return from December 1, 1999 to March 
31, 2000 for the 43 stocks and the index. This figure shows the intraday evolution of the 
average return (RET) within successive intraday periods of 5 minutes for each stock belonging to 
the CAC 40 index. TOT_AVERAGE represents the average evolution for all the 43 stocks. The 
liquidity indicator has been calculated following the procedure described in Appendix 2.11.2 and 
it has been standardized by subtracting by its mean and then divided by its standard deviation. 
Hence the vertical axis presents the standardized extent of market liquidity. The horizontal axis 
corresponds to the time axis based on 96 periods of 5 minutes. 
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FIGURE 2.9.11: Intraday patterns of the return in absolute terms from December 1, 1999 
to March 31, 2000 for the 43 stocks and the index. This figure shows the intraday evolution of 
the return in absolute terms (ABSRET) within successive intraday periods of 5 minutes for each 
stock belonging to the CAC 40 index. TOT_AVERAGE represents the average evolution for all 
the 43 stocks. The liquidity indicator has been calculated following the procedure described in 
Appendix 2.11.2 and it has been standardized by subtracting by its mean and then divided by its 
standard deviation. Hence the vertical axis presents the standardized extent of market liquidity. 
The horizontal axis corresponds to the time axis based on 96 periods of 5 minutes. 
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FIGURE 2.9.12: Intraday patterns of the volatility of returns from December 1, 1999 to 
March 31, 2000 for the 43 stocks and the index. This figure shows the intraday evolution of 
the volatility of returns (VARRET) within successive intraday periods of 5 minutes for each stock 
belonging to the CAC 40 index. TOT_AVERAGE represents the average evolution for all the 43 
stocks. The liquidity indicator has been calculated following the procedure described in Appendix 
2.11.2 and it has been standardized by subtracting by its mean and then divided by its standard 
deviation. Hence the vertical axis presents the standardized extent of market liquidity. The 
horizontal axis corresponds to the time axis based on 96 periods of 5 minutes. 
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FIGURE 2.9.13: Intraday patterns of the volatility as log range from December 1, 1999 to 
March 31, 2000 for the 43 stocks and the index. This figure shows the intraday evolution of 
the volatility (VOLA) as log range within successive intraday periods of 5 minutes for each stock 
belonging to the CAC 40 index. TOT_AVERAGE represents the average evolution for all the 43 
stocks. The liquidity indicator has been calculated following the procedure described in Appendix 
2.11.2 and it has been standardized by subtracting by its mean and then divided by its standard 
deviation. Hence the vertical axis presents the standardized extent of market liquidity. The 
horizontal axis corresponds to the time axis based on 96 periods of 5 minutes. 
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FIGURE 2.9.14: Intraday patterns of the waiting time from December 1, 1999 to March 
31, 2000 for the 43 stocks and the index. This figure shows the intraday evolution of the 
waiting time between subsequent trades (WT) within successive intraday periods of 5 minutes for 
each stock belonging to the CAC 40 index. TOT_AVERAGE represents the average evolution 
for all the 43 stocks. The liquidity indicator has been calculated following the procedure 
described in Appendix 2.11.2 and it has been standardized by subtracting by its mean and then 
divided by its standard deviation. Hence the vertical axis presents the standardized extent of 
market liquidity. The horizontal axis corresponds to the time axis based on 96 periods of 5 
minutes. 
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FIGURE 2.9.15: Intraday patterns of the liquidity ratio from December 1, 1999 to March 
31, 2000 for the 43 stocks and the index. This figure shows the intraday evolution of the 
liquidity ratio (LR) within successive intraday periods of 5 minutes for each stock belonging to 
the CAC 40 index. TOT_AVERAGE represents the average evolution for all the 43 stocks. The 
liquidity indicator has been calculated following the procedure described in Appendix 2.11.2 and 
it has been standardized by subtracting by its mean and then divided by its standard deviation. 
Hence the vertical axis presents the standardized extent of market liquidity. The horizontal axis 
corresponds to the time axis based on 96 periods of 5 minutes. 
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FIGURE 2.9.16: Intraday patterns of the flow ratio from December 1, 1999 to March 31, 
2000 for the 43 stocks and the index. This figure shows the intraday evolution of the flow ratio 
(FR) within successive intraday periods of 5 minutes for each stock belonging to the CAC 40 
index. TOT_AVERAGE represents the average evolution for all the 43 stocks. The liquidity 
indicator has been calculated following the procedure described in Appendix 2.11.2 and it has 
been standardized by subtracting by its mean and then divided by its standard deviation. Hence 
the vertical axis presents the standardized extent of market liquidity. The horizontal axis 
corresponds to the time axis based on 96 periods of 5 minutes. 
 
 
 
 
 
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
ACCOR
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
AEROSPATIA
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
AGF
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
AIR
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
ALCATEL
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
ALSTOM
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
AVENTIS
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
AXA
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
BIC
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
BNP
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
BOUYGUES
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
CANAL
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
CAP
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
CARREFOUR
-2
0
2
4
6
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
CASINO
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
CREDIT
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
CSF
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
DANONE
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
DEXIA
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
EQUANT
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
ERIDANIA
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
FRANCE
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
LAFARGE
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
LAGARDERE
-2
0
2
4
6
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
LEGRAND
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
LOREAL
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
LVMH
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
MICHELIN
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
MULTI
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
PEUGEOT
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
PINAULT
-2
0
2
4
6
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
RENAULT
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
SAINT
-2
0
2
4
6
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
SANOFI
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
SCHNEIDER
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
SOCIETE
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
SODEXHO
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
STM
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
SUEZ
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
TF1
-1
0
1
2
3
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
TOT_AVERAGE
-2
0
2
4
6
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
TOTAL
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
VALEO
-2
0
2
4
6
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
VIVENDI
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLES 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2 – Tables 
  
 
 109 
TABLE 2.10.1.A: Descriptive statistics. For each stock, the table shows company name, 
market capitalization, weight in the index, price change over the sample period from December 
1, 1999 to November 30, 2000, overall number of trades, average number of shares traded every 
day, quantity traded, quantity traded per day, number of applications and the business sector of 
each company. 
 
Price Change Company Name MarketCap Index 
Weight 01.12.99 30.11.00 Var %
NbTrades Average
Trades p.d.
Volume Volume p.d. No. of application Business Sector 
PANEL A
Agf 9'881'148'945 0.84% 54.3 68.3 25.71% 148'960 581.88 67'398'866 263'276.82 945Insurance
Air Liquide 12'617'100'753 1.08% 151.1 146.8 -2.84% 452'200 1'766.41 41'160'281 160'782.35 1918Basic Materials
Alstom 5'940'658'878 0.51% 31.8 27.2 -14.53% 335'066 1'308.85 118'054'586 461'150.73 1399Industrial
Axa 57'129'278'200 4.87% 140.0 162.0 15.67% 522'386 2'040.57 210'086'377 820'649.91 3868Insurance
Bic 2'530'868'590 0.22% 42.8 41.0 -4.36% 71'520 279.38 16'520'139 64'531.79 757Consumer goods
Bnp 41'542'116'914 3.54% 90.8 90.2 -0.65% 654'552 2'556.84 278'712'563 1'088'720.95 4534Financial Institution
Canal Plus 26'151'009'863 2.23% 111.9 158.1 41.32% 728'102 2'844.15 111'179'973 434'296.77 2981Television
Cap Gemini 22'738'312'534 1.94% 213.8 167.0 -21.86% 901'530 3'521.60 112'957'633 441'240.75 3234Computer Services
Casino Guichard 8'263'886'113 0.70% 115.9 107.5 -7.30% 206'861 808.05 36'822'821 143'839.14 1366Food Retail
Credit Lyonnais 13'664'533'413 1.16% 33.1 39.0 17.98% 529'793 2'069.50 128'053'242 500'207.98 1826Financial Institution
Dexia Sico 13'666'469'381 1.16% 157.0 181.9 15.83% 142'855 558.03 26'850'367 104'884.25 570Financial Institution
Equant 15'431'623'594 1.32% 98.9 36.0 -63.57% 812'594 3'174.20 295'370'027 1'153'789.17 5782Telecom Services
Eridania Beghin 2'530'062'421 0.22% 105.6 105.3 -0.23% 76'939 300.54 6'890'039 26'914.21 855Food and Beverage
France Telecom 145'948'601'889 12.44% 113.9 100.2 -11.98% 1'863'965 7'281.11 524'546'895 2'049'011.31 8141Telecom Services
Lafarge 9'208'521'841 0.78% 100.1 85.4 -14.73% 443'585 1'732.75 95'322'709 372'354.33 2309Construction
Lagardere 9'577'283'774 0.82% 49.5 60.3 21.87% 514'608 2'010.19 128'227'857 500'890.07 2718Multimedia
Legrand 4'510'453'696 0.38% 221.5 193.9 -12.46% 139'220 543.83 11'379'639 44'451.71 862Electric Products
Michelin 4'767'243'799 0.41% 39.4 33.6 -14.83% 294'391 1'149.96 89'238'922 348'589.54 1677Rubber-tires
Peugeot 9'978'589'909 0.85% 203.2 227.3 11.84% 228'903 894.15 30'236'967 118'113.15 1292Auto-Cars/Light Trucks
Pinault 25'167'440'985 2.14% 229.3 205.5 -10.40% 362'844 1'417.36 49'521'039 193'441.56 1910Retailers
Renault 11'490'044'369 0.98% 45.8 55.6 21.41% 472'853 1'847.08 136'389'052 532'769.73 1802Auto-Cars/Light Trucks
Saint Gobain 12'563'648'185 1.07% 169.1 154.7 -8.49% 378'292 1'477.70 60'347'382 235'731.96 1999Building and 
Sanofi 35'199'269'636 3.00% 40.2 67.1 66.75% 362'301 1'415.24 246'565'083 963'144.86 2371Medical-Drugs
Schneider 11'426'911'501 0.97% 71.1 71.7 0.80% 294'784 1'151.50 89'792'900 350'753.52 1642Machinery-Electrical
Sodexho 5'632'088'753 0.48% 184.3 195.5 6.04% 172'092 672.23 14'969'659 58'475.23 871Food-Catering
Suez Lyonnaise des 
Eaux 
34'409'032'814 2.93% 156.8 190.5 21.47% 615'739 2'405.23 126'860'383 495'548.37 3569Water 
Thomson-csf 7'098'289'225 0.60% 30.0 52.4 74.79% 213'433 833.72 53'534'424 209'118.84 854Aerospace/Defense
Total Fina 112'487'946'368 9.59% 131.7 168.5 27.95% 771'538 3'013.82 333'413'802 1'302'397.66 6835Oil Comp-Integrated
Valeo 4'666'916'391 0.40% 73.2 54.4 -25.68% 340'155 1'328.73 71'088'801 277'690.63 1934Auto/Trk Prts&Equip-
Orig 
Vivendi 60'685'848'634 5.17% 88.1 75.2 -14.70% 1'558'531 6'088.01 661'049'177 2'582'223.35 9971Multimedia
PANEL B
Accor 8'504'448'767 0.72% 227 43.03 -5.22% 473'725 1'850.49 130'298'631 508'979.03 1982Hotels&Motels
Aerospatia Matra 17'074'565'199 1.46% 21.29 24.01 12.78% 560'690 2'190.20 167'750'177 655'274.13 1263Aerospace/Defense-
Equip 
Alcatel 74'545'766'570 6.35% 189 57.25 51.46% 1'986'674 7'760.45 846'679'362 3'307'341.26 9283Telecommunication 
Aventis 46'431'642'472 3.96% 61.75 90.4 46.40% 613'072 2'394.81 425'086'754 1'660'495.13 5210Medical-Drugs
Bouygues 20'965'460'705 1.79% 456 50 9.65% 403'548 1'576.36 86'704'849 338'690.82 2262Building&Construct-
Carrefour 52'632'599'567 4.49% 175 69.5 -20.57% 1'002'378 3'915.54 251'756'085 983'422.21 5841Food-Retail
Danone 18'810'626'067 1.60% 232.5 151.7 30.49% 508'459 1'986.17 84'880'028 331'562.61 3111Food-Misc/Diversified
L'Oreal 51'449'339'578 4.38% 657.5 91.5 39.16% 428'682 1'674.54 94'656'899 369'753.51 2406Cosmetics&Toiletries
LVMH 41'713'036'882 3.55% 323 75.5 16.87% 416'816 1'628.19 91'879'355 358'903.73 2100Diversified Operations
Société Générale 24'676'041'281 2.10% 213.9 61.2 14.45% 463'654 1'811.15 144'237'431 563'427.46 2325Money Center Banks
Stmicroelectronics 52'922'065'071 4.51% 125.2 48.41 16.00% 1'023'209 3'996.91 602'450'693 2'353'323.02 5506Electronic Compo-
Semicon
TF1 14'069'644'537 1.20% 358 50 39.66% 437'622 1'709.46 66'297'862 258'976.02 2307Television
Thomson-
Multimedia 
12'727'033'582 1.08% 43.5 44 102.30% 596'429 2'329.80 89'664'743 350'252.90 1588Audio/Video Products 
  
Total 1'173'427'471'64 23'525'550 91'897 7'254'884'47 28'339'392 125'976 
Mean 27'289'010'968 547'106 2'137 168'718'244 659'056 2'930 
Median 14'069'644'537 452'200 1'766 95'322'709 372'354 2'100 
StDev 29'474'668'772 419'381 1'638 186'389'188 728'083 2'297 
 
CHAPTER 2 – Tables 
  
 
110 
TABLE 2.10.1.B: Descriptive statistics of the sixteen liquidity indicators during the first 
period. For each stock, the table shows the average value, for a 5 minutes period, of the sixteen 
liquidity indicators considered in this study, namely: effective half spread (EHS), quoted half 
spread (QHS), difference spread (DSPR), midquote (MID), quoted half spread from the WAS 
file (QHS_WAS), cumulated traded volume (SUMVOL), number of transactions (NBTR), 
volume imbalance (VIMB), volume imbalance in absolute terms (SABSVIMB), return (RET), 
return in absolute terms (ABSRET), volatility of return (VARRET), volatility as log range 
(VOLA), waiting time between subsequent trades (WT), liquidity ratio (LR) and flow ratio (FR). 
The calculation of each proxy is explained in detail in Appendix 2.11.2. 
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TABLE 2.10.1.C: Descriptive statistics of the sixteen liquidity indicators during the 
second period. For each stock, the table shows the average value, for a 5 minutes period, of the 
sixteen liquidity indicators considered in this study, namely: effective half spread (EHS), quoted 
half spread (QHS), difference spread (DSPR), midquote (MID), quoted half spread from the 
WAS file (QHS_WAS), cumulated traded volume (SUMVOL), number of transactions (NBTR), 
volume imbalance (VIMB), volume imbalance in absolute terms (SABSVIMB), return (RET), 
return in absolute terms (ABSRET), volatility of return (VARRET), volatility as log range 
(VOLA), waiting time between subsequent trades (WT), liquidity ratio (LR) and flow ratio (FR). 
The calculation of each proxy is explained in detail in Appendix 2.11.2. 
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TABLE 2.10.2.A: T-statistic for the effective half spread. This table reports the t-values 
resulting when testing two adjacent means against each other within successive intraday periods 
of 5 minutes for the effective half spread (EHS). The t- values consider the first period under 
study (December 1, 1999 - March 31, 2000). (*) means that results are significant at 5% level of 
significance, whereas (**) results are significant at 1% level. 
 
TIME EHS T VALUE OF DIFF. TIME EHS T VALUE OF DIFF.
905 3.918
  1.146   
910 3.556  1305 -0.534   
  3.863 ** 0.233  
915 2.766  1310 -0.564   
  4.013 ** 0.476  
920 2.126  1315 -0.627   
  3.115 ** -0.266  
925 1.603  1320 -0.592   
  1.611 0.067  
930 1.343  1325 -0.601   
  0.085 0.314  
935 1.328  1330 -0.637   
  3.188 ** 0.342  
940 0.775  1335 -0.678   
  0.496 1.423  
945 0.707  1340 -0.850   
  1.129 -1.024  
950 0.562  1345 -0.726   
  0.983 -1.710  
955 0.441  1350 -0.513   
  0.137 0.056  
1000 0.423  1355 -0.520   
  1.955 0.547  
1005 0.166  1400 -0.589   
  -0.754 0.605  
1010 0.261  1405 -0.660   
  0.887 -0.415  
1015 0.161  1410 -0.611   
  2.192 * -1.211  
1020 -0.084  1415 -0.478   
  0.163 1.056  
1025 -0.103  1420 -0.589   
  -0.612 -0.700  
1030 -0.036  1425 -0.503   
  1.267 0.719  
1035 -0.181  1430 -0.596   
  -1.233 -5.933 ** 
1040 -0.037  1435 0.141   
  -1.508 1.521  
1045 0.141  1440 -0.060   
  2.307 * 1.325  
1050 -0.158  1445 -0.226   
  -0.040 0.114  
1055 -0.153  1450 -0.239   
  0.270 0.912  
1100 -0.181  1455 -0.331   
  -0.531 -0.661  
1105 -0.122  1500 -0.268   
  -0.503 0.080  
1110 -0.060  1505 -0.276   
  0.149 -0.664  
1115 -0.079  1510 -0.192   
  -0.634 0.851  
1120 0.005  1515 -0.302   
  1.716 -1.032  
1125 -0.206  1520 -0.193   
  -1.636 1.314  
1130 -0.026  1525 -0.330   
  1.955 -0.989  
1135 -0.236  1530 -0.204   
  1.672 0.232  
1140 -0.393  1535 -0.235   
  -1.430 0.372  
1145 -0.270  1540 -0.273   
  0.593 -0.992  
1150 -0.330  1545 -0.178   
  1.765 -0.188  
1155 -0.515  1550 -0.158   
  0.167 0.188  
1200 -0.530  1555 -0.177   
  -2.638 ** 0.013  
1205 -0.251  1600 -0.178   
  0.139 1.113  
1210 -0.266  1605 -0.281   
  -0.916 -1.270  
1215 -0.179  1610 -0.151   
  1.707 -1.813  
1220 -0.344  1615 0.034   
  1.873 -1.232  
1225 -0.500  1620 0.164   
  -2.018 * 0.409  
1230 -0.307  1625 0.117   
  0.470 -0.518  
1235 -0.358  1630 0.180   
  0.877 -0.397  
1240 -0.460  1635 0.230   
  0.889 0.672  
1245 -0.568  1640 0.146   
  0.821 -1.124  
1250 -0.665  1645 0.301   
  -1.585 0.261  
1255 -0.485  1650 0.263   
  0.163 -1.051  
1300 -0.505  1655 0.407   
  0.240 -6.209 ** 
1305 -0.534  1700 1.441   
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TABLE 2.10.2.B: T-statistic for the quoted half spread. This table reports the t-values 
resulting when testing two adjacent means against each other within successive intraday periods 
of 5 minutes for the quoted half spread (QHS). The t- values consider the first period under 
study (December 1, 1999 - March 31, 2000). (*) means that results are significant at 5% level of 
significance, whereas (**) results are significant at 1% level. 
 
TIME QHS T VALUE OF DIFF. TIME QHS T VALUE OF DIFF.
905 3.883
  -0.030   
910 3.891  1305 -0.495   
  4.991 ** -1.006  
915 2.964  1310 -0.370   
  3.785 ** 0.722  
920 2.399  1315 -0.458   
  4.005 ** -0.193  
925 1.787  1320 -0.435   
  1.559 -1.326  
930 1.543  1325 -0.278   
  0.814 1.465  
935 1.421  1330 -0.469   
  3.276 ** 0.353  
940 0.963  1335 -0.515   
  1.116 1.305  
945 0.817  1340 -0.655   
  0.974 -0.380  
950 0.694  1345 -0.612   
  1.492 -1.884  
955 0.496  1350 -0.395   
  0.252 0.326  
1000 0.460  1355 -0.433   
  2.825 ** 0.614  
1005 0.086  1400 -0.515   
  -1.173 1.168  
1010 0.229  1405 -0.669   
  0.451 -1.087  
1015 0.176  1410 -0.540   
  1.909 -0.858  
1020 -0.045  1415 -0.444   
  0.650 1.276  
1025 -0.122  1420 -0.587   
  -0.972 -0.194  
1030 -0.006  1425 -0.565   
  1.553 -0.849  
1035 -0.195  1430 -0.463   
  -1.473 -4.242 ** 
1040 -0.017  1435 0.068   
  -0.599 0.790  
1045 0.058  1440 -0.025   
  2.159 * 1.817  
1050 -0.211  1445 -0.224   
  -0.326 -0.275  
1055 -0.175  1450 -0.196   
  0.407 1.495  
1100 -0.218  1455 -0.338   
  0.091 -0.657  
1105 -0.229  1500 -0.278   
  -0.765 0.880  
1110 -0.133  1505 -0.363   
  0.112 -1.066  
1115 -0.147  1510 -0.245   
  -0.308 0.346  
1120 -0.109  1515 -0.286   
  1.672 -0.524  
1125 -0.298  1520 -0.226   
  -2.122 * 1.160  
1130 -0.076  1525 -0.351   
  2.044 * -0.233  
1135 -0.298  1530 -0.325   
  1.288 0.300  
1140 -0.432  1535 -0.360   
  -0.382 -0.283  
1145 -0.399  1540 -0.331   
  0.579 -0.419  
1150 -0.452  1545 -0.290   
  1.345 -1.060  
1155 -0.588  1550 -0.182   
  0.367 0.372  
1200 -0.619  1555 -0.219   
  -3.522 ** 0.162  
1205 -0.314  1600 -0.236   
  -0.996 1.406  
1210 -0.221  1605 -0.381   
  -0.609 -0.884  
1215 -0.158  1610 -0.296   
  1.314 -3.012 ** 
1220 -0.302  1615 -0.006   
  1.676 0.390  
1225 -0.465  1620 -0.049   
  -1.215 -0.438  
1230 -0.352  1625 0.005   
  -0.180 -0.841  
1235 -0.332  1630 0.112   
  -0.017 0.676  
1240 -0.330  1635 0.027   
  1.058 -0.028  
1245 -0.467  1640 0.030   
  0.332 -0.437  
1250 -0.505  1645 0.088   
  -1.518 0.391  
1255 -0.348  1650 0.038   
  0.105 -0.333  
1300 -0.359  1655 0.078   
  1.225 -4.662 ** 
1305 -0.495  1700 0.715   
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TABLE 2.10.2.C: T-statistic for the difference spread. This table reports the t-values 
resulting when testing two adjacent means against each other within successive intraday periods 
of 5 minutes for the difference spread (DSPR). The t- values consider the first period under 
study (December 1, 1999 - March 31, 2000). (*) means that results are significant at 5% level of 
significance, whereas (**) results are significant at 1% level. 
 
TIME DSPR T VALUE OF DIFF. TIME DSPR T VALUE OF DIFF.
905 3.920
  0.103  
910 3.893  1305 -0.512  
  5.152 ** -1.093  
915 2.945  1310 -0.369  
  3.833 ** 0.739  
920 2.386  1315 -0.463  
  4.057 ** -0.349  
925 1.772  1320 -0.420  
  1.503 -1.327  
930 1.538  1325 -0.249  
  0.943 1.385  
935 1.397  1330 -0.442  
  3.226 ** 0.447  
940 0.954  1335 -0.502  
  0.986 1.188  
945 0.823  1340 -0.632  
  1.028 -0.389  
950 0.690  1345 -0.588  
  1.509 -1.859  
955 0.487  1350 -0.374  
  0.033 0.638  
1000 0.482  1355 -0.449  
  2.951 ** 0.381  
1005 0.080  1400 -0.499  
  -1.258 1.172  
1010 0.230  1405 -0.655  
  0.632 -0.916  
1015 0.157  1410 -0.543  
  1.918 -0.870  
1020 -0.058  1415 -0.443  
  0.637 1.321  
1025 -0.130  1420 -0.590  
  -1.072 -0.279  
1030 -0.007  1425 -0.560  
  1.845 -0.910  
1035 -0.224  1430 -0.456  
  -1.465 -4.438 ** 
1040 -0.048  1435 0.088  
  -0.810 0.694  
1045 0.054  1440 0.005  
  2.139 * 1.917  
1050 -0.214  1445 -0.207  
  -0.321 -0.090  
1055 -0.179  1450 -0.198  
  0.512 1.447  
1100 -0.234  1455 -0.338  
  -0.037 -0.749  
1105 -0.230  1500 -0.269  
  -0.973 0.643  
1110 -0.105  1505 -0.332  
  0.133 -0.797  
1115 -0.122  1510 -0.242  
  -0.209 0.258  
1120 -0.097  1515 -0.272  
  1.709 -0.313  
1125 -0.278  1520 -0.236  
  -2.043 * 1.071  
1130 -0.065  1525 -0.356  
  2.091 * -0.061  
1135 -0.292  1530 -0.349  
  1.416 0.233  
1140 -0.435  1535 -0.376  
  -0.611 -0.244  
1145 -0.383  1540 -0.350  
  0.549 -0.209  
1150 -0.430  1545 -0.331  
  1.701 -1.206  
1155 -0.592  1550 -0.217  
  0.398 0.473  
1200 -0.626  1555 -0.262  
  -3.450 ** -0.190  
1205 -0.331  1600 -0.243  
  -1.037 1.373  
1210 -0.235  1605 -0.385  
  -0.496 -0.860  
1215 -0.182  1610 -0.303  
  1.138 -2.882 ** 
1220 -0.310  1615 -0.029  
  1.527 0.137  
1225 -0.455  1620 -0.044  
  -0.954 -0.519  
1230 -0.370  1625 0.019  
  -0.118 -0.944  
1235 -0.357  1630 0.135  
  -0.216 0.578  
1240 -0.330  1635 0.065  
  0.993 0.436  
1245 -0.459  1640 0.010  
  0.574 -0.674  
1250 -0.524  1645 0.098  
  -1.597 0.208  
1255 -0.357  1650 0.071  
  0.265 -0.237  
1300 -0.385  1655 0.101  
  1.115 -4.568 ** 
1305 -0.512  1700 0.728  
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TABLE 2.10.2.D: T-statistic for the midquote. This table reports the t-values resulting when 
testing two adjacent means against each other within successive intraday periods of 5 minutes for 
the midquote (MID). The t- values consider the first period under study (December 1, 1999 - 
March 31, 2000). (*) means that results are significant at 5% level of significance, whereas (**) 
results are significant at 1% level. 
 
TIME MID T VALUE OF DIFF. TIME MID T VALUE OF DIFF.
905 -0.056
  -0.664   
910 0.177  1305 -0.360   
  0.457 1.744  
915 0.070  1310 -0.931   
  -0.115 -0.620  
920 0.095  1315 -0.711   
  -0.107 -0.458  
925 0.116  1320 -0.582   
  -0.223 -0.834  
930 0.157  1325 -0.348   
  -0.794 1.563  
935 0.317  1330 -0.860   
  -0.376 -1.148  
940 0.394  1335 -0.454   
  0.126 -0.102  
945 0.369  1340 -0.421   
  0.391 -0.055  
950 0.285  1345 -0.405   
  -0.155 -1.245  
955 0.318  1350 -0.134   
  -0.363 0.916  
1000 0.381  1355 -0.337   
  0.074 -0.113  
1005 0.371  1400 -0.309   
  0.237 -0.513  
1010 0.341  1405 -0.192   
  0.571 0.853  
1015 0.266  1410 -0.390   
  -0.225 0.392  
1020 0.299  1415 -0.496   
  1.002 -1.108  
1025 0.111  1420 -0.213   
  -0.182 -0.862  
1030 0.147  1425 -0.052   
  -0.026 0.896  
1035 0.151  1430 -0.210   
  0.748 -0.863  
1040 0.016  1435 -0.045   
  -0.738 -0.593  
1045 0.144  1440 0.065   
  -0.470 1.054  
1050 0.214  1445 -0.251   
  -0.564 -0.337  
1055 0.284  1450 -0.136   
  0.218 -1.052  
1100 0.257  1455 0.119   
  1.561 -0.200  
1105 0.003  1500 0.152   
  -0.039 -0.110  
1110 0.012  1505 0.168   
  -0.504 -0.017  
1115 0.117  1510 0.171   
  -1.426 -0.491  
1120 0.321  1515 0.243   
  1.276 1.403  
1125 0.155  1520 0.002   
  -0.144 -0.208  
1130 0.177  1525 0.044   
  0.058 -0.898  
1135 0.168  1530 0.206   
  -0.063 -0.002  
1140 0.177  1535 0.207   
  0.475 0.236  
1145 0.103  1540 0.171   
  -0.906 0.702  
1150 0.231  1545 0.026   
  -0.043 -0.576  
1155 0.236  1550 0.146   
  0.438 0.273  
1200 0.189  1555 0.103   
  -0.544 0.716  
1205 0.248  1600 -0.024   
  1.164 -0.683  
1210 0.094  1605 0.101   
  -0.220 0.634  
1215 0.126  1610 -0.011   
  0.750 0.141  
1220 0.019  1615 -0.034   
  -0.735 -0.052  
1225 0.123  1620 -0.026   
  -0.009 0.314  
1230 0.124  1625 -0.076   
  1.423 0.164  
1235 -0.115  1630 -0.109   
  -0.521 -0.015  
1240 -0.029  1635 -0.106   
  2.087 * -0.739  
1245 -0.540  1640 0.038   
  -1.911 -0.210  
1250 -0.066  1645 0.074   
  1.730 0.061  
1255 -0.527  1650 0.063   
  -0.249 0.454  
1300 -0.455  1655 -0.037   
  -0.414 -0.350  
1305 -0.360  1700 0.047   
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TABLE 2.10.3: T-statistic for the QHS_WAS. This table reports the t-values resulting when 
testing two adjacent means against each other within successive intraday periods of 5 minutes for 
the quoted spread from the WAS file (QHS_WAS). The t- values consider the first period under 
study (December 1, 1999 - March 31, 2000). (*) means that results are significant at 5% level of 
significance, whereas (**) results are significant at 1% level. 
 
TIME QHS WAS T VALUE OF DIFF. TIME QHS WAS T VALUE OF DIFF.
905 4.014
  4.851 **  
910 3.495  1305 -0.569  
  5.928 ** 1.015  
915 2.988  1310 -0.624  
  5.120 ** -0.057  
920 2.673  1315 -0.620  
  5.364 ** 0.453  
925 2.387  1320 -0.651  
  5.603 ** -1.007  
930 2.097  1325 -0.581  
  4.428 ** -0.055  
935 1.888  1330 -0.576  
  4.785 ** -0.956  
940 1.658  1335 -0.495  
  1.240 0.403  
945 1.591  1340 -0.527  
  3.373 ** -0.704  
950 1.404  1345 -0.480  
  3.506 ** -0.288  
955 1.200  1350 -0.463  
  1.513 0.025  
1000 1.113  1355 -0.465  
  2.710 ** -0.110  
1005 0.963  1400 -0.457  
  1.296 0.628  
1010 0.895  1405 -0.501  
  2.303 * 0.353  
1015 0.777  1410 -0.521  
  1.884 0.249  
1020 0.681  1415 -0.535  
  1.046 -0.100  
1025 0.621  1420 -0.529  
  2.072 * -0.209  
1030 0.492  1425 -0.519  
  1.349 -0.646  
1035 0.414  1430 -0.486  
  1.237 -2.716 ** 
1040 0.347  1435 -0.360  
  1.137 1.064  
1045 0.284  1440 -0.408  
  1.631 0.417  
1050 0.190  1445 -0.429  
  1.117 0.207  
1055 0.129  1450 -0.440  
  0.087 0.130  
1100 0.124  1455 -0.446  
  1.000 0.223  
1105 0.066  1500 -0.455  
  0.787 0.746  
1110 0.020  1505 -0.488  
  1.507 0.739  
1115 -0.068  1510 -0.524  
  0.799 0.737  
1120 -0.119  1515 -0.560  
  0.969 -0.428  
1125 -0.181  1520 -0.541  
  -0.409 0.880  
1130 -0.156  1525 -0.583  
  1.194 -0.890  
1135 -0.226  1530 -0.541  
  1.621 0.235  
1140 -0.314  1535 -0.553  
  -0.196 0.154  
1145 -0.304  1540 -0.562  
  0.887 -0.598  
1150 -0.349  1545 -0.527  
  0.570 0.381  
1155 -0.376  1550 -0.549  
  0.446 -0.323  
1200 -0.398  1555 -0.530  
  -0.277 -0.299  
1205 -0.384  1600 -0.512  
  0.627 0.589  
1210 -0.414  1605 -0.546  
  -0.847 -0.837  
1215 -0.376  1610 -0.496  
  1.520 0.185  
1220 -0.448  1615 -0.507  
  0.910 0.286  
1225 -0.488  1620 -0.524  
  0.239 -0.874  
1230 -0.498  1625 -0.471  
  0.634 -0.173  
1235 -0.526  1630 -0.461  
  0.153 0.682  
1240 -0.534  1635 -0.505  
  0.272 0.162  
1245 -0.549  1640 -0.518  
  -0.088 -0.461  
1250 -0.544  1645 -0.481  
  0.347 -0.628  
1255 -0.564  1650 -0.434  
  0.044 -0.651  
1300 -0.566  1655 -0.384  
  0.046 -2.244 * 
1305 -0.569  1700 -0.196  
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TABLE 2.10.4.A: T-statistic for the cumulated traded volume. This table reports the t-
values resulting when testing two adjacent means against each other within successive intraday 
periods of 5 minutes for the cumulated traded volume (SUMVOL). The t- values consider the 
first period under study (December 1, 1999 - March 31, 2000). (*) means that results are 
significant at 5% level of significance, whereas (**) results are significant at 1% level. 
 
TIME SUMVOL T VALUE OF DIFF. TIME SUMVOL T VALUE OF DIFF.
905 -0.871
  -5.813 **   
910 0.022  1305 -0.636   
  0.674 2.053 * 
915 -0.091  1310 -0.848   
  1.127 1.620  
920 -0.267  1315 -0.962   
  1.499 -0.129  
925 -0.455  1320 -0.955   
  -0.489 -0.289  
930 -0.407  1325 -0.936   
  -0.614 -2.011 * 
935 -0.342  1330 -0.794   
  -0.050 0.914  
940 -0.337  1335 -0.872   
  -0.042 0.805  
945 -0.332  1340 -0.945   
  0.664 -0.974  
950 -0.397  1345 -0.858   
  -0.144 -1.379  
955 -0.385  1350 -0.735   
  -1.163 1.423  
1000 -0.293  1355 -0.846   
  -2.753 ** -0.371  
1005 -0.031  1400 -0.815   
  2.487 * -1.359  
1010 -0.296  1405 -0.696   
  -0.011 1.170  
1015 -0.295  1410 -0.780   
  -0.790 -0.685  
1020 -0.220  1415 -0.733   
  -0.102 -0.261  
1025 -0.208  1420 -0.713   
  0.310 -2.512 * 
1030 -0.239  1425 -0.505   
  -1.435 -0.172  
1035 -0.114  1430 -0.490   
  1.558 -11.468 ** 
1040 -0.240  1435 0.746   
  0.033 6.611 ** 
1045 -0.243  1440 0.057   
  -2.359 * 2.092 * 
1050 -0.003  1445 -0.105   
  0.702 1.493  
1055 -0.068  1450 -0.228   
  0.388 -3.134 ** 
1100 -0.101  1455 0.020   
  0.836 0.340  
1105 -0.170  1500 -0.008   
  0.806 -1.352  
1110 -0.241  1505 0.114   
  -0.864 1.130  
1115 -0.170  1510 -0.003   
  -0.913 1.340  
1120 -0.095  1515 -0.137   
  0.804 -2.909 ** 
1125 -0.161  1520 0.110   
  1.930 0.497  
1130 -0.319  1525 0.066   
  -2.704 ** -1.083  
1135 -0.067  1530 0.174   
  0.013 -3.653 ** 
1140 -0.068  1535 0.620   
  0.593 -0.930  
1145 -0.124  1540 0.736   
  -0.440 -1.505  
1150 -0.076  1545 0.903   
  -0.288 0.416  
1155 -0.044  1550 0.854   
  -0.876 0.163  
1200 0.060  1555 0.834   
  2.289 * 0.393  
1205 -0.213  1600 0.790   
  2.206 * -2.259 * 
1210 -0.433  1605 1.017   
  -0.477 -0.999  
1215 -0.390  1610 1.118   
  0.143 0.310  
1220 -0.402  1615 1.083   
  0.852 -2.290 * 
1225 -0.467  1620 1.343   
  -2.150 * -0.950  
1230 -0.281  1625 1.452   
  3.529 ** 0.089  
1235 -0.573  1630 1.441   
  1.817 1.682  
1240 -0.695  1635 1.261   
  -0.992 -6.022 ** 
1245 -0.627  1640 1.840   
  0.402 -2.312 * 
1250 -0.658  1645 2.104   
  0.924 -1.459  
1255 -0.724  1650 2.289   
  0.012 -6.425 ** 
1300 -0.725  1655 3.094   
  -0.859 -9.890 ** 
1305 -0.636  1700 4.409   
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TABLE 2.10.4.B: T-statistic for the number of trades. This table reports the t-values 
resulting when testing two adjacent means against each other within successive intraday periods 
of 5 minutes for the number of trades (NBTR). The t- values consider the first period under 
study (December 1, 1999 - March 31, 2000). (*) means that results are significant at 5% level of 
significance, whereas (**) results are significant at 1% level. 
 
TIME NBTR T VALUE OF DIFF. TIME NBTR T VALUE OF DIFF.
905 -0.233
  -7.609 **   
910 1.519  1305 -1.189   
  1.685 1.865  
915 1.113  1310 -1.393   
  2.397 * 1.268  
920 0.591  1315 -1.503   
  1.015 0.073  
925 0.412  1320 -1.509   
  0.093 0.286  
930 0.399  1325 -1.536   
  -0.279 -2.479 * 
935 0.443  1330 -1.303   
  0.635 -0.494  
940 0.343  1335 -1.234   
  -1.368 1.478  
945 0.523  1340 -1.424   
  1.506 -1.716  
950 0.330  1345 -1.278   
  -1.166 -1.883  
955 0.478  1350 -1.092   
  0.651 1.172  
1000 0.404  1355 -1.192   
  -1.825 -1.853  
1005 0.642  1400 -1.011   
  2.073 * -0.683  
1010 0.346  1405 -0.944   
  0.159 -0.391  
1015 0.328  1410 -0.915   
  1.644 -0.858  
1020 0.142  1415 -0.840   
  -1.335 0.547  
1025 0.305  1420 -0.892   
  -0.530 -4.389 ** 
1030 0.369  1425 -0.419   
  0.823 2.741 ** 
1035 0.275  1430 -0.695   
  1.501 -10.400 ** 
1040 0.133  1435 0.780   
  -0.844 4.531 ** 
1045 0.217  1440 0.086   
  -1.165 2.434 * 
1050 0.356  1445 -0.171   
  1.299 2.644 ** 
1055 0.210  1450 -0.407   
  -0.418 -3.961 ** 
1100 0.252  1455 -0.015   
  1.603 -0.886  
1105 0.084  1500 0.098   
  0.363 1.256  
1110 0.044  1505 -0.048   
  -0.237 0.897  
1115 0.067  1510 -0.136   
  -2.852 ** 1.187  
1120 0.316  1515 -0.256   
  2.140 * -1.473  
1125 0.117  1520 -0.121   
  1.323 -0.650  
1130 -0.001  1525 -0.051   
  -2.138 * -0.755  
1135 0.212  1530 0.040   
  0.969 -2.610 ** 
1140 0.106  1535 0.403   
  -0.400 -1.125  
1145 0.150  1540 0.564   
  0.650 -2.039 * 
1150 0.076  1545 0.840   
  -1.001 1.111  
1155 0.208  1550 0.679   
  -0.649 -0.691  
1200 0.312  1555 0.792   
  2.998 ** 0.251  
1205 -0.162  1600 0.753   
  1.819 0.737  
1210 -0.369  1605 0.651   
  0.259 -0.287  
1215 -0.390  1610 0.691   
  1.188 -0.656  
1220 -0.503  1615 0.786   
  0.212 -1.280  
1225 -0.525  1620 0.965   
  -1.590 0.744  
1230 -0.338  1625 0.876   
  4.390 ** 1.588  
1235 -0.806  1630 0.683   
  3.600 ** 0.231  
1240 -1.104  1635 0.656   
  -0.488 -3.014 ** 
1245 -1.064  1640 0.989   
  1.201 -2.199 * 
1250 -1.152  1645 1.281   
  0.316 -0.700  
1255 -1.177  1650 1.381   
  -0.414 -3.229 ** 
1300 -1.129  1655 1.863   
  0.456 -5.728 ** 
1305 -1.189  1700 2.850   
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TABLE 2.10.4.C: T-statistic for the cumulated volume imbalance. This table reports the t-
values resulting when testing two adjacent means against each other within successive intraday 
periods of 5 minutes for the cumulated volume imbalance (VIMB). The t- values consider the 
first period under study (December 1, 1999 - March 31, 2000). (*) means that results are 
significant at 5% level of significance, whereas (**) results are significant at 1% level. 
 
TIME VIMB T VALUE OF DIFF. TIME VIMB T VALUE OF DIFF.
905 -0.105
  -2.053 *   
910 0.299  1305 -0.302   
  0.734 -0.066  
915 0.098  1310 -0.292   
  0.109 -0.701  
920 0.069  1315 -0.196   
  -0.234 -0.983  
925 0.112  1320 -0.080   
  0.374 0.336  
930 0.048  1325 -0.126   
  -0.770 -0.145  
935 0.192  1330 -0.102   
  -0.342 0.800  
940 0.252  1335 -0.238   
  -0.058 -1.090  
945 0.263  1340 -0.066   
  0.693 -0.349  
950 0.124  1345 -0.013   
  0.011 0.021  
955 0.122  1350 -0.016   
  -0.674 0.254  
1000 0.303  1355 -0.057   
  0.988 0.412  
1005 0.045  1400 -0.119   
  0.570 -0.783  
1010 -0.064  1405 -0.009   
  -0.133 0.734  
1015 -0.039  1410 -0.103   
  -0.124 -0.012  
1020 -0.015  1415 -0.101   
  -0.130 0.693  
1025 0.013  1420 -0.211   
  -0.982 -0.250  
1030 0.207  1425 -0.167   
  2.014 * -0.855  
1035 -0.193  1430 0.016   
  -0.569 -1.693  
1040 -0.066  1435 0.375   
  0.095 0.635  
1045 -0.087  1440 0.266   
  -0.213 0.010  
1050 -0.044  1445 0.264   
  -0.345 0.202  
1055 0.018  1450 0.226   
  -1.098 2.534 * 
1100 0.178  1455 -0.487   
  1.494 -2.034 * 
1105 -0.056  1500 0.076   
  0.451 -0.216  
1110 -0.132  1505 0.115   
  -1.991 * 0.243  
1115 0.229  1510 0.077   
  2.049 * -1.098  
1120 -0.149  1515 0.267   
  -1.239 1.573  
1125 0.068  1520 -0.004   
  1.416 0.660  
1130 -0.335  1525 -0.107   
  -0.430 -0.488  
1135 -0.212  1530 -0.023   
  -1.379 -0.517  
1140 0.019  1535 0.074   
  0.311 0.576  
1145 -0.034  1540 -0.059   
  0.206 -0.620  
1150 -0.072  1545 0.091   
  0.585 -0.533  
1155 -0.172  1550 0.220   
  -0.573 -0.115  
1200 -0.080  1555 0.258   
  -0.914 1.262  
1205 0.074  1600 -0.161   
  0.503 -1.451  
1210 -0.016  1605 0.228   
  0.591 1.111  
1215 -0.125  1610 -0.041   
  -0.318 0.315  
1220 -0.072  1615 -0.108   
  0.657 -1.279  
1225 -0.177  1620 0.300   
  -0.367 1.904  
1230 -0.120  1625 -0.442   
  -0.375 -2.545 * 
1235 -0.063  1630 0.531   
  -0.411 1.287  
1240 0.041  1635 0.141   
  1.105 1.964 * 
1245 -0.229  1640 -0.321   
  -0.252 -0.997  
1250 -0.189  1645 -0.048   
  0.773 0.239  
1255 -0.320  1650 -0.114   
  -1.061 -1.811  
1300 -0.147  1655 0.348   
  1.004 -1.244  
1305 -0.302  1700 0.774   
 
CHAPTER 2 – Tables 
  
 
120 
TABLE 2.10.4.D: T-statistic for the cumulated volume imbalance in absolute terms. This 
table reports the t-values resulting when testing two adjacent means against each other within 
successive intraday periods of 5 minutes for the cumulated volume imbalance in absolute terms 
(SABSVIMB). The t- values consider the first period under study (December 1, 1999 - March 31, 
2000). (*) means that results are significant at 5% level of significance, whereas (**) results are 
significant at 1% level. 
 
TIME SABSVIMB T VALUE OF DIFF. TIME SABSVIMB T VALUE OF DIFF.
905 -0.222
  -3.583 **   
910 0.689  1305 -0.975   
  1.449 1.044  
915 0.363  1310 -1.091   
  2.364 * 0.568  
920 -0.048  1315 -1.148   
  0.773 1.402  
925 -0.158  1320 -1.257   
  -1.264 -1.362  
930 0.022  1325 -1.130   
  0.242 -0.823  
935 -0.015  1330 -1.031   
  -0.069 -0.030  
940 -0.004  1335 -1.027   
  -1.144 0.874  
945 0.189  1340 -1.107   
  2.235 * -1.239  
950 -0.147  1345 -0.992   
  -0.733 -1.304  
955 -0.047  1350 -0.870   
  -0.011 0.320  
1000 -0.046  1355 -0.899   
  -2.800 ** -0.142  
1005 0.324  1400 -0.886   
  3.428 ** -2.590 ** 
1010 -0.114  1405 -0.657   
  -0.206 0.017  
1015 -0.093  1410 -0.658   
  -0.160 -0.389  
1020 -0.075  1415 -0.624   
  -1.361 0.228  
1025 0.110  1420 -0.645   
  0.400 -1.601  
1030 0.060  1425 -0.454   
  0.290 0.545  
1035 0.023  1430 -0.539   
  -0.112 -6.022 ** 
1040 0.039  1435 0.422   
  -0.096 3.017 ** 
1045 0.050  1440 0.042   
  -1.142 1.359  
1050 0.187  1445 -0.099   
  0.960 1.204  
1055 0.073  1450 -0.227   
  0.752 -2.462 * 
1100 -0.007  1455 0.311   
  0.452 0.809  
1105 -0.054  1500 0.134   
  1.535 -1.011  
1110 -0.209  1505 0.247   
  -2.053 * 2.237 * 
1115 -0.023  1510 -0.008   
  -0.909 -0.163  
1120 0.068  1515 0.010   
  0.823 1.137  
1125 -0.026  1520 -0.114   
  -0.388 -1.316  
1130 0.070  1525 0.019   
  0.538 -0.276  
1135 -0.062  1530 0.044   
  0.061 -3.701 ** 
1140 -0.068  1535 0.435   
  -0.438 -1.736  
1145 -0.023  1540 0.672   
  1.773 -0.755  
1150 -0.180  1545 0.779   
  -3.248 ** -0.511  
1155 0.198  1550 0.854   
  0.074 -1.251  
1200 0.187  1555 1.159   
  3.442 ** 2.031 * 
1205 -0.235  1600 0.689   
  1.006 -2.431 * 
1210 -0.343  1605 1.052   
  1.423 1.917  
1215 -0.480  1610 0.744   
  -0.636 -1.415  
1220 -0.423  1615 0.973   
  0.323 -0.522  
1225 -0.459  1620 1.061   
  -0.234 -0.700  
1230 -0.432  1625 1.168   
  2.755 ** 1.064  
1235 -0.683  1630 1.013   
  0.417 0.119  
1240 -0.756  1635 0.997   
  0.444 -2.726 ** 
1245 -0.836  1640 1.415   
  0.630 -0.061  
1250 -0.900  1645 1.424   
  0.834 -2.342 * 
1255 -0.987  1650 1.819   
  -0.479 -2.700 ** 
1300 -0.932  1655 2.326   
  0.371 -3.344 ** 
1305 -0.975  1700 3.063   
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TABLE 2.10.5.A: T-statistic for the average return. This table reports the t-values resulting 
when testing two adjacent means against each other within successive intraday periods of 5 
minutes for the average return (RET). The t- values consider the first period under study 
(December 1, 1999 - March 31, 2000). (*) means that results are significant at 5% level of 
significance, whereas (**) results are significant at 1% level. 
 
TIME RET T VALUE OF DIFF. TIME RET T VALUE OF DIFF.
905 2.402
  3.417 **   
910 -0.006  1305 -0.469   
  -0.825 -3.144 ** 
915 0.255  1310 0.169   
  1.357 0.395  
920 -0.081  1315 0.091   
  -0.741 -1.708  
925 0.104  1320 0.411   
  -1.216 1.513  
930 0.374  1325 0.058   
  0.004 1.394  
935 0.373  1330 -0.280   
  -0.116 -0.674  
940 0.393  1335 -0.132   
  3.546 ** -1.383  
945 -0.203  1340 0.161   
  -0.538 1.530  
950 -0.097  1345 -0.143   
  -0.640 -1.251  
955 0.029  1350 0.126   
  -0.754 0.892  
1000 0.160  1355 -0.075   
  2.427 * 1.327  
1005 -0.183  1400 -0.377   
  0.285 -2.244 * 
1010 -0.223  1405 0.091   
  -1.954 1.701  
1015 0.063  1410 -0.266   
  -0.249 -1.481  
1020 0.097  1415 0.049   
  1.063 -0.641  
1025 -0.031  1420 0.162   
  0.368 0.660  
1030 -0.079  1425 0.060   
  0.653 0.186  
1035 -0.173  1430 0.029   
  -0.835 -3.521 ** 
1040 -0.042  1435 0.621   
  1.788 3.741 ** 
1045 -0.330  1440 -0.003   
  1.091 0.212  
1050 -0.504  1445 -0.037   
  -3.365 ** 1.020  
1055 0.039  1450 -0.244   
  0.654 -0.614  
1100 -0.067  1455 -0.113   
  -1.995 * -0.470  
1105 0.277  1500 -0.037   
  0.662 -1.373  
1110 0.164  1505 0.183   
  -1.195 -0.614  
1115 0.357  1510 0.276   
  5.694 ** 1.991 * 
1120 -0.547  1515 -0.018   
  -2.068 * 2.211 * 
1125 -0.244  1520 -0.352   
  -1.043 -2.131 * 
1130 -0.106  1525 -0.054   
  1.336 -0.342  
1135 -0.282  1530 -0.006   
  -1.990 * 0.885  
1140 -0.016  1535 -0.167   
  -1.617 -1.233  
1145 0.220  1540 0.074   
  2.476 * 2.366 * 
1150 -0.164  1545 -0.311   
  -4.291 ** -0.614  
1155 0.378  1550 -0.223   
  1.854 1.708  
1200 0.134  1555 -0.509   
  -1.167 -3.059 ** 
1205 0.315  1600 -0.010   
  2.190 * -1.098  
1210 -0.066  1605 0.175   
  2.842 ** 2.528 * 
1215 -0.592  1610 -0.266   
  -4.572 ** -0.874  
1220 0.235  1615 -0.132   
  0.836 0.367  
1225 0.066  1620 -0.194   
  0.820 -1.109  
1230 -0.101  1625 -0.019   
  0.401 -2.265 * 
1235 -0.179  1630 0.288   
  0.423 1.571  
1240 -0.265  1635 0.061   
  -1.702 2.024 * 
1245 0.130  1640 -0.225   
  0.437 -2.247 * 
1250 0.006  1645 0.089   
  0.682 1.935  
1255 -0.183  1650 -0.170   
  0.509 -1.140  
1300 -0.297  1655 -0.019   
  0.862 -1.383  
1305 -0.469  1700 0.163   
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TABLE 2.10.5.B: T-statistic for the return in absolute terms. This table reports the t-values 
resulting when testing two adjacent means against each other within successive intraday periods 
of 5 minutes for the return in absolute terms (ABSRET). The t- values consider the first period 
under study (December 1, 1999 - March 31, 2000). (*) means that results are significant at 5% 
level of significance, whereas (**) results are significant at 1% level. 
 
TIME ABSRET T VALUE OF DIFF. TIME ABSRET T VALUE OF DIFF.
905 6.292
  12.838 **   
910 2.566  1305 -0.429   
  2.027 * 0.498  
915 2.113  1310 -0.496   
  3.053 ** -0.347  
920 1.543  1315 -0.450   
  1.020 -0.079  
925 1.385  1320 -0.440   
  2.134 * -0.391  
930 1.100  1325 -0.389   
  -0.101 0.308  
935 1.117  1330 -0.430   
  1.369 0.699  
940 0.879  1335 -0.515   
  2.720 ** -0.476  
945 0.533  1340 -0.464   
  -0.219 0.024  
950 0.558  1345 -0.467   
  1.584 -0.516  
955 0.366  1350 -0.411   
  0.132 -0.672  
1000 0.350  1355 -0.332   
  2.019 * 0.324  
1005 0.101  1400 -0.370   
  -0.468 1.062  
1010 0.156  1405 -0.496   
  -0.219 -1.624  
1015 0.180  1410 -0.307   
  1.739 0.613  
1020 -0.016  1415 -0.379   
  0.023 0.363  
1025 -0.019  1420 -0.427   
  1.545 -0.459  
1030 -0.160  1425 -0.369   
  -1.740 -0.645  
1035 0.023  1430 -0.286   
  -0.097 0.625  
1040 0.034  1435 -0.366   
  -1.241 -2.152 * 
1045 0.162  1440 -0.121   
  2.999 ** 0.244  
1050 -0.174  1445 -0.149   
  -0.939 0.538  
1055 -0.058  1450 -0.202   
  -0.176 0.516  
1100 -0.039  1455 -0.251   
  1.041 -0.228  
1105 -0.126  1500 -0.224   
  -0.713 0.070  
1110 -0.060  1505 -0.233   
  -0.378 -0.962  
1115 -0.020  1510 -0.134   
  -0.101 0.562  
1120 -0.008  1515 -0.196   
  0.421 -0.065  
1125 -0.059  1520 -0.189   
  -0.440 0.430  
1130 -0.017  1525 -0.238   
  0.850 0.269  
1135 -0.097  1530 -0.267   
  1.130 0.955  
1140 -0.211  1535 -0.368   
  0.324 -1.348  
1145 -0.243  1540 -0.225   
  0.165 2.228 * 
1150 -0.258  1545 -0.422   
  -0.307 -1.221  
1155 -0.229  1550 -0.314   
  1.770 -0.905  
1200 -0.387  1555 -0.226   
  -1.720 -0.295  
1205 -0.232  1600 -0.200   
  -1.503 -0.212  
1210 -0.073  1605 -0.181   
  0.030 0.845  
1215 -0.077  1610 -0.257   
  1.933 -0.591  
1220 -0.270  1615 -0.206   
  1.586 -0.718  
1225 -0.428  1620 -0.138   
  0.068 -1.701  
1230 -0.435  1625 0.038   
  -0.125 -0.255  
1235 -0.422  1630 0.065   
  -1.286 1.832  
1240 -0.284  1635 -0.131   
  2.362 * 0.639  
1245 -0.550  1640 -0.196   
  1.053 -1.207  
1250 -0.662  1645 -0.071   
  -2.209 * 0.589  
1255 -0.424  1650 -0.130   
  -0.222 0.774  
1300 -0.398  1655 -0.198   
  0.255 -3.536 ** 
1305 -0.429  1700 0.162   
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TABLE 2.10.5.C: T-statistic for the volatility of returns. This table reports the t-values 
resulting when testing two adjacent means against each other within successive intraday periods 
of 5 minutes for the volatility of returns (VARRET). The t- values consider the first period under 
study (December 1, 1999 - March 31, 2000). (*) means that results are significant at 5% level of 
significance, whereas (**) results are significant at 1% level. 
 
TIME VARRET T VALUE OF DIFF. TIME VARRET T VALUE OF DIFF.
905 7.706
  19.082 **   
910 2.032  1305 -0.285   
  2.239 * 0.457  
915 1.589  1310 -0.332   
  2.107 * -0.121  
920 1.217  1315 -0.321   
  0.807 0.980  
925 1.071  1320 -0.408   
  1.650 -0.189  
930 0.797  1325 -0.392   
  0.548 -0.380  
935 0.710  1330 -0.360   
  0.752 0.637  
940 0.590  1335 -0.414   
  2.817 ** 0.431  
945 0.244  1340 -0.448   
  -0.590 -0.628  
950 0.307  1345 -0.401   
  2.077 * -1.363  
955 0.099  1350 -0.300   
  -0.902 0.871  
1000 0.198  1355 -0.367   
  0.860 -0.483  
1005 0.090  1400 -0.329   
  0.173 -0.232  
1010 0.074  1405 -0.311   
  1.061 -0.488  
1015 0.003  1410 -0.272   
  0.878 0.888  
1020 -0.077  1415 -0.329   
  0.326 -0.093  
1025 -0.108  1420 -0.322   
  0.651 -0.083  
1030 -0.151  1425 -0.315   
  -1.349 -0.698  
1035 -0.057  1430 -0.260   
  -0.265 -0.931  
1040 -0.030  1435 -0.182   
  -1.675 -0.941  
1045 0.184  1440 -0.111   
  1.708 0.267  
1050 -0.038  1445 -0.134   
  0.250 0.901  
1055 -0.064  1450 -0.205   
  0.113 0.969  
1100 -0.073  1455 -0.263   
  1.101 -0.355  
1105 -0.162  1500 -0.236   
  -0.501 0.754  
1110 -0.126  1505 -0.292   
  -0.827 -2.474 * 
1115 -0.062  1510 -0.073   
  -0.124 1.583  
1120 -0.052  1515 -0.223   
  1.240 -0.091  
1125 -0.146  1520 -0.215   
  -1.189 -0.521  
1130 -0.060  1525 -0.168   
  0.728 0.396  
1135 -0.123  1530 -0.202   
  0.714 1.031  
1140 -0.184  1535 -0.272   
  0.395 -0.317  
1145 -0.212  1540 -0.252   
  -0.485 0.623  
1150 -0.175  1545 -0.291   
  0.667 -0.382  
1155 -0.223  1550 -0.268   
  1.088 -0.825  
1200 -0.281  1555 -0.197   
  -1.246 0.023  
1205 -0.204  1600 -0.199   
  -1.244 -0.476  
1210 -0.100  1605 -0.168   
  -0.292 1.053  
1215 -0.070  1610 -0.238   
  2.094 * -0.628  
1220 -0.251  1615 -0.194   
  1.222 -1.005  
1225 -0.333  1620 -0.122   
  -0.733 -1.270  
1230 -0.281  1625 -0.029   
  -0.321 -0.074  
1235 -0.249  1630 -0.023   
  0.518 0.934  
1240 -0.302  1635 -0.102   
  1.673 0.322  
1245 -0.412  1640 -0.128   
  0.237 -0.472  
1250 -0.425  1645 -0.089   
  -1.581 0.671  
1255 -0.325  1650 -0.141   
  -0.361 0.081  
1300 -0.299  1655 -0.147   
  -0.144 -2.708 ** 
1305 -0.285  1700 0.072   
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TABLE 2.10.5.D: T-statistic for the volatility as log range. This table reports the t-values 
resulting when testing two adjacent means against each other within successive intraday periods 
of 5 minutes for the volatility as log range (VOLA). The t- values consider the first period under 
study (December 1, 1999 - March 31, 2000). (*) means that results are significant at 5% level of 
significance, whereas (**) results are significant at 1% level. 
 
TIME VOLA T VALUE OF DIFF. TIME VOLA T VALUE OF DIFF.
905 1.816
  -5.494 **   
910 3.068  1305 -1.286   
  4.073 ** 0.513  
915 2.293  1310 -1.326   
  2.775 ** 0.087  
920 1.885  1315 -1.332   
  3.373 ** 0.959  
925 1.464  1320 -1.401   
  1.285 0.017  
930 1.325  1325 -1.403   
  3.034 ** -2.456 * 
935 1.014  1330 -1.245   
  2.259 * -1.313  
940 0.777  1335 -1.151   
  0.204 1.400  
945 0.757  1340 -1.252   
  2.072 * -0.792  
950 0.571  1345 -1.194   
  0.295 -2.985 ** 
955 0.546  1350 -0.978   
  0.236 0.640  
1000 0.522  1355 -1.027   
  -0.304 -0.025  
1005 0.553  1400 -1.025   
  1.864 -2.595 ** 
1010 0.393  1405 -0.838   
  1.573 0.236  
1015 0.255  1410 -0.854   
  0.472 0.734  
1020 0.215  1415 -0.902   
  0.718 -1.504  
1025 0.151  1420 -0.785   
  -0.080 -1.568  
1030 0.158  1425 -0.654   
  -1.226 0.779  
1035 0.260  1430 -0.711   
  2.312 * -10.283 ** 
1040 0.063  1435 0.180   
  -1.013 3.395 ** 
1045 0.149  1440 -0.133   
  0.474 2.123 * 
1050 0.110  1445 -0.294   
  -0.768 1.439  
1055 0.173  1450 -0.400   
  -0.176 -1.300  
1100 0.188  1455 -0.303   
  1.232 -1.490  
1105 0.066  1500 -0.191   
  0.146 1.589  
1110 0.051  1505 -0.297   
  0.538 -0.183  
1115 -0.004  1510 -0.283   
  -0.445 1.616  
1120 0.040  1515 -0.409   
  0.445 -0.983  
1125 0.000  1520 -0.334   
  0.187 -0.882  
1130 -0.018  1525 -0.267   
  0.438 -2.599 ** 
1135 -0.062  1530 -0.074   
  1.222 -0.991  
1140 -0.177  1535 0.005   
  -1.613 -1.788  
1145 -0.029  1540 0.169   
  1.826 -3.472 ** 
1150 -0.202  1545 0.525   
  -1.122 2.058 * 
1155 -0.094  1550 0.316   
  1.355 -0.237  
1200 -0.224  1555 0.339   
  0.895 -1.977 * 
1205 -0.298  1600 0.537   
  0.445 0.462  
1210 -0.332  1605 0.490   
  -0.814 -0.572  
1215 -0.269  1610 0.543   
  4.490 * -0.224  
1220 -0.587  1615 0.562   
  1.740 -1.374  
1225 -0.702  1620 0.676   
  0.998 -0.839  
1230 -0.775  1625 0.762   
  0.557 0.786  
1235 -0.817  1630 0.683   
  2.174 * 0.608  
1240 -0.992  1635 0.627   
  0.438 -1.761  
1245 -1.026  1640 0.802   
  2.384 * -2.227 * 
1250 -1.196  1645 1.007   
  -0.491 -1.594  
1255 -1.161  1650 1.173   
  -0.381 -2.387 * 
1300 -1.134  1655 1.481   
  1.963 * -7.674 ** 
1305 -1.286  1700 2.712   
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TABLE 2.10.6: T-statistic for the waiting time. This table reports the t-values resulting when 
testing two adjacent means against each other within successive intraday periods of 5 minutes for 
the waiting time between subsequent trades (WT). The t- values consider the first period under 
study (December 1, 1999 - March 31, 2000). (*) means that results are significant at 5% level of 
significance, whereas (**) results are significant at 1% level. 
 
TIME WT T VALUE OF DIFF. TIME WT T VALUE OF DIFF.
905 -1.822
  -9.020 **   
910 -0.497  1305 1.638   
  -2.063 * -1.341  
915 -0.215  1310 1.851   
  -0.500 -2.043 * 
920 -0.155  1315 2.172   
  0.353 -0.629  
925 -0.196  1320 2.270   
  0.962 0.764  
930 -0.289  1325 2.143   
  0.532 1.457  
935 -0.336  1330 1.889   
  -0.217 -0.339  
940 -0.317  1335 1.944   
  3.421 ** -0.665  
945 -0.588  1340 2.037   
  -2.513 * 2.656 ** 
950 -0.427  1345 1.694   
  0.046 3.339 ** 
955 -0.431  1350 1.301   
  1.053 -0.634  
1000 -0.517  1355 1.375   
  1.380 1.655  
1005 -0.612  1400 1.176   
  -2.355 * 4.226 ** 
1010 -0.457  1405 0.750   
  0.862 -1.078  
1015 -0.514  1410 0.857   
  -2.557 * 1.276  
1020 -0.322  1415 0.704   
  1.795 0.116  
1025 -0.462  1420 0.689   
  1.610 1.831  
1030 -0.580  1425 0.477   
  -1.309 1.443  
1035 -0.499  1430 0.323   
  -1.277 4.488 ** 
1040 -0.429  1435 -0.090   
  1.992 * -1.555  
1045 -0.550  1440 0.048   
  -0.563 0.288  
1050 -0.512  1445 0.023   
  -0.275 0.600  
1055 -0.494  1450 -0.026   
  -0.179 0.615  
1100 -0.484  1455 -0.080   
  -0.532 1.771  
1105 -0.445  1500 -0.223   
  -1.263 -1.556  
1110 -0.345  1505 -0.111   
  1.473 0.043  
1115 -0.456  1510 -0.114   
  0.225 -0.324  
1120 -0.470  1515 -0.093   
  0.245 -0.643  
1125 -0.484  1520 -0.043   
  -0.849 1.592  
1130 -0.435  1525 -0.200   
  -0.689 0.041  
1135 -0.394  1530 -0.204   
  -0.133 3.116 ** 
1140 -0.386  1535 -0.478   
  1.202 0.916  
1145 -0.473  1540 -0.549   
  -0.385 3.095 ** 
1150 -0.446  1545 -0.765   
  -0.106 -0.793  
1155 -0.440  1550 -0.707   
  1.839 -0.043  
1200 -0.556  1555 -0.704   
  -4.847 ** 1.427  
1205 -0.261  1600 -0.814   
  -1.188 -1.334  
1210 -0.174  1605 -0.693   
  -1.056 0.792  
1215 -0.085  1610 -0.766   
  -4.126 ** -0.860  
1220 0.250  1615 -0.696   
  -1.708 2.068 * 
1225 0.387  1620 -0.857   
  -1.155 -0.614  
1230 0.502  1625 -0.806   
  -1.473 -0.108  
1235 0.670  1630 -0.797   
  -5.395 ** -0.229  
1240 1.249  1635 -0.779   
  1.085 1.191  
1245 1.122  1640 -0.864   
  -0.846 1.109  
1250 1.244  1645 -0.939   
  -1.049 2.524 * 
1255 1.390  1650 -1.106   
  -0.790 1.669  
1300 1.504  1655 -1.235   
  -0.823 1.806  
1305 1.638  1700 -1.384   
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TABLE 2.10.7.A: T-statistic for the liquidity ratio. This table reports the t-values resulting 
when testing two adjacent means against each other within successive intraday periods of 5 
minutes for the liquidity ratio (LR). The t- values consider the first period under study 
(December 1, 1999 - March 31, 2000). (*) means that results are significant at 5% level of 
significance, whereas (**) results are significant at 1% level. 
 
TIME LR T VALUE OF DIFF. TIME LR T VALUE OF DIFF.
905 -1.843
  -3.720 **   
910 -1.430  1305 0.424   
  -1.603 -1.783  
915 -1.267  1310 0.732   
  -1.650 0.628  
920 -1.054  1315 0.610   
  0.825 0.190  
925 -1.159  1320 0.571   
  -1.216 0.547  
930 -1.046  1325 0.476   
  -0.463 0.085  
935 -1.004  1330 0.462   
  0.132 2.548 * 
940 -1.018  1335 0.005   
  0.265 -1.051  
945 -1.044  1340 0.223   
  -1.523 1.238  
950 -0.880  1345 -0.036   
  -0.319 0.159  
955 -0.844  1350 -0.062   
  -0.378 0.322  
1000 -0.792  1355 -0.113   
  -0.544 0.017  
1005 -0.718  1400 -0.116   
  -0.178 -0.416  
1010 -0.698  1405 -0.041   
  0.226 0.956  
1015 -0.724  1410 -0.203   
  -1.657 -0.942  
1020 -0.551  1415 -0.047   
  0.367 -0.393  
1025 -0.591  1420 0.043   
  1.362 0.739  
1030 -0.751  1425 -0.121   
  -2.193 * 0.296  
1035 -0.460  1430 -0.164   
  0.681 -1.411  
1040 -0.553  1435 0.001   
  0.326 0.115  
1045 -0.592  1440 -0.014   
  -1.772 -1.240  
1050 -0.367  1445 0.155   
  -0.116 1.234  
1055 -0.352  1450 -0.005   
  0.822 -0.727  
1100 -0.437  1455 0.173   
  -1.230 0.962  
1105 -0.291  1500 -0.057   
  -0.145 -3.046 ** 
1110 -0.273  1505 0.304   
  0.753 1.063  
1115 -0.355  1510 0.159   
  -0.380 -0.052  
1120 -0.311  1515 0.167   
  -0.850 0.124  
1125 -0.194  1520 0.148   
  -0.154 -0.862  
1130 -0.166  1525 0.278   
  0.231 -0.191  
1135 -0.206  1530 0.308   
  0.697 -1.951  
1140 -0.297  1535 0.600   
  -0.534 0.743  
1145 -0.229  1540 0.495   
  -0.378 -0.382  
1150 -0.177  1545 0.568   
  1.789 0.869  
1155 -0.408  1550 0.394   
  -1.888 1.377  
1200 -0.129  1555 0.184   
  -0.097 -0.683  
1205 -0.114  1600 0.278   
  0.617 -3.533 ** 
1210 -0.187  1605 0.813   
  -0.006 -0.030  
1215 -0.186  1610 0.818   
  -0.212 0.921  
1220 -0.159  1615 0.673   
  -0.248 -1.653  
1225 -0.128  1620 0.890   
  -0.254 -2.280 * 
1230 -0.098  1625 1.209   
  -0.814 0.379  
1235 0.017  1630 1.154   
  -1.703 0.176  
1240 0.359  1635 1.131   
  0.457 -1.937  
1245 0.268  1640 1.462   
  0.101 0.375  
1250 0.251  1645 1.394   
  -2.111 * -1.469  
1255 0.616  1650 1.656   
  0.643 -1.475  
1300 0.496  1655 1.949   
  0.388 -0.912  
1305 0.424  1700 2.147   
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TABLE 2.10.7.B: T-statistic for the flow ratio. This table reports the t-values resulting when 
testing two adjacent means against each other within successive intraday periods of 5 minutes for 
the flow ratio (FR). The t- values consider the first period under study (December 1, 1999 - 
March 31, 2000). (*) means that results are significant at 5% level of significance, whereas (**) 
results are significant at 1% level. 
 
TIME FR T VALUE OF DIFF. TIME FR T VALUE OF DIFF.
905 0.239
  3.408 **   
910 -0.630  1305 -0.240   
  -0.848 1.142  
915 -0.528  1310 -0.508   
  -1.037 0.415  
920 -0.403  1315 -0.571   
  1.361 1.231  
925 -0.566  1320 -0.735   
  -1.232 0.209  
930 -0.430  1325 -0.762   
  0.022 -2.326 * 
935 -0.433  1330 -0.462   
  -0.297 1.000  
940 -0.394  1335 -0.593   
  -0.013 0.864  
945 -0.392  1340 -0.713   
  0.170 0.775  
950 -0.412  1345 -0.812   
  0.632 -0.789  
955 -0.483  1350 -0.723   
  0.594 0.739  
1000 -0.546  1355 -0.812   
  -3.889 ** -0.400  
1005 -0.107  1400 -0.765   
  2.899 ** -2.141 * 
1010 -0.407  1405 -0.539   
  -0.757 -0.877  
1015 -0.327  1410 -0.430   
  -0.805 2.917 ** 
1020 -0.242  1415 -0.788   
  0.572 -1.463  
1025 -0.300  1420 -0.613   
  0.690 -1.910  
1030 -0.373  1425 -0.330   
  -2.994 ** 0.097  
1035 -0.031  1430 -0.346   
  4.137 ** -8.900 ** 
1040 -0.476  1435 1.156   
  -1.297 7.182 ** 
1045 -0.353  1440 0.131   
  -2.853 ** 0.146  
1050 0.014  1445 0.113   
  0.414 -0.144  
1055 -0.042  1450 0.135   
  1.327 0.955  
1100 -0.189  1455 -0.009   
  -1.251 1.959  
1105 -0.031  1500 -0.253   
  1.903 -3.694 ** 
1110 -0.280  1505 0.287   
  -1.321 1.571  
1115 -0.086  1510 0.060   
  0.887 -0.724  
1120 -0.225  1515 0.155   
  -0.101 -0.535  
1125 -0.212  1520 0.252   
  1.744 1.054  
1130 -0.402  1525 0.065   
  -1.961 * 0.312  
1135 -0.183  1530 0.023   
  1.083 -2.501 * 
1140 -0.312  1535 0.413   
  -2.311 * -2.094 * 
1145 0.018  1540 0.729   
  1.720 -4.217 ** 
1150 -0.226  1545 1.353   
  -1.210 4.779 ** 
1155 -0.090  1550 0.666   
  -0.205 -0.678  
1200 -0.070  1555 0.748   
  1.644 -0.482  
1205 -0.259  1600 0.827   
  1.396 -1.607  
1210 -0.417  1605 1.109   
  -0.621 0.918  
1215 -0.347  1610 0.970   
  0.520 -0.105  
1220 -0.409  1615 0.989   
  1.010 -0.500  
1225 -0.528  1620 1.089   
  -1.431 -0.494  
1230 -0.332  1625 1.171   
  1.773 -0.552  
1235 -0.574  1630 1.256   
  -0.831 -0.030  
1240 -0.454  1635 1.261   
  -0.507 -3.217 ** 
1245 -0.363  1640 1.802   
  -0.751 1.340  
1250 -0.218  1645 1.554   
  1.560 -2.380 * 
1255 -0.485  1650 2.068   
  -1.134 -1.893  
1300 -0.287  1655 2.518   
  -0.191 -0.764  
1305 -0.240  1700 2.686   
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TABLE 2.10.8.A: The Pearsons correlation between 16 liquidity proxies during the first period. 
This Table shows the correlations among the 16 liquidity proxies defined in Appendix 2.12.2 
during the period December 1, 1999 - March 31, 2000. The calculation  is based on the French 
Stock Exchange, estimated from 43 stocks (weighted average of all the 43 stocks included in the 
CAC 40 index during the first period under study). All correlations are significant at the 0.01 level 
(two-tailed). The meaning of each acronyme is indicated in the list of abbreviations. 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 2.10.8.B: The Pearsons correlation between 16 liquidity proxies during the second 
period. This Table shows the correlations among the 16 liquidity proxies defined in Appendix 
2.12.2 during the period April 1, 2000 - November 30, 2000. The calculation is based on the 
French Stock Exchange, estimated from 43 stocks (weighted average of all the 43 stocks included 
in the CAC 40 index during the second period under study). All correlations are significant at the 
0.01 level (two-tailed). The meaning of each acronyme is indicated in the list of abbreviations. 
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TABLE 2.10.9.A: Stocks ranked by different liquidity proxies during the first period. This table 
shows 43 stocks of the French Stock Exchange belonging to the CAC 40 index, ranked by 16 
different liquidity proxies during the period December 1, 1999 - March 31, 2000. Stocks are 
ranked from the highest liquid stock to the lowest. 
 
EHS QHS DSPR MID QHS_W SUMVO NBTR VIMB SABSVI RET ABSRET VARRE VOLA WT LR FR 
Bnp Bnp EADS EADS Accor Alcatel Vivendi Alcatel Vivendi L'Oreal Suez Suez Dexia Vivendi Bouygue Bouygue
Suez Suez Michelin Alstom Suez Cap France Total France Vivendi Bnp Alcatel Bic France Tf1 Tf1 
Alcatel Alcatel Alstom Michelin Agf Lagarder Alcatel France Aventis Canal Alcatel Bnp Agf Alcatel Legrand Peugeot
Vivendi Vivendi Credit Csf Danone Vivendi Canal Stm Alcatel Equant Vivendi Vivendi Eridania Carrefour Lvmh Cap 
Total Total Aventis Credit Bnp Canal Carrefour Carrefour Total MEAN France France Sodexho Total Cap L'Oreal
France France Renault Bic Pinault Equant Suez Vivendi Bnp Suez Carrefour Total Legrand Suez Peugeot Legrand
Carrefour Carrefour Sanofi Sanofi Michelin Lafarge Stm Lagarder Suez Air Total Carrefour Bnp Stm L'Oreal Lvmh 
Axa Stm Bnp Renault Lafarge Accor Total Equant Credit Lafarge Stm Stm Peugeot Bnp Danone Alcatel 
Aventis Danone Agf Agf Valeo Valeo Credit Valeo Stm Alcatel Danone Danone Michelin Canal Société Danone
Danone Aventis Csf Aventis Csf Aventis Bnp Aventis Axa Carrefour Aventis Aventis Suez Aventis Dexia Canal 
Stm Axa Valeo Valeo L'Oreal Peugeot Cap Bnp Carrefour Bnp Axa Axa Danone Credit Sodexho Société 
Lvmh Société Vivendi Schneide Alcatel Suez Aventis Multi Sanofi Michelin Société Lvmh Société Danone Pinault Saint 
Dexia Lvmh Accor Lagarder Vivendi Saint Danone Accor Equant Casino Lvmh Société Axa Axa Canal Sodexho
Société Pinault Schneide Multi Axa Michelin Renault Lafarge MEAN Total Pinault Dexia Lvmh Cap MEAN Dexia 
Pinault Accor Lagarder Bnp Carrefour Danone Lagarder Renault Renault France Accor Pinault Pinault Renault Saint MEAN
Agf Renault Total Eridania Aventis Bouygue MEAN Canal Lagarder Société Renault L'Oreal Casino Air Alcatel Pinault 
L'Oreal L'Oreal Bic Accor Sodexho Stm Accor MEAN EADS Sanofi Credit Equant L'Oreal Accor Eridania Equant 
Accor Michelin France Lafarge Air Schneide Lafarge Alstom Canal Alstom Dexia Agf Aventis EADS Casino Stm 
Michelin Air Suez Casino Bouygue Legrand Equant Suez Accor Cap Valeo Renault Total Equant Bic Suez 
Renault Dexia Lafarge Vivendi Peugeot MEAN Multi Credit Alstom Schneide Equant Lafarge Sanofi Lafarge Stm Lagarder
Air Valeo Axa Equant Saint Renault Air Danone Michelin Pinault Michelin Air Valeo Société Suez Casino 
Saint Equant Carrefour Axa Tf1 Tf1 Axa Pinault Lafarge Saint Lafarge Michelin MEAN Lagarder Accor Lafarge
MEAN Saint Equant Total Lvmh Bnp EADS Société Schneide Credit L'Oreal Valeo Credit Pinault Lagarder Air 
Credit Credit Stm Dexia Canal Société Pinault Cap Cap Multi Agf Saint Bouygue Lvmh Equant Axa 
Valeo Agf Casino France Eridania Alstom Valeo Sanofi Valeo Aventis Air Credit Schneide Saint Lafarge Carrefour
Equant Cap Alcatel Air Casino Sodexho Société Air Csf Danone MEAN Cap Saint Multi Air Eridania
Cap MEAN Multi Saint Legrand Air Saint Axa Multi Stm Cap MEAN Renault L'Oreal Michelin Vivendi
Peugeot Lafarge Air Sodexho Total Casino Lvmh Csf Saint Axa Saint Canal Accor Sanofi Axa Valeo 
Lafarge Peugeot Dexia Carrefour MEAN Pinault Alstom Casino Agf Lagarder Sanofi Peugeot Csf Valeo Schneide Accor 
Sanofi Lagarder Danone MEAN Renault Credit Sanofi Bouygue Air Renault Canal Lagarder Lafarge MEAN Valeo Schneide
Bouygue Sanofi Saint Suez Lagarder Csf L'Oreal EADS Danone Valeo Lagarder Bouygue Air Michelin Agf Total 
Sodexho Canal MEAN Stm Stm Axa Michelin Peugeot Société Lvmh EADS Casino Alcatel Alstom Renault Bnp 
Lagarder EADS Société Canal Schneide Carrefour Schneide Saint Pinault Legrand Peugeot Schneide Carrefour Schneide Csf Multi 
EADS Bouygue Eridania Legrand France Multi Tf1 Tf1 Lvmh Agf Bouygue Sodexho EADS Tf1 Bnp Bic 
Casino Schneide Pinault Société Dexia Lvmh Bouygue Agf Casino EADS Schneide Sanofi Stm Bouygue Carrefour Agf 
Schneide Casino Sodexho Peugeot Sanofi Total Csf Michelin Peugeot Csf Sodexho EADS Alstom Peugeot Total Aventis
Canal Sodexho Canal Danone Equant France Peugeot Dexia Dexia Sodexho Casino Legrand Vivendi Csf Sanofi France 
Legrand Alstom Peugeot Pinault Société Dexia Casino Legrand L'Oreal Peugeot Alstom Alstom Tf1 Casino Alstom Michelin
Csf Csf Cap Alcatel EADS Bic Sodexho Bic Bouygue Accor Legrand Csf Equant Sodexho Vivendi Renault
Alstom Legrand Legrand Cap Alstom Sanofi Legrand Sodexho Sodexho Dexia Csf Tf1 France Legrand Multi Csf 
Eridania Tf1 Lvmh Lvmh Bic Agf Agf Schneide Legrand Bouygue Tf1 Eridania Cap Agf Aventis Alstom
Tf1 Multi L'Oreal Tf1 Cap Eridania Dexia Eridania Tf1 Tf1 Bic Bic Lagarder Dexia Credit Credit 
Bic Eridania Bouygue Bouygue Credit L'Oreal Eridania L'Oreal Bic Bic Eridania Multi Canal Eridania France Sanofi 
Multi Bic Tf1 L'Oreal Multi EADS Bic Lvmh Eridania Eridania Multi Accor Multi Bic EADS EADS 
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TABLE 2.10.9.B: Stocks ranked by different liquidity proxies during the second period. This 
table shows 43 stocks of the French Stock Exchange belonging to the CAC 40 index, ranked by 
16 different liquidity proxies during the period April 1, 2000 - November 30, 2000.  Stocks are 
ranked from the highest value of liquidity indicator to the lowest. 
 
EHS QHS DSPR MID QHS_W SUMVO NBTR VIMB SABSVI RET ABSRET VARRE VOLA WT LR FR 
Total Vivendi EADS EADS Dexia Equant Alcatel France France Alstom Alcatel France Eridania Alcatel EADS EADS 
Vivendi Total Alstom Alstom STM Alcatel France Alcatel Alcatel Multi France Alcatel Bic France France Alstom
Alcatel Alcatel Michelin Michelin Suez Cap Vivendi Vivendi STM France Vivendi Vivendi Dexia Vivendi Carrefour Credit 
Bnp France Equant Bic Air Vivendi STM Axa Vivendi Cap Total Total Sodexho STM Sanofi Csf 
France Bnp Accor Credit Accor Tf1 Cap Carrefour Aventis Total STM Bnp Legrand Carrefour Multi Sanofi 
Axa STM Aventis Csf Pinault STM Carrefour Stm Equant Stm Bnp STM Agf Total Alstom Accor 
Aventis Axa Credit Accor Axa Valeo Equant Aventis EADS Vivendi Carrefour Carrefour Casino Cap Aventis Renault
Suez Carrefour Renault Renault Alcatel Lagarder Total Suez Carrefour Sanofi Aventis Axa Peugeot Equant Stm Carrefour
STM Aventis Carrefour Equant Total Canal Multi MEAN Total Suez Axa Aventis Suez Bnp Credit Michelin
Dexia Suez Sanofi Sanofi Société Lafarge Canal Equant Bnp Accor Suez Suez Pinault Aventis Vivendi France 
Carrefour Cap Vivendi Valeo Peugeot Danone EADS Bnp Axa Casino Cap Dexia Michelin Axa Agf Multi 
Canal Canal STM Agf Vivendi Multi Bnp Société MEAN Pinault Canal Cap Csf Suez Renault Aventis
Pinault Equant Alcatel Lagarder Eridania Bouygue Aventis Lagarder Sanofi Aventis Dexia Canal Bnp Société Alcatel Bic 
Cap Pinault Bnp Schneide Carrefour Bnp MEAN Cap Société Alcatel Equant Equant Axa Multi Bnp Agf 
Danone Lafarge Valeo Aventis Danone Axa Axa Total Suez Lagarder Danone Lafarge Lafarge EADS Lagarder Stm 
Lvmh Dexia Agf Multi Casino MEAN Tf1 Sanofi Multi Carrefour Lafarge Pinault Total L'Oreal Csf Schneide
Lafarge Danone Lagarder Carrefour Bnp Peugeot Lagarder Lvmh Cap Air Pinault Société Schneide Canal Schneide Equant 
L'Oreal Air Csf Eridania Agf Carrefour Suez Saint Credit Bnp EADS L'Oreal Saint Tf1 Total Bnp 
Société Lvmh Lafarge STM Michelin Accor Société Accor Lagarder Valeo Société Air Aventis Danone Michelin Société 
Saint Société Bic Lafarge Sodexho Suez Bouygue Bouygue Canal Schneide MEAN Saint Danone Credit Société Alcatel 
Peugeot Saint Schneide Société Lafarge Saint Danone Schneide Renault Axa L'Oreal Peugeot Valeo Lvmh Equant Lagarder
Air L'Oreal France Vivendi Saint Michelin L'Oreal Tf1 Accor Csf Lvmh Sanofi Alstom Lagarder Air Vivendi
MEAN MEAN Société Bnp EADS Société Credit Renault L'Oreal Dexia Saint Lagarder MEAN Bouygue Valeo Valeo 
Equant Lagarder Multi Casino Equant France Renault Valeo Lvmh Equant Sanofi EADS Air Renault Axa Total 
Agf Peugeot Total Alcatel MEAN Alstom Lvmh Credit Alstom Tf1 Air Casino Lvmh Accor Lafarge Air 
Sanofi Renault Axa MEAN Schneide Aventis Accor Danone Bouygue Credit Peugeot Accor Accor Air Casino Lafarge
Schneide Accor Casino France L'Oreal Schneide Air L'Oreal Danone Canal Lagarder Schneide Sanofi Lafarge Bic Eridania
Casino Sanofi MEAN Saint Csf Casino Lafarge Agf Lafarge MEAN Accor Renault Vivendi Sanofi L'Oreal MEAN
Renault Bouygue Suez Air Alstom Renault Sanofi Michelin Tf1 Agf Renault Agf Renault Saint Saint Casino 
Accor EADS Saint Dexia Cap Total Saint Csf Michelin Renault Credit Valeo L'Oreal Pinault Suez Lvmh 
Lagarder Schneide Air Axa Valeo Legrand Pinault Alstom Agf Lafarge Tf1 Tf1 Société MEAN Eridania Saint 
Bouygue Tf1 Dexia Total Canal Air Valeo Dexia Schneide Saint Schneide Michelin Carrefour Valeo MEAN Axa 
Michelin Michelin Canal Sodexho France EADS Alstom Bic Valeo EADS Bouygue Sodexho EADS Alstom Cap Pinault 
EADS Valeo Eridania Suez Bic Sodexho Schneide Air Saint Michelin Michelin Credit Credit Schneide Tf1 Suez 
Sodexho Credit Cap Danone Lagarder Pinault Michelin Pinault Air Legrand Valeo Eridania Canal Michelin Canal L'Oreal
Valeo Multi Danone Canal Legrand Agf Peugeot Canal Pinault Société Agf Bic Lagarder Peugeot Pinault Dexia 
Credit Casino Pinault Legrand Bouygue Credit Casino Casino Csf L'Oreal Casino Alstom Bouygue Casino Danone Danone
Eridania Agf Lvmh Cap Renault Lvmh Csf EADS Casino Bouygue Sodexho Multi Cap Csf Dexia Cap 
Alstom Alstom Peugeot Pinault Aventis Sanofi Agf Multi Dexia Danone Multi MEAN Tf1 Agf Bouygue Canal 
Tf1 Sodexho Sodexho Lvmh Lvmh Bic Sodexho Sodexho Peugeot Peugeot Alstom Danone Stm Sodexho Lvmh Sodexho
Bic Eridania Bouygue Peugeot Sanofi Dexia Dexia Peugeot Sodexho Sodexho Bic Legrand France Dexia Sodexho Tf1 
Multi Bic L'Oreal Bouygue Tf1 L'Oreal Legrand Eridania Bic Lvmh Eridania Csf Alcatel Legrand Peugeot Legrand
Csf Csf Tf1 Tf1 Credit Csf Bic Legrand Legrand Bic Legrand Lvmh Multi Bic Legrand Bouygue
Legrand Legrand Legrand L'Oreal Multi Eridania Eridania Lafarge Eridania Eridania Csf Bouygue Equant Eridania Accor Peugeot
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TABLE 2.10.10: Intraday market depth in terms of trading volume: This estimation is based 
on the average trading data between the 43 stocks belonging to the CAC 40 index during a one-
year period. From this sample, I obtained 8352 observations of five minutes each for table 
2.10.10.A and 17’238 for table 2.10.10.B. These tables represent the results of the regression 
between the ratio of cumulated traded volume (explained variable) and the following 
independent variables: ratio of waiting time (RWT), ratio of variance of return (RVARRET), 
ratio of cumulated volume imbalance in absolute terms (RSABSVIMB), a constant (C), and 
ARMA(2,1) in the first period and ARMA(2, 3) in the second period. The conditional variance 
equation of residuals follows a TARCH model in period 1 (explained in detail in Appendix 
2.11.1) and includes two lagged residual coefficients, two for all residuals (ARCH(2)), the other 
only for negative residuals being a dummy variable (RESID<0)*ARCH(1)), lagged conditional 
variance (GARCH(1)) and a constant (C). In the second period the conditional variance equation 
follows a GARCH (1,1). In the Table 2.10.10.A. the value of parameters p, q, r, s and z are 
respectively: 2, 0, 0, 0 and 1. In the Table 2.10.10.B. the value of parameters p, q, r, s and z are 
respectively: 2, 0, 1, 1 and 3. 
 
Table 2.10.10.A: Depth in terms of trading volume during the first period Table 2.10.10.B: Depth in terms of trading volume during the second period
Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
C -0.912 0.013 -68.707 0.000 C -0.442 0.033 -13.365 0.000
RSABSVIMB 0.291 0.019 15.354 0.000 RSABSVIMB 0.628 0.019 33.688 0.000
RVARRET -0.109 0.009 -11.810 0.000 RVARRET(-1) -0.049 0.010 -4.785 0.000
RWT -1.158 0.013 -88.601 0.000 RWT(-1) 0.032 0.018 1.803 0.071
AR(1) 0.984 0.019 50.733 0.000 AR(1) 1.811 0.014 133.861 0.000
AR(2) -0.034 0.016 -2.129 0.033 AR(2) -0.812 0.013 -60.724 0.000
MA(1) -0.749 0.015 -49.849 0.000 MA(1) -1.498 0.020 -74.256 0.000
MA(2) 0.449 0.023 19.335 0.000
C 0.004 0.002 2.070 0.038 MA(3) 0.067 0.009 7.465 0.000
ARCH(1) 0.140 0.034 4.133 0.000
ARCH(2) -0.047 0.014 -3.470 0.001 C 0.042 0.008 5.230 0.000
(RESID< 0)*ARCH(1) -0.088 0.033 -2.643 0.008 ARCH(1) 0.061 0.009 6.782 0.000
GARCH(1) 0.849 0.063 13.505 0.000 GARCH(1) 0.541 0.080 6.740 0.000
R-squared 0.834     Mean dependent var -0.625 R-squared 0.456     Mean dependent var -0.614
Adjusted R-squared 0.834     S.D. dependent var 0.480 Adjusted R-squared 0.456     S.D. dependent var 0.438
S.E. of regression 0.196    Akaike info criterion -0.451 S.E. of regression 0.323    Akaike info criterion 0.573
Sum squared resid 318.833     Schwarz criterion -0.441 Sum squared resid 1799.140     Schwarz criterion 0.578
Log likelihood 1894.070     F-statistic 3812.506 Log likelihood -4924.470     F-statistic 1312.959
Durbin-Watson stat 1.930     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 Durbin-Watson stat 1.988     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000
Inverted AR Roots 0.950 0.040 Inverted AR Roots 0.990 0.820
Inverted MA Roots 0.750 Inverted MA Roots 0.950 0.650 -0.110
       Variance Equation
      Variance Equation
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TABLE 2.10.11: Intraday market depth in terms of order volume imbalance: This 
estimation is based on the average trading data between the 43 stocks belonging to the CAC 40 
index during a one-year period. From this sample I obtained 8352 observations of five minutes 
each for table 2.10.11.A and 17’238 for table 2.10.11.B. These tables represent the results of the 
regression between the ratio of cumulated order volume imbalance in absolute terms (explained 
variable) and the following independent variables: ratio of quoted half spread (RQHS), ratio of 
waiting time (RWT), a constant (C), and ARMA(3,2) in the first period and ARMA(3,1) in the 
second period. The conditional variance equation of residuals follows a GARCH model, 
including 3-lagged residuals coefficients, (ARCH(3)), 1-lagged conditional variance (GARCH(1)) 
and a constant (C). The conditional variance equation in the second period follows a 
GARCH(1,1) model. In the Table 2.10.11.A. the value of parameters p, q, r and z are 
respectively: 3, 0, 0 and 2. In the Table 2.10.11.B. the value of parameters p, q, r and z are 
respectively: 3, 0, 0 and 1. 
 
 
 
Table 2.10.11.A: Depth in terms of volume imbalance during the first period Table 2.10.11.B: Depth in terms of volume imbalance during the second period
Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
C -0.341 0.020 -17.423 0.000 C -0.754 0.015 -51.833 0.000
RQHS -0.028 0.013 -2.149 0.032 RQHS -0.137 0.018 -7.470 0.000
RWT -0.114 0.008 -13.856 0.000 RWT -0.897 0.007 -135.779 0.000
AR(1) 1.864 0.096 19.356 0.000 AR(1) 1.129 0.012 96.312 0.000
AR(2) -0.989 0.136 -7.262 0.000 AR(2) -0.107 0.013 -8.518 0.000
AR(3) 0.123 0.041 3.000 0.003 AR(3) -0.038 0.010 -3.842 0.000
MA(1) -1.463 0.095 -15.386 0.000 MA(1) -0.864 0.008 -112.960 0.000
MA(2) 0.485 0.089 5.423 0.000
C 0.009 0.001 7.225 0.000
C 0.000 0.000 1.932 0.053 ARCH(1) 0.092 0.012 7.657 0.000
ARCH(1) 0.080 0.021 3.891 0.000 GARCH(1) 0.700 0.035 20.233 0.000
ARCH(2) -0.054 0.024 -2.250 0.025
ARCH(3) -0.019 0.012 -1.544 0.123 R-squared 0.768     Mean dependent var -0.540
GARCH(1) 0.985 0.006 155.190 0.000 Adjusted R-squared 0.768     S.D. dependent var 0.438
S.E. of regression 0.211     Akaike info criterion -0.310
R-squared 0.499     Mean dependent var -0.304 Sum squared resid 767.533     Schwarz criterion -0.306
Adjusted R-squared 0.498     S.D. dependent var 0.186 Log likelihood 2683.402     F-statistic 6329.128
S.E. of regression 0.132     Akaike info criterion -1.235 Durbin-Watson stat 1.948     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000
Sum squared resid 144.696     Schwarz criterion -1.224
Log likelihood 5167.856     F-statistic 692.342 Inverted AR Roots 0.980 0.280 -0.140
Durbin-Watson stat 1.967     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 Inverted MA Roots 0.86
Inverted AR Roots 0.990 0.690 0.180
Inverted MA Roots 0.950 0.510
       Variance Equation
       Variance Equation
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TABLE 2.10.12: Time dimension of intraday market liquidity: This estimation is based on 
the average trading data between the 43 stocks belonging to the CAC 40 index during a one-year 
period. From this sample I obtain 8352 observations of five minutes each for table 2.10.12.A and 
17’238 for table 2.10.12.B. These tables represent the results of the regression between the ratio 
of waiting time (explained variable) and the following independent variables: ratio of cumulated 
traded volume (RSUMVOL), ratio of return volatility (RVARRET), ratio of cumulated volume 
imbalance in absolute terms (RSABSVIMB), a constant (C), and ARMA (2,1) in the first period 
and ARMA (3,1) in the second. The conditional variance equation of residuals follows a GARCH 
model (explained in detail in Appendix 2.11.1), including 1-lagged residual coefficient, (ARCH 
(1)), 1-lagged conditional variance (GARCH (1)) and a constant (C). The conditional variance 
equation in the second period follows also a GARCH (1,1) model. In the Table 2.10.12.A. the 
value of parameters p, q, r, s and z are respectively: 2, 0, 0, 0 and 1. In the Table 2.10.12.B. the 
value of parameters p, q, r, s and z are respectively: 3, 0, 0, 0 and 1. 
 
 
 
Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
C -0.577 0.011 -50.921 0.000 C -0.520 0.012 -42.903 0.000
RSUMVOL -0.378 0.011 -34.936 0.000 RSUMVOL -0.040 0.005 -8.786 0.000
RSABSVIMB -0.199 0.015 -13.510 0.000 RSABSVIMB -0.549 0.006 -98.832 0.000
RVARRET 0.035 0.007 4.933 0.000 RVARRET 0.062 0.005 12.150 0.000
AR(1) 1.040 0.020 52.442 0.000 AR(1) 1.047 0.012 84.527 0.000
AR(2) -0.079 0.017 -4.602 0.000 AR(2) -0.011 0.013 -0.909 0.364
MA(1) -0.773 0.015 -51.807 0.000 AR(3) -0.053 0.009 -5.550 0.000
MA(1) -0.857 0.008 -113.335 0.000
C 0.007 0.001 4.996 0.000
ARCH(1) 0.102 0.032 3.230 0.001 C 0.007 0.001 6.587 0.000
GARCH(1) 0.483 0.090 5.335 0.000 ARCH(1) 0.082 0.011 7.464 0.000
GARCH(1) 0.648 0.047 13.659 0.000
R-squared 0.839     Mean dependent var -0.264
Adjusted R-squared 0.839     S.D. dependent var 0.312 R-squared 0.744     Mean dependent var -0.245
S.E. of regression 0.125     Akaike info criterion -1.334 Adjusted R-squared 0.744     S.D. dependent var 0.324
Sum squared resid 131.113     Schwarz criterion -1.325 S.E. of regression 0.164     Akaike info criterion -0.804
Log likelihood 5577.493     F-statistic 4818.196 Sum squared resid 462.015     Schwarz criterion -0.799
Durbin-Watson stat 1.928     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 Log likelihood 6935.192     F-statistic 5002.799
Durbin-Watson stat 1.959     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000
Inverted AR Roots 0.960 0.080
Inverted MA Roots 0.770 Inverted AR Roots 0.980 0.270 -0.200
Inverted MA Roots 0.860
       Variance Equation
       Variance Equation
Table 2.10.12.A: Time dimension of intraday market liquidity during
the first period
Table 2.10.12.B: Time dimension of intraday market liquidity during
the second period
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TABLE 2.10.13: Tightness of intraday market liquidity: This estimation is based on the 
average trading data between the 43 stocks belonging to the CAC 40 index during a one-year 
period. From this sample I obtain 8352 observations of five minutes each for table 2.10.13.A and 
17’238 for table 2.10.13.B. These tables represent the results of the regression between the ratio 
of quoted half spread (explained variable) and the following independent variables: ratio of 
cumulated volume imbalance in absolute terms (SABSVIMB), ratio of return volatility 
(VARRET), ratio of waiting time (WT), a constant (C), and ARMA (2,2) in the first period and 
ARMA (2,1) in the second period. The conditional variance equation of residuals follows, in the 
first and second period, a GARCH model, including 1-lagged residuals coefficients (ARCH (1)), 
1-lagged conditional variance (GARCH (1)) and a constant (C). In the Table 2.10.13.A. the value 
of parameters p, q, r, s and z are respectively: 2, 0, 0, 0 and 2. In the Table 2.10.13.B. the value of 
parameters p, q, r, s and z are respectively: 2, 0, 1, 0 and 1. 
 
 
 
Table 2.10.13.A: Tightness of intraday  market liquidity  during the first period Table 2.10.13.A: Tightness of intraday  market liquidity  during the second period
Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.052 0.007 7.733 0.000 C 0.076 0.003 24.559 0.000
RWT -0.012 0.005 -2.560 0.011 RWT -0.032 0.003 -9.777 0.000
RSABSVIMB 0.035 0.008 4.366 0.000 RSABSVIMB(-1) -0.021 0.005 -4.526 0.000
RVARRET 0.314 0.004 72.094 0.000 RVARRET 0.274 0.003 82.431 0.000
AR(1) 1.489 0.034 43.726 0.000 AR(1) 1.031 0.012 85.928 0.000
AR(2) -0.496 0.033 -14.944 0.000 AR(2) -0.057 0.011 -5.306 0.000
MA(1) -1.152 0.037 -31.214 0.000 MA(1) -0.912 0.007 -136.138 0.000
MA(2) 0.199 0.033 6.118 0.000        Variance Equation
C 0.003 0.002 1.570 0.116
C 0.002 0.001 3.113 0.002 ARCH(1) 0.013 0.008 1.673 0.094
ARCH(1) 0.053 0.014 3.651 0.000 GARCH(1) 0.605 0.248 2.436 0.015
GARCH(1) 0.635 0.106 5.966 0.000
R-squared 0.752     Mean dependent var -0.125
R-squared 0.744     Mean dependent var -0.186 Adjusted R-squared 0.752     S.D. dependent var 0.166
Adjusted R-squared 0.744     S.D. dependent var 0.158 S.E. of regression 0.082     Akaike info criterion -2.152
S.E. of regression 0.080     Akaike info criterion -2.227 Sum squared resid 117.187     Schwarz criterion -2.147
Sum squared resid 52.963     Schwarz criterion -2.218 Log likelihood 18557.170     F-statistic 5236.189
Log likelihood 9308.187     F-statistic 2427.886 Durbin-Watson stat 2.000     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000
Durbin-Watson stat 1.995     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000
Inverted AR Roots 0.970 0.060
Inverted AR Roots 0.990 0.500 Inverted MA Roots 0.910
Inverted MA Roots 0.940 0.210
       Variance Equation
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TABLE 2.10.14: Intraday volatility of return: This estimation is based on the average trading 
data between the 43 stocks belonging to the CAC 40 index during a one-year period. From this 
sample I obtain 8352 observations of five minutes each for table 2.10.14.A and 17’238 for table 
2.10.14.B. These tables represent the results of the regression between the ratio of volatility of 
return (explained variable) and the following independent variables: ratio of quoted half spread 
(RQHS), ratio of cumulated volume imbalance in absolute terms (RSABSVIMB), ratio of waiting 
time (RWT), a constant (C), and ARMA (1,2) in the first period and ARMA (2,2) in the second 
period. The conditional variance equation of residuals follows, in the first and second period, a 
GARCH model, including 1-lagged residuals coefficients (ARCH (1)), 1-lagged conditional 
variance (GARCH (1)) and a constant (C). In the Table 2.10.14.A. the value of parameters p, q, r, 
s and z are respectively: 1, 0, 0, 0 and 2. In the Table 2.10.14.B. the value of parameters p, q, r, s 
and z are respectively: 2, 0, 1, 0 and 2. 
 
 
 
Table 2.10.13.A: Tightness of intraday  market liquidity  during the first period Table 2.10.13.B: Tightness of intraday  market liquidity  during the second period
Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
C -0.590 0.024 -25.102 0.000 C -0.443 0.016 -27.692 0.000
RQHS 0.708 0.031 22.580 0.000 RQHS 0.739 0.030 24.649 0.000
RSABSVIMB -0.098 0.014 -7.134 0.000 RSABSVIMB(-1) 0.048 0.009 5.276 0.000
RWT 0.194 0.020 9.476 0.000 RWT 0.234 0.011 20.591 0.000
AR(1) 0.985 0.002 400.041 0.000 AR(1) 1.323 0.109 12.084 0.000
MA(1) -0.789 0.015 -53.307 0.000 AR(2) -0.335 0.107 -3.120 0.002
MA(2) -0.096 0.013 -7.240 0.000 MA(1) -1.174 0.110 -10.711 0.000
MA(2) 0.248 0.097 2.570 0.010
C 0.004 0.003 1.619 0.105
ARCH(1) 0.015 0.007 2.263 0.024 C 0.013 0.004 3.263 0.001
GARCH(1) 0.908 0.052 17.457 0.000 ARCH(1) 0.028 0.007 3.853 0.000
GARCH(1) 0.751 0.073 10.352 0.000
R-squared 0.485     Mean dependent var -0.724
Adjusted R-squared 0.485     S.D. dependent var 0.330 R-squared 0.517     Mean dependent var -0.666
S.E. of regression 0.237     Akaike info criterion -0.045 Adjusted R-squared 0.516     S.D. dependent var 0.347
Sum squared resid 467.052     Schwarz criterion -0.037 S.E. of regression 0.241     Akaike info criterion -0.010
Log likelihood 198.495     F-statistic 873.461 Sum squared resid 1001.214     Schwarz criterion -0.005
Durbin-Watson stat 1.996     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 Log likelihood 95.424     F-statistic 1840.633
Durbin-Watson stat 1.995     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000
Inverted AR Roots 0.990
Inverted MA Roots 0.900 -0.110 Inverted AR Roots 0.980 0.340
Inverted MA Roots 0.900 0.280
       Variance Equation
       Variance Equation
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TABLE 2.10.15: Intraday relation between quoted half spread from the WAS file and 
volume imbalance: This estimation is based on the average trading data between the 43 stocks 
belonging to the CAC 40 index during a one-year period. From this sample I obtain 8352 
observations of five minutes each for table 2.10.15.A and 17’238 for table 2.10.15.B. These tables 
represent the results of the regression between the ratio of quoted half spread from the weighted 
average spread file (explained variable) and the following independent variables: ratio of 
cumulated volume imbalance in absolute terms (RSABSVIMB), ratio of volatility of returns 
(RVARRET), ratio of waiting time (RWT), a constant (C), and ARMA (2,1) for the first period 
and an ARMA (2,2) in the second period. The conditional variance equation of residuals follows 
a GARCH model including 1-lagged residuals coefficients (ARCH (1)), 1-lagged conditional 
variance (GARCH (1)) and a constant (C). On the other hand, in the second period, the 
conditional variance equation of residuals follows a TARCH model (explained in detail in 
Appendix 2.11.1) including 2-lagged residuals coefficients, one for all the residuals (ARCH (1)), 
the other only for negative residuals being a dummy variable (RESID < 0)*ARCH(1), lagged 
conditional variance (GARCH (1)) and a constant (C). In the Table 2.10.15.A. the value of 
parameters p, q, r, s and z are respectively: 2, 0, 0, 0 and 1. In the Table 2.10.15.B. the value of 
parameters p, q, r, s and z are respectively: 2, 0, 0, 0 and 2. 
 
Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
C -0.031 0.019 -1.659 0.097 C -0.062 0.011 -5.585 0.000
SABSVIMB -0.063 0.002 -28.343 0.000 SABSVIMB -0.074 0.002 -48.413 0.000
VARRET 0.040 0.001 30.680 0.000 VARRET -0.003 0.001 -3.034 0.002
WT 0.005 0.001 3.346 0.001 WT -0.015 0.001 -13.995 0.000
AR(1) 1.424 0.024 58.479 0.000 AR(1) 1.571 0.028 56.144 0.000
AR(2) -0.430 0.024 -17.954 0.000 AR(2) -0.575 0.028 -20.875 0.000
MA(1) -0.732 0.019 -39.397 0.000 MA(1) -0.919 0.030 -30.651 0.000
MA(2) 0.098 0.017 5.669 0.000
C 0.000 0.000 12.638 0.000
ARCH(1) 0.086 0.006 13.441 0.000 C 0.001 0.000 38.805 0.000
GARCH(1) 0.607 0.029 21.270 0.000 ARCH(1) 0.276 0.010 27.168 0.000
(RESID< 0)*ARCH(1) -0.042 0.012 -3.599 0.000
R-squared 0.944     Mean dependent var -0.044 GARCH(1) 0.307 0.014 22.049 0.000
Adjusted R-squared 0.944     S.D. dependent var 0.148
S.E. of regression 0.035     Akaike info criterion -3.898 R-squared 0.885     Mean dependent var -0.013
Sum squared resid 10.246     Schwarz criterion -3.890 Adjusted R-squared 0.885     S.D. dependent var 0.117
Log likelihood 16286.180     F-statistic 15520.430 S.E. of regression 0.040     Akaike info criterion -3.728
Durbin-Watson stat 1.978     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 Sum squared resid 27.398     Schwarz criterion -3.723
Log likelihood 32139.830     F-statistic 12001.370
Inverted AR Roots 0.990 0.430 Durbin-Watson stat 1.914     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000
Inverted MA Roots 0.730
Inverted AR Roots 0.990 0.580
Inverted MA Roots 0.800 0.120
       Variance Equation
       Variance Equation
Table 2.10.15.A: Relation betweenthe ratio of quoted spread from the
WAS file (QHS_WAS) and the cumulated volume imbalance in
absolute terms during the first period under study .
Table 2.10.15.B: Relation betweenthe ratio of quoted spread from the
WAS file (QHS_WAS) and the cumulated volume imbalance in
absolute terms during the second period under study .
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APPENDIX 2.11.1: Analysis of a time series 
 
After running the regression analysis I controlled that all the hypothesis concerning the model 
hold. In checking for the serial correlation, there are two limitations: the Durbin Watson statistics 
can only be used, if there is no lagged dependent variable on the right hand side of my 
regression. And, on the other hand, only the null hypothesis of no serial correlation against the 
alternative first order serial correlation can be tested. In order to overcome these limitations, I 
also performed the Q-statistics and the Breusch-Godfrey Lagrange multiplier test. The null 
hypothesis of this latter is that there is no serial correlation up to the specified order. The Q-
statistics allows to perform autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation functions of the residuals, 
together with the Ljung-Box Q-statistics for high order serial correlation. If there is no serial 
correlation in the residuals, the autocorrelation and the partial autocorrelation (hereafter PAC) at 
all lags should be nearly zero, and all Q-statistics should be insignificant with large p-values. This 
was verified for all the regressions. The Marquardt algorithm was used to estimate the correct 
ARMA specification. For AR models, the R2, the standard error of regression and the Durbin 
Watson statistic were based on the one-period forecast38. The general AR(p) process is 
represented by the following equation: 
( ) tt2t21t1tt y...yyy:pAR ε+γ++γ+γ+µ= ρ−ρ−−  
For a stationary AR(1) model, the p lies between –1 and +1. The stationarity condition for 
general AR(p) processes is that the inverted roots of the log polynomial lies inside the unit circle. 
In my regression analysis, I report also these roots as inverted AR roots at the bottom of the 
regression. There is no particular problem if the roots are imaginary, but a stationary AR model 
should have all roots with a residual less than one. 
The most widely used models for estimating AR models are the Cochrane-Orcutt, Prais-
Winston, Hatanaka and Hildreth-Lu procedures. All these approaches suffer from important 
drawbacks, which occur when working with models containing lagged dependent variables as 
regressors, or with models using high order AR specifications. Instead, a non-linear regression 
technique is used. Note that non-linear least square estimates are asymptotically equivalent to 
maximum likelihood estimates, and are asymptotically efficient. The coefficients are estimated by 
the Marquardt non-linear least squares algorithm. In the ARMA model, the MA term 
corresponds to the moving average. A moving average forecasting model uses lagged values of 
the forecast error to improve the current forecast as reported by the following equation: 
 
( ) qtq2t21t1tt ...y:qMA −−− εθ++εθ+εθ+ε=  
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Therefore the general ARMA (ρ, q) model is expressed as follows: 
( ) qtq2t21t1tt2t21t1tt ...y...yyy:q,pARMA −−−ρ−ρ−− εθ++εθ+εθ+ε+γ++γ+γ+µ=  
In order to decide what kind of ARMA model to use, I looked at the autocorrelation and the 
PAC function. If the autocorrelation function dies off smoothly at a geometric rate and the PAC 
is zero after one lag, then a first order autoregressive model is appropriate. Alternatively, if the 
autocorrelations are zero after one lag and partial autocorrelation (PAC) declines geometrically, a 
first order moving average process would seem appropriate. If the autocorrelations appear like a 
wavy cyclical pattern, this would suggest the presence of a seasonal ARMA structure. 
The Akaike Information criterion (smaller values of the AIC are preferred) and the Schwartz 
criterion (an alternative to the AIC imposing a larger penalty for additional coefficients) provide 
also a guideline for the appropriate lag order selection. The theory behind ARMA estimation is 
based on a stationary time series. A series is said to be stationary if the mean and the 
autocovariance of the series does not depend on time. I checked whether my series is stationary 
or not, before using it on regression. The formal method to test the stationarity of a series is the 
unit root test. I performed two tests: the Dickey-Fuller (and Augmented Dickey-Fuller) and the 
Phillips-Perron test (PP test). 
The Dickey-Fuller (DF) test considers first an AR(1) process: 
t1tt ypy ε++µ= −  
where µ and p are parameters and ε is assumed to be white noise. yt is a stationary series, if –
1<p<1. If p=1, it is a nonstationary series (a random walk with drift). From the point where the 
process is started, the variance of y increases steadily with time and goes to infinity. If the 
absolute value of ρ is greater than one, the series is explosive. Therefore, the hypothesis of a 
stationary series can be evaluated by testing whether the absolute value of p is strictly less than 
one. The DF test is valid only if the series is an AR(1) process. If the series is correlated in the 
presence of higher order lags, the assumption of white noise disturbances is violated. The ADF 
and PP tests use different methods to check for higher-order serial correlation in the series. The 
ADF test makes a parametric correction for higher order correlation by assuming that the y series 
follows an AR(p) process and adjusting the test methodology. 
The PP test proposes a non-parametric method of controlling for higher order serial 
correlation series. While the ADF test corrects for higher order serial correlation by adding 
lagged differenced terms, the PP makes a correction to t-statistic of the y coefficient from the 
AR(1) regression in order to account for the serial correlation in ε. The correction is non-
parametric, since an estimate of the spectrum of ε at frequency zero is used which is robust to 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of unknown forms. This procedure uses the Newey-West 
heteroskedasticity autocorrelation consistent estimate. 
                                                                                                                                                        
38 These residuals are the errors that you would observe if you made a prediction of the value of yt using 
contemporaneous information, but ignoring the information contained in the lagged residual. 
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Both the Augmented Dickey-Fuller and the Phillips-Perron tests take the unit root as the null 
hypothesis H0: p=1. Since explosive series do not make much economic sense, this null hypothesis is 
tested against the one-sided alternative H0: p <1. The null hypothesis of a unit root (p=1) is 
rejected in favour of a one-sided alternative (p<1), if the t-statistic is significantly less than the 
critical value. Considering my series, the null hypothesis of a unit root is always rejected, i.e. my 
series are stationary. In fact, the statistics are largely below the MacKinnon critical value. It is 
therefore possible to use the ARMA models.I checked also for the multicollinearity, carrying out 
the collinearity test (Variance Inflation Test). The results were negative. 
The Jarque-Bera statistic was used to test whether the standardized residuals are normally 
distributed. If the standardized residuals are normally distributed, the Jarque-Bera statistic should 
not be significant. In some cases, the distribution of the residuals is not normal according to the 
Jarque-Bera test, but my estimates are nevertheless consistent under quasi-maximum likelihood 
assumptions. 
In order to model and forecast conditional variances, I specifically used the Autoregressive 
Conditional Heteroskedasticity (ARCH) models. In this case, the variance of the dependent 
variable is modeled as a function of past values of the dependent variable and of the independent 
or exogenous variable. ARCH models were introduced by Engle (1982), and generalized as 
GARCH by Bollersev (1986). For the ARCH model one has to consider two distinct 
specifications: one for the conditional mean and one for the conditional variance. 
The GARCH equation is formed by a mean equation, written as a function of exogenous 
variables with an error term, and by a conditional variance equation which is a function of three 
terms: the mean, the news about volatility from the previous period, measured as the lag of the 
squared residual from the mean equation (ARCH term), and, finally, the forecast variance 
(GARCH term) of the last period. The representation of the GARCH (p,q) variance is: 
∑∑
= −= −
σβ+εα+ω=σ
p
1j
jt
2
j
q
1i
it
2
it
2:)q,p(GARCH  
where p is the order of the GARCH terms and q is the order of the ARCH term. In the 
standard GARCH (1,1) specification: 
ttt xy ε+= γ    (1) 
1t
2
1t
2
t
2
−+− σβεα+ω=σ   (2) 
The mean equation given in (1) is written as a function of exogenous variables with an error 
term. Since t2σ  is the one period ahead forecast variance based on past information, it is called 
the conditional variance. The conditional variance equation, specified in (2) is a function of three 
terms: 
1. the mean ω  
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2. News about volatility from the previous period, measured as the lag of the squared 
residual from the mean equation, i.e., it2−ε  (the ARCH term). 
3. Last period’s forecast variance jt2−σ  (the GARCH term) 
Furthermore, the quasi-maximum likelihood covariance and standard errors were computed, 
using the methods described by Bollersev and Wooldridge (1992), because my residuals were not 
conditionally normally distributed. The ARCH parameters are, however, still consistent. The sum 
of the ARCH and GARCH coefficients are very close to one, indicating that the volatility shocks 
are quite persistent. 
The correlogram (autocorrelation and PAC) of the squared standardized residuals can be used 
to look for remaining ARCH in the variance equation and to check the specification of the 
variance equation. If the mean equation is correctly specified, all Q-statistics should be not 
significant. The Lagrange multiplier test (ARCH LM test) was used to test whether the 
standardized residuals exhibit additional ARCH. If the variance equation is correctly specified, 
there should be no ARCH left in the standardized residuals. 
Engle and Ng (1993) developed two models in order to consider also asymmetric shocks to 
volatility: TARCH and EGARCH. 
TARCH, or threshold ARCH, was introduced independently by Zakoian (1990) and Glosten, 
Jaganathan and Runkle (1993). The specification for the conditional variance is: 
 
1t
2
1t1t
2
1t
2
t
2 d −−−− σβ+εγ+εα+ω=σ  
 
Where dt = 1 if εt<0, and dt =0 otherwise. 
In this model, good news (εt >0) and bad news (εt <0) have differential effects on the 
conditional variance: good news has an impact of α, while bad news has an impact of α + γ. If 
γ>0, one can say that the leverage effect exists. This is obtained by the means of the dummy 
variable dt-1, which considers negative shocks in one of the two ARCH components. If γ ≠ 0, the 
news impact is asymmetric. The conditional variance includes also one-lagged conditional 
variance, σ2t-1 and a constant ω. The leverage effect term is represented by (RESID<0)*ARCH(1). 
For higher order specifications of the TARCH model the following equation is estimated: 
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APPENDIX 2.11.2: Intraday market liquidity indicators: Sixteen market liquidity indicators 
were used, namely effective half spread (EHS), quoted half spread (QHS), difference spread 
(DSPR), midquote (MID), quoted half spread from the WAS file (QHS_WAS)39, cumulated 
traded volume (SUMVOL), number of trades (NBTR), volume imbalance (VIMB), sum of 
volume imbalance in absolute terms (SABSVIMB), return (RET), return in absolute terms 
(ABSRET), volatility of return (VARRET), volatility measured as a log range (VOLA), waiting 
time (WT), liquidity ratio (LR), flow ratio (FR). Every proxy is measured on an intraday time 
period of 5 minutes. The ask price is labelled by Aski,j,t, the bid price Bidi,j,t, the binary variable 
that equals one for customer buy orders and negative one for customer sell orders by Di,j,t, the 
price by pi,j,t, the quantity traded by qi,j,t, the volume related to the best bid by VBuyi,j,t, the volume 
related to the best ask by VSelli,j,t, the maximum price within an intraday periods of five minutes 
by supi,j, the minimum price within an intraday period of five minutes by infi,j, the trade time 
during the day, i.e. the time when a transaction occur, by timei,j,t, and each transaction, 
independently of the quantity traded, by obsi,j,t. The intraday period of 5 minutes is labelled by i = 
1,…,96, (in the first period, and i = 1,…,102 in the second period), the day is indexed by j = 
1,…,J and the trade time during the i-5 minutes period by t = 1,…, n. 
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39 Note that QHS and QHS_WAS are calculated in the same manner, but QHS is obtained from the order data file, 
while QHS_WAS from the weighted average spread file. 
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The standardization of each time series was based on the daily mean and the daily variance of 
each individual stock. Let the stock be s = 1, …, 43 and, as before, the intraday periods of five 
minutes i = 1, …, 96 for the first period and i = 1,…,102 in the second period, while the day is 
indexed by j = 1, …, J. So, for instance, standardized cumulated trading volume, say SSUMVOL, 
for the stock s and the day j is: 
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The standardized market liquidity, i.e. the average for all the 43 index belonging to the CAC 40 
index, in terms of cumulated trading volume for the intraday time i and the trading day j is: 
 
 SSUMVOL
43
1AVERAGE_TOT
43
1s
s,j,ij,i ∑==          (18) 
 
The other 15 standardized proxies of intraday market liquidity are standardized and calculated 
following the same procedure. 
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APPENDIX 2.11.3: Intraday market variables. Six variables in the regression analysis of 
Section 2.6 and 2.7 are taken into account. These are the ratio of quoted bid-ask spread (RQHS), 
the ratio of the quoted bid-ask spread from the weighted average spread file (RQHS_WAS)20, the 
ratio of cumulated trading volume (RSUMVOL), the ratio of sum of volume imbalance in 
absolute terms (RSABSVIMB), the ratio of return volatility (RVARRET) and the ratio of the 
waiting time between subsequent trades (RWT). Every proxy is measured on an intraday time of 
5 minutes. Trading volume of each transaction is labelled by qi,j,t, price by pi,j,t, the ask price by 
Aski,j,t, the bid price by Bidi,j,t, the volume related to the best ask by VSelli,j,t, the volume related to 
the best bid by VBuyi,j,t and the trade time during the day, i.e. the time when a transaction occur, 
by timei,j,t,. The trading day is indexed by j = 1, ..., J, the intraday period of 5 minutes by i = 1, ..., 
96 (during the first period and i = 1,…,102 in the second period) and the trade time during the i-
5 minutes period by t = 1, ..., n. 
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20 cf. footnote 19. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
INTRADAY PUBLIC INFORMATION PATTERNS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.1 Abstract 
 
This chapter analyzes the intraday release of public 
information through one of the most important providers of 
economic and financial information: the Reuters News 2000 
Alert System. All types of public information released by the 
Reuters Terminal has been considered. All news items has 
been then classified into one of eight categories according to 
their nature: All alerts, market news, economic news, 
political news, industrial news, general news, corporate news 
and firm-specific news. The patterns of information arrival 
has been documented in terms of the number of news 
releases per 5 minutes, with an emphasis on the intraday 
flows. All these information proxies display a distinct 
intraday pattern, similar to the inverted U-shaped pattern 
previously found by Berry and Howe (1994). The types of 
news items are also documented by day of the week (Friday 
has the fewest) and month of the year (February has most). 
Higher market capitalization does not necessarily correlate 
with higher news coverage. 
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3.2. Introduction and literature review 
One of the most important issues in the efficiency market theory is the investors’ reaction to news 
arrival. This reaction leads to a change of the asset price, reflecting investors’ expectation of risk and 
return. The literature distinguishes between public information and private information (French and 
Roll, 1986). The former is related to the semi-strong form of the efficiency theory, and the latter to the 
strong form (Fama 1970). The semi-strong form considers the efficient adjustment to information that 
is publicly available (announcements of quarterly earnings, stock splits, dividends, and so on). In 
contrast, the strong form considers investors who have a monopolistic access to any information 
relevant for price formation. This chapter concentrates on public information, which corresponds to 
news that is publicly available to all market participants. This type of information is released mainly, but 
not exclusively, by the most important press agencies worldwide. The proliferation of Internet and of 
online brokers has made it possible, through different providers (Yahoo!, CBS market watch, Etrade, 
etc.), to get access to public information for all kind of investors, above all small investors. However, 
the interpretation, the quality (Veronesi 2000) and the timing of a news release play an important role in 
investment decisions, as investors assume increasingly more intraday positions instead of considering a 
longer investment horizon. 
It seems to be evident that not all the released information leads to a revision of investors’ 
expectations about the future payoffs of a stock. Investors are flooded every day, every minute and in 
some cases every few seconds with a variety of information: corporations earnings reports, revisions of 
macroeconomic indexes, statements by policy makers and political news. Investors, in order to update 
their projections of the future growth rate of the economy and interest rate, process these pieces of 
information. In turn, these changes in projections affect investment decisions. How is the behaviour of 
this news during the trading day, i.e. when is information mainly released during the day, the week and 
the year? Is it possible to differentiate news types by a specific category? Does an intraday pattern of 
news, like the one previously found for intraday market liquidity, exist? Which is most frequently news 
released? Do big companies receive greater coverage? These are only some of the questions I shall try to 
answer in this chapter by analysing public information. There are not many studies in the literature that 
found a distinct intraday news pattern, and I hope that my contribution to this extremely important 
issue in finance will shed new light on the behaviour of public information during the day. 
Berry and Howe (1994), using intraday returns, trading volume calculated on the S&P 500 index and 
the overall flow of intraday public information obtained and estimated by the Reuter’s News Service, 
during the period May 1990-April 1991, found an intraday news pattern. They studied an intraday 
periods of half an hour, which is probably too long, in order to establish a relation with market activity. 
In contrast to my approach, they mix macro news and firm-specific news, a solution which in my 
opinion may not be optimal. The authors develop a measure of public information flow to financial 
markets, and use it for documenting the patterns of information arrival. Their measure is the number of 
news released by Reuters’s News Service per unit of time. They found that public information arrival is 
nonconstant, displaying seasonalities and distinct intraday patterns. In particular, they found that public 
information arrival exhibits an inverted U-shaped pattern across trading days. 
Thompson, Olsen and Dietrich (1987) also focus on public information. Their database consists 
of announcements concerning firms quoted on the NYSE and on the AMEX. The period under 
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investigation is the year 1983, and their provider is the Wall Street Journal. They found that larger 
firms and certain industries receive greater coverage, and that the number of announcements 
varies across days of the week and month of the year. Monday and December have the fewest 
announcements. Special types of news items (earnings and dividends) are also documented by 
the day of the week and month of the year. Earnings and dividends stories are much more 
present than other news, and they exhibit patterns related to quarterly announcements. This 
research has been considered important for its interday evolution of public information. 
In a related article, Mitchell and Mulherin (1994) used a “distinctive proxy” for information: the 
number of announcements released daily by the Dow Jones & Company. Although they recognize 
that their source of information may be imperfect concerning of the overall information available to 
market participants, they nevertheless consider this measure more comprehensive that the one 
previously used. Via a sample of macroeconomic and firm-specific news announcements, they noted 
a seasonal pattern in the information flow by month, by day of the week and for holidays. For the full 
sample, April has the largest number of announcements per day, while December has the smallest 
number per day. They conclude that the variability across months is partially due to the financial 
reporting cycle. The average number of news announcements by day of the week shows an increase 
through Thursday and then tapers off sharply on Friday. They also found that the number of 
announcements is significantly lower on days before and after market holidays. The day-of-the-
week behaviour of the Dow Jones announcements resembles the reported patterns in stock 
market trading activity (Jain and Joh 1988, Lakonishok and Maberly, 1990). 
Similarities between intraday liquidity patterns and regularities of news release have also been 
reported in such early studies as Rozeff and Kinney (1976), who conjecture that the abnormal 
stock returns in January might stem from an above average amount of information production 
by firms at the turn of the year. Atkins and Basu (1991), Berry and Howe (1994), Niederhoffer 
(1971), Penman (1987), Thompson, Olsen and Dietrich (1987) and Change and Taylor (1995), 
among others, found the same. Patterns in intraday news release, such as big New York Times 
front page headlines, the daily number of stories in the Wall Street Journal, the number of news 
items that appear in Reuters News Service, and seasonalities in earnings announcements, mirror 
many of the observed regularities in financial markets. Macroeconomic and government 
announcements have been related to market volatility patterns, for example by Ederington and 
Lee (1993), Harvey and Huang (1991) and French, Leftwich and Uhrig (1989). In particular, 
Ederington and Lee (1993) gave a description of intraday news patterns, within a 5 minutes 
periods, for the most important monthly macroeconomic news announcements (unemployment, 
price producer index, consumer producer index, and so on). However, pattern in news 
announcements does not explain the day of the week seasonalities in market activity. 
On the other hand, Damodaran (1989) found a day of the week pattern in the information 
content of dividend and earnings announcements, resembling that of stock return. Roll (1988) 
found a similar result, but he was using stories in the financial press. 
Similar to Berry and Howe (1994), Gay and Mohorovic (1999), using the Reuters Business 
Briefing (hereafter RBB) provider for the Swiss market, found analogous weekly pattern in the 
sense that general macroeconomic and market news are significantly more numerous on 
Tuesdays and Thursdays. The behaviour of firm-specific news is different. Stories are most 
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numerous on Mondays; their number gradually decreases through the week and rises again on 
Fridays. Firm-specific news shows the traditional intraday U-shaped pattern, whereas general 
news seems to follow an inverted U-shaped pattern across trading days. They also noted that 
cross-listed companies receive more attention and generate more news than firms listed on a 
single exchange, finding, in this manner, results similar to Baker, Nofsinger and Weaver (1998). 
Harvey and Huang (1991, 1992) observed that many macroeconomic announcements occur 
during the first hour of trading on Thursdays and Fridays. Ederington and Lee (1993) support 
this observation, based on nineteen announcements whose upcoming release is regularly covered 
in The Week Ahead section of Business Week. 
Juergens (1999), during the period 1993-1996, compiled the date and time stamps from the 
Dow Jones News Wire (DJNW) articles in order to examine the impact of news announcements. 
Unlike Berry and Howe (1994), she found that intra-trading day patterns of news announcements 
exhibit the well-known U-shaped pattern for her sample. One possible explanation for the 
difference between her results and those of Berry and Howe (1994) is that she uses a different 
sample (DJNW vs. Reuters) and examines a later time period. She shows a similar U-shaped 
pattern for investment recommendations. Similar to the findings in Berry and Howe (1994), she 
noticed that a significant portion of news announcements occurs after the close of trading. 
Juergens (1999) explains by the tendency of firms to make announcements after the close of the 
market. The intraday trading hour patterns of recommendations and news announcements 
exhibit again the classical U-shaped pattern. 
Atkins and Basu (1995), who had reported on news stories on the Dow Jones News Service 
(Broadtape) related to 400 randomly selected firms on the NYSE during 1984, made another 
study examining public information. They claim that this type of information is essentially the 
same as that on all the various news wire services, and is time stamped to the minute of the 
information release. Smirlock and Starks (1985, 1988) and Patell and Wolfson (1984) also used 
this data set. Atkins and Basu’s (1995) patterns of intraday announcement show that before 08:00 
a.m. and after 06:30 p.m. there are less than four announcements for any 15-minute periods, 
whereas during the trading day there is an average of more than 200 announcements per 15 
minutes period. The maximum number is reached between 11:45 a.m. and noon, and, in contrast, 
the minimum number occurs between 01:15 p.m. and 01:30 p.m.. The most striking observation 
is made just after the market close, when the average number of announcements is nearly two 
and a half times the average number that occurs while the market is open. It seems that 
companies frequently prefer to make public announcements when the market is closed, and 
particularly right after the market closes (Atkins and Basu, 1995 and Juergens, 1999). This result 
seems to be evident for the US market. On the contrary, in Europe (Swiss, French and German 
markets), companies usually release, information such as earnings announcements before the 
market opens. In their firm-specific sample, Atkins and Basu (1995) also examine the time 
pattern of public announcements, focusing on time periods after the market closes. They 
conclude that, for firms making announcements after the close, trading in their shares exhibits an 
excess volume just before the close as well as on the following opening. 
Nofsinger (2001), using firm-specific news releases in the Wall Street Journal and 
macroeconomic announcements during the period 1 November 1990 through 31 January 1991, 
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found that the number of articles for each day is very similar for Monday through Thursday. The 
number then increases on Fridays. This is consistent with the end-of-the-week bias found by 
Thompson, Olsen and Dietrich (1987), although Mitchell and Mulherin (1994) saw the largest 
number of news releases to occur on Mondays. The number of articles published in Nofsinger’s 
(2001) study, during November, December and January show the smallest number in December, 
which is consistent with Thompson et al. (1987). 
Chang and Taylor (1996), in an approach similar to mine, divide news items into five 
categories according to their nature. They also count the number of headlines reported by 
Reuters within a fixed period of time and apply five intraday periods: one hour, 30 minutes, 15 
minutes and 5 minutes across the businees week. Their news categories are as follows: first, they 
extract the US scheduled macroeconomic news following the Ederington and Lee (1993, 1995) 
approach. Second, through the utilization of key words they extract German macroeconomic 
news. Third and fourth, information related to the Bundesbank’s monetary policy instruments, 
and, respectively, the US Federal Reserve’s monetary policy are extracted. The last category 
corresponds to the global flow of information obtained through the 1st to the 4th subgroup. The 
authors found that US macroeconomic news and US Federal Reserve news items are higher than 
the German Bundesbank news. Monday has the lowest number of news releases, and Thursday 
the highest. The highest news activity is during the trading day, when also stocks are traded and 
not only currency. 
Melvin and Yin (1998) measured the public information arrival using the Reuters Money-
Market Headline News from December 1, 1993 to April 26, 1995. They considered the total 
news flow rather than selecting certain types of news. The basic unit of time used in their analysis 
is one hour. The average hourly number of reported news events on the Reuters screen for the 
business week shows a distinct intraday day seasonality where news events climb to a daily peak 
the morning in Europe and when the European and North American markets overlap. Clearly, 
public information largely arrives during business hours in each region. 
Ranaldo (2002) also addresses the question of whether news arrivals have an intraday 
seasonality. He shows that index-related news occur mostly around openings and closings. For 
the firm-specific news, i.e. regarding companies quoted on the CAC 40 index, he does not find 
any clear patterns. The 01:30 p.m. to 02:00 p.m. interval seems, however, to be the period when 
the fewest news are released. 
From the literature one cannot draw any congruent conclusion about intraday news patterns 
because of the heterogeneity or, in some cases, homogeneity of the news and of providers whom 
the authors considered in approaching the public information issue. They do not make any clear 
distinction between themes, or they limit themselves to few subjects. I shall try to overcome this 
lack of agreement among researchers by considering the whole flow of public information 
received by the market participants and dividing it into different categories according to its 
nature. 
The data and methodology used in this study will be described in Section 3.3, whereas the 
results will be discussed in Section 3.4. The conclusions will be drawn in section 3.5. You will 
find the corresponding graphs and tables in section 3.6 and 3.7 respectively. 
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3.3 Data and methodology 
 
The data used for this study was obtained from the Reuters News 2000 alert system. It 
consists of the most important news released during a one-year period (December 1, 1999 to 
November 30, 2000) over the full 24-hour day. All the subgroups (see Table 3.7.7), were then 
assigned to one of the following eight categories: All alerts, Political news, Market news, 
Economic news, Industrial news, Corporate news, Firm-specific news and General news. 
All alerts represents the headlines of important news that is immediately released by the 
Reuters terminal without a detailed article, which usually follows a few minutes later. This 
category may correspond to the hot stories published by the Bloomberg terminal, but in reality 
Reuters considers a vaster range of news. Bloomberg publishes only those news items which may 
have an influence on market activity and are related to the most important blue chips worldwide 
as well as to macroeconomic indicators. Both Reuters and Bloomberg can be considered as a mix 
of the most significant news of each category and subgroup. But Reuters, is a news provider 
which had been considered also in previous studies as a data source for public information flow, 
because as Berry and Howe (1994) say, “it provides market participants with a timely source of 
information on news stories that impact financial markets”. One criticism of Reuters is that it is 
not a completely public source of information, since access to it is not free. But considering its 
strength in the financial information field, it can be reasonably retained as a valid source of public 
information. Moreover, it can be assumed that the vast majority of market participants have this 
or a similar information system at their disposal. Berry and Howe (1994) also underline that 
market participants use this news service on a regular basis, along with the Dow Jones News 
Service and perhaps a few other news wires, as a prime source for economic decision-making. 
Political news is a category where one can find all sorts of news related to political activities 
(politics, diplomatic affairs, elections and so on) worldwide.  However, if one wants to know 
something about the general market activity (for example commodities, bonds and forex) one 
would check the market news category. All the macroeconomic indicators (gross domestic 
products, interest rates, central bank decisions, inflation, money supply and so on) of all 
countries in the world can be found in the economic news category. Industrial news include 
firms sectors such as automobiles, aerospace, chemicals and others, which can be found in detail 
in Table 3.7.7. The Corporate news category includes news about companies, earnings, dividends 
and ratings worldwide. In contrast to this last group, where all firms are covered, in the Firm-
specific news category only such news items are considered which strictly concern firms 
belonging to the CAC 40 index during the one-year period under study. In the last group, the 
General news, the rest of public information is examined, which cannot be classified within the 
other seven categories. Sport, crime and religion are only few examples of items which belong to 
this category. For each category, I made different subgroups (see Table 3.7.7). Only All alerts 
does not have a subgroup. 
I am aware that this classification may be a little subjective, but it has been established 
following some distinction already made by Reuters in their Reuters Business Briefing 3000 
(hereafter RBB) programme used for the daily news. But RBB proceeds to a categorization that is 
not suitable for intraday news, resulting, in some cases, in a subjective analysis. In order to find 
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out into which category news item falls, I applied certain criteria concerning their importance. 
Reuters News Services have been used in previous studies and have proven their reliability. The 
RBB allows to distinguish different news categories (macroeconomic, corporate and so on) and 
stories released in French, English or German. I retain, in my intraday analysis, only public 
information released in English. 
The release procedure by press and federal agencies is best explained by Ederington and Lee 
(1993, 1995), Thompson, Olsen and Dietrich (1987) and Patell and Wolfson (1982). The release 
is distributed to reporter (about 30 minutes prior to the scheduled release time) because of the 
“need for timely access”. During that half hour, reporters have time to tape the headline and the 
news story they want to put into their computers or pick up the phone one minute before the 
deadline. However, until the scheduled release time the phone lines are dead. Then the stories hit 
the wires and are displayed on the boards on the floor of the exchanges within a few seconds. 
As shown in Appendix 3.7.7, each category includes different subgroups. For these 
subgroups, a keyword combination exists in order to list all relevant news. The number of news 
items containing specified keyword combinations during each five minutes period is my measure 
of news arrival. The lists of news categories, the list of subgroups, the number of news items and 
examples for each news category are reported in Table 3.7.7, 3.7.1, 3.7.2 and 3.7.8. When repeats 
of news items occur, I keep only one and delete the subsequent, but only if time and date 
correspond to the original one. On the other hand, if the headlines are repeated but the release 
time is different, I keep both. This procedure is different from the one previously used by 
DeGennaro and Shrieves (1997), but in my view the release of the same news at different times 
may not just be an update, but a signal of the importance of a headline. In other aspects too, my 
approach is different from DeGennaro and Shrieves (1997). They classified news into one 
category only, so that no item appears more than once in the sample. In my sample, instead, one 
news item can fall into one or more categories. For example, if I consider a news item related to 
the Renault company, this headline will fall into the Firm-specific news category and into the 
Industrial news category (subgroup automobile). 
A complete list of the news items is available from the author. To my knowledge, no other 
extant research has considered such a broad range of news. 
By taping a key word for each news category (see Table 3.7.7 for some key words), I obtain 
the exact date and time of the headline release and of the history behind it (see Appendix 3.7.8 
for some examples). This investigations like the one in Chapter 2, concerns the French market 
and in particular the 39 stocks belonging to the CAC40 index between December 1, 1999 and 
November 30, 2000. In contrast to Chapter 2 I left out 4 shares due to technical problems40. As 
my analysis focuses on the French market, also intraday news patterns related to that country are 
                                                 
40 The Reuters terminal used to record one year of intraday news proved to be quite unstable. The terminal 
contained a maximum of 6 months of historical data until the end of the year 2000, when Reuters decided to reduce 
this period to 5 months without providing additional information to their customers. This caused a 1½ month lack 
of data collection depending on the news category considered. I show the results of this period, but I do not 
consider them for my general conclusions. Unlike in other studies, I did not replace the missing observations by the 
sample mean. 
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shown. The procedure is the same as previously explained, except for the addition of the 
abbreviation FR at the end of each keyword. 
Reuters' news is recorded in Greenwich Mean Time (GMT). For the purpose of identifying 
regional business hours of the French market, I adjusted my sample by adding 1 hour to all news 
recorded in order to have public information expressed in Central European Time (CET). 
I decided to show intraday news patterns by day of the week and month of the year, as well as 
the global flow of public information for news related or not to the French market for all the 
eight categories, within which the news items are grouped according to their nature. Also 
calculated, but not reported, is the intraday public information pattern for news relevant for 
business hours of trading only, and for the 256 business days. For this last pattern, all news 
before and after the trading hours were left out, i.e. before 9:00 o’clock and after 17:00 until 
March 31, 2000, and after 17:30 since April 1, 2000. The number of news headlines, as in 
previous studies (Melvin and Xin 1995, 1998, Chang and Taylor 1996, and Berry and Howe 
1994) can be considered as a measure of the arrival of public information. The average number 
of observations per day (for a total of 366 days) is reported. I also checked for significant mean 
changes between two consecutive time periods, but this will be presented in the empirical results 
section 3.4. 
For the Firm-specific news, only intraday patterns of purely Firm-specific news are 
documented, i.e. without the ones related to the CAC index. For this purpose, words such as 
CAC40, CAC or index in the headline were identified, and those items were not included into the 
Firm-specific category. This procedure is similar to that adopted by Ranaldo (2002). In particular 
Alcatel news (Figure 3.6.8), France Telecom (Figure 3.6.9), Vivendi (Figure 3.6.10) and Total 
Fina (Figure 3.6.11) are reported. 
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3.4 Empirical results 
 
The eight categories selected provide an overview of the information flow, and their 
respective patterns highlight interesting results. Collecting each story per news item, per 5 
minutes period, I collected 3’679’721 observations for the global flow of information, and 
235’518 for French related news during one year. 
Tables 3.7.1 and 3.7.2 display data organized by month of the year, by day of the week and the 
global flow of information. From Table 3.7.1 it is evident that information related to the French 
market is highest during the month of March in seven of eight categories. Only in the Economic 
news category it is highest in September. I left out the data for June, July and August from the 
analysis due to technical problems registered in the Reuters Terminal, because they do not allow 
a comparison with other months. Considering the remaining months, for the global flow of 
information of each category (not French related) it is very difficult to draw any conclusion. In 
three cases, namely Market, General and Corporate news, November shows the highest number 
of information, in two cases (All alerts and Industrial news) this happened in May, in other two 
cases in February (Political news and news concerning CAC40 stocks) and one in March 
(Economic news). It is difficult to explain such an irregular pattern, but one can say that the 
majority of news is reported two months after the end of a quarter. Considering the overall 
information flow, news release is highest in February and March for that related to France, which 
is different from what Mitchell and Mulherin (1994) found, namely most occur in April. The 
reason for this discrepancy may be the time period considered and, above all, the different 
provider. In contrast to their results, I found that public information is lowest in December for 
All alerts, Political, General and Corporate, in January for Industrial, in April for Market and 
Economic news and in December for the CAC 40 stocks. In my approach, one has to bear in 
mind that April has the fewest trading days (only 18 trading days), whereas March and August 
(not considered in general conclusion) have most (23 trading days each). 
Overall, the total number of news (French related and non-) is smallest in December. This 
result is similar to that of Thompson et al. (1987) and Mitchell and Mulherin (1994). Table 3.7.2 
shows the overall information flow by day of the week. Also in this case, interesting features 
emerge. First, during the business week, news is concentrated on Wednesday (All alerts, Political, 
General, Economic and Corporate news), with the exception of Market news (on Thursdays), 
and Industrial news (on Tuesday). For the French related news, public information is always 
much more concentrated on Thursdays, which also in other studies is the heaviest day. Among 
them are Mitchell and Mulherin (1994) and Gay and Mohorovic (1999) for macroeconomic and 
market news, and Harvey and Huang (1991, 1992) for macroeconomic news. 
The information release is light on Friday (All alerts, Industrial, General, Economic and 
Corporate) and on Monday (Political news and Market news). This distribution between days of the 
week is also evident for the French market. The result is similar to Berry and Howe (1994) who 
found that Mondays and Fridays are light compared with the other trading days, especially, like in my 
case, with Wednesday for not French related news and Thursday for French related news (see also 
the total flow of information). Considering the whole week, the overall news flow is lowest on 
Sunday, and on Saturday for French related subjects. Chang and Taylor (1995) found results similar 
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to mine. In fact, news is light on Monday and heavy on Thursday. But Gay and Mohorovic (1999) 
saw a decrease from Monday to Thursday, and then an increase on Friday for firm-specific news (U-
shaped pattern). Table 3.7.10 to 3.7.16 report tests of equality (mean, median and variance) between 
days of the week and months of the year. The results show that the null hypothesis of equality 
between days of the week and months of the year can be rejected in most cases. 
Tables 3.7.3 to 3.7.6 show various situations concerning the 39 stocks belonging to the CAC 
40 index during the one-year period under study. 
Table 3.7.4 ranks the companies according to the total number of news released about them. 
France Telecom received the greatest coverage, and news on them is particularly concentrated 
during the month of July, but less so in January. On the bottom side I found Bic, for which the 
total number of news was only 15. These tables also show the evolution of public information by 
month of the year. However in my general conclusion, I shall omit September and October 
(although they occur in the Tables), because of the above-mentioned problem related to the 
Reuters Terminal. Table 3.7.6 gives a classification by market capitalization. The results seems to 
show that there is no a strict relation between market capitalization and the number of news 
released, even if in some rare cases the opposite seems to be true as for France Telecom. The 
intraday evolution in each category provides further interesting results. 
As already demonstrated by other studies (Atkins and Basu, 1995 and Ranaldo, 2002), news is 
much more concentrated, for each category, around the opening (1-2 hours before), at around 
14:30, when the majority of US macroeconomic news is released, at the closing of European 
stock market and last at around 22:00, when also the US market closes. Information is light 
during the Asian trading hours, even though some peaks can occur. Intraday evolution is also 
calculated and showed, for All Alerts news, by month of the year, by day of the week and by 
business trading hours. The latter case is not shown. In all these cases, seasonalities are strictly 
correlated, and no major changes are seen. The inverted U-shaped pattern, shown in other 
studies, is much more pronounced for the French market, and the decrease after the market close 
is very sharp. Figures 3.6.1 to 3.6.20 show the intraday pattern of each category41 of public 
information considered in this study (French related and non-). T-tests for each liquidity proxy 
are shown in Tables 3.7.9.A to 3.7.9.G. 
Political news, which exhibit an inverted U-shape pattern, is almost constant during trading 
hours but show two big increases outside the trading hours: one at 07:30 a.m. and the other one 
hour later. On the contrary, French related news show three peaks after the market closure. 
Market news exhibits an inverted U-shaped pattern only in the afternoon of trading hours 
when the news is highest, mainly between 14:30 and 16:00 o’clock. During this period, US 
macroeconomic indicators are made public and the pre-opening of the US market begins. 
For the French Market news I observed an increasing trend until 17:30 when the market 
closes. This seems to be logical if one looks at the subgroups included in this category. These 
seasonalities of the French related news are always present also in the other categories, with the 
only exception of Economic news, where this trend is not so evident. Industrial news are light 
                                                 
41 For the firm-specific news category, the graphs of Alcatel, France Telecom, Vivendi and Total Fina are shown. 
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compared to the other categories, mainly during the first hours of trading. General news is higher 
during the whole day, but a lull occurs in the early morning. 
In conclusion one can say that investors are flooded with many news items, which may or 
may not have an impact on their expectations of the future payoff of a stock. Since this flow 
arrives continuously also before the beginning of the trading day, investors can include all these 
news items into their analysis. 
CHAPTER 3 – Intraday public information patterns 
  
  
 163 
3.5. Conclusions 
 
In chapter 3 a measure of intraday public information flow was presented, which considers, 
always with respect to the French Stock exchange, the number of news items released by the 
Reuters 2000 Alert System during a one-year period. In the first part, each news item is 
categorized according to its nature. This procedure leads to the creation of eight major categories 
containing various subgroups. The categories are: All alerts, Political news, Market news, 
Industrial news, Economic news, Corporate news, Firm-specific news and General news. All 
alerts, which is a combination of the most important headlines for all categories, represents the 
vast majority of news per unit of time. Depending on the category chosen, the news flow varies 
by month of the year and by day of the week. Overall, the information release is mostly 
concentrated on February and March for the French related news items. For both, French news 
and non-, news flow is lightest in December. 
The day with the lightest overall information flow is Friday, whereas the heaviest is 
Wednesday. Concerning the public information released for the French market, Monday is the 
lightest and Thursday the heaviest. 
The coverage of the CAC 40 stocks, expressed as the number of firm-specific news, shows 
that market capitalization is not strictly related to this news flow. One of the few exceptions is 
the biggest blue chip, France Telecom, which during my period analysis released the highest 
number of news and is well positioned also in the analysis by month of the year. Most of the 
other stocks show no such a correlation between capitalization and news publication. 
In the second part of chapter 3, intraday news patterns are presented by category, day of the 
week, month and business hour. My results show that the total public information flow follows 
an inverted U-shaped pattern, especially during the afternoon of trading days. For the France 
related news, I observed an increasing trend until the end of the exchange session, and afterwards 
a clear decrease, but similar to an inverted U-shape. In my opinion, it will be interesting for 
future research to deepen the analysis by considering contemporaneously also other providers, 
such as the Bloomberg terminal, which is much used by financial analysts and portfolio 
managers. My conclusions may stimulate a broader debate concerning the role of public 
information in investment decisions. In the next section I shall try to analyse whether there is any 
relation between the flow of public information and market liquidity. 
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FIGURE 3.6.1: Average number of All alerts news observations by time of the day: This 
figure shows the average intraday information flow of All alerts news during a one year period 
(December 1, 1999 – November 30, 2000) for all trading days by time of the day in five-minutes 
segments. On the horizontal axis there are 288 intervals of five minutes each (corresponding to 
one day) and on the vertical axis there are the average number of observations. 
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FIGURE 3.6.2: Average number of Political news observations by time of the day: This 
figure shows the average intraday information flow of Political news during a one year period 
(December 1, 1999 – November 30, 2000) for all trading days by time of the day in five-minutes 
segments. On the horizontal axis there are 288 intervals of five minutes each (corresponding to 
one day) and on the vertical axis there are the average number of observations. 
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FIGURE 3.6.3: Average number of Market news observations by time of the day: This 
figure shows the average intraday information flow of Market news during a one year period 
(December 1, 1999 – November 30, 2000) ) for all trading days by time of the day in five-
minutes segments. On the horizontal axis there are 288 intervals of five minutes each 
(corresponding to one day) and on the vertical axis there are the average number of observations. 
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FIGURE 3.6.4: Average number of Industrial news observations by time of the day: This 
figure shows the average intraday information flow of Industrial news during a one year period 
(December 1, 1999 – November 30, 2000) for all trading days by time of the day in five-minutes 
segments. On the horizontal axis there are 288 intervals of five minutes each (corresponding to 
one day) and on the vertical axis there are the average number of observations. 
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FIGURE 3.6.5: Average number of General news observations by time of the day: This 
figure shows the average intraday information flow of General news during a one year period 
(December 1, 1999 – November 30, 2000) for all trading days by time of the day in five-minutes 
segments. On the horizontal axis there are 288 intervals of five minutes each (corresponding to 
one day) and on the vertical axis there are the average number of observations. 
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FIGURE 3.6.6: Average number of Economic news observations by time of the day: This 
figure shows the average intraday information flow of Economic news during a one year period 
(December 1, 1999 – November 30, 2000) for all trading days by time of the day in five-minutes 
segments. On the horizontal axis there are 288 intervals of five minutes each (corresponding to 
one day) and on the vertical axis there are the average number of observations. 
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FIGURE 3.6.7: Average number of Corporate news observations by time of the day: This 
figure shows the average intraday information flow of Corporate news during a one year period 
(December 1, 1999 – November 30, 2000) for all trading days by time of the day in five-minutes 
segments. On the horizontal axis there are 288 intervals of five minutes each (corresponding to 
one day) and on the vertical axis there are the average number of observations. 
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FIGURE 3.6.8: Average number of Alcatel news observations by time of the day: This 
figure shows the average intraday information flow of Alcatel news during a one year period 
(December 1, 1999 – November 30, 2000) for all trading days by time of the day in five-minutes 
segments. On the horizontal axis there are 288 intervals of five minutes each (corresponding to 
one day) and on the vertical axis there are the average number of observations. 
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FIGURE 3.6.9: Average number of France Telecom news observations by time of the 
day: This figure shows the average intraday information flow of France Telecom news during a 
one year period (December 1, 1999 – November 30, 2000) for all trading days by time of the day 
in five-minutes segments. On the horizontal axis there are 288 intervals of five minutes each 
(corresponding to one day) and on the vertical axis there are the average number of observations. 
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FIGURE 3.6.10: Average number of Vivendi news observations by time of the day: This 
figure shows the average intraday information flow of Vivendi news during a one year period 
(December 1, 1999 – November 30, 2000) for all trading days by time of the day in five-minutes 
segments. On the horizontal axis there are 288 intervals of five minutes each (corresponding to 
one day) and on the vertical axis there are the average number of observations. 
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FIGURE 3.6.11: Average number of Total news observations by time of the day: This 
figure shows the average intraday information flow of Total news during a one year period 
(December 1, 1999 – November 30, 2000) for all trading days by time of the day in five-minutes 
segments. On the horizontal axis there are 288 intervals of five minutes each (corresponding to 
one day) and on the vertical axis there are the average number of observations. 
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FIGURE 3.6.12: Average number of All Alerts news France observations by time of the 
day: This figure shows the average intraday information flow of All Alerts news France during a 
one year period (December 1, 1999 – November 30, 2000) for all trading days by time of the day 
in five-minutes segments. On the horizontal axis there are 288 intervals of five minutes each 
(corresponding to one day) and on the vertical axis there are the average number of observations. 
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FIGURE 3.6.13: Average number of Political news France observations by time of the 
day: This figure shows the average intraday information flow of Political news France during a 
one year period (December 1, 1999 – November 30, 2000) for all trading days by time of the day 
in five-minutes segments. On the horizontal axis there are 288 intervals of five minutes each 
(corresponding to one day) and on the vertical axis there are the average number of observations. 
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FIGURE 3.6.14: Average number of Market news France observations by time of the day: 
This figure shows the average intraday information flow of Market news France during a one 
year period (December 1, 1999 – November 30, 2000) for all trading days by time of the day in 
five-minutes segments. On the horizontal axis there are 288 intervals of five minutes each 
(corresponding to one day) and on the vertical axis there are the average number of observations. 
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FIGURE 3.6.15: Average number of Industrial news France observations by time of the 
day: This figure shows the average intraday information flow of Industrial news France during a 
one year period (December 1, 1999 – November 30, 2000) for all trading days by time of the day 
in five-minutes segments. On the horizontal axis there are 288 intervals of five minutes each 
(corresponding to one day) and on the vertical axis there are the average number of observations. 
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FIGURE 3.6.16: Average number of General news France observations by time of the 
day: This figure shows the average intraday information flow of General news France during a 
one year period (December 1, 1999 – November 30, 2000) for all trading days by time of the day 
in five-minutes segments. On the horizontal axis there are 288 intervals of five minutes each 
(corresponding to one day) and on the vertical axis there are the average number of observations. 
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FIGURE 3.6.17: Average number of Economic news France observations by time of the 
day: This figure shows the average intraday information flow of Economic news France during a 
one year period (December 1, 1999 – November 30, 2000) for all trading days by time of the day 
in five-minutes segments. On the horizontal axis there are 288 intervals of five minutes each 
(corresponding to one day) and on the vertical axis there are the average number of observations. 
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FIGURE 3.6.18: Average number of Corporate news France observations by time of the 
day: This figure shows the average intraday information flow of Corporate news France during a 
one year period (December 1, 1999 – November 30, 2000) for all trading days by time of the day 
in five-minutes segments. On the horizontal axis there are 288 intervals of five minutes each 
(corresponding to one day) and on the vertical axis there are the average number of observations. 
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FIGURE 3.6.19: Average number of All alerts news observations by day of the week: This 
figure shows the average intraday information flow of All alerts news during a one year period 
(December 1, 1999 – November 30, 2000) for all trading days by time of the day in five-minutes 
segments. On the horizontal axis there are 288 intervals of five minutes each (corresponding to 
one day) and on the vertical axis there are the average number of observations. 
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FIGURE 3.6.20: Average number of All alerts news observations by month of the year: 
This figure shows the average intraday information flow of All alerts news during a one year 
period (December 1, 1999 – November 30, 2000) for all trading days by time of the day in five-
minutes segments. On the horizontal axis there are 288 intervals of five minutes each 
(corresponding to one day) and on the vertical axis there are the average number of observations. 
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Table 3.7.1: Global information flow by month of the year. This table reports global 
information flow by month of the year from December 1, 1999 to November 30, 2000 for each 
of the eight categories considered in this study and released by the Reuters 2000 alert system. 
 
 
News Category December 1999 January 2000 February 2000 March 2000 April 2000 May 2000 June 2000  
All alerts 105'276 117'028 126'267 135'358 114'961 136'155 89'296*  
All alerts Fr 3'038 3'535 3'817 4'188 3'030 3'738 3'390  
Political 39'623 41'193 68'130 51'977 42'008 49'256 43'601  
Political Fr 2'463 2'704 2'870 3'123 2'472 2'881 2'317  
market 55'455 59'576 62'845 58'857 41'618 1'972* 821*  
market Fr 2'401 2'720 3'898 7'805 6'314 4'312 2'691  
Industrial 37'493 28'344 48'322 48'581 43'406 50'788 37'378  
Industrial fr 1'048 1'269 1'794 2'984 2'350 2'436 2'004  
General 20'093 21'749 22'525 25'590 23'836 27'851 24'315  
General Fr 3'039 3'535 3'818 4'187 3'187 3'732 3'393  
Economic 24'600 26'123 26'093 27'664 22'899 26'443 23'303  
Economic Fr 926 992 905 1'038 856 995 788  
Corporate 30'052 36'463 40'356 37'528 34'002 34'702 25018*  
Corporate Fr 1'048 1'269 1'794 2'984 2'350 2'436 2'004  
Stocks CAC 40 1'439 1'668 1'945 1'871 1'517 1'735 1'462  
Total 312'592 330'476 394'538 385'555 322'730 327'167 243'732  
Total Fr 15'402 17'692 20'841 28'180 22'076 22'265 18'049  
         
News Category July 2000 August 2000 September October 2000 November TOTAL MEAN STD. DEV. 
All alerts 229* 52'372* 114'537 130'348 125'955 1'247'78 122'876 40'160.96 
All alerts Fr 3'510 2'580 3'611 3'682 3'487 41'606 3'570 421.83 
Political 13'149* 20'463* 43'167 43'709 47'689 503'965 47'417 14'067.05 
Political Fr 2'684 1'975 2'898 2'909 2'711 32'007 2'781 315.00 
market 7* 228* 55'892 64'376 68'090 469'737 52'164 29'115.18 
market Fr 2'927 2'230 3'214 3'145 2'757 44'414 4'063 1'704.42 
Industrial 19'844* 25'823 42'708 48'719 46'343 477'749 43'856 10'226.13 
Industrial fr 2'273 1'830 2'221 1'848 1'079 23'136 1'892 581.95 
General 21'317 21'127 27'661 28'087 31'452 295'603 25'427 3'519.63 
General Fr 3'511 2'585 3'666 3'719 3'486 41'858 3'597 411.37 
Economic 25'708 21'758 24'528 26'486 25'557 301'162 25'599 1'724.94 
Economic Fr 933 686 1'080 956 962 11'117 968 108.55 
Corporate 19'174* 20'416* 26720* 35'657 43'635 383'723 35'457 7'742.83 
Corporate Fr 2'273 1'830 2'221 1'848 1'079 23'136 1'892 581.95 
Stocks CAC 40 1'666 1'226 674* 1224* 1'817 18'244 1'520 354.35 
Total 99'428 162'187 335'213 377'382 388'721 3'679'72 43'806 32'081.30 
Total Fr 19'777 14'942 19'585 19'331 17'378 235'518 2'453 1'193.37 
* Due to technical problems with the Reuters 2000 News Alert System, the subgroup belonging to the corresponding category is not 
complete 
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Table 3.7.2: Global information flow by day of the week. This table reports global 
information flow by day of the week from December 1, 1999 to November 30, 2000 for each of 
the eight categories considered in this study and released by the Reuters 2000 alert system. 
 
 Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday Sunday TOTAL MEAN STD. DEV.
All alerts 232'615 254'719 258'808 249'838 203'491 24'438 23'873 1'247'782 178'255 106'883.8
All alerts Fr 6'577 7'694 8'156 8'474 7'000 1'789 1'916 41'606 5'944 2'868.25 
           
Political 86'147 101'399 104'243 103'382 88'086 10'166 10'542 503'965 71'995 42'716.45 
Political Fr 5'143 6'115 6'454 6'712 5'589 1'012 982 32'007 4'572 2'497.48 
           
Market 83'621 93'038 96'884 97'173 86'306 6'497 6'218 469'737 67'219 41'900.19 
Market Fr 7'558 8'808 9'311 9'509 7'711 789 728 44'414 6'345 3'886.55 
           
Industrial 97'525 105'570 101'992 94'890 69'057 4'849 3'866 477'749 68'250 45'209.99 
Industrial Fr 3'997 4'624 4'770 5'094 3'923 347 381 23'136 3'305 2'051.29 
           
General 48'636 52'912 56'170 54'780 45'622 17'975 19'508 295'603 42'229 16'447.23 
General Fr 6'591 7'702 8'159 8'463 7'171 1'852 1'920 41'858 5'980 2'863.40 
           
Economic 54'444 60'092 62'867 61'170 52'658 5'212 4'719 301'162 43'023 26'250.68 
Economic Fr 1'875 2'088 2'145 2'243 2'133 333 300 11'117 1'588 875.85 
           
Corporate 68'132 79'604 81'647 81'103 66'747 3'511 2'979 383'723 54'818 35'740.49 
Corporate Fr 3'997 4'624 4'770 5'094 3'923 347 381 23'136 3'305 2'051.29 
           
Total 671'120 747'334 762'611 742'336 611'967 72'648 71'705 3'679'721 75'096 65'929 
Total Fr 35'738 41'655 43'765 45'589 37'450 6'469 6'608 217'274 4'434 2'939 
*There were six market holidays: New Year's Eve (Friday 31.12.1999), Good Friday (Friday 21.04.2000), Easter Monday (Monday 
24.04.2000), Labour day (Monday 01.05.2000), Whitmonday (Monday 12.06.2000) and National Holiday (14.07.2000). 
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Table 3.7.3: Firm-specific news. This table reports firm-specific news (without CAC40 news) 
by month of the year during the period December 1, 1999 and November 30, 2000 released by 
the Reuters 2000 alert system. 
 
Company December 
1999 
January 2000 February 
2000 
March 2000 April 2000 May 2000 June 2000 July 2000  
Accor 21 6 15 15 7 15 9 12 
Agf 12 10 11 13 9 8 5 1 
Air 4 24 14 11 14 31 3 7 
Alcatel 63 59 111 73 66 114 90 103 
Alstom 23 15 40 35 19 33 14 24 
Aventis 21 18 16 31 30 35 32 34 
Axa 24 35 32 40 30 38 21 43 
Bic 3 3 0 4 2 0 0 1 
BNP 45 27 45 27 34 43 48 66 
Bouygues 61 16 29 29 28 70 39 22 
CAC40 Index 130 123 133 102 66 82 76 69 
Canal 80 96 120 112 82 63 134 73 
Cap Gemini 35 57 36 55 31 30 21 9 
Carrefour 27 62 64 44 26 39 15 53 
Casino 4 7 17 26 15 31 5 9 
Credit Lyonnais 41 24 16 29 38 31 11 21 
Thomson-csf 17 64 26 30 13 13 30 14 
Danone 35 36 35 49 19 39 41 31 
EADS 59 47 59 97 59 7 1 87 
Equant 26 29 16 34 10 53 35 23 
Eridania 1 4 23 7 0 4 12 2 
France 210 155 158 250 242 316 260 340 
Lafarge 7 47 67 35 44 44 24 25 
Lagardere 16 69 75 56 39 19 12 8 
Legrand 1 3 3 3 1 1 0 11 
L'Oreal 6 6 10 4 13 6 7 14 
LVMH 32 43 42 54 18 50 34 35 
Michelin 3 7 5 14 10 8 7 21 
Peugeot 35 34 80 47 27 24 15 23 
Renault 60 95 84 112 139 91 60 61 
Saint Gobain 7 15 19 11 24 25 4 12 
Sanofi 2 10 9 11 17 3 7 6 
Schneider 5 10 9 5 11 3 1 8 
Société Générale 58 49 53 45 31 46 8 33 
Sodexho 9 4 4 1 0 3 5 3 
Stmicroelectronics 34 43 20 54 30 70 26 52 
Suez Lyonnaise des 32 28 46 80 53 37 50 57 
Total 87 94 90 82 87 94 55 64 
Valeo 10 12 11 3 22 8 2 14 
Vivendi 93 182 208 149 111 108 243 175 
    
Company August 
2000 
September 
2000 
October 
2000 
November 
2000 
TOTAL MEAN STD. 
DEV. 
CAC40 
News 
Market Capital 
Accor 6 1 20 8 135 6 6 143 8'504'448'767
Agf 3 2 4 10 88 7 4 90 9'881'148'945
Air 4 7 5 0 124 10 9 140 12'617'100'753
Alcatel 73 39 131 138 1060 88 31 1255 74'545'766'570
Alstom 19 5 4 35 266 22 12 296 5'940'658'878
Aventis 24 15 71 147 474 40 37 494 46'431'642'472
Axa 62 8 18 34 385 32 14 392 57'129'278'200
Bic 0 0 2 0 15 1 1 18 2'530'868'590
BNP 51 38 8 55 487 41 15 504 41'542'116'914
Bouygues 27 12 22 46 401 33 18 499 20'965'460'705
CAC40 Index 83 34 75 96 1069 89 29 1069 
Canal 19 18 39 39 875 73 39 1072 26'151'009'863
Cap Gemini 19 4 6 50 353 29 18 473 22'738'312'534
Carrefour 37 17 0 20 404 34 20 460 52'632'599'567
Casino 8 9 3 14 148 12 9 171 8'263'886'113
Credit Lyonnais 4 12 12 18 257 21 11 290 13'664'533'413
Thomson-csf 19 15 21 32 294 25 14 328 7'098'289'225
Danone 22 10 9 76 402 34 18 426 18'810'626'067
EADS 20 19 40 40 535 45 30 548 17'074'565'199
Equant 17 17 18 50 328 27 14 451 15'431'623'594
Eridania 3 3 1 12 72 6 7 73 2'530'062'421
France 276 111 266 247 2831 236 67 3146 145'948'601'889
Lafarge 9 10 19 17 348 29 19 365 9'208'521'841
Lagardere 5 2 5 6 312 26 27 417 9'577'283'774
Legrand 3 7 3 0 36 3 3 46 4'510'453'696
L'Oreal 3 10 4 15 98 8 4 116 51'449'339'578
LVMH 22 7 18 38 393 33 14 451 41'713'036'882
Michelin 33 10 11 8 137 11 8 147 4'767'243'799
Peugeot 11 26 28 18 368 31 18 398 9'978'589'909
Renault 35 24 59 72 892 74 32 922 11'490'044'369
Saint Gobain 6 1 11 12 147 12 7 159 12'563'648'185
Sanofi 2 15 5 17 104 9 5 125 35'199'269'636
Schneider 4 4 20 4 84 7 5 104 11'426'911'501
Société Générale 28 20 11 47 429 36 17 456 24'676'041'281
Sodexho 1 0 3 0 33 3 3 43 5'632'088'753
Stmicroelectronics 22 6 44 67 468 39 20 622 52'922'065'071
Suez Lyonnaise des Eaux 74 24 33 71 585 49 19 608 34'409'032'814
Total 77 75 43 115 963 80 19 1040 112'487'946'368
Valeo 6 1 11 23 123 10 7 139 4'666'916'391
Vivendi 89 46 121 120 1645 137 56 1812 60'685'848'634
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Table 3.7.4: Rank of Firm-specific news. This table reports firm-specific news (without CAC40 
news) by month of the year during the period December 1, 1999 and November 30, 2000 released by 
the Reuters 2000 alert system and ranked considering the total number of news (from lowest to highest). 
 
Company December 1999 January 2000 February 2000 March 2000 April 2000 May 2000 June 2000  
Bic 3 3 0 4 2 0 0  
Sodexho 9 4 4 1 0 3 5  
Legrand 1 3 3 3 1 1 0  
Eridania 1 4 23 7 0 4 12  
Schneider 5 10 9 5 11 3 1  
Agf 12 10 11 13 9 8 5  
L'Oreal 6 6 10 4 13 6 7  
Sanofi 2 10 9 11 17 3 7  
Valeo 10 12 11 3 22 8 2  
Air 4 24 14 11 14 31 3  
Accor 21 6 15 15 7 15 9  
Michelin 3 7 5 14 10 8 7  
Saint Gobain 7 15 19 11 24 25 4  
Casino 4 7 17 26 15 31 5  
Credit Lyonnais 41 24 16 29 38 31 11  
Alstom 23 15 40 35 19 33 14  
Thomson-csf 17 64 26 30 13 13 30  
Lagardere 16 69 75 56 39 19 12  
Equant 26 29 16 34 10 53 35  
Lafarge 7 47 67 35 44 44 24  
Cap Gemini 35 57 36 55 31 30 21  
Peugeot 35 34 80 47 27 24 15  
Axa 24 35 32 40 30 38 21  
LVMH 32 43 42 54 18 50 34  
Bouygues 61 16 29 29 28 70 39  
Danone 35 36 35 49 19 39 41  
Carrefour 27 62 64 44 26 39 15  
Société Générale 58 49 53 45 31 46 8  
Stmicroelectronics 34 43 20 54 30 70 26  
Aventis 21 18 16 31 30 35 32  
BNP 45 27 45 27 34 43 48  
EADS 59 47 59 97 59 7 1  
Suez Lyonnaise des Eaux 32 28 46 80 53 37 50  
Canal 80 96 120 112 82 63 134  
Renault 60 95 84 112 139 91 60  
Total 87 94 90 82 87 94 55  
Alcatel 63 59 111 73 66 114 90  
CAC40 Index 130 123 133 102 66 82 76  
Vivendi 93 182 208 149 111 108 243  
France 210 155 158 250 242 316 260  
Company July 2000 August 2000 September 2000 October 2000 November 
2000 
TOTAL MEAN STD. DEV. 
Bic 1 0 0 2 0 15 1.25 1.48 
Sodexho 3 1 0 3 0 33 2.75 2.63 
Legrand 11 3 7 3 0 36 3.00 3.16 
Eridania 2 3 3 1 12 72 6.00 6.67 
Schneider 8 4 4 20 4 84 7.00 5.10 
Agf 1 3 2 4 10 88 7.33 4.14 
L'Oreal 14 3 10 4 15 98 8.17 4.13 
Sanofi 6 2 15 5 17 104 8.67 5.48 
Valeo 14 6 1 11 23 123 10.25 7.06 
Air 7 4 7 5 0 124 10.33 9.21 
Accor 12 6 1 20 8 135 6.09 6.09 
Michelin 21 33 10 11 8 137 11.42 8.22 
Saint Gobain 12 6 1 11 12 147 12.25 7.50 
Casino 9 8 9 3 14 148 12.33 8.77 
Credit Lyonnais 21 4 12 12 18 257 21.42 11.46 
Alstom 24 19 5 4 35 266 22.17 11.80 
Thomson-csf 14 19 15 21 32 294 24.50 14.28 
Lagardere 8 5 2 5 6 312 26.00 26.71 
Equant 23 17 17 18 50 328 27.33 13.58 
Lafarge 25 9 10 19 17 348 29.00 18.55 
Cap Gemini 9 19 4 6 50 353 29.42 18.36 
Peugeot 23 11 26 28 18 368 30.67 18.26 
Axa 43 62 8 18 34 385 32.08 13.80 
LVMH 35 22 7 18 38 393 32.75 14.10 
Bouygues 22 27 12 22 46 401 33.42 17.63 
Danone 31 22 10 9 76 402 33.50 18.20 
Carrefour 53 37 17 0 20 404 33.67 19.75 
Société Générale 33 28 20 11 47 429 35.75 16.53 
Stmicroelectronics 52 22 6 44 67 468 39.00 19.53 
Aventis 34 24 15 71 147 474 39.50 36.95 
BNP 66 51 38 8 55 487 40.58 15.20 
EADS 87 20 19 40 40 535 44.58 29.83 
Suez Lyonnaise des Eaux 57 74 24 33 71 585 48.75 18.86 
Canal 73 19 18 39 39 875 72.92 38.69 
Renault 61 35 24 59 72 892 74.33 32.06 
Total 64 77 75 43 115 963 80.25 19.31 
Alcatel 103 73 39 131 138 1060 88.33 31.02 
CAC40 Index 69 83 34 75 96 1069 89.08 29.22 
Vivendi 175 89 46 121 120 1645 137.08 55.98 
France 340 276 111 266 247 2831 235.92 67.14 
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Table 3.7.5: Rank of Firm-specific news by month of the year. This table reports firm-
specific news (without CAC40 news) by month of the year during the period December 1, 1999 
and November 30, 2000 released by the Reuters 2000 alert system and ranked considering the 
total number of news (from lowest to highest). 
 
 
Company December Company January Company February Company March Company April Company May 
Eridania 1 Bic 3 Bic 0 Sodexho 1 Eridania 0 Bic 0
Legrand 1 Legrand 3 Legrand 3 Legrand 3 Sodexho 0 Legrand 1
Sanofi 2 Eridania 4 Sodexho 4 Valeo 3 Legrand 1 Sanofi 3
Bic 3 Sodexho 4 Michelin 5 Bic 4 Bic 2 Schneider 3
Michelin 3 Accor 6 Sanofi 9 L'Oreal 4 Accor 7 Sodexho 3
Air 4 L'Oreal 6 Schneider 9 Schneider 5 Agf 9 Eridania 4
Casino 4 Casino 7 L'Oreal 10 Eridania 7 Equant 10 L'Oreal 6
Schneider 5 Michelin 7 Agf 11 Air 11 Michelin 10 EADS 7
L'Oreal 6 Agf 10 Valeo 11 Saint Gobain 11 Schneider 11 Agf 8
Lafarge 7 Sanofi 10 Air 14 Sanofi 11 L'Oreal 13 Michelin 8
Saint Gobain 7 Schneider 10 Accor 15 Agf 13 Thomson-csf 13 Valeo 8
Sodexho 9 Valeo 12 Aventis 16 Michelin 14 Air 14 Thomson-csf 13
Valeo 10 Alstom 15 Credit Lyonnais 16 Accor 15 Casino 15 Accor 15
Agf 12 Saint Gobain 15 Equant 16 Casino 26 Sanofi 17 Lagardere 19
Lagardere 16 Bouygues 16 Casino 17 BNP 27 LVMH 18 Peugeot 24
Thomson-csf 17 Aventis 18 Saint Gobain 19 Bouygues 29 Alstom 19 Saint Gobain 25
Accor 21 Air 24 Stmicroelectronics 20 Credit Lyonnais 29 Danone 19 Cap Gemini 30
Aventis 21 Credit Lyonnais 24 Eridania 23 Thomson-csf 30 Valeo 22 Air 31
Alstom 23 BNP 27 Thomson-csf 26 Aventis 31 Saint Gobain 24 Casino 31
Axa 24 Suez Lyonnaise des 
Eaux 
28 Bouygues 29 Equant 34 Carrefour 26 Credit Lyonnais 31 
Equant 26 Equant 29 Axa 32 Alstom 35 Peugeot 27 Alstom 33
Carrefour 27 Peugeot 34 Danone 35 Lafarge 35 Bouygues 28 Aventis 35
LVMH 32 Axa 35 Cap Gemini 36 Axa 40 Aventis 30 Suez Lyonnaise des 
Eaux 
37 
Suez Lyonnaise des 
Eaux 
32 Danone 36 Alstom 40 Carrefour 44 Axa 30 Axa 38 
Stmicroelectronics 34 LVMH 43 LVMH 42 Société Générale 45 Stmicroelectronics 30 Carrefour 39
Cap Gemini 35 Stmicroelectronics 43 BNP 45 Peugeot 47 Cap Gemini 31 Danone 39
Danone 35 EADS 47 Suez Lyonnaise des 46 Danone 49 Société Générale 31 BNP 43
Peugeot 35 Lafarge 47 Société Générale 53 LVMH 54 BNP 34 Lafarge 44
Credit Lyonnais 41 Société Générale 49 EADS 59 Stmicroelectronics 54 Credit Lyonnais 38 Société Générale 46
BNP 45 Cap Gemini 57 Carrefour 64 Cap Gemini 55 Lagardere 39 LVMH 50
Société Générale 58 Alcatel 59 Lafarge 67 Lagardere 56 Lafarge 44 Equant 53
EADS 59 Carrefour 62 Lagardere 75 Alcatel 73 Suez Lyonnaise 
des Eaux 
53 Canal 63 
Renault 60 Thomson-csf 64 Peugeot 80 Suez Lyonnaise des 
Eaux 
80 EADS 59 Bouygues 70 
Bouygues 61 Lagardere 69 Renault 84 Total 82 Alcatel 66 Stmicroelectronics 70
Alcatel 63 Total 94 Total 90 EADS 97 CAC40 66 CAC40 82
Canal 80 Renault 95 Alcatel 111 CAC40 102 Canal 82 Renault 91
Total 87 Canal 96 Canal 120 Canal 112 Total 87 Total 94
Vivendi 93 CAC40 123 CAC40 133 Renault 112 Vivendi 111 Vivendi 108
CAC40 130 France 155 France 158 Vivendi 149 Renault 139 Alcatel 114
France 210 Vivendi 182 Vivendi 208 France 250 France 242 France 316
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Table 3.7.5: (cont.) Rank of Firm-specific news by month of the year. 
 
 
Company June Company July Company August Company September Company October Company November
Bic 0 Agf 1 Bic 0 Bic 0 Carrefour 0 Air 0
Legrand 0 Bic 1 Sodexho 1 Sodexho 0 Eridania 1 Bic 0
EADS 1 Eridania 2 Sanofi 2 Accor 1 Bic 2 Legrand 0
Schneider 1 Sodexho 3 Agf 3 Saint Gobain 1 Casino 3 Sodexho 0
Valeo 2 Sanofi 6 Eridania 3 Valeo 1 Legrand 3 Schneider 4
Air 3 Air 7 Legrand 3 Agf 2 Sodexho 3 Lagardere 6
Saint Gobain 4 Lagardere 8 L'Oreal 3 Lagardere 2 Agf 4 Accor 8
Agf 5 Schneider 8 Air 4 Eridania 3 Alstom 4 Michelin 8
Casino 5 Cap Gemini 9 Credit Lyonnais 4 Cap Gemini 4 L'Oreal 4 Agf 10
Sodexho 5 Casino 9 Schneider 4 Schneider 4 Air 5 Eridania 12
L'Oreal 7 Legrand 11 Lagardere 5 Alstom 5 Lagardere 5 Saint Gobain 12
Michelin 7 Accor 12 Accor 6 Stmicroelectronics 6 Sanofi 5 Casino 14
Sanofi 7 Saint Gobain 12 Saint Gobain 6 Air 7 Cap Gemini 6 L'Oreal 15
Société Générale 8 L'Oreal 14 Valeo 6 Legrand 7 BNP 8 Lafarge 17
Accor 9 Thomson-csf 14 Casino 8 LVMH 7 Danone 9 Sanofi 17
Credit Lyonnais 11 Valeo 14 Lafarge 9 Axa 8 Michelin 11 Credit Lyonnais 18
Eridania 12 Credit Lyonnais 21 Peugeot 11 Casino 9 Saint Gobain 11 Peugeot 18
Lagardere 12 Michelin 21 Equant 17 Danone 10 Société Générale 11 Carrefour 20
Alstom 14 Bouygues 22 Alstom 19 Lafarge 10 Valeo 11 Valeo 23
Carrefour 15 Equant 23 Canal 19 L'Oreal 10 Credit Lyonnais 12 Thomson-csf 32
Peugeot 15 Peugeot 23 Cap Gemini 19 Michelin 10 Axa 18 Axa 34
Axa 21 Alstom 24 Thomson-csf 19 Bouygues 12 Equant 18 Alstom 35
Cap Gemini 21 Lafarge 25 EADS 20 Credit Lyonnais 12 LVMH 18 LVMH 38
Lafarge 24 Danone 31 Danone 22 Aventis 15 Lafarge 19 Canal 39
Stmicroelectronics 26 Société Générale 33 LVMH 22 Sanofi 15 Accor 20 EADS 40
Thomson-csf 30 Aventis 34 Stmicroelectronics 22 Thomson-csf 15 Schneider 20 Bouygues 46
Aventis 32 LVMH 35 Aventis 24 Carrefour 17 Thomson-csf 21 Société Générale 47
LVMH 34 Axa 43 Bouygues 27 Equant 17 Bouygues 22 Cap Gemini 50
Equant 35 Stmicroelectronics 52 Société Générale 28 Canal 18 Peugeot 28 Equant 50
Bouygues 39 Carrefour 53 Michelin 33 EADS 19 Suez Lyonnaise 
des Eaux 
33 BNP 55 
Danone 41 Suez Lyonnaise des 
Eaux 
57 Renault 35 Société Générale 20 Canal 39 Stmicroelectronics 67 
BNP 48 Renault 61 Carrefour 37 Renault 24 EADS 40 Suez Lyonnaise 
des Eaux 
71 
Suez Lyonnaise des 
Eaux 
50 Total 64 BNP 51 Suez Lyonnaise des 
Eaux 
24 Total 43 Renault 72 
Total 55 BNP 66 Axa 62 Peugeot 26 Stmicroelectronics 44 Danone 76
Renault 60 CAC40 69 Alcatel 73 CAC40 34 Renault 59 CAC40 96
CAC40 76 Canal 73 Suez Lyonnaise des 
Eaux 
74 BNP 38 Aventis 71 Total 115 
Alcatel 90 EADS 87 Total 77 Alcatel 39 CAC40 75 Vivendi 120
Canal 134 Alcatel 103 CAC40 83 Vivendi 46 Vivendi 121 Alcatel 138
Vivendi 243 Vivendi 175 Vivendi 89 Total 75 Alcatel 131 Aventis 147
France 260 France 340 France 276 France 111 France 266 France 247
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Table 3.7.6: Rank of Firm-specific news by month of the year and by market 
capitalization. This table reports firm-specific news (without CAC40 news) by month of the 
year during the period December 1, 1999 and November 30, 2000 released by the Reuters 2000 
alert system and ranked considering the market capitalization (from lowest to highest). 
 
Company December 
1999 
January 2000 February 2000 March 2000 April 2000 May 2000 June 2000 Market Cap  
Eridania 1 4 23 7 0 4 12 2'530'062'421
Bic 3 3 0 4 2 0 0 2'530'868'590  
Legrand 1 3 3 3 1 1 0 4'510'453'696  
Valeo 10 12 11 3 22 8 2 4'666'916'391  
Michelin 3 7 5 14 10 8 7 4'767'243'799  
Sodexho 9 4 4 1 0 3 5 5'632'088'753  
Alstom 23 15 40 35 19 33 14 5'940'658'878  
Thomson-csf 17 64 26 30 13 13 30 7'098'289'225  
Casino 4 7 17 26 15 31 5 8'263'886'113  
Accor 21 6 15 15 7 15 9 8'504'448'767  
Lafarge 7 47 67 35 44 44 24 9'208'521'841  
Lagardere 16 69 75 56 39 19 12 9'577'283'774  
Agf 12 10 11 13 9 8 5 9'881'148'945  
Peugeot 35 34 80 47 27 24 15 9'978'589'909  
Schneider 5 10 9 5 11 3 1 11'426'911'501  
Renault 60 95 84 112 139 91 60 11'490'044'369  
Saint Gobain 7 15 19 11 24 25 4 12'563'648'185  
Air 4 24 14 11 14 31 3 12'617'100'753  
Credit Lyonnais 41 24 16 29 38 31 11 13'664'533'413  
Equant 26 29 16 34 10 53 35 15'431'623'594  
EADS 59 47 59 97 59 7 1 17'074'565'199  
Danone 35 36 35 49 19 39 41 18'810'626'067  
Bouygues 61 16 29 29 28 70 39 20'965'460'705  
Cap Gemini 35 57 36 55 31 30 21 22'738'312'534  
Société Générale 58 49 53 45 31 46 8 24'676'041'281  
Canal 80 96 120 112 82 63 134 26'151'009'863  
Suez Lyonnaise des Eaux 32 28 46 80 53 37 50 34'409'032'814  
Sanofi 2 10 9 11 17 3 7 35'199'269'636  
BNP 45 27 45 27 34 43 48 41'542'116'914  
LVMH 32 43 42 54 18 50 34 41'713'036'882  
Aventis 21 18 16 31 30 35 32 46'431'642'472  
L'Oreal 6 6 10 4 13 6 7 51'449'339'578  
Carrefour 27 62 64 44 26 39 15 52'632'599'567  
Stmicroelectronics 34 43 20 54 30 70 26 52'922'065'071  
Axa 24 35 32 40 30 38 21 57'129'278'200  
Vivendi 93 182 208 149 111 108 243 60'685'848'634  
Alcatel 63 59 111 73 66 114 90 74'545'766'570  
Total 87 94 90 82 87 94 55 112'487'946'368  
France 210 155 158 250 242 316 260 145'948'601'889  
CAC40 Index 130 123 133 102 66 82 76  
Total 1439 1668 1851 1879 1517 1735 1462
     
Company July 2000 August 2000 September 
2000 
October 2000 November 
2000
TOTAL MEAN STD. DEV. Market Cap 
Eridania 2 3 3 1 12 72 6.00 6.67 2'530'062'421
Bic 1 0 0 2 0 15 1.25 1.48 2'530'868'590
Legrand 11 3 7 3 0 36 3.00 3.16 4'510'453'696
Valeo 14 6 1 11 23 123 10.25 7.06 4'666'916'391
Michelin 21 33 10 11 8 137 11.42 8.22 4'767'243'799
Sodexho 3 1 0 3 0 33 2.75 2.63 5'632'088'753
Alstom 24 19 5 4 35 266 22.17 11.80 5'940'658'878
Thomson-csf 14 19 15 21 32 294 24.50 14.28 7'098'289'225
Casino 9 8 9 3 14 148 12.33 8.77 8'263'886'113
Accor 12 6 1 20 8 135 6.09 6.09 8'504'448'767
Lafarge 25 9 10 19 17 348 29.00 18.55 9'208'521'841
Lagardere 8 5 2 5 6 312 26.00 26.71 9'577'283'774
Agf 1 3 2 4 10 88 7.33 4.14 9'881'148'945
Peugeot 23 11 26 28 18 368 30.67 18.26 9'978'589'909
Schneider 8 4 4 20 4 84 7.00 5.10 11'426'911'501
Renault 61 35 24 59 72 892 74.33 32.06 11'490'044'369
Saint Gobain 12 6 1 11 12 147 12.25 7.50 12'563'648'185
Air 7 4 7 5 0 124 10.33 9.21 12'617'100'753
Credit Lyonnais 21 4 12 12 18 257 21.42 11.46 13'664'533'413
Equant 23 17 17 18 50 328 27.33 13.58 15'431'623'594
EADS 87 20 19 40 40 535 44.58 29.83 17'074'565'199
Danone 31 22 10 9 76 402 33.50 18.20 18'810'626'067
Bouygues 22 27 12 22 46 401 33.42 17.63 20'965'460'705
Cap Gemini 9 19 4 6 50 353 29.42 18.36 22'738'312'534
Société Générale 33 28 20 11 47 429 35.75 16.53 24'676'041'281
Canal 73 19 18 39 39 875 72.92 38.69 26'151'009'863
Suez Lyonnaise des Eaux 57 74 24 33 71 585 48.75 18.86 34'409'032'814
Sanofi 6 2 15 5 17 104 8.67 5.48 35'199'269'636
BNP 66 51 38 8 55 487 40.58 15.20 41'542'116'914
LVMH 35 22 7 18 38 393 32.75 14.10 41'713'036'882
Aventis 34 24 15 71 147 474 39.50 36.95 46'431'642'472
L'Oreal 14 3 10 4 15 98 8.17 4.13 51'449'339'578
Carrefour 53 37 17 0 20 404 33.67 19.75 52'632'599'567
Stmicroelectronics 52 22 6 44 67 468 39.00 19.53 52'922'065'071
Axa 43 62 8 18 34 385 32.08 13.80 57'129'278'200
Vivendi 175 89 46 121 120 1645 137.08 55.98 60'685'848'634
Alcatel 103 73 39 131 138 1060 88.33 31.02 74'545'766'570
Total 64 77 75 43 115 963 80.25 19.31 112'487'946'368
France 340 276 111 266 247 2831 235.92 67.14 145'948'601'889
CAC40 Index 69 83 34 75 96 1069 89.08 29.22 
Total 1666 1226 684 1224 1817 18168 41.25 47.65 
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Table 3.7.7.: News category: This table reports seven of the eight news categories considered. 
Firm-specific news are not reported. In each category, a keyword is given for every subgroup. 
 
 
 
 
Category Subgroup / Keyword News
All Alerts AA All Alerts
Political news DIP Diplomatic affairs
POL Politics
VOTE Elections
Market news C All commodity news
E All Reuters international equity news
E-DRV Equity derivative news
EQB Equity linked bonds
EUB/ Eurobonds
EUR Euro 
EUROPE-EUB European Eurobond news
FRX Forex news
FX/OPT News on currency options
M Reuters money news
MMT Money markets
T Treasury news
DRV Derivatives
MTG/ Mortgage-backed
OPEC OPEC
OPTIONS Option news
Industrial AER Aerospace & military technology
APL Appliances & household durables
AUT Automobiles
BEV Beverages & tobacco
BLD Building materials & components
CHE Chemicals
CON Construction & housing
COT Cotton & silk
ELC Electrical & electronics
ELI Electronic components / instruments
FOD Food & households products
IND Industrial components
MAC Machinery & engineering
TIM Forest products & paper
TEX Textiles & apparel
WOO Wool
DPR Data processing & reproduction
GDM Gold mines
GRA Grains
GRO All grains / oilseed news
REC Recreation, other consumer goods
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TABLE 3.7.7 (cont.) 
 
 
 
General LIF Lifestyle
CRIM Criminality
DIS General / manmade disasters
ENT Entertainment
ENV Environment
G General / human interest news
ODD Human interest
REL Religion
SCI Science technology
SPO Sports news
WEA Weather news
Economic BNK Banking
CEN Central banks
D Reuters news for debt market
DBT Debt news
ECB European central bank
FED Federal reserve news
INSTANT Fast analysis of economic data
INT Interest rates news
MCE Macroeconomics
TRD International debt issues
Corporate AAA Rating news
DBT-ISU New issue headlines
DIV Dividends
EUB-ISU Eurobond new issue news
IPO New equity issue
GLANCE/RCH Hot stocks research alert
HOT Most active shares
IDEA Trading idea & strategies
MRG Merger & acquisition
RCH Broker research
RES Company results
RESF Company results forecasts
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TABLE 3.7.8: Samples of Reuters news. This table reports some news of each category 
during the month of December 1999 released by the Reuters 2000 News Alert System. 
 
 
 
Date CET GMT News
03.12.1999 161500 151500 RTRS-London gold fix higher in PM, spot off lows
03.12.1999 161500 151500 RTRS-Moody 's rates Kansai Electric < 9503.T>  bonds Aa2
03.12.1999 161600 151600 BSW-Nunn, Wolfowitz to Head Special Hughes Task Force to Review Company 's < GM.N>
03.12.1999 161600 151600 BSW-REMINDER/Holiday  Retail Story  and Photo Opportunity ; Psychic Holiday  Helper at
03.12.1999 161600 151600 BSW-TSIG.com Partners with Coca-Cola for Superbowl Promotion < TSIG.OB>
03.12.1999 161600 151600 PRN-GoCo-op Completes Successful Round of Financing
03.12.1999 161600 151600 RNS-RNS-SVB Holdings PLC < SVB.L>  Directors'  Shareholdings
03.12.1999 161600 151600 RNS-RNS-Text 100 Group PLC Doc reAdmission to OFL,etc
03.12.1999 161600 151600 RTRS-FOCUS-Schroeder slams Britain, lauds France
03.12.1999 161600 151600 RTRS-Greenspan to attend Commerce Dept. press briefing
03.12.1999 161700 151700 BSW-UCSD Extension to Offer New Certificate in Clinical Trials Administration
03.12.1999 161700 151700 PRN-Vanguard Health Care Fund to Reopen to New Accounts
03.12.1999 161700 151700 RNS-RNS-Hull Trading UK EMM Disclosure< NWB.L>  < BSCT.L>  < RBOS.L>
03.12.1999 161700 151700 RNS-RNS-Lon.&Manchester Gp Circ re Resolution Passed
03.12.1999 161700 151700 RTRS-Saudi highway  robbers'  hands, feet chopped off
03.12.1999 161700 151700 RTRS-TABLE-Venezuela 2000 economic forecasts from IESA
03.12.1999 161700 151700 RTRS-Telecom Developement sees sales doubling in 1999
03.12.1999 161800 151800 RNS-RNS-Salomon Brothers EMM Disclosure< CW.L>
03.12.1999 161800 151800 RNS-RNS-Total Fina S.A. Statement re Production
03.12.1999 161800 151800 RTRS-Essar Steel < ESRG.BO>  notice to FRN holders
03.12.1999 161900 151900 RNS-RNS-British-BorneoOil&Gs < BBOR.L>  Rule 8 Disclosure
03.12.1999 161900 151900 RTRS-***GLANCE - Brazil top stories at 1515 GMT***
03.12.1999 161900 151900 RTRS-EU could have say  in Kirch-Murdoch deal-Germany
Date CET GMT News
01.12.1999 195500 185500 RTRS-Colombia sets jail terms for heinous crimes
01.12.1999 195900 185900 RTRS-FOCUS-Mozambique faces split vote in weekend polls
01.12.1999 200000 190000 BSW-ADVISORY/National Urban League Media Advisory
01.12.1999 200000 190000 RTRS-Insecticide from GM corn seeps into soil - study
01.12.1999 200000 190000 RTRS-U.S. ambassador to Haiti resigns
01.12.1999 200000 190000 RTRS-UK may  be forced to close nuclear plants -report
01.12.1999 200100 190100 RTRS-Iran welcomes Gulf Arab stand on islands row
01.12.1999 200300 190300 RTRS-Reuters World News highlights 1900 GMT, Dec 1
01.12.1999 200400 190400 BSW-National Boston Medical, Inc. Reports First Quarter Financial Results < NBMX.OB>
01.12.1999 200400 190400 RTRS-FOCUS-Italy  PM starts ground-breaking Liby a trip
01.12.1999 200500 190500 RTRS-DepoMed, Elan to develop gastric drug technology
01.12.1999 200600 190600 RTRS-Brazil' s UOL expands with Venezuela Internet portal
01.12.1999 200700 190700 RTRS-Momentous gene breakthrough heralded as milestone
01.12.1999 200700 190700 RTRS-Moody 's issues mutual fund report for November
01.12.1999 200800 190800 RTRS-Rolimpex< ROLIs.WA> group H1 loss up to PLN 38 mln
01.12.1999 201100 191100 RTRS-Opposition veteran leads in Guinea-Bissau poll
01.12.1999 201300 191300 RTRS-Macedonia coalition may  survive election row
01.12.1999 201400 191400 RTRS-Bass < BASS.L>  buy s Inter-Continental hotel lease
01.12.1999 201400 191400 RTRS-Vatican official urges WTO to listen to grassroots
01.12.1999 201500 191500 RTRS-California bus bank ads reach end of the line
01.12.1999 201600 191600 PRN-MDS Harris Names Ebi Kalahi Kimanani, Ph.D. to Newly  Created Position of Vice
01.12.1999 201600 191600 PRN-Pharmacia & Upjohn Scientists Isolate Important Alzheimer' s Disease < PNU.N>
01.12.1999 201800 191800 RTRS-FOCUS-U.S. FTC staff opposes BP Amoco-Arco merger
ALL ALERTS
POLITICAL NEWS
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TABLE 3.7.8 (cont.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Date CET GMT News
01.12.1999 104400 94400 RTRS-Indian Shipping-Bombay  Port berths, vessels status
01.12.1999 104400 94400 RTRS-KepFELS < KFEI.SI>  to buy  5.4 pct SPC stake
01.12.1999 104400 94400 RTRS-RESEARCH ALERT-ABN AMRO downgrades Allied < ALLD.L>
01.12.1999 104500 94500 RTRS-Finnish forestries gain on shift from techs
01.12.1999 104500 94500 RTRS-Hungary  forint eases vs band on y r-end uncertainty
01.12.1999 104500 94500 RTRS-LIFFE March cocoa falls sharply  in early  trade
01.12.1999 104500 94500 RTRS-Swiss shares shrug off early  losses
01.12.1999 104500 94500 RTRS-Telia-Telenor say s Esat rejected bid outright
01.12.1999 104600 94600 RTRS-Jordan, Iraq open talks on renewal of oil deal
01.12.1999 104600 94600 RTRS-Korea Aluminium-Suppliers, buy ers apart on premium
01.12.1999 104600 94600 RTRS-LIFFE coffee rockets above resistance
01.12.1999 104600 94600 RTRS-Mediator meets with Microsoft in Chicago - WSJ
01.12.1999 104600 94600 RTRS-Singapore stocks end lower, technology  stocks hit
01.12.1999 104800 94800 RTRS-LIFFE white sugar falls to new contract low
01.12.1999 104800 94800 RTRS-S.Africa rand moves firmer at midday , bonds steady
01.12.1999 104900 94900 RTRS-Croatia soon to complete Privredna selloff -paper
01.12.1999 104900 94900 RTRS-Ericsson, Sprint in CDMA infrastructure deal
01.12.1999 104900 94900 RTRS-LME aluminium gains early , stocks fall
01.12.1999 104900 94900 RTRS-PRESS DIGEST - Ireland - Dec 1
01.12.1999 104900 94900 RTRS-UK's Prescott say s air safety  not compromised
01.12.1999 104900 94900 WSC-North America Energy  Weather Summary
01.12.1999 105000 95000 RTRS-HKMA bought HK dlrs at convertibility  rate in Oct
01.12.1999 105100 95100 RTRS-Latvia Ventspils port seen closed all day  due wind
Date CET GMT News
01.12.1999 41400 31400 RTRS-IBRA to tender Astra < ASII.JK>  shares next week
01.12.1999 41700 31700 BSW-STREAMING VIDEO: December & January  -- Important Times To Think About Your
01.12.1999 42200 32200 RTRS-TAKE A LOOK - Korean grain buy ing < GRAIN/TRD/KR1>
01.12.1999 42500 32500 BSW-STREAMING VIDEO: Sears Creates Handy man's Heaven Online
01.12.1999 42500 32500 RTRS-U.S. candidates go cy ber for campaign fund-raising
01.12.1999 42600 32600 RTRS-CORRECTED-Olympus Optical to list sales unit in 2 y rs
01.12.1999 42600 32600 RTRS-PRESS DIGEST - British business press - December 1
01.12.1999 44200 34200 RTRS-Hatred of WTO spawns odd alliance in Seattle
01.12.1999 44600 34600 RTRS-Indonesian palm oil shipments Nov. 1-30
01.12.1999 44600 34600 RTRS-Philippines plans to buy  40,000 T U.S. soy , wheat
01.12.1999 45000 35000 RTRS-Canon< 7751.T>  wins Samsung< 05930.KS>  stepper order
01.12.1999 45300 35300 RTRS-CORRECTED - Profit-taking sends Toronto stocks spiraling down
01.12.1999 45500 35500 RTRS-Indonesia soymeal imports Nov. 1-30
01.12.1999 50000 40000 PRN-RateXchange Expands Finance Management < NAMI.OB>
01.12.1999 50100 40100 RTRS-Trifast < TRI.L>  sees S$20 mln from S'pore centre
01.12.1999 50200 40200 RTRS-Income tax for Vietnamese at foreign co's may  fall
01.12.1999 50400 40400 RTRS-TABLE-Hy undai Mtr Nov auto sales up 21.5 pct y r/y r
01.12.1999 50500 40500 RTRS-PRESS DIGEST - Financial Times - December 1
01.12.1999 50900 40900 RTRS-TABLE-Malay sia Powertek < PTEK.KL>  3-mth net rises
01.12.1999 50900 40900 RTRS-Timberline names senior vice presidents
01.12.1999 51500 41500 RTRS-HK exchange censures Q-tech < 0109.HK>
01.12.1999 51800 41800 RTRS-U.S. pushes Japan on giving up anti-dumping review
01.12.1999 52600 42600 RTRS-Japan say s not protectionist despite rice tariff
MARKET NEWS
INDUSTRIAL NEWS
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TABLE 3.7.8 (cont.) 
 
 
 
Date CET GMT News
02.12.1999 170000 160000 RTRS-CSCE coffee eyes 150 cts/lb on Brazil crop fears
02.12.1999 170000 160000 RTRS-Liby a vows to help stamp out terrorism
02.12.1999 170600 160600 RTRS-Dexia < DEXI.BR>  bids for rest of Dexia France
02.12.1999 170600 160600 RTRS-EU grants free-market grain at weekly  tender
02.12.1999 170600 160600 RTRS-Salzburg Festival names new artistic director
02.12.1999 170600 160600 RTRS-Soccer-Keny an champions stripped of title for match-fixing
02.12.1999 170900 160900 RTRS-Euro Debt-Prices fall as euro nears dollar parity
02.12.1999 171200 161200 Reuters Sports Summary  at 1545 GMT, Dec
02.12.1999 171200 161200 RTRS-ACNielsen< ART.N> buys UK media measurement firm MMS
02.12.1999 171200 161200 RTRS-INTERVIEW-Dexia sees no further merger with SocGen
02.12.1999 171300 161300 RTRS-Market Scrooges humbug European retailer rally
02.12.1999 171400 161400 RTRS-N.Ireland hopes peace will boost economy
02.12.1999 171500 161500 RTRS-Red Cross visits Algerian jails, first since 1992
02.12.1999 171500 161500 RTRS-S.African union to provide AZT for rape victims
02.12.1999 171600 161600 RTRS-EU sells intervention grain at weekly  tender
02.12.1999 171600 161600 RTRS-Paris CAC ends in red, dragged by  France Telecom
02.12.1999 171800 161800 RTRS-EU seen valuing French wheat around $90/tonne
02.12.1999 171800 161800 RTRS-Swiss Multimedia Co. Ly sis Buys UK-Based Concision
02.12.1999 171900 161900 RTRS-Five killed in fighting near Somali airstrip
02.12.1999 171900 161900 RTRS-FOCUS-U.S. new home sales reach record in October
02.12.1999 171900 161900 RTRS-Gefco< PEUP.PA> ey es 14 bln franc turnover next y ear
02.12.1999 171900 161900 RTRS-Lagardere < LAGA.PA>  rallies on Internet prospects
02.12.1999 172800 162800 RTRS-Canada trade sees big wheat and canola crops
Date CET GMT News
09.12.1999 82200 72200 RTRS-DIARY - Today  in Italy  - December 9
09.12.1999 82200 72200 RTRS-INDICATORS-Czech Republic-Dec 9
09.12.1999 82600 72600 RTRS-INDICATORS - Latvia - Dec 8
09.12.1999 83000 73000 RTRS-India will be among fastest growing mkts-Deutsche
09.12.1999 83000 73000 RTRS-TABLE-Opinion polls on Swedish membership of EMU
09.12.1999 83000 73000 RTRS-TECHNICALS-Forex market outlook and key  levels
09.12.1999 83500 73500 RTRS-Colt Telecom < CTM.L>  sets 320 mln euro cnv note
09.12.1999 83600 73600 RTRS-TABLE-Russia' s CPI 0.3 pct Nov 30-Dec 6
09.12.1999 83700 73700 RTRS-Swiss Nat Bank say s Q3 GDP as expected
09.12.1999 83900 73900 RTRS-TECHNICALS-Debt market outlook and key  levels
09.12.1999 84000 74000 RTRS-DIARY - Slovak Republic - to Dec 31
09.12.1999 84100 74100 RTRS-PRESS DIGEST- Spain - Dec 9
09.12.1999 84300 74300 RTRS-Dane Unidanmark's Tryg-Baltica buy s Norway 's Vesta
09.12.1999 84300 74300 RTRS-Euro drifts to day ' s lows against dollar in Europe
09.12.1999 84500 74500 RTRS-***INDICATORS - Slovak Republic - updated Dec 7***
09.12.1999 84600 74600 RTRS-S.Korea bonds end flat but sentiment better on won
09.12.1999 84700 74700 RTRS-Indonesia insists CPO exports roll on from Sumatra
09.12.1999 85300 75300 RTRS-French decision challenge to European Union-By rne
09.12.1999 85400 75400 BSW-S&P Rates Intl Credit Recovery  Japan One Y21 Bil. ABS
09.12.1999 85400 75400 RTRS-Duff&Phelps reaffirms S.Africa' s currency  ratings
09.12.1999 85600 75600 RTRS-Slovak November CPI up 0.4 pct mo/mo, 13.9 pct y r/y r
09.12.1999 85600 75600 RTRS-Slovak Q3 GDP up 0.6 pct y r/y r vs Q2 2.9 pct rise
09.12.1999 85700 75700 RTRS-German November steel output up 9.1 percent y/y
GENERAL NEWS
ECONOMIC NEWS
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TABLE 3.7.8 (cont.) 
 
 
 
Date CET GMT News
02.12.1999 172800 162800 RNS-RNS-Broadgate Investment < BGT.L>  Net Asset Value
02.12.1999 172800 162800 RNS-RNS-First Ireland Inv. < FIC.L>  Net Asset Value
02.12.1999 172900 162900 RTRS-CORRECTED - FACTBOX-Key  data on Novartis< NOVZn.S> /AstraZeneca< AZN.ST>
02.12.1999 172900 162900 RTRS-Software, Internet shares slump on Danish bourse
02.12.1999 173000 163000 PRN-New York' s Hottest Internet Executives Convene for First Ever Highland Capital
02.12.1999 173000 163000 RNS-RNS-Leveraged Inc Fd Ld < LIF.L>  Net Asset Value
02.12.1999 173000 163000 RTRS-Irish private sector lending edges higher in Oct
02.12.1999 173100 163100 PRN-Burnham Pacific Announces Fourth Quarter 1999 Dividend < BPP.N>
02.12.1999 173100 163100 RTRS-Portugal' s Colep surges on takeover talk
02.12.1999 173200 163200 RTRS-Suomi trustees okay  sale of Pohjola< POHBS.HE> stake
02.12.1999 173300 163300 RNS-RNS-Goldman Sachs. EMM Disclosure< RBOS.L>  < NWB.L>  < BSCT.L>  < BOC.L>
02.12.1999 173300 163300 RTRS-CORRECTED-AstraZeneca, Novartis did not discuss
02.12.1999 173300 163300 RTRS-Investors say  "I do!" to the Knot Inc. IPO
02.12.1999 173400 163400 RTRS-U.S. mortgage-backeds lower amid lively  dealings
02.12.1999 173500 163500 RTRS-Fitch IBCA cuts The Greenalls Group Plc ratings
02.12.1999 173700 163700 RTRS-RESEARCH ALERT - Brocade < BRCD.O>  target raised
02.12.1999 173800 163800 RTRS-TABLE-World's largest crop protection producers
02.12.1999 174100 164100 RNS-RNS-Bank of Scotland Gov < BSCT.L>  Rule 8 Disclosure
02.12.1999 174200 164200 RNS-RNS-Fidelity  Jap. Values < FJV.L>  Net Asset Value
02.12.1999 174200 164200 RTRS-Dexia seeks entry  into pan-European stock indices
02.12.1999 174200 164200 RTRS-Misy s< MSY.L>  play s down meetings as stock surges
02.12.1999 174200 164200 RTRS-RESEARCH ALERT - Broadcom < BRCM.O>  target raised
02.12.1999 174300 164300 PRN-National Discount Brokers Signs Marketing Agreement With Sandbox.com < NDB.N>
Date CET GMT News
02.12.1999 94100 84100 RTRS-Preussag< PRSG.DE> eyes link-ups with Club Med,Accor
02.12.1999 95300 85300 RTRS-Club Med < CMIP.PA>  soars on Preussag link idea
02.12.1999 122200 112200 RTRS-Preussag partnership talk boosts Club Med< CMIP.PA>
02.12.1999 154800 144800 RTRS-FOCUS-Preussag ey es ties with French tourism firms
02.12.1999 163600 153600 RTRS-Preussag say s open to any thing on Club Med, Accor
03.12.1999 102400 92400 RTRS-PRESS DIGEST - Portugal -- Dec 3
06.12.1999 133800 123800 RTRS-INTERVIEW-Accor< ACCP.PA>  to exploit voucher boom
13.12.1999 95400 85400 RTRS-Accor < ACCP.PA>  details investment plans - report
13.12.1999 145200 135200 RTRS-FOCUS-Preussag< PRSG.F>  CEO eyes more acquisitions
15.12.1999 174300 164300 RTRS-Accor confirms 99 net attrib up about 10 percent
16.12.1999 81600 71600 RTRS-French bourse seen opening up in wake of U.S.
20.12.1999 175900 165900 RTRS-Abidjan bourse higher, assurers boost volume
20.12.1999 204200 194200 RTRS-Accor< ACCP.PA>  adds 27 hotels to Australia chain
21.12.1999 90800 80800 RTRS-Accor< ACCP.PA> adds 27 hotels to its German network
21.12.1999 90800 80800 RTRS-Paris Bourse dips at open, but Bouygues jumps
21.12.1999 102700 92700 RTRS-Bass< BASS.L>  wins SPHC bid in Australia--report
21.12.1999 113500 103500 RTRS-Paris Bourse lower early  but Bouy gues sparkles
21.12.1999 121800 111800 RTRS-Paris Bourse off at midday , Bouygues still sizzles
21.12.1999 130300 120300 RTRS-FOCUS-Bass< BASS.L>  to win Australian hotels-source
22.12.1999 84300 74300 RTRS-Eurotunnel < ETL.L> < EUTL.PA>  in Accor hotel deal
28.12.1999 95400 85400 RTRS-PRESS DIGEST - France - December 28
14.01.2000 125800 115800 RTRS-RESEARCH ALERT-Deutsche starts NH Hoteles as buy
17.01.2000 42500 32500 RTRS-Bass < BASS.L>  continues Australian hotel buy  talks
*Firm specific sample considers news related to the Accor stocks
**Reuters is not the only  press agencies that publish its news on the Reuters terminal but also the Business Wire (BSW)
CORPORATE NEWS
FIRM-SPECIFIC NEWS
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TABLE 3.7.9.A: T-statistic for All Alerts News. This table reports the t-values resulting when 
testing two adjacent means against each other within successive intraday periods of 5 minutes for 
All Alerts News. The t- values consider the period from December 1, 1999 to March 31, 2000). 
(*) means that results are significant at 5% level of significance, whereas (**) indicates 
significance at 1% level. 
 
TIME ALL ALERTS VALUE OF DIFF. TIME ALL ALERTS VALUE OF DIFF. 
905 0.437
  2.986 **  
910 -0.245   1305 0.866  
  0.036  1.075  
915 -0.248   1310 0.567  
  -2.065 * -0.437  
920 0.028   1315 0.662  
  1.300  -3.096 ** 
925 -0.159   1320 1.983  
  0.438  0.537  
930 -0.210   1325 1.656  
  -1.138  2.134 * 
935 -0.079   1330 0.597  
  0.967  -1.393  
940 -0.191   1335 1.856  
  0.295  0.704  
945 -0.221   1340 1.096  
  -0.596  0.949  
950 -0.157   1345 0.502  
  0.409  -2.649 ** 
955 -0.202   1350 1.339  
  0.313  2.817 ** 
1000 -0.235   1355 0.410  
  -1.845  0.236  
1005 0.568   1400 0.363  
  1.733  -3.023 ** 
1010 -0.189   1405 1.335  
  0.220  0.978  
1015 -0.213   1410 0.964  
  -1.172  0.423  
1020 -0.069   1415 0.836  
  1.194  -4.074 ** 
1025 -0.216   1420 2.617  
  0.147  2.221 * 
1030 -0.231   1425 1.534  
  -0.966  1.534  
1035 -0.126   1430 1.031  
  0.534  -2.100 * 
1040 -0.186   1435 1.796  
  0.271  1.888  
1045 -0.215   1440 1.118  
  -0.566  1.972 * 
1050 -0.153   1445 0.759  
  0.685  -4.310 ** 
1055 -0.229   1450 1.619  
  0.130  4.427 ** 
1100 -0.242   1455 0.757  
  -3.032 ** 1.459  
1105 0.214   1500 0.618  
  2.048 * -2.261 * 
1110 -0.119   1505 1.240  
  -0.127  1.232  
1115 -0.102   1510 0.824  
  -2.913 ** -0.452  
1120 0.709   1515 0.943  
  2.883 ** -2.169 * 
1125 -0.092   1520 1.834  
  0.652  0.146  
1130 -0.172   1525 1.721  
  -0.475  1.015  
1135 -0.116   1530 0.974  
  0.283  -0.008  
1140 -0.149   1535 0.977  
  0.192  0.917  
1145 -0.171   1540 0.710  
  -1.632  0.372  
1150 0.073   1545 0.623  
  1.472  -0.915  
1155 -0.146   1550 0.851  
  0.119  1.404  
1200 -0.160   1555 0.515  
  -3.050 ** 0.075  
1205 0.451   1600 0.500  
  1.733  -1.305  
1210 0.063   1605 0.805  
  0.120  1.117  
1215 0.043   1610 0.540  
  -4.048 ** 0.252  
1220 1.245   1615 0.489  
  3.887 ** -2.637 ** 
1225 0.077   1620 1.163  
  0.818  2.570 * 
1230 -0.041   1625 0.502  
  -1.352  0.527  
1235 0.177   1630 0.402  
  1.233  -0.494  
1240 -0.030   1635 0.495  
  -0.173  -1.041  
1245 -0.005   1640 1.246  
  -2.483 * 0.539  
1250 0.525   1645 0.834  
  2.508 * 0.808  
1255 -0.003   1650 0.571  
  -0.475  0.669  
1300 0.071   1655 0.439  
  -2.997 ** -1.101  
1305 0.866   1700 1.459  
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TABLE 3.7.9.B: T-statistic for Political News. This table reports the t-values resulting when 
testing two adjacent means against each other within successive intraday periods of 5 minutes for 
Political News. The t- values consider the period from December 1, 1999 to March 30, 2000). (*) 
means that results are significant at 5% level of significance, whereas (**) indicates significance at 
1% level. 
 
 
TIME POLITICAL VALUE OF DIFF. TIME POLITICAL VALUE OF DIFF. 
905 1.213
  6.271 **   
910 0.398   1305 0.882   
  0.382  2.544 * 
915 0.367   1310 0.634   
  -2.155 * 0.161  
920 0.543   1315 0.621   
  1.129  -4.938 ** 
925 0.456   1320 1.087   
  -0.131  3.854 ** 
930 0.465   1325 0.722   
  -4.225 ** 1.452  
935 0.725   1330 0.588   
  5.355 ** -1.252  
940 0.394   1335 0.724   
  0.033  1.282  
945 0.392   1340 0.576   
  0.538  -0.137  
950 0.354   1345 0.592   
  -0.458  -3.752 ** 
955 0.387   1350 1.024   
  0.815  5.719 ** 
1000 0.338   1355 0.485   
  -5.054 ** 0.717  
1005 0.821   1400 0.440   
  3.996 ** -3.686 ** 
1010 0.431   1405 0.773   
  1.404  -0.050  
1015 0.322   1410 0.778   
  -1.712  0.982  
1020 0.442   1415 0.617   
  0.806  -3.413 ** 
1025 0.397   1420 1.501   
  0.682  2.334 * 
1030 0.356   1425 0.990   
  -4.230 ** 2.257 * 
1035 0.610   1430 0.789   
  3.942 ** -2.076 * 
1040 0.411   1435 0.938   
  0.317  2.192 * 
1045 0.395   1440 0.782   
  -0.063  -0.184  
1050 0.399   1445 0.800   
  0.355  -2.643 ** 
1055 0.376   1450 1.062   
  -0.530  2.490 * 
1100 0.410   1455 0.843   
  -6.963 ** 0.819  
1105 0.910   1500 0.774   
  5.413 ** -3.191 * 
1110 0.487   1505 1.202   
  -1.552  1.395  
1115 0.604   1510 1.000   
  -1.850  1.293  
1120 0.812   1515 0.867   
  2.244 * -4.205 ** 
1125 0.560   1520 1.311   
  0.883  3.556 ** 
1130 0.491   1525 0.978   
  0.280  1.426  
1135 0.471   1530 0.865   
  -0.903  -2.714 ** 
1140 0.520   1535 1.089   
  0.317  2.145 * 
1145 0.498   1540 0.938   
  -1.823  0.326  
1150 0.682   1545 0.916   
  0.552  -2.276 * 
1155 0.628   1550 1.080   
  1.101  2.724 ** 
1200 0.545   1555 0.876   
  -8.481 ** -0.201  
1205 1.221   1600 0.891   
  6.054 ** -2.296 * 
1210 0.781   1605 1.144   
  -0.300  1.175  
1215 0.798   1610 1.016   
  -3.690 ** 0.262  
1220 1.225   1615 1.000   
  3.946 ** -3.825 ** 
1225 0.729   1620 1.269   
  0.533  2.370 * 
1230 0.692   1625 1.075   
  -1.079  2.586 ** 
1235 0.750   1630 0.906   
  1.737  -2.205 * 
1240 0.650   1635 1.010   
  -0.849  0.177  
1245 0.703   1640 0.998   
  -1.332  0.464  
1250 0.810   1645 0.964   
  4.195 ** -2.119 * 
1255 0.419   1650 1.091   
  -0.467  -0.784  
1300 0.457   1655 1.135   
  -4.724 ** 1.907  
1305 0.882   1700 1.014   
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TABLE 3.7.9.C: T-statistic for Market News. This table reports the t-values resulting when 
testing two adjacent means against each other within successive intraday periods of 5 minutes for 
Market News. The t- values consider the period from December 1, 1999 to March 30, 2000). (*) 
means that results are significant at 5% level of significance, whereas (**) indicates significance at 
1% level. 
 
TIME MARKET VALUE OF DIFF. TIME MARKET VALUE OF DIFF. 
905 0.550
  2.025 *   
910 -0.072   1305 0.432   
  0.060  0.749  
915 -0.083   1310 0.166   
  0.065  0.074  
920 -0.095   1315 0.145   
  -0.901  -1.283  
925 0.102   1320 0.691   
  -0.206  -0.127  
930 0.151   1325 0.776   
  0.337  0.031  
935 0.074   1330 0.754   
  1.013  -0.450  
940 -0.151   1335 1.077   
  -0.561  0.381  
945 -0.034   1340 0.827   
  0.175  -0.461  
950 -0.068   1345 1.161   
  0.179  0.385  
955 -0.104   1350 0.883   
  -0.278  -0.266  
1000 -0.045   1355 1.035   
  -1.859  1.122  
1005 0.926   1400 0.421   
  1.463  -1.862  
1010 0.165   1405 1.692   
  -1.023  1.377  
1015 0.523   1410 0.700   
  0.531  0.080  
1020 0.317   1415 0.663   
  1.808  -0.026  
1025 -0.170   1420 0.672   
  -1.004  0.726  
1030 0.001   1425 0.418   
  -0.552  0.643  
1035 0.197   1430 0.215   
  -0.092  -1.964 * 
1040 0.244   1435 0.792   
  0.266  0.684  
1045 0.121   1440 0.593   
  -0.438  -0.936  
1050 0.377   1445 1.868   
  0.073  0.473  
1055 0.324   1450 1.163   
  0.675  0.614  
1100 -0.027   1455 0.719   
  -1.153  0.173  
1105 0.242   1500 0.642   
  0.933  -0.588  
1110 0.014   1505 0.875   
  0.836  1.047  
1115 -0.165   1510 0.477   
  -0.738  -0.503  
1120 -0.003   1515 0.639   
  0.478  -1.107  
1125 -0.105   1520 1.082   
  -0.090  0.769  
1130 -0.088   1525 0.758   
  0.517  -1.137  
1135 -0.184   1530 2.125   
  0.124  0.111  
1140 -0.209   1535 1.971   
  0.153  0.950  
1145 -0.242   1540 1.166   
  -0.387  -0.165  
1150 -0.168   1545 1.291   
  0.012  1.115  
1155 -0.171   1550 0.549   
  -0.138  -0.985  
1200 -0.146   1555 1.300   
  -2.182 * 1.050  
1205 0.470   1600 0.522   
  1.077  -0.583  
1210 0.129   1605 0.700   
  0.549  0.567  
1215 -0.006   1610 0.489   
  -0.055  0.363  
1220 0.006   1615 0.369   
  0.955  -0.702  
1225 -0.186   1620 0.703   
  -0.668  0.613  
1230 -0.063   1625 0.405   
  -0.783  0.654  
1235 0.160   1630 0.210   
  0.205  -1.142  
1240 0.091   1635 3.972   
  -0.163  0.820  
1245 0.149   1640 1.160   
  -0.258  0.329  
1250 0.251   1645 0.798   
  0.365  0.579  
1255 0.136   1650 0.470   
  -0.154  0.973  
1300 0.180   1655 0.227   
  -0.672  0.001  
1305 0.432   1700 0.227   
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TABLE 3.7.9.D: T-statistic for Industrial News. This table reports the t-values resulting 
when testing two adjacent means against each other within successive intraday periods of 5 
minutes for Industrial News. The t- values consider the period from December 1, 1999 to March 
30, 2000). (*) means that results are significant at 5% level of significance, whereas (**) indicates 
significance at 1% level. 
 
TIME INDUSTRIAL VALUE OF DIFF. TIME INDUSTRIAL VALUE OF DIFF. 
905 -0.389
  1.462    
910 -0.487   1305 1.651   
  1.179  2.103 * 
915 -0.542   1310 0.726   
  -6.450 ** -0.243  
920 -0.337   1315 0.821   
  4.932 ** -5.404 ** 
925 -0.509   1320 4.198   
  0.676  1.834  
930 -0.535   1325 2.581   
  -3.098 ** 1.850  
935 -0.420   1330 1.147   
  3.170 ** -0.647  
940 -0.525   1335 1.413   
  0.258  3.100 ** 
945 -0.532   1340 0.574   
  -1.355  0.593  
950 -0.491   1345 0.422   
  0.201  -5.366 ** 
955 -0.498   1350 2.522   
  0.323  4.294 ** 
1000 -0.509   1355 0.815   
  -3.475 ** 0.479  
1005 -0.343   1400 0.721   
  2.394 * -4.774 ** 
1010 -0.476   1405 2.695   
  -0.028  1.654  
1015 -0.475   1410 1.809   
  -3.696 ** 0.687  
1020 -0.165   1415 1.541   
  3.887 ** -7.968 ** 
1025 -0.500   1420 5.485   
  -0.168  3.705 ** 
1030 -0.494   1425 3.336   
  -1.673  5.294 ** 
1035 -0.422   1430 1.324   
  0.998  -1.457  
1040 -0.472   1435 1.692   
  0.917  3.414 ** 
1045 -0.508   1440 0.961   
  -2.846 ** 2.894 ** 
1050 -0.376   1445 0.645   
  2.252 * -5.008 ** 
1055 -0.497   1450 2.269   
  -0.310  4.507 ** 
1100 -0.483   1455 0.773   
  -3.043 ** -0.434  
1105 -0.077   1500 0.826   
  2.058 * -3.183 ** 
1110 -0.383   1505 2.138   
  -0.061  1.468  
1115 -0.378   1510 1.450   
  -4.105 ** 1.839  
1120 1.270   1515 0.968   
  3.801 ** -4.014 ** 
1125 -0.264   1520 3.424   
  2.475 * 2.703 ** 
1130 -0.456   1525 1.539   
  -1.546  2.136 * 
1135 -0.337   1530 0.777   
  1.065  -1.985 * 
1140 -0.414   1535 1.012   
  -0.221  3.342 ** 
1145 -0.402   1540 0.654   
  -3.783 ** 0.640  
1150 0.071   1545 0.608   
  3.655 ** -3.783 ** 
1155 -0.373   1550 1.096   
  1.876  4.281 ** 
1200 -0.460   1555 0.575   
  -4.751 ** 0.028  
1205 0.516   1600 0.574   
  2.499 * -3.508 ** 
1210 -0.104   1605 1.107   
  0.287  2.105 * 
1215 -0.148   1610 0.742   
  -7.402 ** 1.132  
1220 2.566   1615 0.616   
  6.555 ** -7.413 ** 
1225 0.140   1620 1.958   
  3.496 ** 7.096 ** 
1230 -0.221   1625 0.691   
  -3.317 ** 2.617 ** 
1235 0.262   1630 0.522   
  2.586 ** -3.366 ** 
1240 -0.151   1635 0.710   
  -0.247  2.772 ** 
1245 -0.118   1640 0.562   
  -4.542 ** -0.456  
1250 1.036   1645 0.585   
  4.120 ** -3.255 ** 
1255 -0.032   1650 0.846   
  -0.732  3.733 ** 
1300 0.097   1655 0.511   
  -4.248 ** -0.836  
1305 1.651   1700 0.568   
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TABLE 3.7.9.E: T-statistic for General News. This table reports the t-values resulting when 
testing two adjacent means against each other within successive intraday periods of 5 minutes for 
General News. The t- values consider the period from December 1, 1999 to March 30, 2000). (*) 
means that results are significant at 5% level of significance, whereas (**) indicates significance at 
1% level. 
 
TIME GENERAL VALUE OF DIFF. TIME GENERAL VALUE OF DIFF. 
905 0.127
  2.186 *   
910 0.028   1305 0.552   
  0.917  1.082  
915 -0.022   1310 0.353   
  -3.095 ** 1.141  
920 0.782   1315 0.247   
  1.316  -4.333 ** 
925 0.363   1320 0.833   
  1.423  1.826  
930 0.083   1325 0.522   
  0.476  1.590  
935 0.053   1330 0.280   
  1.166  -1.729  
940 -0.002   1335 0.504   
  -0.418  2.632 ** 
945 0.016   1340 0.209   
  1.459  1.354  
950 -0.058   1345 0.101   
  -1.027  -6.053 ** 
955 0.002   1350 0.637   
  0.764  5.313 ** 
1000 -0.046   1355 0.214   
  -1.432  -0.430  
1005 0.038   1400 0.243   
  1.199  -2.734 ** 
1010 -0.021   1405 1.056   
  0.201  0.997  
1015 -0.030   1410 0.696   
  -1.842  0.832  
1020 0.089   1415 0.491   
  1.852  -5.266 ** 
1025 -0.034   1420 1.316   
  -0.985  4.690 ** 
1030 0.023   1425 0.766   
  -0.581  3.389 ** 
1035 0.060   1430 0.457   
  1.114  -1.716  
1040 -0.010   1435 0.787   
  0.667  2.167 * 
1045 -0.043   1440 0.369   
  0.648  0.433  
1050 -0.075   1445 0.334   
  -0.727  -3.957 ** 
1055 -0.035   1450 0.722   
  0.468  4.620 ** 
1100 -0.061   1455 0.299   
  -8.081 ** -1.359  
1105 0.439   1500 0.375   
  6.234 ** -2.892 ** 
1110 0.014   1505 1.179   
  0.717  1.838  
1115 -0.033   1510 0.601   
  -3.349 ** 1.089  
1120 0.377   1515 0.417   
  2.786 ** -4.278 ** 
1125 0.035   1520 0.972   
  0.132  2.913 ** 
1130 0.027   1525 0.607   
  0.173  2.372 * 
1135 0.018   1530 0.404   
  -0.597  -1.304  
1140 0.053   1535 0.546   
  0.542  2.024 * 
1145 0.022   1540 0.343   
  -2.062 * -0.305  
1150 0.184   1545 0.358   
  1.748  -1.958  
1155 0.038   1550 0.487   
  0.687  1.027  
1200 -0.004   1555 0.408   
  -6.959 ** 1.912  
1205 0.731   1600 0.276   
  5.236 ** -2.883 ** 
1210 0.173   1605 0.689   
  0.547  1.548  
1215 0.137   1610 0.455   
  -4.418 ** 0.596  
1220 0.632   1615 0.410   
  4.331 ** -4.770 ** 
1225 0.115   1620 0.737   
  -0.129  5.598 ** 
1230 0.125   1625 0.356   
  -2.370 ** -1.689  
1235 0.273   1630 0.467   
  3.799 ** 0.658  
1240 0.017   1635 0.408   
  -0.649  -0.058  
1245 0.054   1640 0.413   
  -3.055 ** 0.372  
1250 0.234   1645 0.389   
  3.398 ** -0.881  
1255 0.036   1650 0.447   
  -0.591  0.931  
1300 0.069   1655 0.389   
  -2.707 ** 0.834  
1305 0.552   1700 0.323   
 
CHAPTER 3 – Tables 
  
 
 207 
TABLE 3.7.9.F: T-statistic for Economic News. This table reports the t-values resulting 
when testing two adjacent means against each other within successive intraday periods of 5 
minutes for Economic News. The t- values consider the period from December 1, 1999 to 
March 30, 2000). (*) means that results are significant at 5% level of significance, whereas (**) 
indicates significance at 1% level. 
 
TIME ECONOMIC VALUE OF DIFF. TIME ECONOMIC VALUE OF DIFF. 
905 0.683
  9.026 **   
910 0.068   1305 0.783   
  0.354  3.899 ** 
915 0.044   1310 0.477   
  -1.493  0.499  
920 0.142   1315 0.430   
  1.482  -3.729 ** 
925 0.021   1320 1.487   
  0.054  1.481  
930 0.016   1325 0.934   
  -5.102 ** 1.340  
935 0.418   1330 0.526   
  1.836  -1.438  
940 0.281   1335 0.811   
  1.765  2.366 * 
945 0.162   1340 0.470   
  1.080  0.103  
950 0.103   1345 0.456   
  0.553  -3.494 ** 
955 0.062   1350 1.186   
  -0.177  3.371 ** 
1000 0.075   1355 0.546   
  -4.998 ** 2.246 * 
1005 0.592   1400 0.393   
  3.834 ** -6.295 ** 
1010 0.183   1405 0.980   
  0.828  2.812 ** 
1015 0.127   1410 0.616   
  -1.371  -0.441  
1020 0.226   1415 0.673   
  2.675 ** -4.691 ** 
1025 0.039   1420 1.685   
  -0.060  2.963 ** 
1030 0.043   1425 0.982   
  -3.245 ** 3.647 ** 
1035 0.264   1430 0.520   
  2.757 ** -6.045 ** 
1040 0.070   1435 1.064   
  0.602  3.758 ** 
1045 0.031   1440 0.656   
  0.349  0.892  
1050 0.011   1445 0.583   
  0.579  -4.416 ** 
1055 -0.012   1450 1.125   
  -0.701  4.063 ** 
1100 0.025   1455 0.612   
  -9.946 ** -0.497  
1105 0.824   1500 0.663   
  7.243 ** -4.321 ** 
1110 0.188   1505 1.174   
  0.648  4.931 ** 
1115 0.142   1510 0.707   
  -4.663 ** -0.200  
1120 0.872   1515 0.722   
  4.767 ** -4.784 ** 
1125 0.128   1520 1.391   
  2.128 * 4.048 ** 
1130 0.034   1525 0.792   
  -2.650 ** 1.098  
1135 0.128   1530 0.702   
  1.534  -1.681  
1140 0.072   1535 0.796   
  2.030 * 4.221 ** 
1145 -0.001   1540 0.590   
  -0.719  0.285  
1150 0.039   1545 0.577   
  1.538  -2.505 ** 
1155 -0.045   1550 0.739   
  -1.269  3.205 ** 
1200 -0.002   1555 0.536   
  -11.735 ** -2.528 * 
1205 0.818   1600 0.671   
  8.900 ** -2.690 ** 
1210 0.143   1605 0.940   
  -0.239  3.564 ** 
1215 0.155   1610 0.574   
  -4.294 ** -0.378  
1220 0.838   1615 0.600   
  4.431 ** -4.455 ** 
1225 0.121   1620 1.035   
  0.542  5.272 ** 
1230 0.090   1625 0.556   
  -2.106 * -0.210  
1235 0.244   1630 0.567   
  1.239  -2.784 ** 
1240 0.145   1635 0.719   
  -0.750  3.370 ** 
1245 0.208   1640 0.535   
  -2.446 * -0.070  
1250 0.615   1645 0.538   
  1.971 * -1.931  
1255 0.271   1650 0.632   
  0.041  2.560 * 
1300 0.267   1655 0.502   
  -6.416 ** 1.271  
1305 0.783   1700 0.409   
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TABLE 3.7.9.G: T-statistic for Corporate News. This table reports the t-values resulting 
when testing two adjacent means against each other within successive intraday periods of 5 
minutes for Economic News. The t- values consider the period from December 1, 1999 to 
March 30, 2000). (*) means that results are significant at 5% level of significance, whereas (**) 
indicates significance at 1% level. 
 
TIME CORPORATE VALUE OF DIFF. TIME CORPORATE VALUE OF DIFF. 
905 0.068
  2.037 *   
910 -0.096   1305 0.745   
  0.373  1.924  
915 -0.120   1310 0.404   
  -3.054 ** 0.393  
920 0.084   1315 0.344   
  3.080 ** -5.556 ** 
925 -0.108   1320 1.627   
  -0.478  2.095 * 
930 -0.077   1325 0.956   
  -2.720 ** 1.606  
935 0.175   1330 0.502   
  3.071 ** -2.191 * 
940 -0.088   1335 0.927   
  0.208  3.263 ** 
945 -0.101   1340 0.420   
  -0.691  0.575  
950 -0.056   1345 0.350   
  -0.023  -5.395 ** 
955 -0.055   1350 1.494   
  0.431  4.538 ** 
1000 -0.085   1355 0.467   
  -3.558 ** 0.711  
1005 0.180   1400 0.367   
  2.671 ** -4.229 ** 
1010 -0.030   1405 0.964   
  0.313  0.677  
1015 -0.053   1410 0.857   
  -1.482  0.702  
1020 0.076   1415 0.766   
  2.498 * -6.387 ** 
1025 -0.133   1420 2.162   
  -0.480  3.672 ** 
1030 -0.105   1425 1.266   
  -2.553 * 3.426 ** 
1035 0.042   1430 0.714   
  2.278 * -2.518 * 
1040 -0.095   1435 1.047   
  -0.378  2.154 * 
1045 -0.070   1440 0.729   
  -0.303  0.713  
1050 -0.051   1445 0.614   
  0.129  -3.514 ** 
1055 -0.059   1450 1.428   
  -0.703  3.477 ** 
1100 -0.011   1455 0.673   
  -3.308 ** 0.413  
1105 0.278   1500 0.623   
  2.512 * -2.939 ** 
1110 0.053   1505 1.044   
  0.883  1.968 * 
1115 -0.010   1510 0.764   
  -4.354 ** 0.075  
1120 0.707   1515 0.756   
  4.054 ** -4.013 ** 
1125 0.024   1520 1.644   
  0.727  2.893 ** 
1130 -0.032   1525 0.926   
  -1.084  1.530  
1135 0.056   1530 0.706   
  1.566  -1.955  
1140 -0.057   1535 0.887   
  0.928  2.016 * 
1145 -0.106   1540 0.670   
  -2.182 * 0.594  
1150 0.082   1545 0.600   
  1.318  -1.933  
1155 -0.032   1550 0.805   
  0.605  2.597 ** 
1200 -0.065   1555 0.539   
  -4.652 ** -0.654  
1205 0.649   1600 0.602   
  2.444 * -2.302 * 
1210 0.202   1605 0.815   
  0.560  1.275  
1215 0.136   1610 0.656   
  -5.656 ** 0.131  
1220 1.163   1615 0.640   
  5.522 ** -3.775 ** 
1225 0.140   1620 1.083   
  1.977 * 3.209 ** 
1230 -0.000   1625 0.641   
  -2.713 ** 0.881  
1235 0.297   1630 0.529   
  1.902  -1.443  
1240 0.054   1635 0.673   
  0.856  0.969  
1245 -0.019   1640 0.588   
  -4.703 ** -0.474  
1250 0.562   1645 0.629   
  4.847 ** -0.011  
1255 -0.062   1650 0.630   
  -1.018  -0.112  
1300 0.017   1655 0.642   
  -5.289 ** 1.702  
1305 0.745   1700 0.483   
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TABLE 3.7.10.A: Mean equality test among months of the year and days of the week for 
All Alerts News: This test is based on a single-factor, between-subjects, analysis of variance 
(ANOVA). The basic idea is that if the subgroups have the same mean, then the variability 
between the sample means (between group) should be the same as the variability within any 
subgroup (within group).This test covers a one year period (December 1, 1999 – November 30, 
2000) by month of the year and by day of the week within successive intraday periods of five 
minutes for All Alerts news related and non- to France. 
 
All Alerts news 
 
 
 
All Alerts news France 
 
 
M ethod df V alue Pr obability M ethod df V alue Pr obabilit y
A nov a F-stat ist ic (8,  2583) 4.837 0.000 A nov a F-stat ist ic (4,  1435) 5.511 0.000
Sour ce of  V ar iat ion df Sum  of Sq. M ean  Sq. Source of  V ar iat ion df Sum  of Sq. M ean  Sq.
Betw een 8 3329.235 416.154 Betw een 4 2316.198 579.050
W ith in 2583 222227.000 86.034 W ithin 1435 150773.900 105.069
Total 2591 225556.200 87.054 Total 1439 153090.100 106.386
Std. Er r . S td. Er r .
V ar iable C ount M ean Std. D ev . of  M ean V ar iable C ount M ean Std. D ev . of  M ean
D EC EM BER 288 11.792 7.610 0.448 M O N D A Y 288 15.533 11.246 0.663
JA N U A R Y 288 13.108 8.953 0.528 TU ESD A Y 288 17.008 11.323 0.667
FEBR U A R Y 288 15.118 10.104 0.595 W ED NESD A Y 288 16.955 10.823 0.638
M A R C H 288 15.161 10.167 0.599 TH U R SD A Y 288 16.368 10.152 0.598
A PR IL 288 13.306 9.105 0.537 FR ID A Y 288 13.588 7.104 0.419
M A Y 288 15.250 9.916 0.584 A ll 1440 15.890 10.314 0.272
SEPTEM BER 288 13.257 8.935 0.526
O C TO BER 288 14.600 9.767 0.576
N O V EM BER 288 14.578 8.622 0.508
A ll 2592 14.019 9.330 0.183
A nalysis of  V ar iance A nalysis of  V ar iance
C ategor y  S tat ist ics C ategor y  Stat ist ics
Method df Value Probability Method df V alue Probability
A nov a F-stat ist ic (8, 2583) 5.485 0.000 A nova F-statistic (4, 1435) 4.747 0.001
Source of V ar iation df Sum of Sq. Mean Sq. Source of Var iat ion df Sum of Sq. Mean Sq.
Between 8.000 4.146 0.518 Between 4.000 2.636 0.659
W ithin 2583.000 244.088 0.094 W ithin 1435.000 199.218 0.139
Total 2591.000 248.235 0.096 Total 1439.000 201.854 0.140
Std. Err . Std. Err .
Var iable C ount Mean Std. Dev . of Mean V ar iable C ount Mean Std. Dev . of Mean
DEC EMBER 288.000 0.340 0.269 0.016 MO NDA Y 288.000 0.439 0.339 0.020
JA NUA RY 288.000 0.396 0.303 0.018 TUESDA Y 288.000 0.514 0.379 0.022
FEBRU A RY 288.000 0.457 0.353 0.021 W EDNESDA Y 288.000 0.534 0.381 0.022
MA RC H 288.000 0.469 0.347 0.020 THU RSDA Y 288.000 0.555 0.418 0.025
A PRIL 288.000 0.351 0.270 0.016 FRIDA Y 288.000 0.467 0.339 0.020
MA Y 288.000 0.419 0.322 0.019 A ll 1440.000 0.502 0.375 0.010
SEPTEMBER 288.000 0.418 0.292 0.017
O C TO BER 288.000 0.412 0.307 0.018
NO V EMBER 288.000 0.404 0.291 0.017
A ll 2592.000 0.407 0.310 0.006
A nalysis of Var iance A nalysis of V ar iance
C ategory Statistics C ategory Stat ist ics
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TABLE 3.7.10.B: Median equality tests among months of the year and days of the week 
for All Alerts News: This table reports various rank-based nonparametric tests of the hypothesis 
that the subgroups have the same median, against the alternative that at least one subgroup has a 
different median. Kruskal-Wallis one-way ANOVA by ranks test. This is a generalization of 
the Mann-Whitney test to more than two subgroups. The test is based on a one-way analysis of 
variance using only ranks of the data. The Table reports the chi-square approximation to the 
Kruskal-Wallis test statistic (with tie correction). Under the null hypothesis, this statistic is 
approximately distributed as a 2χ  with the number of subgroups-1 degrees of freedom (see 
Sheskin, 1997). Van der Waerden (normal scores) test. This test is analogous to the Kruskal-
Wallis test, except that the ranks are smoothed by converting them into normal quantiles 
(Conover, 1980). This table reports a statistic which is approximately distributed as a 2χ  with the 
number of subgroups -1 degrees of freedom under the null hypothesis. Chi-square test for the 
median. This is a rank-based ANOVA test based on the comparison of the number of 
observations above and below the overall median in each subgroup. This test is also known as 
the median test (Conover, 1980). These tests cover a one year period (December 1, 1999 – 
November 30, 2000) by month of the year and by day of the week within successive intraday 
periods of five minutes for All Alerts news related and non- to France. 
 
All Alerts news 
 
 
All Alerts news France 
 
 
Method df V alue Probability Method df V alue Probability
Med. C hi-square 8.000 66.429 0.000 Med. C hi-square 4.000 22.789 0.000
A dj. Med. C hi-square 8.000 64.000 0.000 A dj. Med. C hi-square 4.000 21.595 0.000
K ruskal-W allis 8.000 52.251 0.000 K ruskal-W allis 4.000 18.001 0.001
v an der  W aerden 8.000 60.732 0.000 v an der  W aerden 4.000 24.470 0.000
>  O v erall >  O v erall
V ar iable C ount Median Median Mean Rank Mean Score V ar iable C ount Median Median Mean Rank
D EC EMBER 288 10.629 102.000 1098.851 -0.281 MO ND A Y 288.000 13.221 126.000 672.764
JA NU A RY 288 11.226 120.000 1198.913 -0.138 TU ESD A Y 288.000 14.519 155.000 754.946
FEBRU A RY 288 12.793 162.000 1380.302 0.128 W ED NESD A Y 288.000 15.009 162.000 768.476
MA RC H 288 13.403 174.000 1403.668 0.155 THU RSD A Y 288.000 14.726 158.000 750.271
A PRIL 288 11.567 128.000 1220.017 -0.125 FRID A Y 288.000 12.731 118.000 656.043
MA Y 288 13.387 173.000 1421.280 0.174 A ll 1440.000 14.077 719.000 720.500
SEPTEMBER 288 11.900 137.000 1233.267 -0.075
O C TO BER 288 12.371 147.000 1324.507 0.025
NO V EMBER 288 12.483 152.000 1387.694 0.137
A ll 2592 12.233 1295.000 1296.500 0.000
C ategory Stat ist ics C ategory Stat ist ics
M et h o d df V alu e Pr obabil it y M et h o d df V alu e P r o babil it y
M ed. C h i-squ ar e 8 .000 14.773 0.064 M ed. C h i-squ ar e 4.000 2 .961 0 .564
A dj. M ed. C h i-squ ar e 8 .000 13.767 0.088 A dj. M ed. C h i-squ ar e 4.000 2 .540 0 .638
K r u skal-W al l is 8 .000 34.681 0.000 K r u sk al-W al l is 4.000 16 .373 0 .003
v an  der  W aer den 8 .000 44.221 0.000 v an  der  W aer den 4.000 25 .220 0 .000
>  O v er al l >  O v er al l
V ar iab le C ou n t M edian M edian M ean  R an k M ean  S co r e V ar iab le C o u n t M edian M edian M ean  R an k
D EC EM BER 288.000 0 .290 120.000 1138.231 -0 .211 M O N D A Y 288 .000 0.413 134 .000 646 .420
JA N U A R Y 288.000 0 .355 143.000 1271.148 -0 .028 TU ES D A Y 288 .000 0.500 149 .000 734 .240
FEBR U A R Y 288.000 0 .431 157.000 1396.321 0 .167 W ED N ES D A Y 288 .000 0.528 149 .000 755 .339
M A R C H 288.000 0 .419 154.000 1415.227 0 .193 TH U R S D A Y 288 .000 0.509 148 .000 769 .399
A P R IL 288.000 0 .333 130.000 1178.075 -0 .175 F R ID A Y 288 .000 0.404 137 .000 697 .102
M A Y 288.000 0 .387 147.000 1311.753 0 .025 A ll 1440 .000 0.462 717 .000 720 .500
S EP TEM BER 288.000 0 .400 145.000 1354.134 0 .084
O C TO BER 288.000 0 .419 148.000 1298.095 -0 .010
N O V EM BER 288.000 0 .367 141.000 1305.516 -0 .003
A ll 2592.000 0 .367 1285.000 1296.500 0 .005
C at ego r y  S t at ist ics C at egor y  S t at ist ics
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TABLE 3.7.10.C: Variance equality tests among months of the year and days of the week 
for All Alerts news: Tests the null hypothesis that the variances in all subgroups are equal 
against the alternative that at least one subgroup has a different variance. See Conover, et al. 
(1981) for a general discussion of variance testing. Bartlett test. This test compares the 
logarithm of the weighted average variance with the weighted sum of the logarithms of the 
variances. Under the joint null hypothesis that the subgroup variances are equal and that the 
sample is normally distributed, the test statistic is approximately distributed as a 2χ  with the 
number of subgroups-1 degrees of freedom. Note, however, that the joint hypothesis implies 
that this test is sensitive to departures from normality. Levene test. This test is based on an 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) of the absolute difference from the mean. The F-statistic for the 
Levene test has an approximate F-distribution with the number of subgroups -1 numerator 
degrees of freedom and N- the number of subgroups denominator degrees of freedom under the 
null hypothesis of equal variances in each subgroup (Levene, 1960). Brown-Forsythe (modified 
Levene) test. This is a modification of the Levene test in which the absolute mean difference is 
replaced with the absolute median difference and appears to be a superior test in terms of 
robustness and power (Conover, et al. (1981), Brown and Forsythe (1974), Neter, et al. 
(1996)).These test cover a one year period (December 1, 1999 – November 30, 2000) by month 
of the year and by day of the week within successive intraday periods of five minutes for All 
Alerts News related and non- to France. 
 
All Alerts news 
 
 
 
All Alerts news France 
 
M eth od df V alu e Pr obability M ethod df V alu e Pr obability
Bar t let t 8.000 38.205 0.000 Bar t let t 4.000 74.363 0.000
Lev en e (8,  2583) 3.505 0.001 Lev en e (4,  1435) 9.731 0.000
Br ow n -For sy th e (8,  2583) 2.573 0.009 Br ow n -For sy the (4,  1435) 6.871 0.000
C ategor y  Stat ist ics C ategor y  Stat ist ics
M ean A bs. M ean  A bs. M ean  A bs. M ean A bs.
V ar iable C ou n t Std. D ev . M ean D iff . M edian  D iff . V ar iable C oun t Std. D ev . M ean  D iff . M edian  D iff .
D EC EM BER 288.000 7.610 5.547 5.385 M O N D A Y 288.000 11.246 8.388 8.075
JA N U A R Y 288.000 8.953 6.740 6.465 TU ESD A Y 288.000 11.323 8.618 8.281
FEBR U A R Y 288.000 10.104 7.606 7.251 W ED N ESD A Y 288.000 10.823 8.206 7.960
M A R C H 288.000 10.167 7.221 6.932 TH U R SD A Y 288.000 10.152 7.719 7.520
A PR IL 288.000 9.105 6.811 6.595 FR ID A Y 288.000 7.104 5.599 5.554
M A Y 288.000 9.916 7.163 6.938 A ll 1440.000 10.314 7.706 7.478
SEPTEM BER 288.000 8.935 6.541 6.374
O C TO BER 288.000 9.767 7.709 7.361 Bar tlet t  w eigh ted standard deviat ion :  10.25031
N O V EM BER 288.000 8.622 6.203 5.893
A ll 2592.000 9.330 6.838 6.577
Bar t let t  w eigh ted stan dard dev iat ion :  9.275476
M et h o d df V alu e P r o bab il it y M et h o d d f V alu e P r o b abil it y
Bar t let t 8 .000 44 .292 0 .000 B ar t let t 4 .000 18 .399 0 .001
Lev en e (8 ,  2583 ) 9 .748 0 .000 Lev en e (4 ,  1435) 8 .989 0 .000
Br o w n -F o r sy t h e (8 ,  2583 ) 9 .074 0 .000 B r o w n -F o r sy t h e (4 ,  1435) 8 .387 0 .000
M ean  A b s. M ean  A bs. M ean  A bs. M ean  A b s.
V ar iab le C o u n t S t d . D ev . M ean  D if f . M edian  D if f . V ar iab le C o u n t S t d . D ev . M ean  D if f . M edian  D if f .
D EC EM B ER 288 .000 0 .269 0 .230 0 .228 M O N D A Y 288 .000 0 .339 0 .304 0 .303
JA N U A R Y 288 .000 0 .303 0 .265 0 .265 TU ES D A Y 288 .000 0 .379 0 .341 0 .341
F EB R U A R Y 288 .000 0 .353 0 .309 0 .308 W ED N ES D A Y 288 .000 0 .381 0 .338 0 .338
M A R C H 288 .000 0 .347 0 .304 0 .302 TH U R S D A Y 288 .000 0 .418 0 .375 0 .373
A P R IL 288 .000 0 .270 0 .235 0 .234 F R ID A Y 288 .000 0 .339 0 .307 0 .305
M A Y 288 .000 0 .322 0 .282 0 .282 A ll 1440 .000 0 .375 0 .333 0 .332
S EP TEM B ER 288 .000 0 .292 0 .256 0 .256
O C TO B ER 288 .000 0 .307 0 .264 0 .264 B ar t l et t  w eigh t ed  st an d ar d  d ev ia t io n :   0 .372596
N O V EM B ER 288 .000 0 .291 0 .250 0 .249
A l l 2592 .000 0 .310 0 .266 0 .265
B ar t l e t t  w eigh t ed  st an d ar d  d ev ia t io n :   0 .307405
C at eg o r y  S t at ist ics C at ego r y  S t at ist ics
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TABLE 3.7.11.A: Mean equality test among months of the year and days of the week for 
Political news: This test is based on a single-factor, between-subjects, analysis of variance 
(ANOVA). The basic idea is that if the subgroups have the same mean, then the variability 
between the sample means (between group) should be the same as the variability within any 
subgroup (within group).This test covers a one year period (December 1, 1999 – November 30, 
2000) by month of the year and by day of the week within successive intraday periods of five 
minutes for Political news related and non- to France. Due to technical problems with the 
Reuters Terminal some periods are left out from the analysis. 
 
Political news 
 
 
Political news France 
 
 
 
Method df Value Probability Method df Value Probability
Anova F-statistic (8, 2583) 15.375 0.000 Anova F-statistic (4, 1435) 3.084 0.015
Source of Variation df Sum of Sq. Mean Sq. Source of Variation df Sum of Sq. Mean Sq.
Between 8.000 2803.674 350.459 Between 4.000 330.869 82.717
Within 2583.000 58878.370 22.795 Within 1435.000 38494.800 26.826
Total 2591.000 61682.050 23.806 Total 1439.000 38825.670 26.981
Std. Err. Std. Err.
Variable Count Mean Std. Dev. of Mean Variable Count Mean Std. Dev. of Mean
DECEMBER 288.000 4.438 3.701 0.218 MONDAY 288.000 5.752 4.751 0.280
JANUARY 288.000 4.614 4.016 0.237 TUESDAY 288.000 6.771 5.451 0.321
FEBRUARY 288.000 8.157 7.289 0.429 THURSDAY 288.000 6.773 5.352 0.315
MARCH 288.000 5.822 4.759 0.280 WEDNESDAY 288.000 6.829 5.533 0.326
APRIL 288.000 5.701 4.810 0.283 FRIDAY 288.000 5.882 4.753 0.280
MAY 288.000 5.517 4.655 0.274 All 1440.000 6.401 5.194 0.137
SEPTEMBER 288.000 4.996 4.213 0.248
OCTOBER 288.000 4.896 3.819 0.225
NOVEMBER 288.000 5.520 4.735 0.279
All 2592.000 5.518 4.879 0.096
Category Statistics Category Statistics
Analysis of Variance Analysis of Variance
Method df Value Probability Method df Value Probability
Anova F-statistic (8, 2583) 2.210 0.024 Anova F-statistic (4, 1435) 3.606 0.006
Source of Variation df Sum of Sq. Mean Sq. Source of Variation df Sum of Sq. Mean Sq.
Between 8.000 1.466 0.183 Between 4.000 1.744 0.436
Within 2583.000 214.146 0.083 Within 1435.000 173.572 0.121
Total 2591.000 215.611 0.083 Total 1439.000 175.317 0.122
Std. Err. Std. Err.
Variable Count Mean Std. Dev. of Mean Variable Count Mean Std. Dev. of Mean
DECEMBER 288.000 0.276 0.255 0.015 MONDAY 288.000 0.343 0.297 0.017
JANUARY 288.000 0.303 0.279 0.016 TUESDAY 288.000 0.408 0.360 0.021
FEBRUARY 288.000 0.344 0.309 0.018 WEDNESDAY 288.000 0.423 0.363 0.021
MARCH 288.000 0.350 0.331 0.019 THURSDAY 288.000 0.440 0.390 0.023
APRIL 288.000 0.286 0.254 0.015 FRIDAY 288.000 0.373 0.322 0.019
MAY 288.000 0.323 0.287 0.017 All 1440.000 0.397 0.349 0.009
SEPTEMBER 288.000 0.335 0.288 0.017
OCTOBER 288.000 0.326 0.300 0.018
NOVEMBER 288.000 0.314 0.281 0.017
All 2592.000 0.317 0.288 0.006
Analysis of Variance Analysis of Variance
Category Statistics Category Statistics
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TABLE 3.7.11.B: Median equality tests among months of the year and days of the week 
for Political news: This table reports various rank-based nonparametric tests of the hypothesis 
that the subgroups have the same median, against the alternative that at least one subgroup has a 
different median. Kruskal-Wallis one-way ANOVA by ranks test. This is a generalization of 
the Mann-Whitney test to more than two subgroups. The test is based on a one-way analysis of 
variance using only ranks of the data. The Table reports the chi-square approximation to the 
Kruskal-Wallis test statistic (with tie correction). Under the null hypothesis, this statistic is 
approximately distributed as a 2χ  with the number of subgroups-1 degrees of freedom (see 
Sheskin, 1997). Van der Waerden (normal scores) test. This test is analogous to the Kruskal-
Wallis test, except that the ranks are smoothed by converting them into normal quantiles 
(Conover, 1980). This table reports a statistic which is approximately distributed as a 2χ  with the 
number of subgroups -1 degrees of freedom under the null hypothesis. Chi-square test for the 
median. This is a rank-based ANOVA test based on the comparison of the number of 
observations above and below the overall median in each subgroup. This test is also known as 
the median test (Conover, 1980). These tests cover a one year period (December 1, 1999 – 
November 30, 2000) by month of the year and by day of the week within successive intraday 
periods of five minutes for Political news related and non- to France. Due to technical problems 
with the Reuters Terminal some periods are left out from the analysis. 
 
Political news 
 
 
Political news France 
 
 
 
Method df Value Probability Method df Value Probability
Med. Chi-square 8.000 2.583 0.958 Med. Chi-square 4.000 0.628 0.960
Adj. Med. Chi-square 8.000 2.198 0.974 Adj. Med. Chi-square 4.000 0.445 0.979
Kruskal-Wallis 8.000 92.598 0.000 Kruskal-Wallis 4.000 20.551 0.000
van der Waerden 8.000 150.948 0.000 van der Waerden 4.000 39.386 0.000
>  Overall >  Overall
Variable Count Median Median Mean Rank Mean Score Variable Count Median Median Mean Rank
DECEMBER 288.000 2.548 141.000 1102.510 -0.284 MONDAY 288.000 4.673 140.000 643.658
JANUARY 288.000 2.855 140.000 1121.201 -0.302 TUESDAY 288.000 5.587 146.000 752.988
FEBRUARY 288.000 4.724 155.000 1598.674 0.556 THURSDAY 288.000 5.208 145.000 762.639
MARCH 288.000 4.129 145.000 1381.161 0.105 WEDNESDAY 288.000 5.670 147.000 764.038
APRIL 288.000 4.083 146.000 1357.071 0.074 FRIDAY 288.000 4.558 140.000 679.177
MAY 288.000 3.952 145.000 1323.361 0.022 All 1440.000 5.000 718.000 720.500
SEPTEMBER 288.000 3.133 139.000 1228.134 -0.107
OCTOBER 288.000 3.645 141.000 1236.328 -0.102
NOVEMBER 288.000 3.850 144.000 1320.059 0.039
All 2592.000 3.814 1296.000 1296.500 0.000
Category Statistics Category Statistics
Method df Value Probability Method df Value Probability
Med. Chi-square 8.000 4.334 0.826 Med. Chi-square 4.000 1.067 0.900
Adj. Med. Chi-square 8.000 3.829 0.872 Adj. Med. Chi-square 4.000 0.823 0.935
Kruskal-Wallis 8.000 16.794 0.032 Kruskal-Wallis 4.000 11.580 0.021
van der Waerden 8.000 21.064 0.007 van der Waerden 4.000 15.650 0.004
>  Overall >  Overall
Variable Count Median Median Mean Rank Mean Score Variable Count Median Median Mean Rank
DECEMBER 288.000 0.210 129.000 1186.623 -0.138 MONDAY 288.000 0.308 138.000 654.403
JANUARY 288.000 0.258 140.000 1238.663 -0.064 TUESDAY 288.000 0.365 147.000 732.950
FEBRUARY 288.000 0.276 145.000 1371.679 0.118 WEDNESDAY 288.000 0.368 145.000 749.432
MARCH 288.000 0.258 141.000 1339.286 0.097 THURSDAY 288.000 0.368 147.000 758.181
APRIL 288.000 0.233 142.000 1240.759 -0.076 FRIDAY 288.000 0.260 139.000 707.535
MAY 288.000 0.258 140.000 1310.913 0.032 All 1440.000 0.327 716.000 720.500
SEPTEMBER 288.000 0.267 151.000 1375.816 0.117
OCTOBER 288.000 0.258 139.000 1301.330 0.018
NOVEMBER 288.000 0.267 148.000 1303.431 0.021
All 2592.000 0.258 1275.000 1296.500 0.014
Category Statistics Category Statistics
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TABLE 3.7.11.C: Variance equality tests among months of the year and days of the week 
for Political news: Tests the null hypothesis that the variances in all subgroups are equal against 
the alternative that at least one subgroup has a different variance. See Conover, et al. (1981) for a 
general discussion of variance testing. Bartlett test. This test compares the logarithm of the 
weighted average variance with the weighted sum of the logarithms of the variances. Under the 
joint null hypothesis that the subgroup variances are equal and that the sample is normally 
distributed, the test statistic is approximately distributed as a 2χ  with the number of subgroups-1 
degrees of freedom. Note, however, that the joint hypothesis implies that this test is sensitive to 
departures from normality. Levene test. This test is based on an analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
of the absolute difference from the mean. The F-statistic for the Levene test has an approximate 
F-distribution with the number of subgroups -1 numerator degrees of freedom and N- the 
number of subgroups denominator degrees of freedom under the null hypothesis of equal 
variances in each subgroup (Levene, 1960). Brown-Forsythe (modified Levene) test. This is a 
modification of the Levene test in which the absolute mean difference is replaced with the 
absolute median difference and appears to be a superior test in terms of robustness and power 
(Conover, et al. (1981), Brown and Forsythe (1974), Neter, et al. (1996)).These test cover a one 
year period (December 1, 1999 – November 30, 2000) by month of the year and by day of the 
week within successive intraday periods of five minutes for Political News related and non- to 
France. Due to technical problems with the Reuters Terminal some periods are left out from the 
analysis. 
 
Political news 
 
 
Political news France 
 
Method df Value Probability Method df Value Probability
Bartlett 8.000 219.277 0.000 Bartlett 4.000 12.833 0.012
Levene (8, 2583) 38.894 0.000 Levene (4, 1435) 6.002 0.000
Brown-Forsythe (8, 2583) 22.471 0.000 Brown-Forsythe (4, 1435) 4.422 0.002
Mean Abs. Mean Abs. Mean Abs. Mean Abs.
Variable Count Std. Dev. Mean Diff. Median Diff. Variable Count Std. Dev. Mean Diff. Median Diff.
DECEMBER 288.000 3.701 3.201 3.164 MONDAY 288.000 4.751 4.243 4.207
JANUARY 288.000 4.016 3.482 3.437 TUESDAY 288.000 5.451 4.907 4.856
FEBRUARY 288.000 7.289 6.254 6.160 THURSDAY 288.000 5.352 4.785 4.753
MARCH 288.000 4.759 4.137 4.112 WEDNESDAY 288.000 5.533 4.850 4.827
APRIL 288.000 4.810 4.033 3.989 FRIDAY 288.000 4.753 4.229 4.191
MAY 288.000 4.655 3.903 3.860 All 1440.000 5.194 4.603 4.567
SEPTEMBER 288.000 4.213 3.538 3.485
OCTOBER 288.000 3.819 3.309 3.247 Bartlett weighted standard deviation:  5.179348
NOVEMBER 288.000 4.735 3.895 3.848
All 2592.000 4.879 3.972 3.922
Bartlett weighted standard deviation:  4.774366
Category Statistics Category Statistics
Method df Value Probability Method df Value Probability
Bartlett 8.000 33.094 0.000 Bartlett 4.000 25.853 0.000
Levene (8, 2583) 5.738 0.000 Levene (4, 1435) 11.113 0.000
Brown-Forsythe (8, 2583) 4.375 0.000 Brown-Forsythe (4, 1435) 9.000 0.000
Mean Abs. Mean Abs. Mean Abs. Mean Abs.
Variable Count Std. Dev. Mean Diff. Median Diff. Variable Count Std. Dev. Mean Diff. Median Diff.
DECEMBER 288.000 0.255 0.217 0.213 MONDAY 288.000 0.297 0.261 0.260
JANUARY 288.000 0.279 0.242 0.240 TUESDAY 288.000 0.360 0.315 0.314
FEBRUARY 288.000 0.309 0.273 0.271 WEDNESDAY 288.000 0.363 0.323 0.321
MARCH 288.000 0.331 0.282 0.277 THURSDAY 288.000 0.390 0.343 0.341
APRIL 288.000 0.254 0.224 0.223 FRIDAY 288.000 0.322 0.288 0.285
MAY 288.000 0.287 0.248 0.246 All 1440.000 0.349 0.306 0.304
SEPTEMBER 288.000 0.288 0.243 0.241
OCTOBER 288.000 0.300 0.247 0.244 Bartlett weighted standard deviation:  0.347788
NOVEMBER 288.000 0.281 0.236 0.235
All 2592.000 0.288 0.246 0.243
Category Statistics Category Statistics
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TABLE 3.7.12.A: Mean equality test among months of the year and days of the week for 
Market news: This test is based on a single-factor, between-subjects, analysis of variance 
(ANOVA). The basic idea is that if the subgroups have the same mean, then the variability 
between the sample means (between group) should be the same as the variability within any 
subgroup (within group).This test covers a one year period (December 1, 1999 – November 30, 
2000) by month of the year and by day of the week within successive intraday periods of five 
minutes for Market news related and non- to France. Due to technical problems with the Reuters 
Terminal some periods are left out from the analysis. 
 
Market news 
 
 
Market news France 
 
 
 
 
Method df Value Probability Method df Value Probability
Anova F-statistic (7, 2296) 23.079 0.000 Anova F-statistic (4, 1435) 4.467 0.001
Source of Variation df Sum of Sq. Mean Sq. Source of Variation df Sum of Sq. Mean Sq.
Between 7.000 1781.642 254.520 Between 4.000 148.163 37.041
Within 2296.000 25321.280 11.028 Within 1435.000 11898.260 8.291
Total 2303.000 27102.920 11.769 Total 1439.000 12046.420 8.371
Std. Err. Std. Err.
Variable Count Mean Std. Dev. of Mean Variable Count Mean Std. Dev. of Mean
DECEMBER 288.000 6.211 3.094 0.182 MONDAY 288.000 5.584 2.754 0.162
JANUARY 288.000 6.762 3.640 0.214 TUESDAY 288.000 6.212 2.899 0.171
FEBRUARY 288.000 7.525 3.716 0.219 WEDNESDAY 288.000 6.347 2.934 0.173
MARCH 288.000 6.592 3.285 0.194 THURSDAY 288.000 6.366 3.212 0.189
APRIL 288.000 4.817 2.512 0.148 FRIDAY 288.000 5.763 2.558 0.151
SEPTEMBER 288.000 6.469 3.233 0.190 All 1440.000 6.054 2.893 0.076
OCTOBER 288.000 7.211 3.606 0.212
NOVEMBER 288.000 7.881 3.323 0.196
All 2304.000 6.683 3.431 0.071
Analysis of Variance Analysis of Variance
Category Statistics Category Statistics
Method df Value Probability Method df Value Probability
Anova F-statistic (8, 2583) 97.984 0.000 Anova F-statistic (4, 1435) 5.156 0.000
Source of Variation df Sum of Sq. Mean Sq. Source of Variation df Sum of Sq. Mean Sq.
Between 8.000 99.420 12.427 Between 4.000 3.462 0.866
Within 2583.000 327.605 0.127 Within 1435.000 240.903 0.168
Total 2591.000 427.024 0.165 Total 1439.000 244.365 0.170
Std. Err. Std. Err.
Variable Count Mean Std. Dev. of Mean Variable Count Mean Std. Dev. of Mean
DECEMBER 288.000 0.269 0.234 0.014 MONDAY 288.000 0.505 0.377 0.022
JANUARY 288.000 0.305 0.255 0.015 TUESDAY 288.000 0.588 0.425 0.025
FEBRUARY 288.000 0.467 0.332 0.020 WEDNESDAY 288.000 0.610 0.426 0.025
MARCH 288.000 0.874 0.548 0.032 THURSDAY 288.000 0.623 0.448 0.026
APRIL 288.000 0.731 0.491 0.029 FRIDAY 288.000 0.515 0.367 0.022
MAY 288.000 0.483 0.362 0.021 All 1440.000 0.568 0.412 0.011
SEPTEMBER 288.000 0.372 0.305 0.018
OCTOBER 288.000 0.352 0.283 0.017
NOVEMBER 288.000 0.319 0.255 0.015
All 2592.000 0.464 0.406 0.008
Analysis of Variance Analysis of Variance
Category Statistics Category Statistics
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TABLE 3.7.12.B: Median equality tests among months of the year and days of the week 
for Market news: This table reports various rank-based nonparametric tests of the hypothesis 
that the subgroups have the same median, against the alternative that at least one subgroup has a 
different median. Kruskal-Wallis one-way ANOVA by ranks test. This is a generalization of 
the Mann-Whitney test to more than two subgroups. The test is based on a one-way analysis of 
variance using only ranks of the data. The Table reports the chi-square approximation to the 
Kruskal-Wallis test statistic (with tie correction). Under the null hypothesis, this statistic is 
approximately distributed as a 2χ  with the number of subgroups-1 degrees of freedom (see 
Sheskin, 1997). Van der Waerden (normal scores) test. This test is analogous to the Kruskal-
Wallis test, except that the ranks are smoothed by converting them into normal quantiles 
(Conover, 1980). This table reports a statistic which is approximately distributed as a 2χ  with the 
number of subgroups -1 degrees of freedom under the null hypothesis. Chi-square test for the 
median. This is a rank-based ANOVA test based on the comparison of the number of 
observations above and below the overall median in each subgroup. This test is also known as 
the median test (Conover, 1980). These tests cover a one year period (December 1, 1999 – 
November 30, 2000) by month of the year and by day of the week within successive intraday 
periods of five minutes for Market news related and non- to France. Due to technical problems 
with the Reuters Terminal some periods are left out from the analysis. 
 
Market News 
 
 
Market news France 
 
 
 
Method df Value Probability Method df Value Probability
Med. Chi-square 7.000 112.827 0.000 Med. Chi-square 4.000 14.722 0.005
Adj. Med. Chi-square 7.000 110.375 0.000 Adj. Med. Chi-square 4.000 13.795 0.008
Kruskal-Wallis 7.000 163.195 0.000 Kruskal-Wallis 4.000 14.261 0.007
van der Waerden 7.000 206.759 0.000 van der Waerden 4.000 23.495 0.000
>  Overall >  Overall
Variable Count Median Median Mean Rank Mean Score Variable Count Median Median Mean Rank
DECEMBER 288.000 5.919 128.000 1067.424 -0.110 MONDAY 288.000 5.683 123.000 651.865
JANUARY 288.000 6.516 148.000 1155.349 0.030 TUESDAY 288.000 6.288 157.000 744.276
FEBRUARY 288.000 7.138 170.000 1307.665 0.269 WEDNESDAY 288.000 6.330 160.000 763.516
MARCH 288.000 6.323 143.000 1139.318 0.006 THURSDAY 288.000 6.179 149.000 748.200
APRIL 288.000 4.750 71.000 770.700 -0.673 FRIDAY 288.000 5.519 131.000 694.644
SEPTEMBER 288.000 6.450 145.000 1123.222 -0.059 All 1440.000 6.048 720.000 720.500
OCTOBER 288.000 6.855 162.000 1254.215 0.155
NOVEMBER 288.000 7.500 183.000 1402.108 0.384
All 2304.000 6.323 1150.000 1152.500 0.000
Category Statistics Category Statistics
Method df Value Probability Method df Value Probability
Med. Chi-square 8.000 183.140 0.000 Med. Chi-square 4.000 2.622 0.623
Adj. Med. Chi-square 8.000 179.329 0.000 Adj. Med. Chi-square 4.000 2.240 0.692
Kruskal-Wallis 8.000 462.374 0.000 Kruskal-Wallis 4.000 18.038 0.001
van der Waerden 8.000 542.123 0.000 van der Waerden 4.000 27.519 0.000
>  Overall >  Overall
Variable Count Median Median Mean Rank Mean Score Variable Count Median Median Mean Rank
DECEMBER 288.000 0.226 92.000 916.443 -0.503 MONDAY 288.000 0.462 134.000 653.642
JANUARY 288.000 0.258 110.000 1002.054 -0.400 TUESDAY 288.000 0.538 148.000 741.722
FEBRUARY 288.000 0.414 148.000 1386.590 0.108 WEDNESDAY 288.000 0.566 150.000 763.078
MARCH 288.000 0.839 211.000 1898.684 0.898 THURSDAY 288.000 0.538 146.000 767.255
APRIL 288.000 0.733 205.000 1733.800 0.619 FRIDAY 288.000 0.462 138.000 676.802
MAY 288.000 0.419 149.000 1373.477 0.083 All 1440.000 0.509 716.000 720.500
SEPTEMBER 288.000 0.300 132.000 1171.384 -0.186
OCTOBER 288.000 0.290 128.000 1118.394 -0.267
NOVEMBER 288.000 0.300 118.000 1067.674 -0.303
All 2592.000 0.387 1293.000 1296.500 0.006
Category Statistics Category Statistics
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TABLE 3.7.12.C: Variance equality tests among months of the year and days of the week 
for Market news: Tests the null hypothesis that the variances in all subgroups are equal against 
the alternative that at least one subgroup has a different variance. See Conover, et al. (1981) for a 
general discussion of variance testing. Bartlett test. This test compares the logarithm of the 
weighted average variance with the weighted sum of the logarithms of the variances. Under the 
joint null hypothesis that the subgroup variances are equal and that the sample is normally 
distributed, the test statistic is approximately distributed as a 2χ  with the number of subgroups-1 
degrees of freedom. Note, however, that the joint hypothesis implies that this test is sensitive to 
departures from normality. Levene test. This test is based on an analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
of the absolute difference from the mean. The F-statistic for the Levene test has an approximate 
F-distribution with the number of subgroups -1 numerator degrees of freedom and N- the 
number of subgroups denominator degrees of freedom under the null hypothesis of equal 
variances in each subgroup (Levene, 1960). Brown-Forsythe (modified Levene) test. This is a 
modification of the Levene test in which the absolute mean difference is replaced with the 
absolute median difference and appears to be a superior test in terms of robustness and power 
(Conover, et al. (1981), Brown and Forsythe (1974), Neter, et al. (1996)).These test cover a one 
year period (December 1, 1999 – November 30, 2000) by month of the year and by day of the 
week within successive intraday periods of five minutes for Market News related and non- to 
France. Due to technical problems with the Reuters Terminal some periods are left out from the 
analysis. 
 
Market news 
 
 
Market news France 
 
Method df Value Probability Method df Value Probability
Bartlett 7.000 57.643 0.000 Bartlett 4.000 16.181 0.003
Levene (7, 2296) 6.780 0.000 Levene (4, 1435) 1.738 0.139
Brown-Forsythe (7, 2296) 6.357 0.000 Brown-Forsythe (4, 1435) 1.697 0.148
Mean Abs. Mean Abs. Mean Abs. Mean Abs.
Variable Count Std. Dev. Mean Diff. Median Diff. Variable Count Std. Dev. Mean Diff. Median Diff.
DECEMBER 288.000 3.094 2.461 2.452 MONDAY 288.000 2.754 2.227 2.226
JANUARY 288.000 3.640 2.789 2.778 TUESDAY 288.000 2.899 2.290 2.289
FEBRUARY 288.000 3.716 2.946 2.927 WEDNESDAY 288.000 2.934 2.323 2.323
MARCH 288.000 3.285 2.583 2.570 THURSDAY 288.000 3.212 2.523 2.516
APRIL 288.000 2.512 2.022 2.021 FRIDAY 288.000 2.558 2.176 2.169
SEPTEMBER 288.000 3.233 2.703 2.703 All 1440.000 2.893 2.308 2.305
OCTOBER 288.000 3.606 2.968 2.953
NOVEMBER 288.000 3.323 2.690 2.671 Bartlett weighted standard deviation:  2.879491
All 2304.000 3.431 2.645 2.634
Bartlett weighted standard deviation:  3.320908
Category Statistics Category Statistics
Method df Value Probability Method df Value Probability
Bartlett 8.000 441.756 0.000 Bartlett 4.000 16.563 0.002
Levene (8, 2583) 57.491 0.000 Levene (4, 1435) 7.553 0.000
Brown-Forsythe (8, 2583) 52.886 0.000 Brown-Forsythe (4, 1435) 6.492 0.000
Mean Abs. Mean Abs. Mean Abs. Mean Abs.
Variable Count Std. Dev. Mean Diff. Median Diff. Variable Count Std. Dev. Mean Diff. Median Diff.
DECEMBER 288.000 0.234 0.203 0.202 MONDAY 288.000 0.377 0.327 0.326
JANUARY 288.000 0.255 0.228 0.227 TUESDAY 288.000 0.425 0.375 0.374
FEBRUARY 288.000 0.332 0.287 0.285 WEDNESDAY 288.000 0.426 0.379 0.376
MARCH 288.000 0.548 0.444 0.443 THURSDAY 288.000 0.448 0.397 0.394
APRIL 288.000 0.491 0.406 0.406 FRIDAY 288.000 0.367 0.332 0.331
MAY 288.000 0.362 0.318 0.316 All 1440.000 0.412 0.362 0.360
SEPTEMBER 288.000 0.305 0.270 0.267
OCTOBER 288.000 0.283 0.254 0.252 Bartlett weighted standard deviation:  0.409728
NOVEMBER 288.000 0.255 0.224 0.223
All 2592.000 0.406 0.293 0.291
Bartlett weighted standard deviation:  0.356133
Category Statistics Category Statistics
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TABLE 3.7.13.A: Mean equality test among months of the year and days of the week for 
Industrial news: This test is based on a single-factor, between-subjects, analysis of variance 
(ANOVA). The basic idea is that if the subgroups have the same mean, then the variability 
between the sample means (between group) should be the same as the variability within any 
subgroup (within group).This test covers a one year period (December 1, 1999 – November 30, 
2000) by month of the year and by day of the week within successive intraday periods of five 
minutes for Industrial news related and non- to France. Due to technical problems with the 
Reuters Terminal some periods are left out from the analysis. 
 
Industrial news 
 
 
Industrial news France 
 
 
 
 
Method df Value Probability Method df Value Probability
Anova F-statistic (8, 2583) 8.806 0.000 Anova F-statistic (4, 1435) 8.055 0.000
Source of Variation df Sum of Sq. Mean Sq. Source of Variation df Sum of Sq. Mean Sq.
Between 8.000 1613.660 201.708 Between 4.000 1029.453 257.363
Within 2583.000 59167.090 22.906 Within 1435.000 45846.640 31.949
Total 2591.000 60780.750 23.458 Total 1439.000 46876.090 32.575
Std. Err. Std. Err.
Variable Count Mean Std. Dev. of Mean Variable Count Mean Std. Dev. of Mean
DECEMBER 288.000 4.199 4.093 0.241 MONDAY 288.000 6.512 6.675 0.393
JANUARY 288.000 3.175 3.703 0.218 TUESDAY 288.000 7.049 6.536 0.385
FEBRUARY 288.000 5.786 5.430 0.320 WEDNESDAY 288.000 6.682 6.019 0.355
MARCH 288.000 5.441 5.233 0.308 THURSDAY 288.000 6.217 5.201 0.306
APRIL 288.000 5.024 4.803 0.283 FRIDAY 288.000 4.611 3.032 0.179
MAY 288.000 5.689 5.342 0.315 All 1440.000 6.214 5.707 0.150
SEPTEMBER 288.000 4.943 4.941 0.291
OCTOBER 288.000 5.457 4.844 0.285
NOVEMBER 288.000 5.364 4.397 0.259
All 2592.000 5.009 4.843 0.095
Analysis of Variance Analysis of Variance
Category Statistics Category Statistics
Method df Value Probability Method df Value Probability
Anova F-statistic (8, 2583) 34.748 0.000 Anova F-statistic (4, 1435) 5.255 0.000
Source of Variation df Sum of Sq. Mean Sq. Source of Variation df Sum of Sq. Mean Sq.
Between 8.000 10.681 1.335 Between 4.000 1.112 0.278
Within 2583.000 99.250 0.038 Within 1435.000 75.930 0.053
Total 2591.000 109.931 0.042 Total 1439.000 77.043 0.054
Std. Err. Std. Err.
Variable Count Mean Std. Dev. of Mean Variable Count Mean Std. Dev. of Mean
DECEMBER 288.000 0.117 0.114 0.007 MONDAY 288.000 0.267 0.216 0.013
JANUARY 288.000 0.142 0.129 0.008 TUESDAY 288.000 0.309 0.238 0.014
FEBRUARY 288.000 0.215 0.184 0.011 WEDNESDAY 288.000 0.313 0.233 0.014
MARCH 288.000 0.334 0.269 0.016 THURSDAY 288.000 0.334 0.258 0.015
APRIL 288.000 0.272 0.226 0.013 FRIDAY 288.000 0.262 0.201 0.012
MAY 288.000 0.273 0.222 0.013 All 1440.000 0.297 0.231 0.006
SEPTEMBER 288.000 0.257 0.202 0.012
OCTOBER 288.000 0.207 0.166 0.010
NOVEMBER 288.000 0.257 0.202 0.012
All 2592.000 0.231 0.206 0.004
Analysis of Variance Analysis of Variance
Category Statistics Category Statistics
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TABLE 3.7.13.B: Median equality tests among months of the year and days of the week 
for Industrial news: This table reports various rank-based nonparametric tests of the hypothesis 
that the subgroups have the same median, against the alternative that at least one subgroup has a 
different median. Kruskal-Wallis one-way ANOVA by ranks test. This is a generalization of 
the Mann-Whitney test to more than two subgroups. The test is based on a one-way analysis of 
variance using only ranks of the data. The Table reports the chi-square approximation to the 
Kruskal-Wallis test statistic (with tie correction). Under the null hypothesis, this statistic is 
approximately distributed as a 2χ  with the number of subgroups-1 degrees of freedom (see 
Sheskin, 1997). Van der Waerden (normal scores) test. This test is analogous to the Kruskal-
Wallis test, except that the ranks are smoothed by converting them into normal quantiles 
(Conover, 1980). This table reports a statistic which is approximately distributed as a 2χ  with the 
number of subgroups -1 degrees of freedom under the null hypothesis. Chi-square test for the 
median. This is a rank-based ANOVA test based on the comparison of the number of 
observations above and below the overall median in each subgroup. This test is also known as 
the median test (Conover, 1980). These tests cover a one year period (December 1, 1999 – 
November 30, 2000) by month of the year and by day of the week within successive intraday 
periods of five minutes for Industrial news related and non- to France. Due to technical 
problems with the Reuters Terminal some periods are left out from the analysis. 
 
Industrial news 
 
 
Industrial news France 
 
 
 
Method df Value Probability Method df Value Probability
Med. Chi-square 8.000 66.346 0.000 Med. Chi-square 4.000 6.028 0.197
Adj. Med. Chi-square 8.000 64.278 0.000 Adj. Med. Chi-square 4.000 5.545 0.236
Kruskal-Wallis 8.000 148.972 0.000 Kruskal-Wallis 4.000 19.021 0.001
van der Waerden 8.000 176.717 0.000 van der Waerden 4.000 23.131 0.000
>  Overall >  Overall
Variable Count Median Median Mean Rank Mean Score Variable Count Median Median Mean Rank
DECEMBER 288.000 2.903 127.000 1159.089 -0.176 MONDAY 288.000 4.865 151.000 698.436
JANUARY 288.000 1.935 88.000 863.083 -0.645 TUESDAY 288.000 4.904 150.000 768.205
FEBRUARY 288.000 4.155 154.000 1425.715 0.194 WEDNESDAY 288.000 4.811 149.000 757.802
MARCH 288.000 4.048 159.000 1384.009 0.131 THURSDAY 288.000 4.491 144.000 740.438
APRIL 288.000 3.600 143.000 1294.144 0.005 FRIDAY 288.000 3.981 126.000 637.620
MAY 288.000 4.581 169.000 1453.505 0.215 All 1440.000 4.476 720.000 720.500
SEPTEMBER 288.000 3.433 142.000 1258.028 -0.053
OCTOBER 288.000 3.774 150.000 1369.726 0.109
NOVEMBER 288.000 4.317 163.000 1461.201 0.220
All 2592.000 3.600 1295.000 1296.500 0.000
Category Statistics Category Statistics
Method df Value Probability Method df Value Probability
Med. Chi-square 8.000 165.757 0.000 Med. Chi-square 4.000 8.375 0.079
Adj. Med. Chi-square 8.000 162.042 0.000 Adj. Med. Chi-square 4.000 7.743 0.102
Kruskal-Wallis 8.000 246.396 0.000 Kruskal-Wallis 4.000 11.938 0.018
van der Waerden 8.000 266.934 0.000 van der Waerden 4.000 14.975 0.005
>  Overall >  Overall
Variable Count Median Median Mean Rank Mean Score Variable Count Median Median Mean Rank
DECEMBER 288.000 0.097 61.000 845.262 -0.575 MONDAY 288.000 0.231 136.000 672.646
JANUARY 288.000 0.097 84.000 960.662 -0.441 TUESDAY 288.000 0.279 150.000 743.504
FEBRUARY 288.000 0.172 136.000 1292.076 -0.014 WEDNESDAY 288.000 0.245 143.000 744.646
MARCH 288.000 0.258 168.000 1573.345 0.432 THURSDAY 288.000 0.283 154.000 764.229
APRIL 288.000 0.200 156.000 1453.576 0.234 FRIDAY 288.000 0.192 123.000 677.476
MAY 288.000 0.226 151.000 1437.089 0.202 All 1440.000 0.250 706.000 720.500
SEPTEMBER 288.000 0.217 166.000 1433.509 0.170
OCTOBER 288.000 0.161 125.000 1239.472 -0.080
NOVEMBER 288.000 0.217 166.000 1433.509 0.170
All 2592.000 0.194 1213.000 1296.500 0.011
Category Statistics Category Statistics
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TABLE 3.7.13.C: Variance equality tests among months of the year and days of the week 
for Industrial news: Tests the null hypothesis that the variances in all subgroups are equal 
against the alternative that at least one subgroup has a different variance. See Conover, et al. 
(1981) for a general discussion of variance testing. Bartlett test. This test compares the 
logarithm of the weighted average variance with the weighted sum of the logarithms of the 
variances. Under the joint null hypothesis that the subgroup variances are equal and that the 
sample is normally distributed, the test statistic is approximately distributed as a 2χ  with the 
number of subgroups-1 degrees of freedom. Note, however, that the joint hypothesis implies 
that this test is sensitive to departures from normality. Levene test. This test is based on an 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) of the absolute difference from the mean. The F-statistic for the 
Levene test has an approximate F-distribution with the number of subgroups -1 numerator 
degrees of freedom and N- the number of subgroups denominator degrees of freedom under the 
null hypothesis of equal variances in each subgroup (Levene, 1960). Brown-Forsythe (modified 
Levene) test. This is a modification of the Levene test in which the absolute mean difference is 
replaced with the absolute median difference and appears to be a superior test in terms of 
robustness and power (Conover, et al. (1981), Brown and Forsythe (1974), Neter, et al. 
(1996)).These test cover a one year period (December 1, 1999 – November 30, 2000) by month 
of the year and by day of the week within successive intraday periods of five minutes for 
Industrial News related and non- to France. Due to technical problems with the Reuters 
Terminal some periods are left out from the analysis. 
 
Industrial news 
 
 
Industrial news France 
 
Method df Value Probability Method df Value Probability
Bartlett 8.000 71.568 0.000 Bartlett 4.000 190.061 0.000
Levene (8, 2583) 4.634 0.000 Levene (4, 1435) 18.800 0.000
Brown-Forsythe (8, 2583) 3.595 0.000 Brown-Forsythe (4, 1435) 13.212 0.000
Mean Abs. Mean Abs. Mean Abs. Mean Abs.
Variable Count Std. Dev. Mean Diff. Median Diff. Variable Count Std. Dev. Mean Diff. Median Diff.
DECEMBER 288.000 4.093 2.692 2.537 MONDAY 288.000 6.675 4.594 4.405
JANUARY 288.000 3.703 2.348 2.188 TUESDAY 288.000 6.536 4.646 4.421
FEBRUARY 288.000 5.430 3.716 3.506 WEDNESDAY 288.000 6.019 4.239 4.086
MARCH 288.000 5.233 3.416 3.219 THURSDAY 288.000 5.201 3.736 3.640
APRIL 288.000 4.803 3.285 3.128 FRIDAY 288.000 3.032 2.165 2.113
MAY 288.000 5.342 3.309 3.171 All 1440.000 5.707 3.876 3.733
SEPTEMBER 288.000 4.941 3.358 3.200
OCTOBER 288.000 4.844 3.590 3.448 Bartlett weighted standard deviation:  5.652334
NOVEMBER 288.000 4.397 2.825 2.699
All 2592.000 4.843 3.171 3.011
Bartlett weighted standard deviation:  4.786057
Category Statistics Category Statistics
Method df Value Probability Method df Value Probability
Bartlett 8.000 311.369 0.000 Bartlett 4.000 20.638 0.000
Levene (8, 2583) 38.632 0.000 Levene (4, 1435) 5.827 0.000
Brown-Forsythe (8, 2583) 28.336 0.000 Brown-Forsythe (4, 1435) 4.791 0.001
Mean Abs. Mean Abs. Mean Abs. Mean Abs.
Variable Count Std. Dev. Mean Diff. Median Diff. Variable Count Std. Dev. Mean Diff. Median Diff.
DECEMBER 288.000 0.114 0.093 0.089 MONDAY 288.000 0.216 0.178 0.177
JANUARY 288.000 0.129 0.109 0.107 TUESDAY 288.000 0.238 0.196 0.194
FEBRUARY 288.000 0.184 0.156 0.153 WEDNESDAY 288.000 0.233 0.195 0.191
MARCH 288.000 0.269 0.225 0.219 THURSDAY 288.000 0.258 0.218 0.215
APRIL 288.000 0.226 0.188 0.183 FRIDAY 288.000 0.201 0.173 0.169
MAY 288.000 0.222 0.178 0.174 All 1440.000 0.231 0.192 0.189
SEPTEMBER 288.000 0.202 0.166 0.163
OCTOBER 288.000 0.166 0.138 0.135 Bartlett weighted standard deviation:  0.230029
NOVEMBER 288.000 0.202 0.166 0.163
All 2592.000 0.206 0.158 0.154
Bartlett weighted standard deviation:  0.196021
Category Statistics Category Statistics
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TABLE 3.7.14.A: Mean equality test among months of the year and days of the week for 
General news: This test is based on a single-factor, between-subjects, analysis of variance 
(ANOVA). The basic idea is that if the subgroups have the same mean, then the variability 
between the sample means (between group) should be the same as the variability within any 
subgroup (within group).This test covers a one year period (December 1, 1999 – November 30, 
2000) by month of the year and by day of the week within successive intraday periods of five 
minutes for General news related and non- to France. Due to technical problems with the 
Reuters Terminal some periods are left out from the analysis. 
 
General news 
 
 
General news France 
 
 
 
 
Method df Value Probability Method df Value Probability
Anova F-statistic (8, 2583) 23.855 0.000 Anova F-statistic (4, 1435) 8.286 0.000
Source of Variation df Sum of Sq. Mean Sq. Source of Variation df Sum of Sq. Mean Sq.
Between 8.000 416.705 52.088 Between 4.000 80.119 20.030
Within 2583.000 5640.044 2.184 Within 1435.000 3468.723 2.417
Total 2591.000 6056.750 2.338 Total 1439.000 3548.842 2.466
Std. Err. Std. Err.
Variable Count Mean Std. Dev. of Mean Variable Count Mean Std. Dev. of Mean
DECEMBER 288.000 2.251 1.016 0.060 MONDAY 288.000 3.248 1.638 0.097
JANUARY 288.000 2.436 1.119 0.066 TUESDAY 288.000 3.533 1.642 0.097
FEBRUARY 288.000 2.697 1.273 0.075 WEDNESDAY 288.000 3.680 1.663 0.098
MARCH 288.000 2.866 1.266 0.075 THURSDAY 288.000 3.589 1.596 0.094
APRIL 288.000 2.759 1.272 0.075 FRIDAY 288.000 3.046 1.181 0.070
MAY 288.000 3.120 1.468 0.087 All 1440.000 3.419 1.570 0.041
SEPTEMBER 288.000 3.202 1.282 0.076
OCTOBER 288.000 3.146 1.457 0.086
NOVEMBER 288.000 3.640 2.570 0.151
All 2592.000 2.902 1.529 0.030
Analysis of Variance Analysis of Variance
Category Statistics Category Statistics
Method df Value Probability Method df Value Probability
Anova F-statistic (8, 2583) 4.819 0.000 Anova F-statistic (4, 1435) 4.262 0.002
Source of Variation df Sum of Sq. Mean Sq. Source of Variation df Sum of Sq. Mean Sq.
Between 8.000 3.683 0.460 Between 4.000 2.390 0.597
Within 2583.000 246.768 0.096 Within 1435.000 201.154 0.140
Total 2591.000 250.450 0.097 Total 1439.000 203.544 0.141
Std. Err. Std. Err.
Variable Count Mean Std. Dev. of Mean Variable Count Mean Std. Dev. of Mean
DECEMBER 288.000 0.340 0.269 0.016 MONDAY 288.000 0.440 0.340 0.020
JANUARY 288.000 0.396 0.303 0.018 TUESDAY 288.000 0.514 0.380 0.022
FEBRUARY 288.000 0.457 0.353 0.021 WEDNESDAY 288.000 0.535 0.382 0.023
MARCH 288.000 0.469 0.347 0.020 THURSDAY 288.000 0.554 0.418 0.025
APRIL 288.000 0.369 0.283 0.017 FRIDAY 288.000 0.479 0.348 0.020
MAY 288.000 0.418 0.321 0.019 All 1440.000 0.504 0.376 0.010
SEPTEMBER 288.000 0.424 0.295 0.017
OCTOBER 288.000 0.417 0.308 0.018
NOVEMBER 288.000 0.403 0.292 0.017
All 2592.000 0.410 0.311 0.006
Category Statistics Category Statistics
Analysis of Variance Analysis of Variance
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TABLE 3.7.14.B: Median equality tests among months of the year and days of the week 
for General news: This table reports various rank-based nonparametric tests of the hypothesis 
that the subgroups have the same median, against the alternative that at least one subgroup has a 
different median. Kruskal-Wallis one-way ANOVA by ranks test. This is a generalization of 
the Mann-Whitney test to more than two subgroups. The test is based on a one-way analysis of 
variance using only ranks of the data. The Table reports the chi-square approximation to the 
Kruskal-Wallis test statistic (with tie correction). Under the null hypothesis, this statistic is 
approximately distributed as a 2χ  with the number of subgroups-1 degrees of freedom (see 
Sheskin, 1997). Van der Waerden (normal scores) test. This test is analogous to the Kruskal-
Wallis test, except that the ranks are smoothed by converting them into normal quantiles 
(Conover, 1980). This table reports a statistic which is approximately distributed as a 2χ  with the 
number of subgroups -1 degrees of freedom under the null hypothesis. Chi-square test for the 
median. This is a rank-based ANOVA test based on the comparison of the number of 
observations above and below the overall median in each subgroup. This test is also known as 
the median test (Conover, 1980). These tests cover a one year period (December 1, 1999 – 
November 30, 2000) by month of the year and by day of the week within successive intraday 
periods of five minutes for General news related and non- to France. Due to technical problems 
with the Reuters Terminal some periods are left out from the analysis. 
 
General news 
 
 
General news France 
 
 
 
Method df Value Probability Method df Value Probability
Med. Chi-square 8.000 186.219 0.000 Med. Chi-square 4.000 30.628 0.000
Adj. Med. Chi-square 8.000 182.256 0.000 Adj. Med. Chi-square 4.000 29.362 0.000
Kruskal-Wallis 8.000 176.225 0.000 Kruskal-Wallis 4.000 35.459 0.000
van der Waerden 8.000 172.317 0.000 van der Waerden 4.000 37.512 0.000
>  Overall >  Overall
Variable Count Median Median Mean Rank Mean Score Variable Count Median Median Mean Rank
DECEMBER 288.000 2.258 70.000 932.201 -0.462 MONDAY 288.000 3.298 131.000 666.356
JANUARY 288.000 2.403 87.000 1044.870 -0.314 TUESDAY 288.000 3.538 148.000 749.917
FEBRUARY 288.000 2.707 131.000 1206.764 -0.137 WEDNESDAY 288.000 3.764 168.000 792.712
MARCH 288.000 2.839 149.000 1310.319 0.013 THURSDAY 288.000 3.689 161.000 771.427
APRIL 288.000 2.767 138.000 1257.082 -0.085 FRIDAY 288.000 3.154 110.000 622.089
MAY 288.000 3.129 176.000 1442.030 0.177 All 1440.000 3.472 718.000 720.500
SEPTEMBER 288.000 3.283 187.000 1516.983 0.278
OCTOBER 288.000 3.226 176.000 1465.280 0.198
NOVEMBER 288.000 3.100 168.000 1492.972 0.332
All 2592.000 2.806 1282.000 1296.500 0.000
Category Statistics Category Statistics
Method df Value Probability Method df Value Probability
Med. Chi-square 8.000 14.028 0.081 Med. Chi-square 4.000 2.794 0.593
Adj. Med. Chi-square 8.000 13.050 0.110 Adj. Med. Chi-square 4.000 2.390 0.665
Kruskal-Wallis 8.000 31.217 0.000 Kruskal-Wallis 4.000 15.316 0.004
van der Waerden 8.000 39.659 0.000 van der Waerden 4.000 23.818 0.000
>  Overall >  Overall
Variable Count Median Median Mean Rank Mean Score Variable Count Median Median Mean Rank
DECEMBER 288.000 0.290 120.000 1131.771 -0.219 MONDAY 288.000 0.423 134.000 644.837
JANUARY 288.000 0.355 143.000 1264.674 -0.037 TUESDAY 288.000 0.500 149.000 732.009
FEBRUARY 288.000 0.431 157.000 1390.146 0.158 WEDNESDAY 288.000 0.528 149.000 752.672
MARCH 288.000 0.419 154.000 1408.519 0.183 THURSDAY 288.000 0.509 148.000 766.412
APRIL 288.000 0.333 133.000 1212.024 -0.129 FRIDAY 288.000 0.423 138.000 706.571
MAY 288.000 0.387 147.000 1303.693 0.014 All 1440.000 0.462 718.000 720.500
SEPTEMBER 288.000 0.400 146.000 1359.839 0.094
OCTOBER 288.000 0.403 149.000 1300.424 -0.008
NOVEMBER 288.000 0.367 141.000 1297.411 -0.013
All 2592.000 0.367 1290.000 1296.500 0.005
Category Statistics Category Statistics
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TABLE 3.7.14.C: Variance equality tests among months of the year and days of the week 
for General news: Tests the null hypothesis that the variances in all subgroups are equal against 
the alternative that at least one subgroup has a different variance. See Conover, et al. (1981) for a 
general discussion of variance testing. Bartlett test. This test compares the logarithm of the 
weighted average variance with the weighted sum of the logarithms of the variances. Under the 
joint null hypothesis that the subgroup variances are equal and that the sample is normally 
distributed, the test statistic is approximately distributed as a 2χ  with the number of subgroups-1 
degrees of freedom. Note, however, that the joint hypothesis implies that this test is sensitive to 
departures from normality. Levene test. This test is based on an analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
of the absolute difference from the mean. The F-statistic for the Levene test has an approximate 
F-distribution with the number of subgroups -1 numerator degrees of freedom and N- the 
number of subgroups denominator degrees of freedom under the null hypothesis of equal 
variances in each subgroup (Levene, 1960). Brown-Forsythe (modified Levene) test. This is a 
modification of the Levene test in which the absolute mean difference is replaced with the 
absolute median difference and appears to be a superior test in terms of robustness and power 
(Conover, et al. (1981), Brown and Forsythe (1974), Neter, et al. (1996)).These test cover a one 
year period (December 1, 1999 – November 30, 2000) by month of the year and by day of the 
week within successive intraday periods of five minutes for General News related and non- to 
France. Due to technical problems with the Reuters Terminal some periods are left out from the 
analysis. 
 
General news 
 
 
General news France 
 
Method df Value Probability Method df Value Probability
Bartlett 8.000 410.114 0.000 Bartlett 4.000 42.966 0.000
Levene (8, 2583) 27.247 0.000 Levene (4, 1435) 7.339 0.000
Brown-Forsythe (8, 2583) 22.966 0.000 Brown-Forsythe (4, 1435) 7.428 0.000
Mean Abs. Mean Abs. Mean Abs. Mean Abs.
Variable Count Std. Dev. Mean Diff. Median Diff. Variable Count Std. Dev. Mean Diff. Median Diff.
DECEMBER 288.000 1.016 0.753 0.753 MONDAY 288.000 1.638 1.275 1.274
JANUARY 288.000 1.119 0.842 0.842 TUESDAY 288.000 1.642 1.302 1.302
FEBRUARY 288.000 1.273 0.994 0.994 WEDNESDAY 288.000 1.663 1.316 1.313
MARCH 288.000 1.266 0.973 0.973 THURSDAY 288.000 1.596 1.268 1.265
APRIL 288.000 1.272 1.016 1.016 FRIDAY 288.000 1.181 0.955 0.949
MAY 288.000 1.468 1.163 1.163 All 1440.000 1.570 1.223 1.221
SEPTEMBER 288.000 1.282 0.989 0.986
OCTOBER 288.000 1.457 1.185 1.181 Bartlett weighted standard deviation:  1.554744
NOVEMBER 288.000 2.570 1.786 1.731
All 2592.000 1.529 1.078 1.071
Bartlett weighted standard deviation:  1.477675
Category Statistics Category Statistics
Method df Value Probability Method df Value Probability
Bartlett 8.000 38.329 0.000 Bartlett 4.000 15.781 0.003
Levene (8, 2583) 8.558 0.000 Levene (4, 1435) 7.896 0.000
Brown-Forsythe (8, 2583) 7.918 0.000 Brown-Forsythe (4, 1435) 7.380 0.000
Mean Abs. Mean Abs. Mean Abs. Mean Abs.
Variable Count Std. Dev. Mean Diff. Median Diff. Variable Count Std. Dev. Mean Diff. Median Diff.
DECEMBER 288.000 0.269 0.230 0.229 MONDAY 288.000 0.340 0.304 0.304
JANUARY 288.000 0.303 0.265 0.265 TUESDAY 288.000 0.380 0.341 0.341
FEBRUARY 288.000 0.353 0.309 0.308 WEDNESDAY 288.000 0.382 0.339 0.339
MARCH 288.000 0.347 0.304 0.302 THURSDAY 288.000 0.418 0.375 0.373
APRIL 288.000 0.283 0.247 0.246 FRIDAY 288.000 0.348 0.315 0.313
MAY 288.000 0.321 0.282 0.281 All 1440.000 0.376 0.335 0.334
SEPTEMBER 288.000 0.295 0.258 0.257
OCTOBER 288.000 0.308 0.265 0.265 Bartlett weighted standard deviation:  0.374402
NOVEMBER 288.000 0.292 0.250 0.249
All 2592.000 0.311 0.268 0.267
Bartlett weighted standard deviation:  0.309088
Category Statistics Category Statistics
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TABLE 3.7.15.A: Mean equality test among months of the year and days of the week for 
Economic news: This test is based on a single-factor, between-subjects, analysis of variance 
(ANOVA). The basic idea is that if the subgroups have the same mean, then the variability 
between the sample means (between group) should be the same as the variability within any 
subgroup (within group).This test covers a one year period (December 1, 1999 – November 30, 
2000) by month of the year and by day of the week within successive intraday periods of five 
minutes for Economic news related and non- to France. Due to technical problems with the 
Reuters Terminal some periods are left out from the analysis. 
 
Economic news 
 
 
Economic news France 
 
 
 
 
Method df Value Probability Method df Value Probability
Anova F-statistic (8, 2583) 3.060 0.002 Anova F-statistic (4, 1435) 5.233 0.000
Source of Variation df Sum of Sq. Mean Sq. Source of Variation df Sum of Sq. Mean Sq.
Between 8.000 53.384 6.673 Between 4.000 80.802 20.200
Within 2583.000 5632.539 2.181 Within 1435.000 5539.043 3.860
Total 2591.000 5685.923 2.194 Total 1439.000 5619.844 3.905
Std. Err. Std. Err.
Variable Count Mean Std. Dev. of Mean Variable Count Mean Std. Dev. of Mean
DECEMBER 288.000 2.755 1.336 0.079 MONDAY 288.000 3.635 2.081 0.123
JANUARY 288.000 2.926 1.526 0.090 TUESDAY 288.000 4.013 2.043 0.120
FEBRUARY 288.000 3.124 1.613 0.095 WEDNESDAY 288.000 4.119 2.095 0.123
MARCH 288.000 3.099 1.538 0.091 THURSDAY 288.000 4.007 1.972 0.116
APRIL 288.000 2.650 1.431 0.084 FRIDAY 288.000 3.516 1.587 0.094
MAY 288.000 2.962 1.522 0.090 All 1440.000 3.858 1.976 0.052
SEPTEMBER 288.000 2.839 1.454 0.086
OCTOBER 288.000 2.967 1.505 0.089
NOVEMBER 288.000 2.958 1.341 0.079
All 2592.000 2.920 1.481 0.029
Analysis of Variance Analysis of Variance
Category Statistics Category Statistics
Method df Value Probability Method df Value Probability
Anova F-statistic (7, 2296) 1.654 0.116 Anova F-statistic (4, 1435) 1.353 0.248
Source of Variation df Sum of Sq. Mean Sq. Source of Variation df Sum of Sq. Mean Sq.
Between 7.000 0.126 0.018 Between 4.000 0.077 0.019
Within 2296.000 24.947 0.011 Within 1435.000 20.457 0.014
Total 2303.000 25.073 0.011 Total 1439.000 20.534 0.014
Std. Err. Std. Err.
Variable Count Mean Std. Dev. of Mean Variable Count Mean Std. Dev. of Mean
DECEMBER 288.000 0.104 0.102 0.006 MONDAY 288.000 0.125 0.113 0.007
JANUARY 288.000 0.111 0.103 0.006 TUESDAY 288.000 0.139 0.122 0.007
FEBRUARY 288.000 0.108 0.106 0.006 WEDNESDAY 288.000 0.141 0.119 0.007
MARCH 288.000 0.116 0.109 0.006 THURSDAY 288.000 0.147 0.121 0.007
APRIL 288.000 0.099 0.094 0.006 FRIDAY 288.000 0.142 0.123 0.007
SEPTEMBER 288.000 0.125 0.111 0.007 All 1440.000 0.139 0.119 0.003
OCTOBER 288.000 0.107 0.101 0.006
NOVEMBER 288.000 0.111 0.107 0.006
All 2304.000 0.110 0.104 0.002
Analysis of Variance Analysis of Variance
Category Statistics Category Statistics
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TABLE 3.7.15.B: Median equality tests among months of the year and days of the week 
for Economic news: This table reports various rank-based nonparametric tests of the 
hypothesis that the subgroups have the same median, against the alternative that at least one 
subgroup has a different median. Kruskal-Wallis one-way ANOVA by ranks test. This is a 
generalization of the Mann-Whitney test to more than two subgroups. The test is based on a 
one-way analysis of variance using only ranks of the data. The Table reports the chi-square 
approximation to the Kruskal-Wallis test statistic (with tie correction). Under the null hypothesis, 
this statistic is approximately distributed as a 2χ  with the number of subgroups-1 degrees of 
freedom (see Sheskin, 1997). Van der Waerden (normal scores) test. This test is analogous to 
the Kruskal-Wallis test, except that the ranks are smoothed by converting them into normal 
quantiles (Conover, 1980). This table reports a statistic which is approximately distributed as a 2χ  
with the number of subgroups -1 degrees of freedom under the null hypothesis. Chi-square test 
for the median. This is a rank-based ANOVA test based on the comparison of the number of 
observations above and below the overall median in each subgroup. This test is also known as 
the median test (Conover, 1980). These tests cover a one year period (December 1, 1999 – 
November 30, 2000) by month of the year and by day of the week within successive intraday 
periods of five minutes for Economic news related and non- to France. Due to technical 
problems with the Reuters Terminal some periods are left out from the analysis. 
 
Economic news 
 
 
Economic news France 
 
 
 
Method df Value Probability Method df Value Probability
Med. Chi-square 8.000 22.448 0.004 Med. Chi-square 4.000 26.028 0.000
Adj. Med. Chi-square 8.000 21.072 0.007 Adj. Med. Chi-square 4.000 24.740 0.000
Kruskal-Wallis 8.000 25.532 0.001 Kruskal-Wallis 4.000 20.523 0.000
van der Waerden 8.000 30.400 0.000 van der Waerden 4.000 27.587 0.000
>  Overall >  Overall
Variable Count Median Median Mean Rank Mean Score Variable Count Median Median Mean Rank
DECEMBER 288.000 2.694 130.000 1225.878 -0.099 MONDAY 288.000 3.500 118.000 655.049
JANUARY 288.000 2.839 149.000 1292.127 -0.016 TUESDAY 288.000 4.029 161.000 751.245
FEBRUARY 288.000 3.034 155.000 1385.396 0.135 WEDNESDAY 288.000 4.123 162.000 773.828
MARCH 288.000 2.968 158.000 1384.944 0.140 THURSDAY 288.000 3.953 156.000 756.332
APRIL 288.000 2.583 114.000 1141.210 -0.218 FRIDAY 288.000 3.452 123.000 666.047
MAY 288.000 2.935 152.000 1319.729 0.031 All 1440.000 3.790 720.000 720.500
SEPTEMBER 288.000 2.733 136.000 1256.542 -0.062
OCTOBER 288.000 2.855 148.000 1320.307 0.022
NOVEMBER 288.000 2.933 150.000 1342.366 0.066
All 2592.000 2.833 1292.000 1296.500 0.000
Category Statistics Category Statistics
Method df Value Probability Method df Value Probability
Med. Chi-square 7.000 6.722 0.458 Med. Chi-square 4.000 2.623 0.623
Adj. Med. Chi-square 7.000 6.014 0.538 Adj. Med. Chi-square 4.000 2.318 0.678
Kruskal-Wallis 7.000 13.729 0.056 Kruskal-Wallis 4.000 3.839 0.428
van der Waerden 7.000 15.448 0.031 van der Waerden 4.000 4.946 0.293
>  Overall >  Overall
Variable Count Median Median Mean Rank Mean Score Variable Count Median Median Mean Rank
DECEMBER 288.000 0.065 138.000 1084.161 -0.067 MONDAY 288.000 0.115 132.000 685.418
JANUARY 288.000 0.065 141.000 1132.852 0.003 TUESDAY 288.000 0.115 141.000 728.913
FEBRUARY 288.000 0.069 137.000 1173.524 0.041 WEDNESDAY 288.000 0.113 143.000 708.262
MARCH 288.000 0.097 151.000 1153.125 0.044 THURSDAY 288.000 0.132 151.000 733.200
APRIL 288.000 0.067 134.000 1126.644 -0.028 FRIDAY 288.000 0.115 139.000 746.707
SEPTEMBER 288.000 0.100 159.000 1263.667 0.185 All 1440.000 0.115 706.000 720.500
OCTOBER 288.000 0.065 141.000 1110.319 -0.029
NOVEMBER 288.000 0.100 147.000 1175.707 0.055
All 2304.000 0.069 1148.000 1152.500 0.026
Category Statistics Category Statistics
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TABLE 3.7.15.C: Variance equality tests among months of the year and days of the week 
for Economic news: Tests the null hypothesis that the variances in all subgroups are equal 
against the alternative that at least one subgroup has a different variance. See Conover, et al. 
(1981) for a general discussion of variance testing. Bartlett test. This test compares the 
logarithm of the weighted average variance with the weighted sum of the logarithms of the 
variances. Under the joint null hypothesis that the subgroup variances are equal and that the 
sample is normally distributed, the test statistic is approximately distributed as a 2χ  with the 
number of subgroups-1 degrees of freedom. Note, however, that the joint hypothesis implies 
that this test is sensitive to departures from normality. Levene test. This test is based on an 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) of the absolute difference from the mean. The F-statistic for the 
Levene test has an approximate F-distribution with the number of subgroups -1 numerator 
degrees of freedom and N- the number of subgroups denominator degrees of freedom under the 
null hypothesis of equal variances in each subgroup (Levene, 1960). Brown-Forsythe (modified 
Levene) test. This is a modification of the Levene test in which the absolute mean difference is 
replaced with the absolute median difference and appears to be a superior test in terms of 
robustness and power (Conover, et al. (1981), Brown and Forsythe (1974), Neter, et al. 
(1996)).These test cover a one year period (December 1, 1999 – November 30, 2000) by month 
of the year and by day of the week within successive intraday periods of five minutes for 
Economic News related and non- to France. Due to technical problems with the Reuters 
Terminal some periods are left out from the analysis. 
 
Economic news 
 
 
Economic news France 
 
Method df Value Probability Method df Value Probability
Bartlett 8.000 18.196 0.020 Bartlett 4.000 28.106 0.000
Levene (8, 2583) 2.196 0.025 Levene (4, 1435) 4.056 0.003
Brown-Forsythe (8, 2583) 2.133 0.030 Brown-Forsythe (4, 1435) 4.018 0.003
Mean Abs. Mean Abs. Mean Abs. Mean Abs.
Variable Count Std. Dev. Mean Diff. Median Diff. Variable Count Std. Dev. Mean Diff. Median Diff.
DECEMBER 288.000 1.336 1.088 1.087 MONDAY 288.000 2.081 1.625 1.619
JANUARY 288.000 1.526 1.223 1.220 TUESDAY 288.000 2.043 1.633 1.633
FEBRUARY 288.000 1.613 1.298 1.295 WEDNESDAY 288.000 2.095 1.651 1.651
MARCH 288.000 1.538 1.204 1.198 THURSDAY 288.000 1.972 1.598 1.597
APRIL 288.000 1.431 1.110 1.107 FRIDAY 288.000 1.587 1.317 1.316
MAY 288.000 1.522 1.252 1.252 All 1440.000 1.976 1.565 1.563
SEPTEMBER 288.000 1.454 1.186 1.183
OCTOBER 288.000 1.505 1.220 1.218 Bartlett weighted standard deviation:  1.964678
NOVEMBER 288.000 1.341 1.078 1.078
All 2592.000 1.481 1.184 1.182
Bartlett weighted standard deviation:  1.476692
Category Statistics Category Statistics
Method df Value Probability Method df Value Probability
Bartlett 7.000 10.740 0.150 Bartlett 4.000 2.759 0.599
Levene (7, 2296) 1.950 0.058 Levene (4, 1435) 2.755 0.027
Brown-Forsythe (7, 2296) 1.532 0.152 Brown-Forsythe (4, 1435) 2.262 0.060
Mean Abs. Mean Abs. Mean Abs. Mean Abs.
Variable Count Std. Dev. Mean Diff. Median Diff. Variable Count Std. Dev. Mean Diff. Median Diff.
DECEMBER 288.000 0.102 0.082 0.079 MONDAY 288.000 0.113 0.091 0.090
JANUARY 288.000 0.103 0.086 0.084 TUESDAY 288.000 0.122 0.105 0.104
FEBRUARY 288.000 0.106 0.090 0.088 WEDNESDAY 288.000 0.119 0.103 0.102
MARCH 288.000 0.109 0.088 0.086 THURSDAY 288.000 0.121 0.104 0.103
APRIL 288.000 0.094 0.078 0.076 FRIDAY 288.000 0.123 0.106 0.105
SEPTEMBER 288.000 0.111 0.092 0.091 All 1440.000 0.119 0.102 0.101
OCTOBER 288.000 0.101 0.082 0.079
NOVEMBER 288.000 0.107 0.089 0.087 Bartlett weighted standard deviation:  0.119397
All 2304.000 0.104 0.086 0.084
Bartlett weighted standard deviation:  0.104238
Category Statistics Category Statistics
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TABLE 3.7.16.A: Mean equality test among months of the year and days of the week for 
Corporate news: This test is based on a single-factor, between-subjects, analysis of variance 
(ANOVA). The basic idea is that if the subgroups have the same mean, then the variability 
between the sample means (between group) should be the same as the variability within any 
subgroup (within group).This test covers a one year period (December 1, 1999 – November 30, 
2000) by month of the year and by day of the week within successive intraday periods of five 
minutes for Corporate news related and non- to France. Due to technical problems with the 
Reuters Terminal some periods are left out from the analysis. 
 
Corporate news 
 
 
Corporate news France 
 
 
 
 
Method df Value Probability Method df Value Probability
Anova F-statistic (8, 2583) 16.789 0.000 Anova F-statistic (4, 1435) 7.433 0.000
Source of Variation df Sum of Sq. Mean Sq. Source of Variation df Sum of Sq. Mean Sq.
Between 8.000 882.454 110.307 Between 4.000 235.408 58.852
Within 2583.000 16970.570 6.570 Within 1435.000 11362.100 7.918
Total 2591.000 17853.030 6.890 Total 1439.000 11597.500 8.059
Std. Err. Std. Err.
Variable Count Mean Std. Dev. of Mean Variable Count Mean Std. Dev. of Mean
DECEMBER 288.000 3.366 1.980 0.117 MONDAY 288.000 4.549 2.758 0.163
JANUARY 288.000 4.084 2.704 0.159 TUESDAY 288.000 5.315 3.014 0.178
FEBRUARY 288.000 4.832 2.918 0.172 WEDNESDAY 288.000 5.349 3.022 0.178
MARCH 288.000 4.203 2.497 0.147 THURSDAY 288.000 5.313 2.980 0.176
APRIL 288.000 3.935 2.552 0.150 FRIDAY 288.000 4.457 2.210 0.130
MAY 288.000 3.887 2.527 0.149 All 1440.000 4.997 2.839 0.075
SEPTEMBER 288.000 3.093 2.243 0.132
OCTOBER 288.000 3.994 2.660 0.157
NOVEMBER 288.000 5.050 2.853 0.168
All 2592.000 4.049 2.625 0.052
Analysis of Variance Analysis of Variance
Category Statistics Category Statistics
Method df Value Probability Method df Value Probability
Anova F-statistic (8, 2583) 46.590 0.000 Anova F-statistic (4, 1435) 5.255 0.000
Source of Variation df Sum of Sq. Mean Sq. Source of Variation df Sum of Sq. Mean Sq.
Between 8.000 13.132 1.641 Between 4.000 1.112 0.278
Within 2583.000 91.005 0.035 Within 1435.000 75.930 0.053
Total 2591.000 104.136 0.040 Total 1439.000 77.043 0.054
Std. Err. Std. Err.
Variable Count Mean Std. Dev. of Mean Variable Count Mean Std. Dev. of Mean
DECEMBER 288.000 0.117 0.114 0.007 MONDAY 288.000 0.267 0.216 0.013
JANUARY 288.000 0.142 0.129 0.008 TUESDAY 288.000 0.309 0.238 0.014
FEBRUARY 288.000 0.215 0.184 0.011 WEDNESDAY 288.000 0.313 0.233 0.014
MARCH 288.000 0.334 0.269 0.016 THURSDAY 288.000 0.334 0.258 0.015
APRIL 288.000 0.272 0.226 0.013 FRIDAY 288.000 0.262 0.201 0.012
MAY 288.000 0.273 0.222 0.013 All 1440.000 0.297 0.231 0.006
SEPTEMBER 288.000 0.257 0.202 0.012
OCTOBER 288.000 0.207 0.166 0.010
NOVEMBER 288.000 0.125 0.111 0.007
All 2592.000 0.216 0.200 0.004
Analysis of Variance Analysis of Variance
Category Statistics Category Statistics
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TABLE 3.7.16.B: Median equality tests among months of the year and days of the week 
for Corporate news: This table reports various rank-based nonparametric tests of the 
hypothesis that the subgroups have the same median, against the alternative that at least one 
subgroup has a different median. Kruskal-Wallis one-way ANOVA by ranks test. This is a 
generalization of the Mann-Whitney test to more than two subgroups. The test is based on a 
one-way analysis of variance using only ranks of the data. The Table reports the chi-square 
approximation to the Kruskal-Wallis test statistic (with tie correction). Under the null hypothesis, 
this statistic is approximately distributed as a 2χ  with the number of subgroups-1 degrees of 
freedom (see Sheskin, 1997). Van der Waerden (normal scores) test. This test is analogous to 
the Kruskal-Wallis test, except that the ranks are smoothed by converting them into normal 
quantiles (Conover, 1980). This table reports a statistic which is approximately distributed as a 2χ  
with the number of subgroups -1 degrees of freedom under the null hypothesis. Chi-square test 
for the median. This is a rank-based ANOVA test based on the comparison of the number of 
observations above and below the overall median in each subgroup. This test is also known as 
the median test (Conover, 1980). These tests cover a one year period (December 1, 1999 – 
November 30, 2000) by month of the year and by day of the week within successive intraday 
periods of five minutes for Corporate news related and non- to France. Due to technical 
problems with the Reuters Terminal some periods are left out from the analysis. 
 
Corporate news 
 
 
Corporate news France 
 
 
 
Method df Value Probability Method df Value Probability
Med. Chi-square 8.000 115.556 0.000 Med. Chi-square 4.000 18.428 0.001
Adj. Med. Chi-square 8.000 112.448 0.000 Adj. Med. Chi-square 4.000 17.351 0.002
Kruskal-Wallis 8.000 143.034 0.000 Kruskal-Wallis 4.000 23.224 0.000
van der Waerden 8.000 167.574 0.000 van der Waerden 4.000 33.441 0.000
>  Overall >  Overall
Variable Count Median Median Mean Rank Mean Score Variable Count Median Median Mean Rank
DECEMBER 288.000 3.032 109.000 1114.457 -0.236 MONDAY 288.000 4.317 125.000 652.967
JANUARY 288.000 3.403 139.000 1293.583 0.011 TUESDAY 288.000 4.837 152.000 759.479
FEBRUARY 288.000 4.276 188.000 1524.139 0.323 WEDNESDAY 288.000 4.953 159.000 766.865
MARCH 288.000 3.871 171.000 1379.384 0.110 THURSDAY 288.000 4.925 158.000 764.300
APRIL 288.000 3.367 137.000 1264.394 -0.040 FRIDAY 288.000 3.981 122.000 658.889
MAY 288.000 3.629 147.000 1265.141 -0.038 All 1440.000 4.654 716.000 720.500
SEPTEMBER 288.000 2.650 93.000 982.201 -0.483
OCTOBER 288.000 3.306 129.000 1258.703 -0.056
NOVEMBER 288.000 4.250 183.000 1586.498 0.409
All 2592.000 3.541 1296.000 1296.500 0.000
Category Statistics Category Statistics
Method df Value Probability Method df Value Probability
Med. Chi-square 8.000 169.634 0.000 Med. Chi-square 4.000 8.375 0.079
Adj. Med. Chi-square 8.000 165.643 0.000 Adj. Med. Chi-square 4.000 7.743 0.102
Kruskal-Wallis 8.000 285.894 0.000 Kruskal-Wallis 4.000 11.938 0.018
van der Waerden 8.000 313.180 0.000 van der Waerden 4.000 14.975 0.005
>  Overall >  Overall
Variable Count Median Median Mean Rank Mean Score Variable Count Median Median Mean Rank
DECEMBER 288.000 0.097 81.000 895.342 -0.513 MONDAY 288.000 0.231 136.000 672.646
JANUARY 288.000 0.097 107.000 1013.457 -0.376 TUESDAY 288.000 0.279 150.000 743.504
FEBRUARY 288.000 0.172 147.000 1349.795 0.059 WEDNESDAY 288.000 0.245 143.000 744.646
MARCH 288.000 0.258 183.000 1620.891 0.498 THURSDAY 288.000 0.283 154.000 764.229
APRIL 288.000 0.200 179.000 1506.939 0.303 FRIDAY 288.000 0.192 123.000 677.476
MAY 288.000 0.226 164.000 1492.061 0.273 All 1440.000 0.250 706.000 720.500
SEPTEMBER 288.000 0.217 184.000 1490.002 0.243
OCTOBER 288.000 0.161 139.000 1296.264 -0.010
NOVEMBER 288.000 0.100 98.000 1003.750 -0.369
All 2592.000 0.161 1282.000 1296.500 0.012
Category Statistics Category Statistics
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TABLE 3.7.16.C: Variance equality tests among months of the year and days of the week 
for Corporate news: Tests the null hypothesis that the variances in all subgroups are equal 
against the alternative that at least one subgroup has a different variance. See Conover, et al. 
(1981) for a general discussion of variance testing. Bartlett test. This test compares the 
logarithm of the weighted average variance with the weighted sum of the logarithms of the 
variances. Under the joint null hypothesis that the subgroup variances are equal and that the 
sample is normally distributed, the test statistic is approximately distributed as a 2χ  with the 
number of subgroups-1 degrees of freedom. Note, however, that the joint hypothesis implies 
that this test is sensitive to departures from normality. Levene test. This test is based on an 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) of the absolute difference from the mean. The F-statistic for the 
Levene test has an approximate F-distribution with the number of subgroups -1 numerator 
degrees of freedom and N- the number of subgroups denominator degrees of freedom under the 
null hypothesis of equal variances in each subgroup (Levene, 1960). Brown-Forsythe (modified 
Levene) test. This is a modification of the Levene test in which the absolute mean difference is 
replaced with the absolute median difference and appears to be a superior test in terms of 
robustness and power (Conover, et al. (1981), Brown and Forsythe (1974), Neter, et al. 
(1996)).These test cover a one year period (December 1, 1999 – November 30, 2000) by month 
of the year and by day of the week within successive intraday periods of five minutes for 
Corporate News related and non- to France. Due to technical problems with the Reuters 
Terminal some periods are left out from the analysis. 
 
Corporate news 
 
 
Corporate news France 
 
Method df Value Probability Method df Value Probability
Bartlett 8.000 62.357 0.000 Bartlett 4.000 36.756 0.000
Levene (8, 2583) 6.792 0.000 Levene (4, 1435) 6.296 0.000
Brown-Forsythe (8, 2583) 4.659 0.000 Brown-Forsythe (4, 1435) 5.571 0.000
Mean Abs. Mean Abs. Mean Abs. Mean Abs.
Variable Count Std. Dev. Mean Diff. Median Diff. Variable Count Std. Dev. Mean Diff. Median Diff.
DECEMBER 288.000 1.980 1.529 1.493 MONDAY 288.000 2.758 2.177 2.165
JANUARY 288.000 2.704 2.127 2.045 TUESDAY 288.000 3.014 2.406 2.368
FEBRUARY 288.000 2.918 2.218 2.146 WEDNESDAY 288.000 3.022 2.387 2.363
MARCH 288.000 2.497 1.851 1.832 THURSDAY 288.000 2.980 2.361 2.334
APRIL 288.000 2.552 2.030 1.976 FRIDAY 288.000 2.210 1.809 1.787
MAY 288.000 2.527 1.808 1.794 All 1440.000 2.839 2.228 2.203
SEPTEMBER 288.000 2.243 1.713 1.674
OCTOBER 288.000 2.660 2.204 2.104 Bartlett weighted standard deviation:  2.813865
NOVEMBER 288.000 2.853 2.200 2.121
All 2592.000 2.625 1.964 1.909
Bartlett weighted standard deviation:  2.563221
Category Statistics Category Statistics
Method df Value Probability Method df Value Probability
Bartlett 8.000 433.349 0.000 Bartlett 4.000 20.638 0.000
Levene (8, 2583) 54.720 0.000 Levene (4, 1435) 5.827 0.000
Brown-Forsythe (8, 2583) 39.925 0.000 Brown-Forsythe (4, 1435) 4.791 0.001
Mean Abs. Mean Abs. Mean Abs. Mean Abs.
Variable Count Std. Dev. Mean Diff. Median Diff. Variable Count Std. Dev. Mean Diff. Median Diff.
DECEMBER 288.000 0.114 0.093 0.089 MONDAY 288.000 0.216 0.178 0.177
JANUARY 288.000 0.129 0.109 0.107 TUESDAY 288.000 0.238 0.196 0.194
FEBRUARY 288.000 0.184 0.156 0.153 WEDNESDAY 288.000 0.233 0.195 0.191
MARCH 288.000 0.269 0.225 0.219 THURSDAY 288.000 0.258 0.218 0.215
APRIL 288.000 0.226 0.188 0.183 FRIDAY 288.000 0.201 0.173 0.169
MAY 288.000 0.222 0.178 0.174 All 1440.000 0.231 0.192 0.189
SEPTEMBER 288.000 0.202 0.166 0.163
OCTOBER 288.000 0.166 0.138 0.135 Bartlett weighted standard deviation:  0.230029
NOVEMBER 288.000 0.111 0.091 0.087
All 2592.000 0.200 0.149 0.145
Bartlett weighted standard deviation:  0.187702
Category Statistics Category Statistics
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TABLE 3.7.17: The Pearsons correlation between 15 news categories during a one year 
period. This Table shows the correlations among the 15 news categories defined in Chapter 3 
during a one year period (December 1, 1999 – November 30, 2000). All correlations are 
significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed). The meaning of each acronym is indicated in the list of 
abbreviations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4 
 
PUBLIC INFORMATION IMPACT ON THE PARIS BOURSE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1 Abstract 
 
This chapter studies and analyses the intraday 
information flow impact on the stocks that compose 
the CAC 40 index during a one year period. Two 
approaches are used: first, the classical regression 
model based on a broad range of public information 
released by the Reuters 2000 alert system (as 
independent variables) and intraday market liquidity 
indicators (as dependent variables). Second, the 
price impact indicator developed by Bessembinder 
and Kaufman (1997), which allows to measure the 
average information content of trades. The results 
show, in most cases, a strong and positive relation 
between information flow and transaction volume as 
well as with market volatility, although less strong, 
and quoted half spread from order data. Instead, 
quoted half spread from the WAS file, is, in most 
cases, negatively related. In some cases, the return 
seems to anticipate the arrival of public information. 
The majority of the results rarely show a 
contemporaneous relation between news arrival and 
liquidity proxies. Corporate news and All Alerts news 
seem to be the categories which have the greatest 
impact on stock liquidity indicators. 
The price impact indicates that private 
information might be present before the news is 
released. However, no clear price impact pattern has 
been found, although the informational role of 
trading is stronger during the opening, the closing 
and during the trading hours corresponding to the 
pre-opening and opening of the US markets. 
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4.2.  Introduction and literature review 
 
Public information has always been a major topic in the financial literature, above all concerning 
its relation to market activity. In the semi-strong form of efficient market hypothesis, Fama (1970) 
explains that a market is efficient if it fully reflects all publicly available information42. In the same 
paper, Fama (1970) developed the strong-form, which includes the private information concept. A 
distinction between public and private information has often been made and studied in the literature 
(French and Roll, 1986). Damodaran (1985), Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) and Ross (1989) are 
examples of theories of the impact of private and public information arrival on securities returns. 
These authors conclude that return volatility increases as a result of trades related to the arrival of 
private information. The latter has been used as a basic concept in order to explain seasonality in 
trading activity (Admati and Pfleiderer, 1988), whereas public information has played a lesser role in 
explaining such an intraday phenomenon, even if some attempts have been reported (Atkins and 
Basu, 1995). In the last two decades, the relation between market activity and specific news 
events, such as corporate earnings, share issue, dividends and so on has dominated financial 
economics. A variety of event studies43 has been reported in the financial literature in order to 
explain the behaviour of securities around this publicly available information. 
Based on the above-mentioned literature, the straightforward question will be asked in this 
chapter whether the publicly available information affects trading activity (transaction volume), 
price movement in securities markets, spread and volatility. The primary contribution of my 
research to this important issue is that I employ a distinctive proxy for information, namely the 
number of intraday announcements released during a one year period by the Reuters 2000 News 
Alert System. First, each news item is put into one of eight categories according to its nature. 
Second, a broad range of stocks is considered, namely the 43 stocks belonging to the CAC 40 
index. Third, the analysis is also performed considering each individual stock instead of only the 
overall index, as usually reported in the literature. Fourth, new light is shed by looking 
contemporaneously at five market activity indicators. Fifth, the price impact measure is applied 
and calculated, which had previously been proposed by Bessembinder and Kaufmann (1997). 
Based on second-by-second data, I used this indicator in an order-driven market, instead of the 
price-driven market described by them. This procedure allows to measure the average 
information content of a trade. Finally, it is the first time that such a broad range of data, 
especially for news activity, is used in the analysis of the Paris Bourse. 
Usually, information is received and processed by the agent, and the market reacts to it. In 
particular, the adjustment of an asset to new information changes investors’ expectations. The 
trader interprets the news, revises his assumptions, and trades in order to arrive at new optimal 
positions. The outcome of this series of events is the generation of a new transaction volume and 
a new equilibrium price. In particular, if market participants disagree about the effects of 
                                                 
42 This strong version is true in the case that information and trading costs, i.e. the costs of getting prices which 
reflect information, are always zero (Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980). A weaker version hypothesizes that prices which 
reflect information (the profits to be made) do not exceed the marginal costs (Jensen, 1978). 
43 The semi-strong form of the efficient market hypothesis has been renamed “event study” by Fama (1991). 
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surprises in announcements, there ought be increased trading activity in the market soon after 
the announcements. In contrast, if they are in consensus about the effects of new information, 
trading may not be abnormal even if prices change. Thus, examining trading activity, one can 
obtain useful information about the actions taken by the market participants based on incoming 
news, which one cannot get from stock returns alone. It is taking into consideration this 
reasoning that Jennings, Starks and Fellinghan (1981) developed their model. 
According to the efficient market hypothesis, however, only unexpected announcements 
immediately affect market reactions, as was partially demonstrated by Pearce and Roley (1985). 
They found, in fact, like Cornell (1983) and Hardouvelis (1987), that only unexpected stock 
announcements significantly affect stock prices. On the other hand, unexpected inflation and real 
economy data news do not cause any significant reaction (Pearcey and Roley (1985). As predicted 
by the theory, anticipated macroeconomic news do not affect market reactions. Furthermore, 
Pearce and Roley (1985) did not find any link between surprises in CPI announcements and 
stock market reaction, whereas Schwert (1981) reported a negative relationship. 
A similar study, but based on hourly data, concerning the NYSE, was performed by Jain 
(1988). He tried to establish a relationship between unexpected macroeconomic news and trading 
volume, as well as between unexpected macroeconomic news and returns. According to his 
findings, hourly returns react to announcements concerning supply and consumer price index 
(response completed within one hour), but not to the producer price index, not even to the 
unemployment rate. Trading volume is not affected by any of the five economic variable 
announcements, indicating that market participants do not differ substantially in their 
interpretation of the effects of announcements. 
Macroeconomic news is one of the two categories mostly considered in the financial literature 
(the second one being firm-specific news). In the following two sections I shall survey both of 
them in order to highlight the major empirical findings in this research field. 
 
A. Macroeconomic news 
 
Many researchers have reported a more or less pronounced relation between stock prices and 
macroeconomic announcements. Among them is Roll (1988) who found that news stories in the 
financial press have little effect on the returns of 96 large stocks. Mitchell and Mulherin (1994), 
however, using the Dow Jones News Stories, saw a significant relationship between macroeconomic 
and firm-specific news and trading volume. In a similar investigation, Schwert (1981) found only a 
weak relation between stock prices and macroeconomic announcements. More general analyses by 
Cutler, Poterba and Summers (1981) and Haugen, Talmor and Torous (1991) failed to find a linkage 
between major news stories and large movements in market prices. Nofsinger (2001) investigated the 
trading behaviour of institutional and individual investors around macroeconomic announcements. 
Both of them buy large firms after good economic news and sell large firms after bad economic 
news. The trading of small firms does not appear to be motivated by macroeconomic news. 
McQueen and Roley (1993) showed that, by allowing for different stages in the business cycle, a 
stronger relationship between stock prices and news is evident. They found that when the economy is 
strong the stock market responds negatively to news about higher real economic activity. This 
negative relation is caused by the longer increase in discount rates relative to expected cash flows. 
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Becker, Finnerty and Friedman (1995) provide a different approach. The authors wanted to find 
out how long it takes for UK equities to adjust to U.S. macroeconomic news, considering index 
future contracts traded in both countries. They found that UK markets immediately react to US 
news, while US markets ignore UK news. More precisely, they saw that FTSE returns from 1:30 to 2:00 
p.m. (i.e. the macroeconomic news release in the USA) are highly correlated to US overnight returns. 
Empirical investigations have been made not only concerning the stock market, but also the foreign 
exchange market. Andersen and Bollerslev (1997), described, for example, the market reaction of the 
DEM-USD foreign exchange market to macroeconomic announcements. Using 5 minutes returns and 
all the news headlines that appeared on Reuters Money News Alert screens (October 1992-October 
1993), they found that the largest returns are linked to the release of public information. 
The exchange market was also considered by Chang and Taylor (1996). In a methodology 
similar to mine, which consists in separating news stories of the Reuters News Service into 
different categories, the authors tried to establish a link between information flow and volatility. 
The total headlines have a significant impact on exchange rate volatility, as shown with ARCH 
models for periods of 15, 10 and 5 minutes. The authors provide evidence that US 
macroeconomic news have a significant impact on DEM / USD volatility at high frequencies, 
but they are unable to show that German macroeconomic news have an impact on DEM / USD 
volatility, suggesting the presence of an asymmetric component. 
De Gennaro and Shrieves (1997) used three categories of news extracted from the Reuters 
Terminal in order to estimate their impact on the volatility of returns in the exchange market for 
Japanese YEN and US dollars: first, the scheduled macroeconomic news items; second, 
unscheduled policy news; and finally unscheduled rate reports. The results document that news 
effects are important determinants of exchange rate volatility. 
The relation between macroeconomic announcements and volatility is central to Li and Engle 
(1998). They analyse the reaction of conditional volatility, implied by ARCH models, to 
scheduled announcements. They hypothesize that first, after macroeconomic announcements 
there is a lower persistence in volatility and volume, and second, there are different reactions to 
good and bad news. Their results support the Kim-Verrecchia model (1991), which claims that, 
though not significantly, the post-release days have a lower than average volatility. As far as 
conditional variance is concerned, the market absorbs scheduled news more quickly than non-
scheduled ones. Their results also show that first, information asymmetry, estimated by the 
volume absolute return ratio (Kim and Verrecchia 1991), decreases after news disclosure, and 
second, that bad news has a stronger asymmetric effect than good news. 
There is also some literature on the question how the futures market processes information 
around macroeconomic announcements on an intraday basis, such as Ederington and Lee (1993, 
1995), Crain and Lee (1995), Leng (1996) and Becker et al. 1996. These authors examined the 
volatility and returns in various futures markets. Leng (1996) found that the impact of major 
announcements lasts for at least an hour, whereas that of minor announcements is relatively 
short-lived. Crain and Lee (1995) also found that most of the price adjustments occur within the 
first hour, with some evidence that volatility remains higher than normal for several hours. 
Bollerslev, Cai and Song (2000), Ederington and Lee (1993), Fleming and Remolora (1997) and 
Balduzzi et al. (1999) examine, instead, the impact of macroeconomic announcements on the US 
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Treasury bond (future) market. They found that economic announcements are an important 
source of volatility. Furthermore, Ederington and Lee (1993) show that the return volatility is 
much higher between 08:30 and 08:35 EST than during any other 5 minutes trading period. 
Fleming and Remolora (1997, 1998) also found a significant effect on BAS and trading activity of 
the 5 year US treasury note. Ederington and Lee (1995) performed another study focusing on the 
information contained in the scheduled macroeconomic news release. More precisely, they 
examined the adjustment of prices in interest rate and foreign exchange futures to the new 
information. Using 10 second returns, they found that prices adjust in a series of numerous small, 
but rapid price changes starting within 10 seconds from the news release, and are basically 
completed within 40 seconds after the release. This is a considerably more rapid adjustment than 
that observed by Patell and Wolfson (1984) in equity markets. 
The financial literature reports also evidence of macroeconomic announcement impact on the 
BAS. In particular, Green (2001), using the MRR (1997) model, studied the impact of 
government bond trading on transaction prices surrounding the release of economic news. He 
found a significant increase in the adverse selection component of the BAS following economic 
announcements with greater price impact, which suggests a rise in the level of information 
asymmetry and an increase in the informational role of trading. Quoted spreads narrow after the 
announcement release, but the adverse selection component increases, suggesting that the level 
of information asymmetry rises following economic announcements. This result is analogous to 
Krinsky and Lee’s (1996) finding that the adverse selection component of equity spreads 
increases after earnings announcements, and is consistent with the presence of a superior 
information processor as modelled by Kim and Verrecchia (1994). 
Frino and Hill (2001) examine, instead, the intraday behaviour of the Sydney Futures 
Exchange around major scheduled macroeconomic announcements. The analysis of price 
volatility, trading volume and quoted BAS indicates that the majority of adjustments to new 
information occurs rapidly, namely, within 240 seconds after the scheduled time for major 
announcements, with some evidence of abnormal activity prior to the announcements. Analysis 
of quoted BAS suggests that it significantly widens in the 20 seconds prior to announcements, 
and remains significantly wider for 30 seconds following announcements. The increase in quoted 
spread is related to both expected and unexpected volatility, implying that market participants 
increase quoted spreads around information announcements with the consequence of adverse 
selection costs. 
 
B. Firm-specific news 
 
Instead of “semi-strong form tests” of price adjustment to public announcements, Fama 
(1991) uses the expression, “event studies”. Event studies are an important part of finance, 
especially corporate finance. Using simple tools, such research works document interesting 
regularities in the response of stock prices to particular firm-specific news. 
Patell and Wolfson (1984) measure the price reaction to earnings and dividend 
announcements. The effects can be felt very quickly and are evident in the first few price 
changes, even if they disappear within five to ten minutes. The results also reveal some activity 1 
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or 2 hours before the news release. Finally, the variance and serial correlation tests show that the 
disturbances persist for several hours after public disclosure and extend well into the following day. 
Earnings are also central in Kim and Verrecchia’s (1991) paper. They suggest that earnings 
announcements may lead to more information asymmetry by increasing the BAS and reducing 
market liquidity. The empirical evidence concerning this issue is not unequivocal. For example, 
Morse and Ushman (1983) and Skinner (1991), using samples of OTC securities, found no clear 
evidence that the BAS changes around earnings announcements. Skinner (1991), however, does 
note that spreads increase immediately after announcements conveying relatively large earnings 
surprises. Examining a sample of NYSE firms, Venkatesh and Chiang (1986) document an 
increase in spreads for scheduled announcements of earnings and dividend, but not otherwise. 
Patell (1991) offers evidence that spreads increase after earnings announcements, implying an 
increase in information asymmetry after these disclosures. Lee et al. (1993), using NYSE 
specialist quotes, found a significant increase in spreads surrounding earnings announcements. 
They also show that the announcement effect on the BAS rapidly dissipates. 
The widening of the spread is also characteristic for McQueen and Roley’s (1993) paper. They  
examined the market reaction to earnings announcements concerning both intraday BAS and volumes 
and found that the spread widens before earnings announcements (30 minutes) and after (during 1 day). 
Juergens (1999) proposed another way of investigation. She explores the impact of analyst 
recommendations on intraday stock returns and volatility when those recommendations coincide 
with the release of public news. She found that there is a significant intraday price reaction, both 
in terms of returns and volatility. Furthermore, analysts’ recommendations have an immediate 
impact on the market when they are released both with and without public news release. 
Ahmed, Schreible and Stevens (2001) analyse, instead, two distinct periods: first, 1996-1999, 
as a period with a significant amount of online trading, and second, 1992-1995, as a period 
without online trading. Their procedure allows to show how, based on noisy rational expectation 
models, the online trading investors react to quarterly earnings announcements, and the 
corresponding effects. They found that the three day stock price reaction to earnings 
announcements is significantly larger in the online trading period as compared to the pre-online 
trading period, after having checked for contemporaneous market returns. 
Ranaldo (2002) investigated the transaction cost components around the firm-specific news 
arrivals. His main results show that: first, spread is tight and LOB is thick in response to news 
arrival. Second, the Glosten and Harris (1988), the Lin, Sanger and Booth (1995) and the AR 
model show that the order processing costs appear to be the largest component. On the other 
hand, the autocorrelation and the adverse selection, which decreases with market liquidity and 
with the rate of public information arrival, are smaller components of transaction costs. Finally, 
another interesting result shows that adverse selection is slightly higher before, rather than after, 
the news arrivals. 
 
C. Global public information flow 
 
Berry and Howe (1994) describe intraday relationships between news arrival estimated by the 
Reuters News Arrival, trading volume, and returns calculated on the S&P 500 index. They show, 
first, that intraday return does not react to contemporaneous and lagged news arrival 
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(insignificant relationship with price volatility); second, the impact on trading volume is low 
(moderate relationship between public information and trading volume), and finally, overnight 
news and opening volume (09:30 – 10 a.m) are significantly related. 
Exchange rate volatility is central to Melvin and Yin’s (1995) approach. They use the Reuters 
Money-Market Headlines News in order to measure the impact of public information arrival, 
impact on the DEM / USD and the YEN / USD. Their results suggest that higher than normal 
public information brings more than normal quoting activity and volatility. 
Gay and Mohorovic (1999) study the impact of daily public news arrival, distinguishing news 
according to its macroeconomic or firm-specific content. The former news show no strong 
results, having a significant impact only on trading volume. The latter, however, shows a positive 
relationship with trading market activity. 
All these investigations prove that financial markets react in some cases rapidly and 
significantly to a specific kind of public news item. Furthermore, these studies focus on aggregate 
market activity rather than individual stock behaviour. The distinction between corporate, 
macroeconomic news and other types of news is rarely made, and if so, it is restricted to few 
categories only. In contrast, my purpose is to study the impact of information flow on individual 
stocks quoted on the CAC 40 and on the relative index. Furthermore, the information flow is not 
restricted to one category only, but it is extended to eight groups contemporaneously. This 
dissociation allows to complement the definition of information flow used in the literature. The 
main objective of this chapter is to analyse whether the volume of publicly reported information 
affects the behaviour of trading activity. 
 
In section 4.3, the data and the methodology used in this study will be described. Section 4.4 
reports the empirical results, and conclusions are given in Section 4.5. Tables and Figures are 
depicted in sections 4.6 and 4.7 respectively. 
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4.3. Data and methodology 
 
The impact of information flow on trading activity is calculated and analysed using two data 
providers: the Société de Bourse Française and the Reuters 2000 News Alert System, which will be 
explained below in more detail. 
 
4.3.1. Transactions and order data 
 
The Société de Bourse Française provides the tick-by-tick data for a one year period 
(December 1, 1999 – November 30, 2000). Among all the available data, trades and orders are 
recorded in two different files, called BDM1D2 and BDM2D2 respectively. The trade file 
provides the time stamp, precise to the second, and the price and quantity traded, whereas the 
order file gives access to the time stamp, cumulated order size and price quotes of the prevailing 
bid and ask quotes. Matching these files allows to reconstruct the LOB before, after and within 
the quotes. Using the Lee and Ready (1991) methodology I identified the buyer- and seller-
initiated trades for all the 43 stock analysed. The stocks were chosen selectively, namely shares 
that belonged to the CAC 40 index during the one year period. The CAC 40 index is the 
principal index of the Paris Bourse where the heavily traded stocks are quoted. 
The French Stock Exchange is an order-driven market, i.e. without designated market makers. 
Its main characteristic is that it is based on a centralized limit order book which is publicly visible 
and where traders voluntarily offer liquidity by filling the order book with limit orders during the 
whole trading day, which lasts continuously from 09:00 a.m. to 05:00 p.m. (until March 31, 2000) 
and until 05:30 p.m. (from April 1, 2000 onwards). Before the opening and after the closing, two 
call auctions are performed in order to determine the opening and closing prices respectively. 
This data has been deleted, like in other research works, from my sample. Analogously, 
“applications”44 were omitted. This procedure left me with 23’525’550 transactions, as already 
shown in the descriptive statistics of Table 2.10.1.A of chapter 2, where also a more precise 
description of the Paris Bourse has been given. 
 
4.3.2  Public information releases 
 
Reuters is one of the major sources of information used by professionals and can be 
considered as a public information proxy, as previously reported by Berry and Howe (1994), 
Goodhart and Demos (1990), Goodhart and O’Hara (1997) and De Gennaro and Shrieves 
(1997). Since it is the purpose of this chapter to examine the impact of public information on 
volume, volatility and spread, the question arises how we might measure news arrival. The 
information content of news is difficult to quantify, and likewise it is difficult to identify whether 
a news item is positive or negative. In fact, investors sometimes diverge in their interpretation of 
a news item. It is for this reason that I consider the overall news flow instead. But since the 
Reuters 2000 News Alert System pages are very diverse and include not only macroeconomic 
news, but any sort of news worldwide, my first task was the identification of all those news 
                                                 
44 See Chapter 2. 
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categories expected to have, potentially, an influence on market trading activity. Using various 
keyword combinations, I scanned the mass of different news items, which then were classified 
into one of the following eight categories: All Alerts News, Political News, Market News, 
Industrial News, General News, Economic News, Corporate News and Firm-specific News. A 
description of these categories and of the subgroups included in them was given in Chapter 3. 
The Reuters 2000 News Alert System provides intraday news with time stamps. After having 
saved all the news in which I was interested, I proceeded to the elimination of news which had 
showed exactly the same time, date and headline. Thus, I arrived at the basic dataset (the detailed 
description of the public information dataset is given in Tables 3.7.1 to 3.7.6 of Chapter 3). I 
then divided it into two distinct periods: one between December 1, 1999 and March 31, 2000, 
and the other between April 1, 2000 and November 30, 2000. This operation was necessary 
because the trading time had changed after April 1, 2000. 
 
4.3.3 Methodology 
 
A. Regression analysis 
 
As a first step, in order to organize the data, a time series of spread (measured as quoted half 
spread from the order data and quoted half spread from the weighted average spread file), 
trading volume, return and volatility (measured as log range) had to be defined over a time 
interval of a fixed length. Following Ederington and Lee’s (1993) procedure I decomposed the 
trading day into 96 periods of 5 minutes each, for the first part (December 1, 1999 – March 31, 
2000), and into 102 periods in the second part (April 1, 2000 – November 30, 2000). The former 
period give me 8’352 observations and, the latter, which is not presented, 17’238. I took into 
consideration twelve time-series: spread (QHS and QHS_WAS), volume (SUMVOL), return 
(RET), volatility (VOLA) and the eight news categories (All Alerts, Political, Market, Industrial, 
General, Economic, Corporate and Firm-specific news). The news category are fifteen if we 
consider also the news related to France. As shown in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, these time-series 
show seasonal patterns which might induce bias in the ARCH family models. In order to avoid 
possible problems associated with seasonality, I deseasonalized each time-series, using Ranaldo’s 
(2000) method which consists in not using the current level of market liquidity, but rather the 
logarithmic ratio between the current level and its normal value at the current moment. All the 
mathematical expressions used in this chapter are provided and explained in Appendix 2.11.2 and 
2.11.3. In the light of the similarities and differences in intraday patterns, it will be interesting to 
relate my measure of public information flow to market activity, in order to test whether French 
stocks react to public information (French related and non-) reaching the market. An appropriate 
model, which had also been used in Berry and Howe’s (1994) research, consists in applying a 
regression analysis. In this chapter, the following five general ARMA regression analysis, one for 
each liquidity indicators, were studied: 
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The intraday period of 5 minutes is labelled by i. RNEWSi denotes the ratio of number of 
news announcements within a five minutes period. RNEWSi is an acronym that can take the 
value of one of the fifteen news categories (French related and non-). In the results it will be 
specified to which category of news, RNEWSi, belongs. Differently from other daily studies, I 
considered only one independent variable (Equation 1, 2 and 5) due to the problems of 
multicollinearity and sensitivity analysis (lead and lagged independent variable) which might 
otherwise emerge. If two or more independent variables, at different lagged intervals, are chosen, 
no precise conclusion can be drawn about which news items influence liquidity indicators. The 
general model presented above considers lagged and leading independent variable, i.e. RNEWSi. 
I established the lead and lag period to be at most one hour. Considering previous studies and 
statistical problems, after that period it will be much more difficult to draw a conclusion. The 
regression analysis will be conducted twice: the first one taking into account lagged independent 
variables and, secondly, leading independent variables. After that, I checked for autocorrelation 
(using correlograms and correcting with the appropriate ARMA model) and heteroskedasticity 
(White heteroskedasticity test and ARCH LM test). After running the ARMA models, the Fisher 
test, the Akaike information criterion and the Schwartz criterion, I found which model have the 
biggest explanatory power. The ARCH LM test allows to find the most plausible ARCH model. 
Using the likelihood ratio rest and residual tests, I finally singled out the most powerful solution. 
Among all the significant regressions, I randomly choose which one to represent in the results 
and only the significant coefficients will be reported. Other tests and conditional variance 
equation are presented in detail in Appendix 2.11.1. 
 
B. Price impact 
 
The simplest measure of trade execution costs is the quoted bid-ask spread, i.e. the difference 
between the quoted ask price and the quoted bid price. Peterson and Fialkowski (1994) and Lee 
(1993) document that trades may occur at prices within the posted bid and ask quotes, implying that 
the quoted spread provides biased estimates of actual execution costs. In order to reflect trades within 
the spread, the effective half spread measure was developed, which gives a better estimation of 
trade execution costs. In fact, the effective half-spread represents the percentage execution cost 
actually paid by the trader, and the gross revenue to the supplier of immediacy. As reported, among 
others, by Glosten and Milgrom (1985), market makers widen the spread in response to better 
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informed traders. Bessembinder and Kaufmann (1997) suggest to decompose the effective half-
spread into two components: the price impact and the realized half spread. Price impact refers to 
the decrease in asset value following a customer sell or the increase in asset value following a 
customer buy which reflects the market assessment based on the private information the trades 
convey. Realized half spread measures the average price reversal after trades and the net revenue 
of market maker after deduction of their losses to better informed traders. However, the realized 
half spread is difficult to estimate because of intermediation costs, defined as the difference 
between transaction price and equilibrium price. For this reason it will not be calculated. As my 
analysis considers the private / public information controversy, it will be interesting to check for 
the presence of private information and its relation to public information release. The price 
impact measure is calculated as follows: 
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Pi, t+30 denotes the first trade price observed 30 minutes after the trade for which the price 
impact is measured. MIDi, j, t is the quote midpoint of the most recently posted bid and ask 
quotes for a security (interpreted as a proxy for the pre-trade value of the asset). Di, j, t is a binary 
variable that equals one for customer buy orders and minus one for customer sell orders. To my 
knowledge, this is the first time that this measure is applied in an order-driven market around 
public information releases. In order to calculate the price impact measure, I proceeded in the 
following manner: first, the Pi, j, t+30 was calculated by observing the first trade 30 minutes after the 
news release. Second, the trading day was decomposed into 96 periods of 5 minutes each for the 
first part and into 102 periods for the second part. Third, I calculated the average price impact 
within a 5 minutes period. Fourth, the intraday evolution of the average price impact is reported, 
and finally, the relation with the intraday information flow is checked by using the regression 
analysis (price impact is the dependent variable). One criticism can be made concerning this 
procedure. For all the transactions after 16:30, I calculated the price impact using the first trade 
of the following day. The major problem may be related to the short interval used (5 min.). I’m 
aware of this problem, but I don’t think this will compromise my results. 
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4.4 Empirical results 
 
Empirical results are presented only for the first period under study, i.e. from December 1, 
1999 to March 31, 2000 due to technical problems associated with the use of the Reuters 2000 
News Alert System Terminal45. Even though there are some categories of news which are 
complete for the full one-year period, the results of the second period do not change significantly 
from the first. The results not presented in this section are available from the author upon 
request. All the statistical procedures and tests follow the method explained in Appendix of 
Chapter 2 (Appendix 2.11.1). 
 
A. Spread 
 
In the spread analysis, two measures are used: first, ratio of the quoted half spread (RQHS), 
directly calculated from the order data, and second, the ratio of quoted half spread obtained from 
the weighted average spread file (RQHS_WAS). The latter represents the price for blocks that 
exceed normal market size. 
The results (Tables 4.7.6.A and 4.7.6.B) are less strong in respect of other liquidity indicators, 
in the sense that when individual stocks are considered, R2-adjusted is significant only in 15 cases 
for the QHS_WAS, whereas for the simple QHS it is situated within the average in 23 cases. The 
R2-adjusted, for the QHS_WAS, ranks from a minimum of 0.654 (Accor) to a maximum of 0.933 
for the CAC 40 index. For the spread calculated from the order data, R2-adjusted ranks from a 
minimum of 0.207 (France Telecom) to a maximum of 0.483 for the CAC 40 index. 
The regression analysis shows that the relation between information and QHS (Table 4.7.15) 
may be negative or positive, and it is therefore difficult to draw any conclusion. Also for the 
QHS_WAS indicator, the relation may be positive or negative. I found, however, in most cases a 
negative relation, meaning that higher volume reduces the quoted spread. A contemporaneous 
relation is rarely noticed, and the best models indicate that information anticipates spread. Such a 
behaviour can be explained as the aggressiveness of a trader. Depending on the news type and on 
whether there is an imbalance on one side of the book, investors who want to transact promptly 
are likely to trade within the quote, therefore reducing the spread. 
 
B. Volume 
 
Trading volume is an important measure of trading activity, and it is regressed, like in other 
studies, on a specific news category and on the absolute value of returns (Berry and Howe, 1994). 
The result of Table 4.7.8.A show evidence of a positive and significant relation between the chosen 
public information proxy (independent variable) and the ratio of transaction volume (dependent 
variable), expressed as the number of shares traded divided by the total number of shares 
outstanding. A higher information flow tends to be transformed into a higher transaction volume. 
However, the opposite may occur in some cases as shown by the Table 4.7.8.B, i.e. more information 
reduce trading activity. Consistent with Berry and Howe (1994) and the studies mentioned in 
Karpoff (1987), the coefficients for the ratio of absolute value of return are always significant, 
                                                 
45 See Chapter 3. 
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but differently from Berry and Howe (1994), it is at the same time negatively related to the 
transaction volume. The negative relation between absolute price change and trading volume has 
also been noticed by Mitchell and Mulherin (1994) in their regression analysis when day of the 
week dummy variables were included. 
The best models (Tables 4.7.8.A to 4.7.8.B) are obtained when the independent variable 
(public information proxy) is lagged until 5 minutes, as in Table 4.7.6.A and, until 40 minutes as 
in Table 4.7.6.B. My results are different from those previously obtained by Berry and Howe 
(1994) who found a positive and significant coefficient of the absolute price change. This 
difference is due to the following reasons: first, Berry and Howe (1994) regress the 
corresponding half hour of each day, whereas I regress each consecutive five minutes period of 
each day. Second, their period under study is different. The period analysed is characterised by 
the tech bubble, and more precisely by the burst of the latter. The volatility was also higher in 
respect to other periods (see Figures 4.6.1.A to 4.6.1.C). Berry and Howe (1994) found less 
important results when considering lagged variables. Table 4.7.16 shows that the R2-adjusted is 
significant in the majority of cases, ranking from 0.113 to a maximum of 0.546 when the CAC 40 
index is considered. 
Karpoff (1987) also tried to shed light on the relation between information and trading 
volume, giving two possible explanations: first, consistent with conjectures made by empirical 
researchers, investor disagreement leads to increased trading activity. Second, abnormal trading 
volume does not necessarily imply disagreement, and volume can increase even if investors 
interpret the information identically, although their prior expectations may have been different. 
As demonstrated by the significant constant term, investors may want to trade even in the 
absence of new information, be it because of unique liquidity or a speculative desire (1986). 
The regression analysis model always shows an autoregressive process and a heteroscedastic 
behaviour for trading volumes. This means that past values are of considerable importance in 
explaining the regression, i.e. past trading volumes are followed by high values in subsequent 
periods. 
The heteroscedasticity is a clear signal that volatility shocks persist over time, creating clusters 
of volatility. This was also reported in other studies on time-series data (Lamoureux and 
Lastrapes, 1990, Cao and Tsay, 1992, Rabemananjara and Zakoian, 1993, Li and Li, 1996). Their 
results can be interpreted as a signal that periods of high volatility in trading volume are followed 
by periods of high volatility also in subsequent periods. Therefore, the best models are ARCH-
GARCH models, the latter being much more used (variance past values are more significant in 
GARCH models). The sum of ARCH and GARCH coefficients is nearly 1, indicating strong 
shock persistence over time. In some cases I also found, as in Table 4.7.6.A, an asymmetric 
component in volume volatility (TARCH effects), leading to the conclusion that negative term 
errors cause a different reaction on volume than positive ones. The coefficient of the asymmetric 
effect is positive, indicating that volatility shocks tend to be increased unless other news 
generated heterogeneity. The asymmetry properties lead to a decrease of predictable volatility and 
speed up market activity, thus increasing liquidity (market depth). Such an interpretation is also 
given by Lamoureux and Lastrapes (1990) who consider a residual of trading volume as news 
arrival, implying that negative (positive) shocks slightly decrease (increase) market activity and 
thus reduce (increase) intraday market depth. 
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C. Return 
 
The news information flow seems to explain also the absolute price returns (Table 4.7.9.B), 
but the R2-adjusted is significant in most of cases, and it ranks from a minimum of 0.070 to a 
maximum of 0.545 if the CAC 40 index is considered. In my regression, leading and lagged 
independent variables were included, with the latter giving the stronger results. In some cases, I 
found that returns anticipate public information (Table 4.7.9.A), and this can interpreted as a 
signal for the existence of private information. If this happened too often, it would invalidate the 
strong form of market efficiency. Private information transforms itself progressively into public 
information. If this hypothesis were true, it would need a deeper investigation by using, for 
example, the price impact measure as previously adopted by Bessembinder and Kaufmann (1997) 
or by decomposing the BAS into its component around public information releases as done by 
Ranaldo (2002) and MRR (1997). 
In the majority of cases, however, better regression results give evidence of the leading impact 
of the information volume proxy on absolute price changes. The coefficients are significant, and 
negatively related to information flow. The estimate model works better when one considers the 
autoregressive process, meaning that past values are strictly correlated. I also found, in some 
cases, even if it is not shown, that the conditional variance equation follows a TARCH model. 
This can be interpreted in the sense that positive and negative shocks may be positively or 
negatively related to price change volatility. 
 
D. Volatility 
 
The study of the relation between public information announcements and trading activity is of 
primary interest when one considers the width of stock price movements, i.e. volatility. The latter 
is of extreme importance for asset management activities. Also derivatives evaluations are based 
on volatility behaviour. Theoretically, if there is more information, investors may interpret it in 
more different ways, thus producing higher volatility. I wanted to test this hypothesis by using 
the same model as the one defined in equation (1). Volatility is now the dependent variable, and 
it corresponds to the log range, the statistical characteristics and properties of which are well 
documented in Alizadeh, Debrandt and Diebold (2002). 
The results (see Table 4.7.10) are, like in the case of volume, significant but relatively less 
strong. The R2-adjusted ranges from a minimum of 0.127 to a maximum of 0.471 in the case of 
the CAC 40 index. The most powerful models are obtained when the independent variable is 
lagged, meaning that a higher information flow anticipates an increase in volatility. Werner and 
Kleidon (1996) also sustain that a higher level of public information causes higher volatility. 
When the constant term is significant, it means that there is always a movement of stock prices, 
independently of public information volume. 
The regression shows an autoregressive process and a heteroscedastic behaviour of volatility, 
meaning that past values are of considerable importance in explaining the regression. I didn’t find 
any asymmetric component. 
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E. The price impact 
 
The price impact measure gives interesting results (Tables 4.7.11 to 4.7.15), even if the R2-
adjusted is less significant than the other liquidity indicators. The relation is negative for France 
Telecom and positive for Air Liquide, Axa, Total Fina and Vivendi. More importantly, the results 
show that the price impact measure anticipates the arrival of public information, meaning that 
private information is present before the release of publicly available information. This is also 
evident in the spread decomposition given by Ranaldo (2002), which indicates that the magnitude 
of the adverse selection is slightly higher before, rather than after, the news release arrivals. This 
interpretation implies a reduction of information asymmetry from the pre-news to the post-news 
environment. 
Green (2001), in his analysis of the bond market, found a significant increase in the adverse 
selection component of the BAS following economic announcements with a greater price 
impact, suggesting a rise in the level of information asymmetry and an increase in the 
informational role of trading. These results are different from mine because I saw that on the 
French Stock Exchange the informational role of trading was much more important before the 
release of information flow (up to 50 minutes as in Tables 4.7.12.A and 4.7.15.B). 
Figures 4.6.2 to 4.6.7 show the intraday evolution of the average price impact within a 5 
minutes period, whereby significant changes occur in the morning for Air Liquide, Axa, Total 
Fina, France Telecom and Vivendi). The private information content of trade is significant also 
in the second part of the day, i.e. after the lunch break (Air Liquide and France Telecom). I saw 
that trades seem to be more informative around the release of US macroeconomic news and 
around the US opening hours, even if there are not significant changes for Axa, Total and 
Vivendi in the afternoon (Tables 4.7.1 to 4.7.5). During these periods, as demonstrated in 
Chapter 2, the trading activity, measured by the trading volume, is generally higher, supporting 
the hypothesis that private informed traders tend to disguise their orders. In Figure 4.6.7, also the 
average price impact measure within a 1 minute period, for France Telecom, is shown. The 
intraday evolution of price impact is here more sensible and higher changes are visible around 
13:00, 14:30, 15:30 and before market close. Another interesting point emerge, however, if we 
look at the intraday evolution, during a five minutes period, of the five stocks presented, i.e. one 
peak at the beginning and one at the end of the trading day. Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) 
suppose that during these periods, the activity of the insider may be highest. Tables 4.7.1 to 4.7.5 
show the t-test, when testing two adjacent means against each other, for 5 stocks, namely Air 
Liquide, Axa, Total, France Telecom and Vivendi. 
 
F. News categories and overnight impact 
 
News impact has been divided into eight different categories, namely All Alerts news, Political 
news, Market News, Economic News, General News, Industrial News, Corporate News and 
Firm-specific news, each of which has a different impact on market trading indicators. 
The regression analysis conducted on individual stocks shows that the companies of the CAC 40 
index are much more sensitive to Corporate news and All Alerts news, and least sensitive to General 
and Industrial news. Investors seem to be influenced by news that have a great impact on the 
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company’s future payoff. Economic news, which include also macroeconomic indicators, play 
instead a lesser role for the CAC 40 stocks, even if they are significant. This is not surprising if 
one considers that investors already know when the majority of macroeconomic news is released, 
since the calendar is fixed by the authorities. Also, such news items are followed by a great number of 
analysts and economists who give an estimation of macroeconomic indicators. As reported in other 
studies (Pearce and Roley, 1985), only unexpected announcements cause a stock price reaction. It 
may be that this unexpected component is much more present in the Corporate news category. 
All Alerts news is the second category which has a great influence on stock liquidity 
indicators. The results of its effect on trading activity are significant. The news items included in 
this category  range from Corporate news to Economic and Industrial news as well as 
Greenspan’s speeches. All Alerts considers only the most important news items, and for this 
reason it can be used as a proxy of global information. In this category the unexpected 
announcement component may be higher than in other news category. 
General news has not a strong impact on the whole trading activity of individual stocks (see 
Table 4.7.17), which confirms, considering the news items included in this category, that the 
procedure of categorisation has been done accurately. It is really difficult to imagine that news such a 
sports, religion or crime can influence stocks behaviour, even if a casual correlation may be found. 
The news which relate to France (for example Industrial France and Corporate France) did 
not have the same impact, confirming that nowadays companies are much more influenced by 
the news flow worldwide. 
Along the line of procedures previously used by Berry and Howe (1994), also an overnight 
analysis was conducted in order to consider information released before and after the market 
trading hours. I calculated the number of news items released after the market closure, i.e. after 
05:00 p.m., until March 31, 2000 and after 05:30 p.m. after that date, and before market opening, 
i.e. before 09:00 a.m.. The total number was added to the first 5 minutes period of the following 
day. However, the analysis did not change my results significantly. 
Finally, using the Granger causality test, I investigate whether trading activity and information 
are causally related in the Granger sense. The test methodology was applied twice: first, I test 
whether it is true that a particular liquidity proxy does not cause a particular public information 
flow and secondly, the opposite was tested. In each cases, the regressions were run with twelve 
lags. The results, which in most cases support my previous results, are summarized in Tables 
4.7.18.A to 4.7.18.E. 
 
G. Concluding remarks 
 
The regression model, as the one presented in the methodology section, may lead to some 
criticism as far as the utilisation of lagged independent variables is concerned. The interpretation 
of the results requires, in this case, some caution, as evidenced by the to following potential 
scenarios. First scenario: the significance of the lagged independent variable, when it is reported, 
may be due to chance or caused by seasonality. In some cases, in fact, the sensitivity analysis 
shows that not all the lagged independent variables are significant but, for example, the 
coefficient is statistically different from zero only once at the tenth lag as in table 4.7.6.A. If this 
occurs two possible explanations can be given: the presence of an extreme value in the time 
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series or a seasonality effect observed for example when Wall Street opens. The former and the 
latter may cause the independent lagged variable to be significantly different from zero. However, 
the series used in this study have been adjusted for seasonality reducing therefore the probability 
that this effect has played a role. Extreme value may be therefore considered as the most 
plausible effect. Consequently, the conclusion that a relation between two variables exist is not 
perfectly correct and for this reason is much more difficult to draw a conclusion. Second 
scenario: the results can be considered stronger if the sensitivity analysis shows that more 
subsequent lagged independent variables are significant (Table 4.7.7.A). In this case it is possible 
to consider the results more intriguing. The conclusions are more debatable. The general 
regression model was applied twice. First, in the analysis of intraday market liquidity 
determinants in chapter 2 and now in this chapter, i.e. the impact of intraday public information 
on liquidity proxies. The analysis of intraday market liquidity determinants showed that, even if 
the ARMA regression model takes up to 12 lags into consideration for each variable, which 
corresponds to one hour of trading, the results deal, in the majority of cases, only with 
contemporaneous relations among liquidity proxies. In chapter 2 the question of a possible 
lead/lag relationship was not raised. In this case, the model seems to work well. It is possible to 
test only contemporaneous relation leaving out lagged independent variables. The news 
information impact on intraday market liquidity indicators was, on the contrary, more difficult to 
interpret. Even if some results show that three subsequent lagged independent variables (15 
minutes) are significant, as for example in Table 4.7.7.A, in other cases the unique significant 
independent variable may only be the consequence of the presence of an extreme value. Another 
problem may be linked to the choice of the model. If we consider that there are, for example, 
two independent variables, as in Equation 2 of Section 4.3.3. and that the sensitivity analysis 
must be conducted for these two variables, it is possible to obtain different combinations of 
significant independent variables by chance. In order to avoid this problem I tried to limit the 
sensitivity analysis of the intraday market liquidity indicators by considering much more the news 
flow variable. This method introduces some subjectivity in the regression analysis and the model 
seems in some way predetermined. Taking into consideration all these possible criticism of the 
model, it is important to exert some caution in the interpretation of the results. 
Another important aspect concerning the interpretation of the results must be discussed. In 
fact, the specification of the regression may also lead to some other criticism about the selection 
of the best model and in the interpretation of the results. The literature identifies some 
approaches concerning the specification problem. One of them is known as the average 
economic regression (AER), where practitioners use techniques that adopt specifications on the 
basis of searches for high R2 or high t values. This technique is called data mining, fishing, 
grubbing or number-crunching. Arguments against this mechanism have been reported by Mayer 
(1975, 1980), Peach and Webb (1983) and Lovell (1983). Mayer (1975, 1980), in particular, 
focuses on adjusted R2, showing that it does a weak job of picking out the correct specification, 
mainly because it capitalizes on chance, choosing a specification because it is able to explain 
better the peculiarities of that particular data set. Lovell (1983), on the other hand, focuses on the 
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search for significant t values, branding it data mining, and concludes that such searches will lead 
to inappropriate specifications, mainly owing to high probability of type I errors because of the 
many tests performed. As stated by Lovell (1983), data mining may lead to impressive results in 
terms of the customer criteria but it may “misleading in terms of what it asserts about the 
underlying process generating the data under study”. However, data mining methodology has 
positive features. In fact, such testing procedure may discover empirical regularities that point to 
errors in theoretical specifications. The use of this sequential or “stepwise” procedure, in which a 
large number of different hypothesis are tested in order to select a model, greatly increase the 
probability of adopting, by chance, an incorrect model. The terminology “data mining” is often 
used in the context of pre-test bias. In particular, researchers often run a large number of 
different regressions on a body of data looking for significant t statistics; i.e., the final results 
chosen are more likely to embody a type I error than the claimed 5%. Lovell (1983) offers a rule 
of thumb for deflating the exaggerated claims of significance generated by such data mining 
procedures: when a search has been conducted for the best k out of c candidate explanatory 
variables, a regression coefficient that appears to be significant at the level α1 should be regarded 
as significant only at level α = (c / k) α1. Taking into consideration all the aspects mentioned 
above and pointed out by some authors, my empirical approach, especially the procedure used in 
the selection of the best model (in particular the lag length) may be similar, in some aspects, to 
the data mining technique. For this reason the interpretation of the results, i.e. for example if 
significant variables and the level of significance are considered, require, therefore, some caution. 
In fact, in the Tables presented, the level of significance does not take into consideration the data 
mining approach, leading to some incorrect conclusions. Exaggerated claims of significance have 
not been deflated using the Lovell (1983) approach. 
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4.5. Conclusions 
 
The objective of this chapter was to find out whether the intraday flow of public information 
reported second-by-second by the Reuters 2000 News Alert System has an impact on the trading 
activity of 43 individual stocks and on the CAC 40 index of the Paris Bourse during a one year 
period (December 1, 1999 – November 30, 2000). 
My analysis concerns the impact of the public information flow, grouped into various news 
categories (All Alerts, Political, Market, Industrial, Economic, Corporate, Firm-specific and 
General news) on the trading activity of the Paris Bourse. The following results were obtained: 
1. The spread measure was divided into two indicators: the ratio of quoted half spread 
(RQHS), calculated from the order data, and the ratio of quoted half spread calculated 
from the weighted average spread (RQHS_WAS). The former was in some cases 
negatively related and in some other positively to information flow, whereas the latter 
was in the majority of cases negatively related. RQHS_WAS shows very high R2-
adjusted. I interpret this result as aggressiveness on the part of investors’ orders. 
2. The intraday volume exhibits a strong, positive, and statistically significant relation 
with the majority of news categories, but to a less extent concerning those related to 
France only. In particular, one can say that higher news activity leads to higher volume 
activity, confirming previous theories such as the one reported by Karpoff (1987) that 
it is either disagreement (the majority of the results reported by empirical 
investigations) or agreement that causes increased trading activity. 
3. When using the absolute price change as dependent variable, the results are somewhat 
different, with the regression analysis indicating a positive relation. In some cases 
stock return precedes news flow and this may be a signal of the presence of private 
information. 
4. Volatility, calculated as log range for its statistical properties, shows that it is 
influenced by the news flow in most of the news categories. The results are relatively 
less strong than for volume, but significantly and positively related. Depending on the 
stock chosen, the more robust results are significant up to a one hour lag, indicating 
that higher news flow leads to higher volatility. 
5. The price impact measure shows that trades are much more informative around 14:30, 
when the US macroeconomic indicators are released, and around 15:30 when the US 
market opens. Consistent with other empirical investigations, private information 
precedes the arrival of public information by up to 50 minutes. 
6. Finally, among the eight news categories considered, the Corporate news and All 
Alerts news show a more robust impact on individual stocks and on the CAC 40 index 
as compared to the other news categories. 
 
Another feature of the results is that the market capitalisation seems to have no influence, i.e. 
bigger and smaller companies may or may not be influenced by the volume of news. The 
consideration of other news providers contemporaneously might give a fresh impulse for 
studying the impact of public information on the trading activity of stock exchanges. 
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FIGURE 4.6.1.A: Daily evolution of the CAC 40 index (December 1, 1999 – November 30, 
2000). This Table shows the daily evolution of the CAC 40 index during a one year period 
(December 1, 1999 – November 30, 2000). During these period the index ranked from a 
minimum of 5312.89 points (December 1, 1999) to a maximum of 6944.77 points (September 4, 
2000). The last observation is 5928.08 points (November 30, 2000). 
 
 
Source: Bloomberg 
 
FIGURE 4.6.1.B: Historical volatility of the CAC 40 index (December 1, 1999 – 
November 30, 2000). This Table shows the historical volatility of the CAC 40 index during a 
one year period (December 1, 1999 – November 30, 2000). The black line is the volatility at 10 
days, the orange line at 30 days, the yellow line at 50 days and the green at 100 days. 
 
Source: Bloomberg  
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FIGURE 4.6.1.C: Historical volatility of the CAC 40 index between 1999 and 2000. This Table 
shows the historical volatility of the CAC 40 index during two years period. The black line is the volatility 
at 10 days, the orange line at 30 days, the yellow line at 50 days and the green at 100 days. 
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FIGURE 4.6.2: Price impact measure for Air Liquide. This Table shows the intraday 
evolution for the average price impact measure, which indicates the trade information content, 
for the Air Liquide stock during the period from December 1, 1999 – March 31, 2000 within 
successive intraday periods of five minutes. 
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FIGURE 4.6.3: Price impact measure for Axa. This Table shows the intraday evolution for 
the average price impact measure, which indicates the trade information content, for the Axa 
stock during the period from December 1, 1999 – March 31, 2000 within successive intraday 
periods of five minutes. 
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FIGURE 4.6.4: Price impact measure for Total Fina. This Table shows the intraday 
evolution for the average price impact measure, which indicates the trade information content, 
for the Total Fina stock during the period from December 1, 1999 – March 31, 2000 within 
successive intraday periods of five minutes. 
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FIGURE 4.6.5: Price impact measure for France Telecom. This Table shows the intraday 
evolution for the average price impact measure, which indicates the trade information content, 
for the France Telecom stock during the period from December 1, 1999 – March 31, 2000 within 
successive intraday periods of five minutes. 
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FIGURE 4.6.6: Price impact measure for Vivendi. This Table shows the intraday evolution 
for the average price impact measure, which indicates the trade information content, for the 
Vivendi stock during the period from December 1, 1999 – March 31, 2000 within successive 
intraday periods of five minutes. 
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FIGURE 4.6.7: Price impact measure for France Telecom (one minute). This Table shows 
the intraday evolution for the average price impact measure, which indicates the trade 
information content, for the Vivendi stock during the period from December 1, 1999 – March 
31, 2000 within successive intraday periods of one minute. 
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TABLE 4.7.1: T-test for the Air Liquide stock. This table reports the t-statistic when testing 
two adjacent means against each other during the period December 1, 1999 – March 31, 2000 for 
Air Liquide price impact measure. 
 
TIME AIR LIQUIDE VALUE OF DIFF. TIME AIR LIQUIDE VALUE OF DIFF.
905 0.302
  0.799   
910 0.132  1305 -0.001   
  0.179 -0.057  
915 0.102  1310 0.007   
  0.606 -1.303  
920 0.015  1315 0.181   
  -1.209 1.157  
925 0.197  1320 0.005   
  1.156 0.092  
930 0.016  1325 -0.009   
  -0.169 1.097  
935 0.037  1330 -0.169   
  0.382 -1.210  
940 -0.023  1335 0.014   
  -0.364 -0.877  
945 0.040  1340 0.130   
  0.159 0.492  
950 0.019  1345 0.076   
  -1.433 0.487  
955 0.203  1350 0.013   
  0.834 0.020  
1000 0.073  1355 0.011   
  0.452 0.644  
1005 -0.003  1400 -0.065   
  0.080 0.136  
1010 -0.016  1405 -0.086   
  0.382 -0.516  
1015 -0.070  1410 -0.007   
  -0.204 -0.596  
1020 -0.043  1415 0.068   
  -0.539 1.071  
1025 0.030  1420 -0.085   
  -0.858 1.314  
1030 0.164  1425 -0.256   
  1.325 -2.849 ** 
1035 -0.024  1430 0.103   
  -1.551 -0.039  
1040 0.198  1435 0.108   
  2.150 * 0.995  
1045 -0.140  1440 -0.005   
  -0.374 0.684  
1050 -0.083  1445 -0.075   
  -1.163 0.929  
1055 0.085  1450 -0.172   
  -0.129 0.172  
1100 0.102  1455 -0.192   
  0.056 -0.620  
1105 0.094  1500 -0.114   
  0.031 -1.893  
1110 0.089  1505 0.113   
  1.538 0.819  
1115 -0.085  1510 0.025   
  -0.196 0.558  
1120 -0.066  1515 -0.034   
  -1.148 -0.763  
1125 0.061  1520 0.063   
  -0.793 1.622  
1130 0.159  1525 -0.169   
  1.301 -0.699  
1135 0.013  1530 -0.062   
  0.538 0.104  
1140 -0.042  1535 -0.077   
  -1.327 -0.823  
1145 0.123  1540 0.034   
  0.492 -0.348  
1150 0.050  1545 0.097   
  0.797 1.665  
1155 -0.060  1550 -0.210   
  -1.159 -1.028  
1200 0.087  1555 -0.050   
  0.235 0.569  
1205 0.058  1600 -0.134   
  1.009 -0.738  
1210 -0.062  1605 -0.028   
  0.490 -0.475  
1215 -0.119  1610 0.038   
  -1.991 * 2.389 * 
1220 0.165  1615 -0.269   
  2.344 * -1.794  
1225 -0.174  1620 -0.038   
  -2.214 * 0.190  
1230 0.113  1625 -0.061   
  -0.588 0.638  
1235 0.218  1630 -0.153   
  0.178 0.771  
1240 0.185  1635 -0.305   
  0.888 -1.459  
1245 0.053  1640 0.013   
  -0.520 0.817  
1250 0.128  1645 -0.180   
  0.611 0.185  
1255 0.030  1650 -0.226   
  -0.554 -0.498  
1300 0.123  1655 -0.109   
  0.748 0.388  
1305 -0.001  1700 -0.213   
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TABLE 4.7.2: T-test for the Axa stock. This table reports the t-statistic when testing two 
adjacent means against each other during the period December 1, 1999 – March 31, 2000 for Axa 
price impact measure. 
 
TIME AXA VALUE OF DIFF. TIME AXA VALUE OF DIFF.
905 0.650
  2.281 *   
910 0.080  1305 0.092   
  0.123 1.499  
915 0.057  1310 -0.076   
  0.731 -1.950  
920 -0.081  1315 0.174   
  -0.291 0.724  
925 -0.014  1320 0.053   
  0.390 -0.188  
930 -0.096  1325 0.085   
  -1.095 0.979  
935 0.094  1330 -0.044   
  1.205 -0.118  
940 -0.130  1335 -0.030   
  -1.077 0.311  
945 0.058  1340 -0.068   
  -0.802 0.305  
950 0.189  1345 -0.107   
  0.253 -0.051  
955 0.145  1350 -0.099   
  0.132 -0.303  
1000 0.123  1355 -0.057   
  0.331 -0.119  
1005 0.073  1400 -0.044   
  -0.768 1.354  
1010 0.182  1405 -0.161   
  -0.320 -0.728  
1015 0.227  1410 -0.070   
  2.919 * 0.603  
1020 -0.103  1415 -0.152   
  -0.982 -0.827  
1025 0.029  1420 -0.056   
  -0.538 -0.503  
1030 0.114  1425 0.008   
  1.570 1.128  
1035 -0.113  1430 -0.133   
  -1.035 -1.735  
1040 0.031  1435 0.084   
  0.362 -0.109  
1045 -0.024  1440 0.098   
  0.266 1.117  
1050 -0.070  1445 -0.064   
  -0.606 -1.121  
1055 0.025  1450 0.134   
  1.122 1.082  
1100 -0.120  1455 -0.036   
  -0.943 0.003  
1105 0.006  1500 -0.036   
  0.009 -1.954  
1110 0.004  1505 0.108   
  0.839 1.627  
1115 -0.147  1510 -0.051   
  -0.224 0.482  
1120 -0.110  1515 -0.110   
  -0.751 -0.274  
1125 0.004  1520 -0.073   
  -0.808 1.092  
1130 0.128  1525 -0.201   
  0.561 0.222  
1135 0.046  1530 -0.220   
  -0.127 -1.938  
1140 0.061  1535 -0.060   
  -0.231 0.429  
1145 0.084  1540 -0.109   
  0.165 0.216  
1150 0.065  1545 -0.137   
  1.712 -0.011  
1155 -0.106  1550 -0.136   
  -1.883 -0.360  
1200 0.080  1555 -0.092   
  -0.522 0.371  
1205 0.143  1600 -0.136   
  0.329 -0.083  
1210 0.102  1605 -0.126   
  0.158 0.060  
1215 0.083  1610 -0.134   
  -0.333 0.045  
1220 0.120  1615 -0.139   
  0.923 -1.848  
1225 0.026  1620 0.117   
  -0.037 -0.454  
1230 0.030  1625 0.190   
  0.547 1.702  
1235 -0.036  1630 -0.081   
  -1.692 -1.299  
1240 0.153  1635 0.196   
  2.003 1.376  
1245 -0.070  1640 -0.152   
  -0.668 -0.421  
1250 0.011  1645 -0.036   
  0.761 -0.297  
1255 -0.080  1650 0.045   
  0.292 -0.547  
1300 -0.119  1655 0.183   
  -1.514 1.403  
1305 0.092  1700 -0.146   
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TABLE 4.7.3: T-test for the Total Fina stock. This table reports the t-statistic when testing 
two adjacent means against each other during the period December 1, 1999 – March 31, 2000 for 
Total Fina price impact measure. 
 
TIME TOTAL FINA VALUE OF DIFF. TIME TOTAL FINA VALUE OF DIFF.
905 0.067
  -0.543   
910 0.225  1305 0.070   
  0.252 1.101  
915 0.170  1310 -0.050   
  1.972 * -0.257  
920 -0.167  1315 -0.023   
  -1.833 0.251  
925 0.106  1320 -0.055   
  1.116 0.365  
930 -0.086  1325 -0.101   
  -0.770 -0.135  
935 0.052  1330 -0.084   
  -0.510 0.786  
940 0.158  1335 -0.184   
  0.261 -0.591  
945 0.100  1340 -0.114   
  -0.757 -0.573  
950 0.252  1345 -0.048   
  0.470 0.409  
955 0.163  1350 -0.092   
  0.014 -0.627  
1000 0.160  1355 -0.027   
  0.621 0.718  
1005 0.056  1400 -0.100   
  -0.169 -0.248  
1010 0.084  1405 -0.073   
  0.361 1.193  
1015 0.032  1410 -0.212   
  -1.322 0.240  
1020 0.173  1415 -0.242   
  -0.326 -2.126 * 
1025 0.217  1420 0.075   
  0.760 0.173  
1030 0.106  1425 0.049   
  -0.471 -0.386  
1035 0.168  1430 0.100   
  1.244 0.042  
1040 0.019  1435 0.094   
  0.446 0.322  
1045 -0.037  1440 0.052   
  -1.103 0.559  
1050 0.095  1445 -0.010   
  0.361 1.070  
1055 0.046  1450 -0.107   
  0.714 -0.656  
1100 -0.055  1455 -0.039   
  0.707 -1.902  
1105 -0.151  1500 0.151   
  -1.053 1.205  
1110 -0.027  1505 0.028   
  0.666 0.612  
1115 -0.100  1510 -0.049   
  0.960 0.639  
1120 -0.211  1515 -0.143   
  -1.715 -0.532  
1125 -0.022  1520 -0.062   
  -0.655 0.997  
1130 0.065  1525 -0.196   
  -0.322 0.806  
1135 0.114  1530 -0.299   
  0.969 -0.443  
1140 -0.012  1535 -0.231   
  -0.088 -1.746  
1145 -0.002  1540 0.025   
  -0.266 0.028  
1150 0.033  1545 0.021   
  1.074 0.582  
1155 -0.113  1550 -0.088   
  0.121 -0.697  
1200 -0.130  1555 0.024   
  -0.964 -0.298  
1205 0.010  1600 0.056   
  0.283 0.898  
1210 -0.032  1605 -0.068   
  -0.546 0.413  
1215 0.041  1610 -0.129   
  -0.167 -1.539  
1220 0.063  1615 0.064   
  -0.251 2.099 * 
1225 0.095  1620 -0.190   
  1.138 -1.350  
1230 -0.023  1625 -0.020   
  -0.419 -0.197  
1235 0.014  1630 0.010   
  -0.148 -0.553  
1240 0.032  1635 0.118   
  -0.973 -0.824  
1245 0.175  1640 0.322   
  1.720 0.561  
1250 -0.061  1645 0.176   
  0.089 1.041  
1255 -0.071  1650 -0.070   
  0.129 -0.382  
1300 -0.085  1655 0.017   
  -1.339 0.280  
1305 0.070  1700 -0.051   
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TABLE 4.7.4: T-test for the France Telecom stock. This table reports the t-statistic when 
testing two adjacent means against each other during the period December 1, 1999 – March 31, 
2000 for France Telecom price impact measure. 
 
TIME FRANCE TELECOM VALUE OF DIFF. TIME FRANCE TELECOM VALUE OF DIFF.
905 0.584
  2.603 *   
910 0.056  1305 0.219   
  0.858 1.107  
915 -0.094  1310 0.098   
  0.493 0.484  
920 -0.195  1315 0.041   
  -0.397 -0.013  
925 -0.116  1320 0.043   
  -1.553 0.962  
930 0.128  1325 -0.068   
  -0.480 0.612  
935 0.199  1330 -0.126   
  1.480 -0.296  
940 -0.033  1335 -0.096   
  0.250 -0.696  
945 -0.080  1340 -0.000   
  -0.671 0.884  
950 0.045  1345 -0.122   
  0.029 -1.349  
955 0.041  1350 0.040   
  -0.032 0.360  
1000 0.045  1355 -0.000   
  -0.957 -0.308  
1005 0.185  1400 0.035   
  0.550 -0.383  
1010 0.100  1405 0.079   
  -0.021 2.659 * 
1015 0.102  1410 -0.249   
  0.689 -1.042  
1020 0.019  1415 -0.117   
  0.411 -0.216  
1025 -0.039  1420 -0.092   
  -0.276 -0.642  
1030 0.002  1425 -0.001   
  0.398 -0.434  
1035 -0.052  1430 0.065   
  0.773 0.211  
1040 -0.149  1435 0.034   
  -0.786 0.714  
1045 -0.040  1440 -0.063   
  1.169 0.136  
1050 -0.201  1445 -0.079   
  -1.148 -0.373  
1055 -0.058  1450 -0.034   
  1.703 0.324  
1100 -0.265  1455 -0.074   
  -0.929 -0.604  
1105 -0.167  1500 0.014   
  -0.497 -0.466  
1110 -0.113  1505 0.092   
  -0.510 0.310  
1115 -0.055  1510 0.049   
  0.597 1.323  
1120 -0.123  1515 -0.097   
  -0.030 -0.722  
1125 -0.120  1520 -0.003   
  -0.359 -0.297  
1130 -0.075  1525 0.035   
  -0.455 -0.526  
1135 -0.016  1530 0.108   
  -0.138 0.241  
1140 0.000  1535 0.072   
  0.513 -0.349  
1145 -0.050  1540 0.120   
  -0.746 -0.034  
1150 0.012  1545 0.126   
  0.139 -0.043  
1155 -0.003  1550 0.134   
  0.212 0.517  
1200 -0.029  1555 0.043   
  -0.564 0.427  
1205 0.045  1600 -0.031   
  0.106 0.325  
1210 0.032  1605 -0.077   
  -0.378 -0.795  
1215 0.079  1610 0.039   
  -0.629 0.096  
1220 0.167  1615 0.022   
  0.886 0.418  
1225 0.053  1620 -0.058   
  0.172 1.389  
1230 0.029  1625 -0.271   
  0.704 -2.714 * 
1235 -0.065  1630 0.117   
  -0.779 0.511  
1240 0.019  1635 0.015   
  0.072 0.405  
1245 0.011  1640 -0.084   
  0.113 -1.182  
1250 -0.005  1645 0.226   
  0.119 -0.134  
1255 -0.024  1650 0.263   
  -1.315 1.216  
1300 0.166  1655 -0.044   
  -0.424 0.894  
1305 0.219  1700 -0.294   
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TABLE 4.7.5: T-test for the Vivendi stock. This table reports the t-statistic when testing two 
adjacent means against each other during the period December 1, 1999 – March 31, 2000 for 
Vivendi price impact measure. 
 
TIME VIVENDI VALUE OF DIFF. TIME VIVENDI VALUE OF DIFF.
905 0.417
  -0.076   
910 0.438  1305 -0.019   
  1.990 * 0.231  
915 -0.049  1310 -0.045   
  -0.442 -0.098  
920 0.047  1315 -0.034   
  -0.275 -0.304  
925 0.102  1320 0.000   
  0.686 0.205  
930 -0.041  1325 -0.025   
  -0.214 -0.135  
935 0.003  1330 -0.006   
  0.084 0.163  
940 -0.014  1335 -0.029   
  1.703 0.207  
945 -0.326  1340 -0.054   
  -2.119 * 0.145  
950 0.006  1345 -0.070   
  -0.368 0.034  
955 0.060  1350 -0.073   
  0.045 0.366  
1000 0.053  1355 -0.104   
  -0.067 -0.601  
1005 0.065  1400 -0.047   
  -0.467 -0.611  
1010 0.152  1405 0.017   
  1.041 -0.294  
1015 -0.006  1410 0.045   
  1.904 -0.247  
1020 -0.217  1415 0.069   
  -1.677 -0.026  
1025 -0.073  1420 0.072   
  -0.236 -0.880  
1030 -0.047  1425 0.197   
  -1.075 0.631  
1035 0.105  1430 0.107   
  1.773 1.556  
1040 -0.128  1435 -0.114   
  -1.469 -0.607  
1045 0.066  1440 -0.033   
  0.490 0.774  
1050 -0.003  1445 -0.105   
  0.039 -0.689  
1055 -0.008  1450 -0.019   
  -0.998 0.362  
1100 0.109  1455 -0.076   
  -0.204 -0.551  
1105 0.132  1500 0.004   
  0.384 -0.900  
1110 0.094  1505 0.125   
  1.668 0.155  
1115 -0.059  1510 0.103   
  0.054 1.847  
1120 -0.066  1515 -0.114   
  0.565 0.695  
1125 -0.122  1520 -0.182   
  -3.251 * 1.243  
1130 0.094  1525 -0.321   
  3.066 -0.461  
1135 -0.118  1530 -0.263   
  -0.036 -0.029  
1140 -0.114  1535 -0.259   
  -0.324 -1.379  
1145 -0.066  1540 -0.088   
  -0.901 0.209  
1150 0.058  1545 -0.115   
  1.314 -0.519  
1155 -0.077  1550 -0.049   
  -1.232 0.502  
1200 0.026  1555 -0.128   
  -0.014 -1.652  
1205 0.027  1600 0.127   
  0.390 0.956  
1210 -0.019  1605 0.020   
  -0.391 0.837  
1215 0.029  1610 -0.100   
  -0.098 -1.067  
1220 0.040  1615 0.077   
  -0.073 0.069  
1225 0.048  1620 0.067   
  -0.531 0.534  
1230 0.113  1625 -0.020   
  0.556 0.891  
1235 0.047  1630 -0.159   
  -0.021 -1.817  
1240 0.049  1635 0.281   
  1.039 0.740  
1245 -0.070  1640 0.062   
  -0.764 -0.264  
1250 0.035  1645 0.130   
  0.039 -0.986  
1255 0.030  1650 0.427   
  2.429 * 0.795  
1300 -0.195  1655 0.195   
  -1.682 1.175  
1305 -0.019  1700 -0.099   
 
CHAPTER 4 – Tables 
  
 
270 
TABLE 4.7.6: Intraday relationship between quoted half spread and Market news. This 
estimation is based on the average trading data between the ratio of quoted half spread and the 
ratio of Market news from December 1, 1999 to March 31, 2000. From this sample I obtained 
8352 observations of five minutes each for table 4.7.6.A and for table 4.7.6.B. Table 4.7.6.A 
represents the results of the regression between the ratio of CAC 40 quoted half spread 
(explained variable) and the following independent variables: ratio of Market news (RMARKET), 
a constant (C), and ARMA (3,3). The conditional variance equation of residuals follows a 
GARCH model including 2-lagged residuals coefficients, 1-lagged conditional variance (GARCH 
(1)) and a constant (C). Table 4.7.6.B represents the results of the regression between the ratio of 
Accor quoted half spread (explained variable) and the following independent variable: ratio of 
Market news for France (RMARKET_FR), a constant (C), and ARMA (2,2). The conditional 
variance equation of residuals follows a GARCH model including 2-lagged residuals coefficients, 
1-lagged conditional variance (GARCH (1)) and a constant (C). In the Table 4.7.6.A. the value of 
parameters p and z are respectively: 3 and 3. In the Table 4.7.6.B. the value of parameters p and z 
are respectively: 2 and 2. 
 
TABLE 4.7.6.A TABLE 4.7.6.B
Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob. Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob. 
C -0.176 0.012 -14.414 0.000 C -0.246 0.032 -7.766 0.000
RMARKET(-10) -0.010 0.004 -2.642 0.008 RMARKET_FR(-7) 0.040 0.015 2.619 0.009
AR(1) 1.570 0.191 8.204 0.000 RMARKET_FR(-8) 0.035 0.015 2.327 0.020
AR(2) -0.521 0.286 -1.825 0.068 AR(1) 1.302 0.049 26.656 0.000
AR(3) -0.053 0.097 -0.543 0.587 AR(2) -0.347 0.042 -8.329 0.000
MA(1) -0.988 0.191 -5.173 0.000 MA(1) -0.714 0.050 -14.323 0.000
MA(2) -0.077 0.175 -0.439 0.661 MA(2) -0.077 0.024 -3.171 0.002
MA(3) 0.110 0.022 4.978 0.000
C 0.022 0.007 3.018 0.003
C 0.002 0.000 3.490 0.001 ARCH(1) 0.083 0.013 6.463 0.000
ARCH(1) 0.031 0.006 4.948 0.000 ARCH(2) -0.053 0.013 -3.963 0.000
GARCH(1) 0.839 0.041 20.614 0.000 GARCH(1) 0.885 0.034 25.894 0.000
R-squared 0.484     Mean dependent var -0.174 R-squared 0.429     Mean dependent var -0.215
Adjusted R-squared 0.483     S.D. dependent var 0.152 Adjusted R-squared 0.428     S.D. dependent var 0.675
S.E. of regression 0.110     Akaike info criterion -1.587 S.E. of regression 0.511     Akaike info criterion 1.486
Sum squared resid 99.866     Schwarz criterion -1.568 Sum squared resid 2171.797     Schwarz criterion 1.504
Log likelihood 6636.049     F-statistic 371.722 Log likelihood -6173.979     F-statistic 312.369
Durbin-Watson stat 2.004     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 Durbin-Watson stat 1.999     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000
Inverted AR Roots 0.990 0.660 -0.080 Inverted AR Roots 0.930 0.370
Inverted MA Roots 0.950 0.360 -0.320 Inverted MA Roots 0.810 -0.100
      Variance Equation
       Variance Equation
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TABLE 4.7.7: Intraday relationship between QHS_WAS and Industrial News. This 
estimation is based on the average trading data between the ratio of quoted half spread from the 
WAS file and the ratio of Industrial news from December 1, 1999 to March 31, 2000. From this 
sample I obtained 8352 observations of five minutes each for table 4.7.7.A and for table 4.7.7.B. 
Table 4.7.7.A represents the results of the regression between the ratio of market quoted half 
spread for the Alstom stock, obtained from the weighted average spread file (explained variable) 
and the following independent variables: ratio of Industrial news (RINDU), a constant (C), and 
ARMA (2,2). The conditional variance equation of residuals follows a GARCH model including 
2-lagged residuals coefficients, two for all the residuals (ARCH (2)), lagged conditional variance 
(GARCH (1)) and a constant (C). Table 4.7.7.B reports the similar regression, but Industrial news 
for France and Lagardere stock are used. The conditional variance equation also follows a 
GARCH(1,2) model. In the Table 4.7.7.A. the value of parameters p and z are respectively: 2 and 
2. In the Table 4.7.7.B. the value of parameters p and z are respectively: 2 and 2. 
 
 
 
 
TA BLE 4.7.7.A TA BLE 4.7.7.B
Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob. Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob. 
C 0.023 0.025 0.916 0.360 C 0.026 0.030 0.861 0.389
RINDU(-8) -0.006 0.003 -1.710 0.087 RINDU_FR(-5) 0.011 0.005 2.177 0.030
RINDU(-9) -0.011 0.003 -3.639 0.000 A R(1) 1.655 0.028 58.605 0.000
RINDU(-1 0) -0.010 0.003 -3.500 0.001 A R(2) -0.663 0.027 -24.537 0.000
A R(1) 1.654 0.032 51.066 0.000 MA (1) -0.794 0.031 -25.318 0.000
A R(2) -0.663 0.031 -21.398 0.000 MA (2) -0.064 0.017 -3.793 0.000
MA (1) -0.689 0.033 -20.719 0.000
MA (2) -0.122 0.012 -10.004 0.000
       Variance Equation C 0.002 0.000 15.001 0.000
A RCH(1) 0.255 0.013 18.997 0.000
C 0.000 0.000 17.226 0.000 A RCH(2) -0.145 0.013 -11.097 0.000
A RCH(1) 0.309 0.012 25.513 0.000 G A RCH(1) 0.846 0.007 113.610 0.000
A RCH(2) -0.263 0.012 -22.256 0.000
G A RCH(1) 0.937 0.003 367.745 0.000 R-squared 0.842     Mean dependent var -0.075
A djusted R-squared 0.842     S.D. dependent var 0.451
R-squared 0.865     Mean dependent var -0.050 S.E. of regression 0.179     A kaike info criter ion -0.782
A djusted R-squared 0.865     S.D. dependent var 0.358 Sum squared resid 266.850     Schwarz cr iterion -0.764
S.E. of regression 0.132     A kaike info criter ion -1.387 Log likelihood 3279.796     F-statistic 2223.535
Sum squared resid 144.177     Schwarz cr iter ion -1.370 Durbin-W atson stat 2.126     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000
Log likelihood 5804.322     F-statistic 2666.929
Durbin-W atson stat 2.060     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 Inverted A R Roots 0.970 0.680
Inverted MA  Roots 0.870 -0.070
Inverted A R Roots 0.970 0.680
Inverted MA  Roots 0.830 -0.150
      Variance Equation
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TABLE 4.7.8: Intraday relationship between market cumulated trading volume and All 
Alerts News. This estimation is based on the average trading data between the ratio of 
cumulated traded volume and the ratio of All Alerts news from December 1, 1999 to March 31, 
2000. From this sample I obtained 8352 observations of five minutes each for table 4.7.8.A and 
for table 4.7.8.B. Table 4.7.8.A represents the results of the regression between the ratio of Canal 
Plus cumulated traded volume (explained variable) and the following independent variables: ratio 
of All Alerts News (RAA) and ratio of average Canal Plus return (RABSRET_CANAL), a 
constant (C), and ARMA (1,2). The conditional variance equation of residuals follows a TARCH 
model including 2-lagged residuals coefficients, one for all the residuals (ARCH (1)), the other 
only for negative residuals being a dummy variable (RESID<0)*ARCH(1), lagged conditional 
variance (GARCH (1)) and a constant (C). Table 4.7.8.B reports a similar regression, but 
cumulated traded volume of AGF stock and All Alerts news for France are used instead. In the 
Table 4.7.8.A. the value of parameters p, q and z are respectively: 1, 0 and 2. In the Table 4.7.8.B. 
the value of parameters p, q and z are respectively: 2, 0 and 2. 
 
 
TABLE 4.7.8.A TABLE 4.7.8.B
Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob. Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob. 
C -0.635 0.071 -8.927 0.000 C -0.966 0.061 -15.899 0.000
RAA(-1) 0.097 0.035 2.817 0.005 RAA_FR(-8) -0.084 0.042 -2.006 0.045
RABSRET_CANAL -0.182 0.016 -11.458 0.000 RABSRET_AGF -0.641 0.023 -28.163 0.000
AR(1) 0.970 0.004 257.289 0.000 AR(1) 0.127 0.179 0.712 0.477
MA(1) -0.726 0.012 -58.742 0.000 AR(2) 0.793 0.169 4.685 0.000
MA(2) -0.077 0.012 -6.527 0.000 MA(1) -0.070 0.176 -0.396 0.692
MA(2) -0.756 0.157 -4.810 0.000
C 0.040 0.005 8.639 0.000
ARCH(1) 0.023 0.005 4.812 0.000 C 0.552 0.163 3.384 0.001
(RESID< 0)*ARCH(1) 0.048 0.007 6.989 0.000 ARCH(1) 0.038 0.008 4.492 0.000
GARCH(1) 0.907 0.007 122.092 0.000 GARCH(1) 0.743 0.070 10.562 0.000
R-squared 0.357     Mean dependent var -0.581 R-squared 0.122     Mean dependent var -0.899
Adjusted R-squared 0.356     S.D. dependent var 1.191 Adjusted R-squared 0.120     S.D. dependent var 1.693
S.E. of regression 0.956     Akaike info criterion 2.703 S.E. of regression 1.588     Akaike info criterion 3.761
Sum squared resid 7604.922     Schwarz criterion 2.720 Sum squared resid 20972.010     Schwarz criterion 3.779
Log likelihood -11247.950     F-statistic 231.264 Log likelihood -15658.520     F-statistic 57.715
Durbin-Watson stat 2.037     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 Durbin-Watson stat 1.974     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000
Inverted AR Roots 0.970 Inverted AR Roots 0.960 -0.830
Inverted MA Roots 0.820 -0.090 Inverted MA Roots 0.900 -0.840
       Variance Equation
      Variance Equation
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TABLE 4.7.9: Intraday relationship between return and Economic news. This estimation is 
based on the average trading data between the ratio of return in absolute terms and the ratio of 
Economic news from December 1, 1999 to March 31, 2000. From this sample I obtained 8352 
observations of five minutes each for table 4.7.9.A and for table 4.7.9.B. Table 4.7.9.A represents 
the results of the regression between the ratio of Vivendi return in absolute terms (explained 
variable) and the following independent variables: ratio of Economic news (RECO), ratio of 
cumulated Vivendi traded volume (RSUMVOL_VIVENDI), a constant (C), and ARMA (3,3). 
The conditional variance equation of residuals follows a GARCH model including 2-lagged 
residuals coefficients for all the residuals (ARCH (1)), lagged conditional variance (GARCH (2)) 
and a constant (C). Table 4.7.9.B reports a similar regression, but cumulated traded volume of 
Aventis stock and Economic news for France are used instead. In the Table 4.7.9.A. the value of 
parameters p, q and z are respectively: 3, 0 and 3. In the Table 4.7.9.B. the value of parameters p, 
q and z are respectively: 3, 0 and 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 4.7.9.A TABLE 4.7.9.B
Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob. Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob. 
C -0.138 0.076 -1.812 0.070 C -0.285 0.028 -10.069 0.000
RECO(3) 0.029 0.009 3.136 0.002 RECO_FR(-1) 0.020 0.010 1.999 0.046
RSUMVOL_VIVENDI -0.109 0.006 -18.290 0.000 RSUMVOL_AVENTIS -0.110 0.006 -18.066 0.000
AR(1) 1.332 0.161 8.266 0.000 AR(1) 0.805 0.090 8.962 0.000
AR(2) -0.025 0.273 -0.093 0.926 AR(2) 0.323 0.079 4.082 0.000
AR(3) -0.308 0.114 -2.699 0.007 AR(3) -0.169 0.048 -3.545 0.000
MA(1) -1.065 0.159 -6.687 0.000 MA(1) -0.518 0.091 -5.682 0.000
MA(2) -0.172 0.227 -0.758 0.449 MA(2) -0.391 0.062 -6.346 0.000
MA(3) 0.251 0.075 3.329 0.001 MA(3) 0.049 0.045 1.087 0.277
C 0.000 0.000 2.067 0.039 C 0.000 0.000 2.135 0.033
ARCH(1) 0.058 0.011 5.413 0.000 ARCH(1) 0.061 0.010 5.993 0.000
ARCH(2) -0.055 0.010 -5.362 0.000 ARCH(2) -0.059 0.010 -5.906 0.000
GARCH(1) 1.531 0.110 13.947 0.000 GARCH(1) 1.515 0.106 14.332 0.000
GARCH(2) -0.535 0.109 -4.917 0.000 GARCH(2) -0.519 0.105 -4.960 0.000
R-squared 0.276     Mean dependent var -0.125 R-squared 0.195     Mean dependent var -0.187
Adjusted R-squared 0.274     S.D. dependent var 0.514 Adjusted R-squared 0.193     S.D. dependent var 0.627
S.E. of regression 0.438     Akaike info criterion 1.160 S.E. of regression 0.563     Akaike info criterion 1.676
Sum squared resid 1596.303     Schwarz criterion 1.181 Sum squared resid 2634.732     Schwarz criterion 1.698
Log likelihood -4811.371     F-statistic 132.320 Log likelihood -6963.448     F-statistic 84.106
Durbin-Watson stat 1.985     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 Durbin-Watson stat 2.000     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000
Inverted AR Roots 1.000 0.750 -0.410 Inverted AR Roots 0.960 0.350 -0.500
Inverted MA Roots 0.980 0.550 -0.470 Inverted MA Roots 0.890 0.110 -0.490
       Variance Equation       Variance Equation
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TABLE 4.7.10: Intraday relationship between volatility and All Alerts News. This 
estimation is based on the average trading data between the ratio of volatility and the ratio of 
Corporate news from December 1, 1999 to March 31, 2000. From this sample I obtained 8352 
observations of five minutes each for table 4.7.10.A and for table 4.7.10.B. Table 4.7.10.A 
represents the results of the regression between the ratio of volatility of Accor stock, measured as 
a log range (explained variable) and the following independent variables: ratio of Corporate news 
(RCORP), a constant (C), and ARMA (2,2). The conditional variance equation of residuals 
follows a GARCH model including 2-lagged residuals coefficients for all the residuals (ARCH 
(2)), 1-lagged conditional variance (GARCH (1)) and a constant (C). Table 4.7.10.B reports a 
similar regression, but Total Fina stock and Corporate news for France are used instead. In the 
Table 4.7.10.A. the value of parameters p and z are respectively: 2 and 2. In the Table 4.7.9.B. the 
value of parameters p and z are respectively: 2 and 2. 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 4.7.10.A TABLE 4.7.10.B
Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob. Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob. 
C -0.286 0.036 -7.938 0.000 C -0.149 0.026 -5.731 0.000
RCORP(-10) 0.034 0.014 2.435 0.015 RCORP_FR(-2) 0.020 0.011 1.753 0.080
AR(1) 1.501 0.029 51.575 0.000 AR(1) 1.410 0.045 31.162 0.000
AR(2) -0.517 0.028 -18.782 0.000 AR(2) -0.431 0.043 -10.074 0.000
MA(1) -1.172 0.031 -37.424 0.000 MA(1) -1.140 0.047 -24.014 0.000
MA(2) 0.240 0.026 9.101 0.000 MA(2) 0.209 0.041 5.138 0.000
       Variance Equation        Variance Equation
C 0.012 0.002 5.287 0.000 C 0.006 0.003 2.078 0.038
ARCH(1) 0.119 0.014 8.255 0.000 ARCH(1) 0.036 0.011 3.232 0.001
ARCH(2) -0.096 0.014 -6.747 0.000 ARCH(2) -0.025 0.011 -2.257 0.024
GARCH(1) 0.951 0.007 131.657 0.000 GARCH(1) 0.966 0.014 67.702 0.000
R-squared 0.230     Mean dependent var -0.233 R-squared 0.146     Mean dependent var -0.140
Adjusted R-squared 0.228     S.D. dependent var 0.784 Adjusted R-squared 0.144     S.D. dependent var 0.554
S.E. of regression 0.689     Akaike info criterion 2.063 S.E. of regression 0.513     Akaike info criterion 1.501
Sum squared resid 3946.005     Schwarz criterion 2.081 Sum squared resid 2186.576     Schwarz criterion 1.518
Log likelihood -8578.897     F-statistic 124.028 Log likelihood -6235.003     F-statistic 71.167
Durbin-Watson stat 2.045     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 Durbin-Watson stat 1.997     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000
Inverted AR Roots 0.970 0.530 Inverted AR Roots 0.960 0.450
Inverted MA Roots 0.910 0.260 Inverted MA Roots 0.910 0.230
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TABLE 4.7.11: Intraday relationship between Air Liquide price impact and public 
information. This estimation is based on the average trading data between the ratio of price 
impact and the ratio of public information from December 1, 1999 to March 31, 2000. From this 
sample I obtained 8352 observations of five minutes each for table 4.7.11.A and for table 
4.7.11.B. Table 4.7.11.A represents the results of the regression between the ratio of Air Liquide 
price impact (explained variable) and the following independent variables: ratio of All Alerts 
news France (RAA_FR), a constant (C), and ARMA (2,1). The conditional variance equation of 
residuals follows a GARCH model including 1-lagged residuals coefficients, 1-lagged conditional 
variance (GARCH (1)) and a constant (C). Table 4.7.11.B represents the results of the regression 
between the ratio of Air Liquide price impact (explained variable) and the following independent 
variables: ratio of Corporate news France (RCORP_FR), a constant (C), and ARMA (2,1). The 
conditional variance equation of residuals follows a GARCH model including 1-lagged residuals 
coefficients, 1-lagged conditional variance (GARCH (1)) and a constant (C). In the Table 
4.7.11.A. the value of parameters p and z are respectively: 2 and 1. In the Table 4.7.11.B. the 
value of parameters p and z are respectively: 2 and 1. 
 
TABLE 4.7.11.A TABLE 4.7.11 .B
Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob. Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob. 
C -0.698 0.057 -12.257 0.000 C -0.745 0.054 -13.797 0.000
RAA_FR(3) 0.091 0.036 2.518 0.012 RCORP_FR(1) 0.074 0.028 2.670 0.008
AR(1) 0.783 0.058 13.536 0.000 RCORP_FR(2) 0.099 0.029 3.413 0.001
AR(2) -0.035 0.028 -1.256 0.209 RCORP_FR(3) 0.084 0.029 2.925 0.003
MA(1) -0.478 0.056 -8.492 0.000 AR(1) 0.777 0.058 13.296 0.000
AR(2) -0.032 0.028 -1.168 0.243
MA(1) -0.472 0.057 -8.284 0.000
C 1.039 0.272 3.814 0.000
ARCH(1) 0.039 0.009 4.340 0.000
GARCH(1) 0.324 0.170 1.903 0.057 C 1.029 0.269 3.829 0.000
ARCH(1) 0.039 0.009 4.301 0.000
R-squared 0.151     Mean dependent var -0.632 GARCH(1) 0.329 0.169 1.954 0.051
Adjusted R-squared 0.149     S.D. dependent var 1.387
S.E. of regression 1.280     Akaike info criterion 3.330 R-squared 0.153     Mean dependent var -0.632
Sum squared resid 13620.490     Schwarz criterion 3.346 Adjusted R-squared 0.151     S.D. dependent var 1.387
Log likelihood -13863.330     F-statistic 82.344 S.E. of regression 1.279     Akaike info criterion 3.328
Durbin-Watson stat 2.013     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 Sum squared resid 13600.020     Schwarz criterion 3.344
Log likelihood -13857.290     F-statistic 83.164
Inverted AR Roots 0.740 0.050 Durbin-Watson stat 2.013     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000
Inverted MA Roots 0.480
Inverted AR Roots 0.730 0.040
Inverted MA Roots 0.470
       Variance Equation
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TABLE 4.7.12: Intraday relationship between Axa price impact and public information. 
This estimation is based on the average trading data between the ratio of price impact and the 
ratio of public information from December 1, 1999 to March 31, 2000. From this sample I 
obtained 8352 observations of five minutes each for table 4.7.12.A and for table 4.7.12.B. Table 
4.7.12.A represents the results of the regression between the ratio of Axa price impact (explained 
variable) and the following independent variables: ratio of Corporate news for France 
(RCORP_FR), a constant (C), and ARMA (2,1). The conditional variance equation of residuals 
follows an ARCH model including 1-lagged residuals coefficients and a constant (C). Table 
4.7.12.B represents the results of the regression between the ratio of Axa price impact (explained 
variable) and the following independent variables: ratio of Market news for France 
(RMARKET_FR), a constant (C), and ARMA (2,1). The conditional variance equation of 
residuals follows an ARCH model including 1-lagged residuals coefficients and a constant (C). In 
the Table 4.7.12.A. the value of parameters p and z are respectively: 2 and 1. In the Table 
4.7.12.B. the value of parameters p and z are respectively: 2 and 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 4.7.12.A TABLE 4.7.12.B
Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob. Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
C -0.770 0.051 -15.084 0.000 C -0.717 0.043 -16.507 0.000
RCORP_FR(9) 0.096 0.031 3.080 0.002 RMARKET_FR(9) 0.121 0.038 3.150 0.002
RCORP_FR(10) 0.062 0.029 2.144 0.032 AR(1) 0.832 0.058 14.391 0.000
RCORP_FR(11) 0.055 0.029 1.893 0.058 AR(2) -0.064 0.026 -2.440 0.015
AR(1) 0.828 0.058 14.190 0.000 MA(1) -0.542 0.057 -9.583 0.000
AR(2) -0.062 0.026 -2.357 0.018
MA(1) -0.538 0.057 -9.426 0.000
C 1.686 0.012 146.476 0.000
ARCH(1) 0.017 0.007 2.357 0.018
C 1.684 0.012 140.729 0.000 R-squared 0.126     Mean dependent var -0.637
ARCH(1) 0.017 0.007 2.392 0.017 Adjusted R-squared 0.124     S.D. dependent var 1.403
S.E. of regression 1.314     Akaike info criterion 3.381
R-squared 0.126     Mean dependent var -0.637 Sum squared resid 14354.150     Schwarz criterion 3.397
Adjusted R-squared 0.124     S.D. dependent var 1.403 Log likelihood -14078.340     F-statistic 66.420
S.E. of regression 1.313     Akaike info criterion 3.381 Durbin-Watson stat 2.040     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000
Sum squared resid 14347.750     Schwarz criterion 3.396
Log likelihood -14076.720     F-statistic 70.585 Inverted AR Roots 0.750 0.090
Durbin-Watson stat 2.039     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 Inverted MA Roots 0.540
Inverted AR Roots 0.740 0.080
Inverted MA Roots 0.540
       Variance Equation
      Variance Equation
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TABLE 4.7.13: Intraday relationship between France Telecom price impact and public 
information. This estimation is based on the average trading data between the ratio of price 
impact and the ratio of public information during December 1, 1999 and March 31, 2000. From 
this sample I obtained 8352 observations of five minutes each for table 4.7.13.A and for table 
4.7.13.B. Table 4.7.13.A represents the results of the regression between the ratio of France 
Telecom price impact (explained variable) and the following independent variables: ratio of All 
Alerts news (RAA), a constant (C), and ARMA (2,1). The conditional variance equation of 
residuals follows an ARCH model including 1-lagged residuals coefficients, 1-lagged conditional 
variance (GARCH (1)) and a constant (C). Table 4.7.13.B represents the results of the regression 
between the ratio of France Telecom price impact (explained variable) and the following 
independent variables: ratio of Corporate news (RCORP), a constant (C), and ARMA (2,1). The 
conditional variance equation of residuals follows an ARCH model including 1-lagged residuals 
coefficients, 1-lagged conditional variance (GARCH (1)) and a constant (C). In the Table 
4.7.13.A. the value of parameters p and z are respectively: 2 and 1. In the Table 4.7.13.B. the 
value of parameters p and z are respectively: 2 and 1. 
 
TABLE 4.7.13.A TABLE 4.7.13.B
Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob. Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob. 
C -0.771 0.036 -21.332 0.000 C -0.770 0.038 -20.489 0.000
RAA(8) -0.102 0.051 -2.012 0.044 RCORP(8) -0.079 0.030 -2.631 0.009
AR(1) 0.791 0.077 10.318 0.000 AR(1) 0.802 0.075 10.668 0.000
AR(2) -0.064 0.036 -1.785 0.074 AR(2) -0.069 0.036 -1.931 0.054
MA(1) -0.444 0.075 -5.890 0.000 MA(1) -0.454 0.074 -6.147 0.000
C 1.157 0.306 3.779 0.000 C 1.126 0.307 3.666 0.000
ARCH(1) 0.034 0.010 3.405 0.001 ARCH(1) 0.033 0.010 3.322 0.001
GARCH(1) 0.327 0.172 1.905 0.057 GARCH(1) 0.346 0.173 2.006 0.045
R-squared 0.166     Mean dependent var -0.749 R-squared 0.166     Mean dependent var -0.749
Adjusted R-squared 0.164     S.D. dependent var 1.474 Adjusted R-squared 0.164     S.D. dependent var 1.474
S.E. of regression 1.348     Akaike info criterion 3.435 S.E. of regression 1.348     Akaike info criterion 3.435
Sum squared resid 15110.100     Schwarz criterion 3.451 Sum squared resid 15116.640     Schwarz criterion 3.451
Log likelihood -14299.950     F-statistic 91.963 Log likelihood -14302.120     F-statistic 91.724
Durbin-Watson stat 2.021     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 Durbin-Watson stat 2.021     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000
Inverted AR Roots 0.700 0.090 Inverted AR Roots 0.700 0.100
Inverted MA Roots 0.440 Inverted MA Roots 0.450
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TABLE 4.7.14: Intraday relationship between Total Fina price impact and public 
information. This estimation is based on the average trading data between the ratio of price 
impact and the ratio of public information from December 1, 1999 to March 31, 2000. From this 
sample I obtained 8352 observations of five minutes each for table 4.7.14.A and for table 
4.7.14.B. Table 4.7.14.A represents the results of the regression between the ratio of Total Fina 
price impact (explained variable) and the following independent variables: ratio of All Alerts 
news for France (RAA_FR), a constant (C), and ARMA (2,1). The conditional variance equation 
of residuals follows an ARCH model including 1-lagged residuals coefficients and a constant (C). 
Table 4.7.14.B represents the results of the regression between the ratio of Total Fina price 
impact (explained variable) and the following independent variables: ratio of Corporate news 
(RCORP), a constant (C), and ARMA (2,1). The conditional variance equation of residuals 
follows an ARCH model including 1-lagged residuals coefficients and a constant (C). In the 
Table 4.7.14.A. the value of parameters p and z are respectively: 2 and 1. In the Table 4.7.14.B. 
the value of parameters p and z are respectively: 2 and 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 4.7.14.A TABLE 4.7.14.B
Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob. Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob. 
C -0.783 0.059 -13.208 0.000 C -0.658 0.038 -17.500 0.000
RAA_FR(5) 0.109 0.037 2.922 0.004 RCORP(6) 0.055 0.027 2.010 0.044
AR(1) 0.932 0.060 15.554 0.000 RCORP(7) 0.060 0.028 2.166 0.030
AR(2) -0.122 0.030 -4.103 0.000 AR(1) 0.926 0.060 15.430 0.000
MA(1) -0.594 0.057 -10.372 0.000 AR(2) -0.119 0.030 -3.989 0.000
MA(1) -0.588 0.057 -10.245 0.000
C 1.614 0.025 64.653 0.000
ARCH(1) 0.026 0.009 2.970 0.003 C 1.617 0.025 65.557 0.000
ARCH(1) 0.025 0.009 2.889 0.004
R-squared 0.163     Mean dependent var -0.673
Adjusted R-squared 0.162     S.D. dependent var 1.408 R-squared 0.163     Mean dependent var -0.673
S.E. of regression 1.289     Akaike info criterion 3.347 Adjusted R-squared 0.161     S.D. dependent var 1.408
Sum squared resid 13826.320     Schwarz criterion 3.362 S.E. of regression 1.290     Akaike info criterion 3.348
Log likelihood -13934.360     F-statistic 95.578 Sum squared resid 13837.190     Schwarz criterion 3.363
Durbin-Watson stat 2.012     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 Log likelihood -13937.870     F-statistic 95.118
Durbin-Watson stat 2.011     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000
Inverted AR Roots 0.770 0.160
Inverted MA Roots 0.590 Inverted AR Roots 0.770 0.150
Inverted MA Roots 0.590
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TABLE 4.7.15: Intraday relationship between Vivendi price impact and public 
information. This estimation is based on the average trading data between the ratio of price 
impact and the ratio of public information from December 1, 1999 to March 31, 2000. From this 
sample I obtained 8352 observations of five minutes each for table 4.7.15.A and for table 
4.7.15.B. Table 4.7.15.A represents the results of the regression between the ratio of Vivendi 
price impact (explained variable) and the following independent variables: ratio of All Alerts 
news (RAA), a constant (C), and ARMA (2,1). The conditional variance equation of residuals 
follows an ARCH model including 1-lagged residuals coefficients and a constant (C). Table 
4.7.15.B represents the results of the regression between the ratio of Vivendi price impact 
(explained variable) and the following independent variables: ratio of Economic News (RECO), a 
constant (C), and ARMA (2,1). The conditional variance equation of residuals follows an ARCH 
model including 1-lagged residuals coefficients and a constant (C). In the Table 4.7.15.A. the 
value of parameters p and z are respectively: 2 and 1. In the Table 4.7.15.B. the value of 
parameters p and z are respectively: 2 and 1. 
 
 
TABLE 4.7.15.A TABLE 4.7.15.B
Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob. Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob. 
C -0.796 0.036 -21.929 0.000 C -0.788 0.039 -20.329 0.000
RAA(6) 0.132 0.052 2.527 0.012 RECO(10) 0.082 0.030 2.715 0.007
RAA(7) 0.097 0.051 1.890 0.059 AR(1) 0.859 0.061 14.028 0.000
AR(1) 0.851 0.062 13.809 0.000 AR(2) -0.085 0.029 -2.979 0.003
AR(2) -0.082 0.029 -2.829 0.005 MA(1) -0.538 0.059 -9.065 0.000
MA(1) -0.530 0.060 -8.867 0.000
C 1.864 0.026 71.647 0.000
C 1.865 0.026 71.805 0.000 ARCH(1) 0.025 0.010 2.470 0.014
ARCH(1) 0.025 0.010 2.440 0.015
R-squared 0.152     Mean dependent var -0.804
R-squared 0.152     Mean dependent var -0.804 Adjusted R-squared 0.150     S.D. dependent var 1.502
Adjusted R-squared 0.150     S.D. dependent var 1.502 S.E. of regression 1.385     Akaike info criterion 3.490
S.E. of regression 1.385     Akaike info criterion 3.490 Sum squared resid 15949.260     Schwarz criterion 3.505
Sum squared resid 15950.350     Schwarz criterion 3.505 Log likelihood -14530.110     F-statistic 87.539
Log likelihood -14530.550     F-statistic 87.500 Durbin-Watson stat 2.013     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000
Durbin-Watson stat 2.013     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000
Inverted AR Roots 0.740 0.110
Inverted AR Roots 0.740 0.110 Inverted MA Roots 0.540
Inverted MA Roots 0.530
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TABLE 4.7.16: Intraday relationship between intraday market liquidity proxy and All 
Alerts news. This table reports the R2-adjusted for all the 43 stocks belonging to the CAC 40 
index. The regressions are all executed between the five liquidity indicators (quoted half spread 
from the order file, quoted half spread from the weighted average spread file, cumulated traded 
volume and volatility measured as a log range) and All Alerts News. All significant results are 
bold faced and double underlined. 
 
 
QHS QHS_WAS Volume Return Volatility
Adjusted R-squared Adjusted R-squared Adjusted R-squared Adjusted R-squared Adjusted R-squared
Accor 0.429 0.654 0.261 0.182 0.228
Aerospatia 0.439 0.854 0.154 0.186 0.231
Agf 0.489 0.676 0.119 0.117 0.114
Air Liquide 0.314 0.800 0.205 0.180 0.183
Alcatel 0.246 0.855 0.443 0.200 0.277
Alstom 0.476 0.865 0.247 0.204 0.183
Aventis 0.313 0.808 0.344 0.193 0.222
Axa 0.253 0.784 0.242 0.155 0.146
Bic 0.509 0.816 0.098 0.154 0.054
Bnp 0.311 0.806 0.279 0.181 0.228
Bouygues 0.426 0.774 0.165 0.143 0.177
Canal Plus 0.358 0.757 0.356 0.219 0.297
Cap Gemini 0.340 0.899 0.311 0.160 0.221
Carrefour 0.273 0.835 0.349 0.186 0.259
Casino 0.386 0.753 0.149 0.108 0.010
Credit Lyonnais 0.427 0.935 0.211 0.296 0.303
Thomson-csf 0.497 0.814 0.202 0.179 0.174
Danone 0.385 0.827 0.201 0.261 0.216
Dexia Sico 0.406 0.744 0.147 0.070 0.055
Equant 0.346 0.855 0.292 0.212 0.214
Eridania 0.453 0.578 0.113 0.080 0.053
France Telecom 0.207 0.830 0.296 0.156 0.194
Lafarge 0.384 0.781 0.297 0.221 0.198
Lagardere 0.418 0.842 0.382 0.214 0.288
Legrand 0.441 0.817 0.137 0.099 0.057
L'Oreal 0.277 0.772 0.187 0.102 0.127
Lvmh 0.351 0.853 0.223 0.156 0.174
Michelin 0.452 0.758 0.160 0.158 0.175
Thomson-Multimedia 0.476 0.894 0.333 0.228 0.246
Peugeot 0.436 0.786 0.189 0.125 0.133
Pinault Printemps 0.342 0.798 0.276 0.199 0.155
Renault 0.425 0.883 0.254 0.236 0.258
Saint Gobain 0.366 0.795 0.238 0.146 0.164
Sanofi Synthelabo 0.417 0.814 0.153 0.206 0.130
Schneider 0.385 0.824 0.210 0.176 0.189
Scociété Générale 0.385 0.852 0.191 0.188 0.184
Sodexho 0.429 0.715 0.189 0.170 0.108
Stmicroelectronics 0.242 0.842 0.345 0.151 0.212
Suez Lyonnaise des Eaux 0.261 0.751 0.297 0.181 0.199
TF1 0.493 0.767 0.182 0.153 0.194
Total 0.213 0.858 0.334 0.166 0.144
Valeo 0.449 0.766 0.225 0.241 0.238
Vivendi 0.295 0.831 0.450 0.272 0.313
Index 0.483 0.933 0.546 0.545 0.471
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TABLE 4.7.17: Intraday relationship between five intraday market liquidity proxy and 
public information arrival. This table reports a X when a significant relationship is observed 
between a liquidity indicator of the CAC 40 index and a specific news category during the first 
period under study (December 1, 1999 – March 31, 2000). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
QHS QHS_WAS Volume Return Volatility
All Alerts X X X X X
All Alerts France X X X X
Political X X X
Political France X X X
Market X X X X
Market France X X X
Industrial X X X
Industrial France
General X X X
General France X X X
Economic X
Economic France X X X
Corporate X X X X
Corporate France X
Firm-specific X X X
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TABLE 4.7.18.A: Granger causality test results for the quoted half spread.  This Table 
shows the results of the Granger causality test among the quoted half spread (QHS) for the CAC 
40 index and the fifteen news categories considered in this study. This test covers the period 
between December 1, 1999 and March 31, 2000. 
 
  Null Hy pothesis: F-Statistic Probability
  TOT_AVERAGE does not Granger Cause AA 1.043 0.406
  AA does not Granger Cause TOT_AVERAGE 1.963 0.024
  TOT_AVERAGE does not Granger Cause AA_FR 1.128 0.331
  AA_FR does not Granger Cause TOT_AVERAGE 0.581 0.860
  TOT_AVERAGE does not Granger Cause POL 1.185 0.287
  POL does not Granger Cause TOT_AVERAGE 2.704 0.001
  TOT_AVERAGE does not Granger Cause POL_FR 1.295 0.213
  POL_FR does not Granger Cause TOT_AVERAGE 0.950 0.495
  TOT_AVERAGE does not Granger Cause MARKET 0.507 0.912
  MARKET does not Granger Cause TOT_AVERAGE 2.034 0.018
  TOT_AVERAGE does not Granger Cause MARKET_FR 2.136 0.012
  MARKET_FR does not Granger Cause TOT_AVERAGE 1.274 0.226
  TOT_AVERAGE does not Granger Cause INDU 1.708 0.058
  INDU does not Granger Cause TOT_AVERAGE 0.868 0.580
  TOT_AVERAGE does not Granger Cause INDU_FR 1.996 0.021
  INDU_FR does not Granger Cause TOT_AVERAGE 1.077 0.375
  TOT_AVERAGE does not Granger Cause GENERAL 1.973 0.023
  GENERAL does not Granger Cause TOT_AVERAGE 0.610 0.835
  TOT_AVERAGE does not Granger Cause GENERAL_FR 1.139 0.322
  GENERAL_FR does not Granger Cause TOT_AVERAGE 0.576 0.863
  TOT_AVERAGE does not Granger Cause ECO 1.134 0.327
  ECO does not Granger Cause TOT_AVERAGE 1.753 0.050
  TOT_AVERAGE does not Granger Cause ECO_FR 1.287 0.218
  ECO_FR does not Granger Cause TOT_AVERAGE 0.422 0.956
  TOT_AVERAGE does not Granger Cause CORP_FR 1.996 0.021
  CORP_FR does not Granger Cause TOT_AVERAGE 1.077 0.375
  TOT_AVERAGE does not Granger Cause CORP 0.611 0.835
  CORP does not Granger Cause TOT_AVERAGE 1.041 0.407
  TOT_AVERAGE does not Granger Cause CAC40 1.440 0.140
  CAC40 does not Granger Cause TOT_AVERAGE 1.347 0.184
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TABLE 4.7.18.B: Granger causality test results for the quoted half spread from the WAS file. 
This Table shows the results of the Granger causality test among the quoted half spread from the 
weighted average spread file (QHS_WAS) for the CAC 40 index and the fifteen news categories 
considered in this study. This test covers the period between December 1, 1999 and March 31, 2000. 
 
  Null Hy pothesis: F-Statistic Probability
  TOT_AVERAGE does not Granger Cause AA 1.526 0.107
  AA does not Granger Cause TOT_AVERAGE 2.260 0.007
  TOT_AVERAGE does not Granger Cause AA_FR 1.362 0.176
  AA_FR does not Granger Cause TOT_AVERAGE 1.022 0.425
  TOT_AVERAGE does not Granger Cause POL 1.830 0.038
  POL does not Granger Cause TOT_AVERAGE 0.952 0.493
  TOT_AVERAGE does not Granger Cause POL_FR 2.357 0.005
  POL_FR does not Granger Cause TOT_AVERAGE 1.001 0.445
  TOT_AVERAGE does not Granger Cause MARKET 2.311 0.006
  MARKET does not Granger Cause TOT_AVERAGE 2.518 0.003
  TOT_AVERAGE does not Granger Cause MARKET_FR 1.512 0.112
  MARKET_FR does not Granger Cause TOT_AVERAGE 0.853 0.595
  TOT_AVERAGE does not Granger Cause INDU 0.920 0.526
  INDU does not Granger Cause TOT_AVERAGE 1.206 0.272
  TOT_AVERAGE does not Granger Cause INDU_FR 1.307 0.206
  INDU_FR does not Granger Cause TOT_AVERAGE 0.827 0.623
  TOT_AVERAGE does not Granger Cause GENERAL 1.724 0.055
  GENERAL does not Granger Cause TOT_AVERAGE 0.893 0.553
  TOT_AVERAGE does not Granger Cause GENERAL_FR 1.394 0.160
  GENERAL_FR does not Granger Cause TOT_AVERAGE 1.029 0.418
  TOT_AVERAGE does not Granger Cause ECO 3.328 0.000
  ECO does not Granger Cause TOT_AVERAGE 2.420 0.004
  TOT_AVERAGE does not Granger Cause ECO_FR 1.494 0.118
  ECO_FR does not Granger Cause TOT_AVERAGE 0.421 0.956
  TOT_AVERAGE does not Granger Cause CORP 2.332 0.006
  CORP does not Granger Cause TOT_AVERAGE 1.357 0.179
  TOT_AVERAGE does not Granger Cause CORP_FR 1.307 0.206
  CORP_FR does not Granger Cause TOT_AVERAGE 0.827 0.623
  TOT_AVERAGE does not Granger Cause CAC40 2.537 0.002
  CAC40 does not Granger Cause TOT_AVERAGE 0.935 0.510
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TABLE 4.7.18.C: Granger causality test results for SUMVOL.  This Table shows the results of the Granger 
causality test among the cumulated traded volume (SUMVOL) for the CAC 40 index and the fifteen news 
categories considered in this study. This test covers the period between December 1, 1999 and March 31, 2000. 
 
  Null Hy pothesis: F-Statistic Probability
  TOT_AVERAGE does not Granger Cause AA 3.773 0.000
  AA does not Granger Cause TOT_AVERAGE 3.007 0.000
  TOT_AVERAGE does not Granger Cause AA_FR 4.538 0.000
  AA_FR does not Granger Cause TOT_AVERAGE 1.162 0.304
  TOT_AVERAGE does not Granger Cause POL 2.119 0.013
  POL does not Granger Cause TOT_AVERAGE 2.064 0.016
  TOT_AVERAGE does not Granger Cause POL_FR 4.895 0.000
  POL_FR does not Granger Cause TOT_AVERAGE 1.398 0.159
  TOT_AVERAGE does not Granger Cause MARKET 4.689 0.000
  MARKET does not Granger Cause TOT_AVERAGE 3.581 0.000
  TOT_AVERAGE does not Granger Cause MARKET_FR 0.963 0.482
  MARKET_FR does not Granger Cause TOT_AVERAGE 1.282 0.221
  TOT_AVERAGE does not Granger Cause INDU 0.776 0.676
  INDU does not Granger Cause TOT_AVERAGE 1.431 0.144
  TOT_AVERAGE does not Granger Cause INDU_FR 1.911 0.029
  INDU_FR does not Granger Cause TOT_AVERAGE 1.160 0.306
  TOT_AVERAGE does not Granger Cause GENERAL 2.440 0.004
  GENERAL does not Granger Cause TOT_AVERAGE 1.921 0.027
  TOT_AVERAGE does not Granger Cause GENERAL_FR 4.523 0.000
  GENERAL_FR does not Granger Cause TOT_AVERAGE 1.175 0.294
  TOT_AVERAGE does not Granger Cause ECO 6.212 0.000
  ECO does not Granger Cause TOT_AVERAGE 1.809 0.041
  TOT_AVERAGE does not Granger Cause ECO_FR 2.543 0.002
  ECO_FR does not Granger Cause TOT_AVERAGE 0.704 0.749
  TOT_AVERAGE does not Granger Cause CORP_FR 1.911 0.029
  CORP_FR does not Granger Cause TOT_AVERAGE 1.160 0.306
  TOT_AVERAGE does not Granger Cause CORP 5.518 0.000
  CORP does not Granger Cause TOT_AVERAGE 3.220 0.000
  TOT_AVERAGE does not Granger Cause CAC40 4.315 0.000
  CAC40 does not Granger Cause TOT_AVERAGE 0.875 0.572
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TABLE 4.7.18.D: Granger causality test results for ABSRET.  This Table shows the results of the Granger 
causality test among the average return in absolute terms (ABSRET) for the CAC 40 index and the fifteen news 
categories considered in this study. This test covers the period between December 1, 1999 and March 31, 2000. 
 
  Null Hy pothesis: F-Statistic Probability
  TOT_AVERAGE does not Granger Cause AA 3.773 0.000
  AA does not Granger Cause TOT_AVERAGE 3.007 0.000
  TOT_AVERAGE does not Granger Cause AA_FR 4.538 0.000
  AA_FR does not Granger Cause TOT_AVERAGE 1.162 0.304
  TOT_AVERAGE does not Granger Cause POL 2.119 0.013
  POL does not Granger Cause TOT_AVERAGE 2.064 0.016
  TOT_AVERAGE does not Granger Cause POL_FR 4.895 0.000
  POL_FR does not Granger Cause TOT_AVERAGE 1.398 0.159
  TOT_AVERAGE does not Granger Cause MARKET 4.689 0.000
  MARKET does not Granger Cause TOT_AVERAGE 3.581 0.000
  TOT_AVERAGE does not Granger Cause MARKET_FR 0.963 0.482
  MARKET_FR does not Granger Cause TOT_AVERAGE 1.282 0.221
  TOT_AVERAGE does not Granger Cause INDU 0.776 0.676
  INDU does not Granger Cause TOT_AVERAGE 1.431 0.144
  TOT_AVERAGE does not Granger Cause INDU_FR 1.911 0.029
  INDU_FR does not Granger Cause TOT_AVERAGE 1.160 0.306
  TOT_AVERAGE does not Granger Cause GENERAL 2.440 0.004
  GENERAL does not Granger Cause TOT_AVERAGE 1.921 0.027
  TOT_AVERAGE does not Granger Cause GENERAL_FR 4.523 0.000
  GENERAL_FR does not Granger Cause TOT_AVERAGE 1.175 0.294
  TOT_AVERAGE does not Granger Cause ECO 6.212 0.000
  ECO does not Granger Cause TOT_AVERAGE 1.809 0.041
  TOT_AVERAGE does not Granger Cause ECO_FR 2.543 0.002
  ECO_FR does not Granger Cause TOT_AVERAGE 0.704 0.749
  TOT_AVERAGE does not Granger Cause CORP 5.518 0.000
  CORP does not Granger Cause TOT_AVERAGE 3.220 0.000
  TOT_AVERAGE does not Granger Cause CORP_FR 1.911 0.029
  CORP_FR does not Granger Cause TOT_AVERAGE 1.160 0.306
  TOT_AVERAGE does not Granger Cause CAC40 4.315 0.000
  CAC40 does not Granger Cause TOT_AVERAGE 0.875 0.572
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TABLE 4.7.18.E: Granger causality test results for the VOLA.  This Table shows the results of the Granger 
causality test among the volatility measured as a log range (VOLA) for the CAC 40 index and the fifteen news 
categories considered in this study. This test covers the period between December 1, 1999 and March 31, 2000. 
 
 
 
  Null Hy pothesis: F-Statistic Probability
  TOT_AVERAGE does not Granger Cause AA 1.915 0.028
  AA does not Granger Cause TOT_AVERAGE 2.724 0.001
  TOT_AVERAGE does not Granger Cause AA_FR 1.648 0.072
  AA_FR does not Granger Cause TOT_AVERAGE 1.373 0.171
  TOT_AVERAGE does not Granger Cause POL 1.763 0.048
  POL does not Granger Cause TOT_AVERAGE 2.752 0.001
  TOT_AVERAGE does not Granger Cause POL_FR 1.297 0.212
  POL_FR does not Granger Cause TOT_AVERAGE 1.209 0.269
  TOT_AVERAGE does not Granger Cause MARKET 1.414 0.151
  MARKET does not Granger Cause TOT_AVERAGE 2.237 0.008
  TOT_AVERAGE does not Granger Cause MARKET_FR 1.505 0.114
  MARKET_FR does not Granger Cause TOT_AVERAGE 1.281 0.222
  TOT_AVERAGE does not Granger Cause INDU 1.242 0.247
  INDU does not Granger Cause TOT_AVERAGE 1.316 0.201
  TOT_AVERAGE does not Granger Cause INDU_FR 2.499 0.003
  INDU_FR does not Granger Cause TOT_AVERAGE 1.871 0.033
  TOT_AVERAGE does not Granger Cause GENERAL 1.918 0.028
  GENERAL does not Granger Cause TOT_AVERAGE 0.967 0.478
  TOT_AVERAGE does not Granger Cause GENERAL_FR 1.643 0.073
  GENERAL_FR does not Granger Cause TOT_AVERAGE 1.365 0.175
  TOT_AVERAGE does not Granger Cause ECO 1.796 0.043
  ECO does not Granger Cause TOT_AVERAGE 1.975 0.022
  TOT_AVERAGE does not Granger Cause ECO_FR 1.102 0.353
  ECO_FR does not Granger Cause TOT_AVERAGE 0.933 0.512
  TOT_AVERAGE does not Granger Cause CORP 2.577 0.002
  CORP does not Granger Cause TOT_AVERAGE 2.085 0.015
  TOT_AVERAGE does not Granger Cause CORP_FR 2.499 0.003
  CORP_FR does not Granger Cause TOT_AVERAGE 1.871 0.033
  TOT_AVERAGE does not Granger Cause CAC40 1.223 0.260
  CAC40 does not Granger Cause TOT_AVERAGE 1.587 0.088
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This chapter analyses the results emerging from my thesis and tries to provide some useful 
considerations for future research. It is organized as follows: Section 5.1 is a brief summary 
of Chapter 1, which dealt with market structures. Section 5.2 critically reviews the results 
obtained in Chapter 2 containing an empirical analysis of the trading structure of the French 
Stock Exchange. Section 5.3 summarizes and discusses the empirical data on intraday public 
information patterns, while Section 5.4 analyses the impact of public information on the Paris 
Bourse. Finally, Section 5.5 gives some indications on the possible direction of future 
research work.  
 
5.1.  Market structures  
 
The first chapter can be considered as a broad survey on various approaches to the topic of 
microstructure, and deals with some interesting features, namely market architecture and market 
microstructure models. First, I reported the definition of microstructure given by O‘Hara (1995), 
i.e. the process and outcome of exchanging assets under explicit trading rules. I then surveyed the 
literature on the main characteristics of stock markets and on microstructure. 
In the last two decades, stock markets worldwide changed drastically, in particular due to the 
technological progress, the European integration and the worldwide deregulation. Most stock 
exchanges abandoned the system based on call auctions in favour of a computerized limit-order 
market (among them the Paris Bourse and the Swiss Stock Exchange). In the late nineties the 
process of consolidation continued: many regional stock exchanges ceased to exist, while 
alternative trading systems, such as the Instinet and Island, gained in importance. We also 
witnessed the creation of new indexes for technology companies, such as the Neue Markt in 
Germany, New Market in Switzerland, and Nuovo Mercato in Italy. But the evolution of 
financial markets after the burst of the tech bubble in March 2000 was disappointing. Earnings 
manipulations, like in the cases of Enron and Worldcom, the terrorist attacks on September 11, 
2001 in America, the worldwide recession and the recent war in Iraq led to a reduction in trading 
activity and the loss of trust in certain companies on the part of investors. Many companies went 
bankrupt, and some indexes related to the so-called New Economy ceased to exist (the last in 
time order was the Neue Markt). All these factors contributed to slowing down the process of 
consolidation we had seen at the end of the nineties. Certain projects have been suspended for 
the moment, such as the single stock exchange for the Euro-zone, but nevertheless the process 
of consolidation will probably continue in the years to come. 
Chapter 1 also reviewed the organization and the main characteristics of financial markets. 
Three criteria were applied for distinguishing them: 
 
a) The moment of the exchange. Two different approaches can be seen: the fixing market, 
where orders are batched together for simultaneous trade, and the continuous market, 
where orders may be submitted any time during trading hours. 
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b) The counterparts of the exchange. Here, we can distinguish between price-driven 
markets and order-driven markets. In the former, designated market makers supply the 
liquidity and maintain a fair and orderly trading. Their compensation is the difference 
between bid and ask. In the latter, there are no market makers, and orders are 
automatically and instantly matched with the orders currently outstanding in the limit 
order book. 
 
c) The location of the exchange. On one hand there are centralized markets, where orders 
are routed to the same location, and on the other hand fragmented markets, where 
orders are routed through markets in different locations (multiple price for the same 
asset).  
 
Other, secondary features characterizing the modern financial markets were briefly mentioned 
in Chapter 1, such as: the information available to market participants (the transparency concept); 
the process of price stabilization when the maximum set limit is exceeded (circuit breaker); the 
degree of exchange automation (floor vs. screen-based electronic systems); the minimum tick, i.e. 
the smallest stock price increment which can be quoted; the price discovery; and finally the 
allowed order form. All these features, however, leave the question open which trading structure 
is the best. Theoretical models (Glosten, 1994, Seppi, 1997 and Parlour and Seppi, 1998) suggest 
that there is no clearly superior market structure. 
At the end of Chapter I, the relatively recent concept of "microstructure" was discussed. All 
the various models have as their central axis the bid-ask spread. However, two types of BAS are 
prominent in the literature, namely the quoted spread (the difference between the ask and bid 
price), and the effective spread (which reflects the reduction in trading costs attributable to trades 
executed within the quotes). The effective spread has two aspects: the price impact (the average 
information content of a trade), and the realized half spread (the effective gain after deduction of 
losses to better informed traders). Regarding the quoted spread, the literature shows that it must 
cover three types of costs incurred by the provider of immediacy: the order processing costs 
(compensation to market makers for providing liquidity services); the inventory holding costs 
(compensation to market makers for bearing the risk of holding unwanted inventories); and the 
adverse information costs (compensation to market makers for possible losses due to the 
presence of better informed investors). These costs are also studied in an order-driven market. 
Finally, I tried to show that access to high frequency data permits a better understanding of the 
price formation process and of the intraday movements on financial makets. Such an 
understanding is of fundamental importance for investors who wish to take frequent intraday 
positions.  
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5.2.  Empirical analysis of the trading structure of the French Stock Exchange  
 
Chapter 2 presented a number of original results on the intraday market liquidity of the 
French Stock Exchange during a one-year period (December 1, 1999 – November 30, 2000). The 
French Stock Exchange merged, in 2000, with the Amsterdam and Brussels Stock Exchanges in 
order to become the first European integrated transnational market called Euronext. In 
particular, the Paris Bourse had gradually shifted, since 1986, from a daily call auction to a 
computerized limit-order market in which trading occurs continuously. After the merger, Paris 
maintained its principal characteristics of an order-driven market with a central order book, and 
an auction before the opening and after closing. 
In the literature, liquidity is defined as a multidimensional concept, and in particular Black 
(1971) claims that it has to meet 4 criteria: breadth, depth, resiliency and immediacy. Therefore, 
the analysis of intraday market liquidity cannot be based on one indicator only. For this reason, in 
my empirical analysis I calculated the common liquidity proxies which had already previously 
been used in the literature: the cumulated traded volume, the returns and the spread. However, I 
deepened the analysis by introducing relatively “new” measures in the intraday context: 
 
(1) The quoted spread, calculated by using the weighted average spread file, which 
represents the price for blocks exceeding normal market size; 
 
(2) The volatility, measured as log range; 
 
(3) The waiting time between subsequent trades, originally introduced by Gouriéroux, 
Jasiak, LeFol (1997); 
 
(4) The liquidity ratio, which had previously been used as an interday liquidity indicator (it 
represents the relation between the number or value of shares and price changes); 
 
(5) The flow ratio (it represents the average number of shares traded in Euro, divided by 
the waiting time between subsequent trades). 
 
All these proxies were applied to the 43 stocks belonging to the CAC 40 index during a one-
year period (December 1, 1999 – November 30, 2000) and were calculated within successive 
intraday periods of 5 minutes. The results showed that: 
 
(1) Spread measures (QHS, QHS_WAS, EHS) follow an inverse J-shaped pattern (wide 
spread at the beginning of the day, which then decreases constantly during the first 
hour of trading); 
 
(2) Volume shows a J-shaped pattern; 
 
(3) Volatility, measured ad log range, has a U-shaped pattern; 
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(4) Waiting time follows an inverse U-shape; 
 
(5) Flow ratio has an inverse J-shaped pattern. 
 
For each of these liquidity proxies, three peaks were observed in the afternoon, as previously 
reported by Ranaldo (2000) for the Swiss market and by Röder (1996), Röder and Bamberg 
(1996) and Kirchner and Schlag (1998) for the German market. The first peak occurs around 
14:30, the second around 15:30 and the last around closing time. Three possible explanations are 
offered: the end of the lunch break; the adjustment of trader positions on the Paris Bourse 
before the US markets open, in particular following the release of US macroeconomic news, and 
finally, the linkage between European markets and US markets. Differently from other studies, I 
did not find any clear pattern in the average return and in the liquidity ratio measures. 
Each liquidity component was also analysed with respect to the others, which led to interesting 
results. In particular, the depth in terms of trading volume showed a negative relation between ratio 
of cumulated traded volume and ratio of waiting time between subsequent trades, ratio of volatility of 
returns, whereas the relation was positive between the ratio of volume imbalance and the ratio of 
cumulated traded volume. The positive relation between cumulated traded volume and volume 
imbalance suggests that volume imbalance between counterparts tends to be transformed into trading 
volume, confirming that both indicators provide information on market depth. An increase in waiting 
time between subsequent trades is related a decrease in market depth. This relationship can be 
viewed as a proxy of trade frequency which is logically positively related to market depth. 
Ranaldo (2000), using the Glosten (1994) model, investigated different situations, according to 
the level of trading volume and the level of volatility, in order to find out the behaviour of 
market participants, i.e. when liquidity traders and informed traders are more likely to trade. Case 
1: Informed traders are more present when the current level of trading volume and volatility is 
higher than normal. Case 2: Liquidity traders are present if the current level of trading volume is 
higher than normal and the current level of volatility is lower than normal. Case 3: The arrival of 
public and private information causes a price revision, which is particularly detectable when the 
current level of volatility is higher than normal, whereas the trading volume is lower. Case 4: 
Liquidity traders dominate trading activity, if volatility and trading volume are lower than normal. 
Following his interpretation, my results were explained as follows:  
 
(1) Cumulated traded volumes can be caused, for example, by volume imbalance due to an 
ongoing price revision and strong liquidity trading; 
 
(2) The negative relation between cumulated traded volume and waiting time may indicate the 
likely presence of discretionary liquidity traders and of small sized trades. It may also indicate 
that uninformed traders were able to protect themselves by reducing trade frequency and, 
inversely, that trading waiting time was used strategically by informed traders. Similar results 
have also been found by Madhavan and Sofianos (1998) with respect to the specialist market; 
 
(3) The TARCH model, present in the majority of the regressions, shows evidence that 
positive and negative shocks have different effects, i.e. bad and good news affect 
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intraday market liquidity asymmetrically. If the residuals are interpreted as news arrival, 
as in Engle and Ng (1993), shocks create unexpected trading volume. The conditional 
variance equation shows that positive and negative ARCH components cancel each 
other when a negative shock is occurring, meaning that bad news reduces trading 
volumes, whereas good news increases them. 
 
The depth in terms of order volume imbalance was also examined, and it showed evidence of 
a negative relation between volume imbalance, spread and waiting time. Lee et al. (1993) and 
Engle and Lange (1997) used this proxy to gauge market depth and found similar results, namely 
a negative relationship between spread and volume imbalance. This negative relationship 
supported the following assumptions: first, that the spread is wider during periods of high 
uncertainty, i.e. when a price revision is more likely (the demand or the supply is more rigid); and, 
second, that the behaviour of limit-order and market-order traders may be motivated by private 
information or liquidity reasons and that consequently, at certain moments, they tend to widen 
the spread, above all in moments of a higher presence of adverse selection.  
The time dimension of intraday market liquidity showed, however, that the waiting time 
between subsequent trades follows an ARMA(1,1)-GARCH(1,1) model; it is negatively related to the 
trading volume and positively to volume imbalance and volatility. In some cases a TARCH model 
was also found. The residual can be interpreted as information arrival, which causes a change in trade 
frequency. Therefore it makes sense that the conditional variance has a TARCH structure, from 
which a negative shock simply eliminates the ARCH components and leaves only the GARCH 
effect. This overreaction to good news is similar to the variance equation found in the analysis of 
depth in terms of trading volume. I observed that a rise in market depth leads to a rise in trade 
frequency, expressed in terms of waiting time between subsequent trades, which means that 
informed traders may be more present, since they use trade frequency in order to act strategically. 
The tightness of intraday market liquidity was measured in order to understand the behaviour 
of the BAS. The results showed a positive relation between spread and volume imbalance during 
the period December – March (an increase in volume imbalance was followed by a wider spread) 
and a negative relation during the period April – November (the activity may have been 
dominated by eager traders who traded within the quoted spread, thus reducing it). The quoted 
spread and the waiting time were also negatively related. Ranaldo (2000) found a significantly 
negative relation only when liquidity traders dominated the trading activity. 
The intraday return volatility analysis showed a positive relation between spread and volatility 
and, on the other hand, a negative relation between volume imbalance and volatility. Return 
volatility may depend on traders’ information, and, as reported in the literature, the positive 
relation between spread and volatility signals an increase in informed trading periods. The 
negative relation to volume imbalance can be interpreted in two ways: first, as a market depth 
proxy and second, as a signal of divergence between the bid and the ask side. Having found a 
negative relation, I interpreted the volume imbalance as a good indicator of market divergence 
between counterparts. A positive relation, however, has been interpreted in the literature as a 
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more efficient proxy of intraday market depth. In this situation, it is possible that informed 
traders and liquidity traders are more present. 
Finally, an empirical analysis was made concerning the relation between the quoted spread, 
calculated from the weighted average spread, and the volume imbalance, a subject not yet studied 
in this form in the microstructure literature. The results are quite intriguing and showed that 
there exists a negative relation between quoted spread, waiting time and imbalance, but a positive 
relation between volatility and spread. The negative relation between spread and volume 
imbalance has been interpreted in the literature as the ability of investors to observe the state of 
the order book and their corresponding aggressiveness (in order to trade promptly they trade 
within the quote, thus reducing the quoted spread); therefore, the volume imbalance has been 
considered as an indicator of the divergence between counterparts. My results showed, through 
very significant regression coefficients, that the WAS is actually a good illiquidity indicator. All 
this is a much debated issue in the microstructure literature. In fact, the WAS can also be related 
to the market depth, and in particular to the elasticity of demand and supply. If demand and 
supply are more rigid, then the WAS will widen, especially at the beginning and at the end of the 
trading day, as is also documented by the spread pattern. Brock and Kleidon (1992) claimed that 
at the beginning and at the end of the trading day demand and supply were more rigid, since 
prices couldn’t adjust during the night or were not likely to do so in the following night. This 
reasoning explains the positive relation. 
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5.3. Intraday public information patterns 
 
Chapter 3 dealt with the intraday information patterns, a subject rarely reported in the 
financial literature. My investigation is based on a broad range of intraday information items 
released during a one-year period by the Reuters 2000 News Alert System. The volume of news 
items constituted the proxy of information arrival. Differently from other studies, I tried to make 
a clearer distinction between types of news, considering not only specific announcements such as 
macroeconomic or earnings news. In fact, eight news categories were taken into consideration: 
All Alerts news (the headlines of important news), Political news (news related to political 
activities worldwide), Market news (news items related to the general market activity), Economic 
news (macroeconomic indicators), Industrial news (manufacturing sectors), Corporate news 
(news about companies, earnings, dividends etc.), Firm-specific news (news related to firms 
belonging to the CAC 40 index) and General news (culture, sports, crime, etc.). The news related 
to France only were also broken down into seven of these eight categories and form a separate 
subgroup. In fact Firm-specific news considers already news items related to France. This 
procedure is different from the one previously reported by Berry and Howe (1994). 
Investors closely follow public information releases in order to update their expectations 
about risk and return. Therefore it is important to know when and which information is released. 
My straightforward question was whether there exists an intraday pattern of news, similarly to 
that found for intraday market liquidity proxies. Investors are flooded every day with news 
announcements, as is demonstrated by the more than 3.5 million news items I collected during 
the one-year period. In order to get a clearer picture of the news flow in the 8 categories, the 24 
hours of the day were subdivided into 5 minutes periods. In this way, an intraday pattern 
emerged which showed that the highest information activity is concentrated around the pre-
opening and opening of US markets, i.e. when all important trading places, except the Tokyo 
Stock Exchange, are open. As previously found, the news patterns more or less resemble an 
inverted U-shape, but each news category has its own particular shape. One or two peaks, 
depending on the news category, were observed shortly before and after the official market 
closing. Two explanations were given: first, news items which might have an important influence 
on the stock price are released shortly before or after trading hours and, second, news which 
might concern press release or news which might concern the opening and the closing of 
financial markets are released just shortly before and afterwards. 
I also reported the news flow by day of the week, by month of the year and by trading hours. 
Unfortunately, technical problems with the Reuters Terminal did not allow to draw general 
conclusions because some categories are not complete. But considering all those months for 
which news has been completely collected, I observed that: 
 
(1) Overall news flow is highest during the month of February, and for the French related 
news it is highest during March. 
 
(2) Overall news flow is smallest in December. 
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(3) The results by day of the week showed that news items are concentrated on 
Wednesday, while they are lightest on Friday. 
 
(4) News coverage concerning the stocks belonging to the CAC 40 index shows different 
results, and the hypothesis that higher capitalization means also higher coverage has 
not been confirmed. 
 
Chapter 3 left open the question whether the Reuters Terminal is the best public information 
proxy, or whether it could be substituted by other information providers such as Bloomberg. If it 
were substituted, would the intraday information proxy change ? One has to bear in mind that 
Reuters has been used in most empirical studies so far, and is a press agency handling all types of 
news. Bloomberg however, concentrates mainly on news which is suitable as a tool for company 
analyses. 
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5.4. Public information impact on the Paris Bourse 
 
Chapter 4 dealt with the public information concept, which in the literature has always been 
applied to market efficiency, and in particular the semi-strong form test carried out by Fama 
(1970), which claims that the prices fully reflect all publicly available information. In contrast to 
previous studies, my investigation looks at the amount of public information and examines its 
effects on intraday trading activity of 43 stocks belonging to the CAC 40 index. Such a procedure 
is relatively new and has first been adopted by Berry and Howe (1994). My study is based on four 
liquidity indicators: cumulated traded volume, return, volatility (log range) and spread. The news 
items are those described in chapter 3, and the intraday liquidity indicators were calculated as 
mentioned in Chapter 2. The analysis was conducted in two steps: 
 
A. Regression analyses 
 
(1) The quoted spread, calculated from the order data, was regressed on the news flow. 
The results showed a positive or negative relation with news announcements, 
depending on the stock chosen (similarly, no clear relation was found in the tightness 
measure of intraday market liquidity), meaning that spread may increase or decrease 
with higher (lower) information flow. In contrast, the quoted half spread shows in the 
majority of cases a negative relation, i.e. the spread widens when the information flow 
is lower, thus reducing trading activity. In this case the presence of informed traders 
may be higher, and liquidity traders tend to protect themselves by widening the spread 
through limit orders. If a trader knows that adverse selection is more severe, he will 
reduce his trading activity until more public information arrives at the market. This 
problem has also been raised by Glosten and Milgrom (1985) with respect to a price-
driven market, where the market maker is confronted with asymmetric information. 
The model claims that if the adverse selection is too extreme, each market maker will 
expect to lose money on trade. The consequence is that the market shuts down until 
enough public information arrives to relieve the adverse selection problem. The 
authors suggested the presence of a monopolist specialist in order to reduce the 
adverse selection effect. In an order-driven market, however, liquidity traders may 
reduce trading activity by widening the spread through limit orders, and informed 
traders may not trade in order not to disclose themselves. 
 
(2) The trading volume was regressed on a specific category and on the absolute value of 
returns. The results showed that a higher information flow (the independent variable might 
be significant until one hour lag) tends to be transformed into a higher transaction volume. 
The positive relation may be interpreted as agreement or disagreement which generates 
trading activity. Volume volatility followed, for certain shares, a TARCH model, implying 
that positive and negative shocks have an asymmetric impact; thus, as already explained 
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by Engle and Ng (1993) and by Lamoreux and Lastrapes (1990), the negative 
coefficient of the asymmetric effect induces a reduction in market activity if bad news 
arrives on the market; 
 
(3) The relation between absolute price changes and news flow was calculated. The results 
were weaker than for other liquidity indicators, but still significant. In some cases I 
found that return anticipates information arrival, meaning that informed traders are 
active; 
 
(4) The influence of news flow on volatility calculated as log range. The results showed 
that a higher information flow leads to higher volatility. Such a positive relation 
between volume and volatility had already been mentioned in Chapter 2. But although 
news items are important for determining volatility and volume, investors also trade for 
other reasons than informational, for liquidity or speculative desires, as shown by the 
constant term of the regression analysis, which was always significant. 
 
B. Measurement of price impact 
 
The measured suggested by Bessembinder and Kaufmann (1997) allows to measure the 
average information content of the trade. I applied their method in an order-driven market. The 
results were intriguing and showed that trades are much more informative before news release, 
i.e. private information anticipates (up to 40 minutes) the arrival of public information. The 
measurement of the intraday evolution of the price impact also showed that trades are more 
informative in the morning and, in some cases, during the pre-opening and opening of the US 
markets. 
 
The theoretical and empirical analyses made in Chapter 1 to 4 lead to a number of surprising 
results which may shed new light on the concept of market efficiency. In practical terms, the 
findings might help investors to decide when and how to trade, and thus become a useful tool 
for asset management activities. 
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5.5. Research agenda 
 
This dissertation left open a number of questions which require further investigations: 
 
(1) The linear regression model may not be the optimal solution, but it constitutes a first 
step in order to analyse the impact of intraday information arrival on stock exchanges. 
 
(2) It may be much more intriguing to analyse the bid-ask spread components around the 
public information arrival, similarly to Ranaldo (2002), but considering, instead of firm-
specific news only, the overall information flow by categories. The models of 
Madhavan, Richardson and Roomans (1997) and Lin, Sanger and Booth (1997) seem 
to be good starting points. 
 
(3) Investors may be much more interested in the option market evolution around the 
news flow. Since options have an higher leverage effect, the information impact may be 
different. The decomposition into order processing costs, inventory holding costs and 
adverse information costs in the option market might lead to a new understanding of 
the price formation process. The analysis may be even more interesting, if it considers 
both the equity market and the option market on the French Stock Exchange, since 
they have a different structure. The former is an order-driven market, whereas the 
latter is a price-driven market. 
 
(4) The analysis in this dissertation were made only a few months after the burst of the 
tech bubble. It would be interesting to see how the market liquidity indicators (spread, 
volume, volatility) have changed during the recent market decline. Did investor 
behaviour change ? 
 
(5) It might be a challenge to analyse the news released by different information providers 
contemporaneously. No doubt high frequency data has provided a better and deeper 
analysis of the price formation process. Today we have much easier access to tick-by-
tick data, thanks to reduced costs of data collection, compared to about ten years ago 
when most empirical studies used daily data. 
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